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Forming and updating impressions about others is critical in everyday life and engages portions of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the amygdala. Some of these activations are attributed to “mentalizing” functions necessary to represent people's mental states, such as beliefs or desires. Evolutionary psychology and developmental studies, however, suggest that interpersonal inferences can also be obtained through the aid of deontic heuristics, which dictate what must (or must not) be done in given circumstances. We used fMRI and asked 18 participants to predict whether unknown characters would follow their desires or obey external rules. Participants had no means, at the beginning, to make accurate predictions, but slowly learned (throughout the experiment) each character's behavioral profile. We isolated brain regions whose activity changed during the experiment, as a neural signature of impression updating: whereas dMPFC was progressively more involved in predicting characters' behavior in relation to their desires, the medial orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala were progressively more recruited in predicting rule-based behavior. Our data provide evidence of a neural dissociation between deontic inference and theory-of-mind (ToM), and support a differentiation of orbital and dorsal prefrontal cortex in terms of low- and high-level social cognition.

Modern thinking about human nature is notoriously divided between two contradictory notions: The Hobbesian tradition portrays men as driven by selfish desires, while the Rousseauian tradition recognizes altruistic proclivities as true motivations to cooperate. We tested preschoolers’ predictions about the prosocial or antisocial manner in which people would behave toward each other. Four stories were presented to 3- and 4-year-old children. In each story, the protagonists could either cooperate, act in terms of their own interests, or adopt a behavior unrelated to the ongoing scenario. Children as young as 3 years of age expected the protagonists to behave prosocially – and even more so if the protagonists were female. The results suggest that, even at an early age, children are inclined to adopt a “Rousseau-like” stance rather than a “suspicious” or “pessimistic” Hobbesian stance.

Abstract: Philosophers agree that an important part of our knowledge is acquired via testimony. One of the main objectives of social epistemology is therefore to specify the conditions under which a hearer is justified in accepting a proposition stated by a source. Non-reductionists, who think that testimony could be considered as an a priori source of knowledge, as well as reductionists, who think that another type of justification has to be added to testimony, share a common conception about children development. Non-reductionists believe that infants and children are fundamentally gullible and their gullibility could be seen as an example for justifying testimony, while reductionists believe that this gullibility is merely an exception that should be taken into account. The objective of this paper is to review contemporary literature in developmental psychology providing empirical grounds likely to clarify this philosophical debate. What emerges from current research is a more elaborated vision of children’s attitude toward testimony. Even at a very young age, children do not blindly swallow information coming from testimony; doubtful or contradictory information is automatically screened by their cognitive system. Even if they are unable to give positive reasons for the acceptance of a given testimony, young children are not gullible. Such empirical findings tend to call into question the radical opposition between reductionism and non-reductionism.