In his discussion of the faults of this model Aumann targets Sartre as a central defender of the constitution model, and some of Aumann's criticisms of Sartre are indeed reasonable, but Aumann goes too far, I think, when he attributes to Sartre the facetious view that "any story we tell about ourselves is fine" and "we would be whomever we took ourselves to be" (p. 45). In the final chapter Aumann raises another doubt regarding the project's viability: Kierkegaard, preferring a more lyrical style, was critical of academic, abstract, and dispassionate philosophy and expressed opposition to arid paraphrase of his views. Needless to say, Kierkegaard himself did not espouse any such thing, and Aumann is explicit about that, which leads him to accuse Kierkegaard of being a "callous human being" (p. 177): he could see but did not care that for some people the project of selfhood might be too harrowing. Another problem with the inner sense model Aumann brings up is that it could generate immoral selves: after all, our beliefs and desires, as Kierkegaard claims, are often "harmful and cruel" (p. 22), so expressing them unchecked could lead to immoral behavior. [Extracted from the article]