Search

EU relations with its eastern neighbours have been pursued with the goal of building a ‘ring of friends’ contributing towards security and stability-building, through reforms’ implementation and the development of closer relations. This transformative agenda met, however, some criticism and resistance from Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 changed profoundly the setting for these relations, including the accession requests coming from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, along with the cut off of relations with Russia and Belarus. The implied debordering and rebordering dynamics taking place show the complexity of material and symbolic bordering practices. Through a critical border studies approach, this paper seeks to unpack these bordering dynamics and how they are reconfiguring the European space, arguing the EU has become locus of resistance for countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia assuring their European identity.

Russia and China are two big players in the international system, both of which share interests and concerns and compete for preponderance and affirmation at the regional level. As a framework for political-military cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) frames this relationship in an institutional setting that might be understood as a tool for rapprochementbetween Moscow and Beijing or as a strategic manoeuvre for balancing an unbalanced international order. Thus the following question arises: is Russian-Chinese cooperation discourse mere political rhetoric or does it imply the intentional forging of a goal-orientated partnership? The relationship between Russia and China in political and security terms reveals identifiable common concerns, such as counter-terrorism or the fight against organised crime, while simultaneously masking the underpinning drivers, based on realpolitikdynamics and image construction on both sides (power projection, regional affirmation). This means that the strategic partnership dialogue between Moscow and Beijing is still far from being real. Realpolitikconsiderations rise above institutional goals, showing the lines of (dis)continuity in discourse and practice in this bilateral relationship.