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The ISM Code requires companies to establish a safety management system and verify its effectiveness through internal safety audits done by internal auditors. The Code is replete with words that are open to interpretation. The ISM code conveys what its objectives are and what it intends to achieve by the language in the code. The interpretation of the meaning of the words is crucial to understanding the content. This research sought the perspectives and understandings of the notions of “safety”, “safety management” and “safety management skills” among internal auditors who audit oil tankers. The research found that there was no common understanding. Initial research on the Code held cautious optimism about its potential impact. With time, the optimism waned and lately transformed into a confident critique of the Code. Is it now time to restore the relevance of the Code through a comprehensive review to align it with the latest developments in the field of Safety Science?

El parís mou es un memorándum en el que 27 autoridades marítimas acuerdan la implementación de un sistema común, el control por el estado rector del puerto (o port state control). según el mismo, los estados de cada una de estas 27 autoridades marítimas deben pasar una inspección emitida por la emsa a todos los buques que entren en puertos extranjeros a su pabellón. los encargados de realizar las inspecciones son los psco, y a pesar de que ellos evalúan diferentes normativas, este trabajo se centra en el código ism: en 1993, la organización marítima internacional adoptó el código de gestión de la seguridad (ism) con fin de regular la gestión y operación de los buques en condiciones de seguridad además de la prevención de la contaminación. aun así, casi tres décadas después, se siguen encontrando síntomas que indican que la seguridad marítima sigue siendo una preocupación en este sentido, en el presente trabajo se analiza la normativa y, a su vez, se estudian las incidencias más frecuentes detectadas con ella en buques en un marco temporal de tres años. siendo también las deficiencias más frecuentes con motivo del propio código ism, se analiza en qué tipo de buques y con qué pabellones se registra. finalmente, se elabora una propuesta técnica para mejorar la efectividad y eficacia de actuación del código ism, se definen los posibles problemas con la finalidad de proponer un plan de mejora, teniendo en cuenta los objetivos de la normativa en cuestión., The Paris MoU is a memorandum in which 27 Maritime Authorities agree to the implementation of a common system, Port State Control.According to this, the states of these 27 Maritime Authorities must pass an inspection issued by EMSA to all vessels that enter foreign ports.Those in charge of carrying out the inspections are the PSCOs, and although they evaluate different regulations, this work focuses on the ISM code:In 1993, the International Maritime Organization, adopted the Safety Management Code (ISM) in order to regulate the safe management and operation of ships in addition to the prevention of pollution. Even so, almost three decades later, there are still signs that indicate that maritime safety remains a concern.What I’m trying to achieve is analyze the regulations and study the most frequent incidents detected with ISM in ships in a three-year time frame. Also, I analyze in which type of ships and with which flags the incidents are registered.Finally, a technical proposal is drawn to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the ISM Code. Possible problems are defined in order to propose an improvement plan, taking into account the objectives of the regulations.

Safety is intertwined with learning, without learning safety would be a static construct. To advance, safety concepts and theories all rely on the art of processing knowledge and though learning attaining a contributing effect. In shipping, the abstract of a near-miss is promoted as ‘good business and economic sense because it can improve crew performance and reduce costs’. Studies have shown the challenges of what constitute safety learning and what can be learned from incidents (Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014), but less attention has been on the perception of how near-miss contribute to maritime safety. This research was conducted to explore the perception and experiences with maritime safety personnel, of how and why near-misses contribute to safety. Inspired by phenomenology, the lived experience was captured through ten semi-structured qualitative interviews of Captains, Owners representatives Recognised bodies and Maritime Administration. Explicating the data shows, that since the implementation of the ISM code in 2002, the responsibility and the power is perceived to have drifted from ship to shore - today safety is shared. What constitutes a near-miss is not absolute, but uniformed categories e.g. unsafe act and conditions, for managing the reports are recognized across the respondents. In the Tanker fleet segment, a ritual to fulfil KPI’s for reporting near-misses’ is imposed by Oil majors, but the purpose are opaque. In the hierarchies of Authority, Owner and Captain, the ritual is questioned, but for unknown reasons safety managers has not entered a dialogue with Oil Majors. The trade-off, not entering the dialogue, creates distrust and bureaucracy, and visualize the influence the Oil Majors’ have been given and how safety manifests itself. The ritual is perceived to increased ‘awareness’ that drives and secure the development of the SMS systems and highlights ‘unsafe’ behaviour. Whereas, Accident Pyramids, linear and latent failure models are the underpinn

Arbetet till sjöss är förenat med risker som kan medföra att olyckor sker. Det ska finnas en plan för krishantering redan innan en olycka har inträffat. Det grundläggande förutsättningarna för att hantera följderna av en händelse finns reglerade i svensk lagstifting men hur följs den drabbade sjömannens hälsa upp av rederiet som arbetsgivare? Med denna frågeställning som bakgrund är syftet med det här arbetet att undersöka hur svenska rederier använder sin krishanteringsplan med fokus på förberedande arbete och omhändertagande av personal efter en kris. För att få svar på frågeställningen har en kvalitativ intervjuundersökning används som metod för datainsamling. Undersökningen omfatter en delvis strukturerad intervju med sju respondenter från sex olika svenska rederier. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att rederierna förhåller sig till gällande krav och regelverk och för att uppfylla en del av kraven tar de hjälp av externa aktörer såsom företagshälsovård och psykologer. Rederierna poängterar att det är svårt att utforma en krisplan för något som inte har hänt, att förutse alla scenarion som kan inträffa betraktas inte som möjligt oavsett hur mycket de övar. Besättningen anses dock som det absolut viktigaste för verksamheten och det sätts inga gränser för att främja deras välbefinnande i kriser., Shipping is often associated with risks which can lead to accidents. There should be a plan for crisis management even before an accident has occurred. Basic prerequisites to deal with the consequences of an accident are regulated in national legislation but how well monitored is the affected sailor’s health by the shipping company as an employer? With that question as a background, the purpose of this thesis is to research how swedish shipping companies use their crisis management plan to support and care for their crew after a crisis. In order to answer the question, qualitative interviews were used as a method for collecting data. The research survey includes a semi-structured interview with seven respondents from six different shipping companies. The research shows that the shipping companies adhere to the requirements and regulations and in order to meet parts of the requirements, they use services of external actors such as occupational health providers and psychologists. The shipping companies explain that it is difficult to create a plan of action for something that has not occurred. To predict a complete scope of crisis scenarios is not deemed as possible, regardless of the amount of drills conducted. The crew is considered the most important element of the business and no restrictions is put on their well being during a time of crisis.