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Human challenge studies, in which human research subjects are intentionally exposed to pathogens to contribute to scientific knowledge, raise many ethical complexities. One controversial question is whether it is ethically permissible to include children as participants. Commentary of the past decades endorses the exclusion of children, while new guidance suggests that pediatric human challenge studies can be ethically permissible. This paper argues that neither children's exclusion nor their inclusion are well justified. I examine and reject three arguments for exclusion, but suggest that these arguments establish pediatric human challenge studies as a complex ethical category of research that requires caution. I then argue for a strong presumption against children's inclusion, by drawing on an analogy to children's inclusion in phase I trials, emphasizing a requirement of necessity, and suggesting that accommodating children's vulnerability promotes an age de‐escalation approach for pediatric human challenge studies research. In the final section, I suggest a procedure for ethics review.

Many activities concerning the unknown involve the potential for risk, and clinical research is no exception. Some research participants experience correlative benefit; others do not. When the participants are adults, [...]

Infants are unable to make their own decisions or express their own wishes about medical procedures and treatments. They rely on surrogates to make decisions for them. Who should be the decision-maker when an infant’s biological parents are also minors? In this paper, we analyse a case in which the biological mother is a child. The central questions raised by the case are whether minor parents should make medical decisions on behalf of an infant, and if so, what are the limits to this decision-making authority? In particular, can they refuse treatment that might be considered best for the infant? We examine different ethical arguments to underpin parental decision-making authority; we argue that provided that minor parents are capable of fulfilling their parental duties, they should have a right to make medical decisions for their infant. We then examine the ethical limits to minor parents’ decision-making authority for their children. We argue that the restricted authority that teenagers are granted to make medical decisions for themselves looks very similar to the restricted autonomy of all parents. That is, they are permitted to make choices, but not harmful choices. Like all parents, minor parents must not abuse or neglect their children and must also promote their welfare. They have a moral right to make medical decisions for their infants within the same ‘zone of parental discretion’ that applies to adult parents. We conclude that adult and minor parents should have comparable decision-making authority for their infants.

Ethics guidelines and commentary suggest that a central function of research ethics committees is to assess the scientific merit of the protocols they review. However, some commentators object to this role, and evidence suggests that the assessment of scientific merit is a significant source of confusion and animosity between ethics committees and clinical investigators. In this essay, we argue that ethics committees should assess the scientific value and validity of research protocols and that new decision‐making tools are needed to help them do so in a systematic, transparent, and reliable way. We present a novel ethical framework that can assist in this task.

Ethics has been identified as a central reason for choosing the stepped wedge trial over other kinds of trial designs. The potential advantage of the stepped wedge design is that it provides all arms of the trial with the active intervention over the course of the study. Some groups receive it later than others, but the study intervention is not withheld from any group. This feature of the stepped wedge design seems particularly ethically advantageous in two instances: (1) when the study intervention appears especially likely to be effective and (2) when the consequences of not receiving the intervention may be dire. But despite an increase in the use of the stepped wedge design and appeals to its ethical superiority as the motivation for its selection, there has been limited attention to the stepped wedge trial in the ethics literature. In the following, I examine whether there are persuasive ethical reasons to prefer or to require a stepped wedge trial. I argue that while the stepped wedge design is ethically permissible, it is not morally superior to other kinds of trials. To this end, I examine the ethical justification for providing, withholding, and delaying interventions in research.

To protect children in research, procedures that are not administered in the medical interests of a child must be restricted. The risk threshold for these procedures is generally measured according to the concept of minimal risk. Minimal risk is often defined according to the risks of "daily life." But it is not clear whose daily life should serve as the baseline; that is, it is not clear to whom minimal risk should refer. Commentators in research ethics often argue that "minimal risk" should refer to healthy children or the subjects of the research. I argue that neither of these interpretations is successful. I propose a new interpretation in which minimal risk refers to children who are not unduly burdened by their daily lives. I argue that children are not unduly burdened when they fare well, and I defend a substantive goods account of children's welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 poses an exceptional threat to global public health and well-being. Recognition of the need to develop effective vaccines at unprecedented speed has led to calls to accelerate research pathways ethically, including by conducting challenge studies (also known as controlled human infection studies (CHIs)) with SARS-CoV-2 (the virus which causes COVID-19). Such research is controversial, with concerns being raised about the social, legal, ethical and clinical implications of infecting healthy volunteers with SARS-CoV-2 for research purposes. Systematic risk evaluations are critical to inform assessments of the ethics of any proposed SARS-CoV-2 CHIs. Such evaluations will necessarily take place within a rapidly changing and at times contested epidemiological landscape, in which differing criteria for the ethical acceptability of research risks have been proposed. This paper critically reviews two such criteria and evaluates whether the use of effective treatment should be a necessary condition for the ethical acceptability of SARS-CoV-2 CHIs, and whether the choice of study sites should be influenced by COVID-19 incidence levels. The paper concludes that ethical evaluations of proposed SARS-CoV-2 CHIs should be informed by rigorous, consultative and holistic approaches to systematic risk assessment.