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Since the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986, critics have raised the dangers of forming too close a bond among the services. Their fear is that doing so [...]

As the military begins to formalize training and standards for cognitive readiness, it is fitting to mark potential barriers to its implementation. This article outlines three general challenges associated with the institutionalization of cognitive readiness: (a) that the training and education community must recognize that higher-order cognitive skills development (at least for lower echelons) is fundamentally new—not merely a slight deviation from the status quo; (b) that commonly discussed cognitive competencies can (and must) be better operationalized for instruction and measurement purposes; and (c) that achieving widespread cognitive readiness will be possible only if senior leaders recognize the importance of sustained support for these competencies. The critical thesis of this article is this: Military leadership tends to view cognitive readiness as an additive aspect (“news”) to what is already known and accepted, instead of as a foundational competency (“new”) that requires widespread transformation. Until the institutionalization of cognitive readiness is recognized as a fundamentally novel, leap-ahead innovation, the military community will struggle to accomplish it.

Explains the cognitive dissonance surrounding joint culture in the minds of the joint warfighters. Concept of 'jointness' by Goldwater-Nichols and Michaeal Vlahos; Reliance on service traditions to achieve jointness in warfighting; Skepticism on the operationalizing joint doctrine in combat.