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The management of Anheuser‐Busch created $11.5 billion of shareholder value between 1996 and 1998, a period in which U.S. demand for beer was flat and the company's profits grew only modestly. Of that $11.5 billion, the authors estimate that nearly $10 billion can be attributed to the growth options created or expanded by the company during that period. While divesting itself of unrelated businesses, such as snack foods, Busch stadium, and the St. Louis Cardinals baseball franchise, the company began purchasing minority equity interests in brewing concerns in markets with growing demand for beer, including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines.

This paper investigates the relationship between a firm's loan commitment demand and its overall capital structure. I develop a model which demonstrates that a loan commitment leads a firm to higher privately optimal debt level and a lower cost of debt funds; these results are driven by the loan commitment's ability to attenuate the potential moral hazard problems attendant upon debt financing. I confront the predictions with cross-sectional data, and find that the availability of unused loan commitment financing is positively related to firm leverage and negatively related to cost of debt funds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G21, G32.Copyright 1995, 1999 Academic Press