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The acts of violence by the far right between 1979 and 1981, the success of Fuerza Nueva's mobilisation strategy, and the symbolic capital formed by episodes such as the union between the Falange and the JONS in the Teatro Calderón in 1934, were factors that contributed to the success of 'Fachadolid'. This, however, contrasts with the poor electoral performance of the extreme right between 1977 and 1982, which was relegated to residual positions except in municipalities with small populations., La escalada de violencia protagonizada por militantes juveniles de extrema derecha entre 1979 y 1981, el notable resultado de la estrategia movilizadora de Fuerza Nueva y el capital simbólico que para los nostálgicos del Franquismo constituían episodios históricos como la fusión de Falange y las JONS en el Teatro Calderón, en 1934, fueron factores que contribuyeron a forjar el éxito del término ‘Fachadolid’. Este, sin embargo, se compadece mal con el resultado electoral de la extrema derecha entre 1977 y 1982, siempre confinada a puestos residuales salvo en municipios de reducida población.

En 2019 se celebraron dos elecciones generales, el 28 de abril y el 10 de noviembre, en las que por primera vez VOX entró en la Cámara Baja con 24 y 52 diputados, respectivamente. El objetivo de este Trabajo de Fin de Grado es analizar el tratamiento de este partido en la prensa en este contexto electoral (1 de enero – 31 de diciembre de 2019). Para ello se realizará un análisis de contenido y del discurso de los editoriales de El Mundo y El País desde la perspectiva de las teorías de la agenda setting y del framing. Los resultados revelan que entre las dos cabeceras existen diferencias sustanciales, tanto en el ámbito cuantitativo como en el enfoque y en los temas que se plantean alrededor de VOX., Two general elections were held in 2019, on April 28 and November 10, in which for the first time VOX entered the Lower House with 24 and 52 deputies, respectively. The objective of this Final Degree Project is to analyze the treatment of this party in the press in this electoral context (January 1 - December 31, 2019). For this purpose, a content and discourse analysis of the editorials of El Mundo and El País will be carried out from the perspective of the agenda setting and framing theories. The results reveal that there are substantial differences between the two newspapers, both in quantitative terms and in the approach and issues raised around VOX., Departamento de Historia Moderna, Contemporánea, de América y Periodismo, Grado en Periodismo

This dissertation explores how the far-right social movement in Nordic countries mobilizes emotion in place and to what ends. Focusing on Sweden and Denmark, I argue that these affective landscapes of the far right movement are mobilized strategically to delineate ethnoracial insiders and outsiders, racialize spaces, and sustain activist participation. Through ethnographic observations, interviews, and visual analysis, I provide a unique analysis of the localized practices of racial nativist ideologies. The affective landscape studied in this dissertation spans "the body"—framed as under threat from others, “badlands”—racialized urban areas linked to crime and immigration, "homelands"—the nostalgic, rural spaces purportedly untouched by multiculturalism, and “safe spaces"—where activists foster expressions of white national identity they believe to be denigrated. Through four articles I offer a novel understanding of how far-right movements mobilize politicized places. Article I shows how Danish far right activists embody nativism through confrontational protests in diverse neighborhoods, using footage of counterprotestors to portray racialized others as threats to national purity. Article II highlights how Swedish activists frame multicultural urban areas as signs of state failure, employing fears of the “badlands” of the nation to justify interventions into these neighborhoods and demonstrate the decline of the Swedish homeland. Article III begins to look more closely within the movement, theorizing how far-right activists negotiate the stigma of their position and the shame which typically follows from that stigma. I find that the far right activists repurpose narratives of stigmatization within movement “safe spaces”, fostering an alternative normative order through the affective practices of truth, love, and humor. Article 4 studies how rural “homelands” become imagined as sanctuaries for white national identities, based on observations of an attempted white s

This is a thesis about the Finnish populistic party Perussuomalaiset, in English the Finns Party. The party has become a force to be reckoned within the Finnish politics, therefore, knowing more about the Finns Party members is a must. The aim of the thesis is to map the identities of the Finns Party members and to find out why they chose this particular party. This is interesting because populism is problematic for the EU — we need to know more about populistic movements in the EU. 14 interviews of the Finns Party members were conducted in 2013 for this thesis, the main methods being semi-structured interview and ethnography. Therefore, this thesis is about the Finns Party in the 2010s. The Finns Party members’ views were analysed, among others, with the help of Etienne Wenger’s communities of practice theory and the concepts of trust, people and identity. The main deliverables of this thesis are the following: the Finns Party was chosen as a means for political participation because 1) the members had been members of the Rural Party, 2) the Finns Party accommodated multiple identities, and not having been in the government, the party had no history of failing its voters 3) there were anti-EU sentiments in the party, 4) it was a match for personal projects of the members and 5) the party had anti-immigration spirit. In addition, the Finns party members were nationalistic and the Finns Party members felt joy and comfort in the party. The main deliverable of the main deliverables, then, is the sense of comfort in the Finns Party. For the Finns Party members, Finnish sovereignty represented comfort, while the EU represented discomfort. For the Finns Party members, the Finns Party was an answer for longing for the nation state. Finally, in the Finns Party, the members were allowed to, from the beginning, when they became members of the Finns Party, to express themselves freely, to be unabashedly nationalistic and to be whatever it meant to be oneself in the party, whic

In the first chapter of the book, “Granola Nazis And Neoliberal Mystics”, Catherine Tebaldi and Alfonso Del Percio discuss digital traditionalism, that is, the ways in which new technologies enable old, often reactionary, ideologies and new modes of life which often call to mind images of ancient traditions. In particular, Tebaldi and Del Percio focus on two seemingly opposed elements of what they call “digital traditionalism”: (a) the rise of white nationalist online influencers, and their use of women’s media, and (b) the UK fascist group, Patriotic Alternative, who couch white supremacy in a return to so-called traditional ways of living that mix the hippie’s “back to the land” and the Nazi’s “blood and soil”. The chapter offers an analysis of “neoliberal mystics”, i.e., entrepreneurs who use the language of ancient spiritual traditions and wellness for technocratic ends. According to Tebaldi and Del Percio, while rugged homesteaders and suited HR bureaucrats may seem at opposite ends of the spectrum, they both blend new technology and reactionary politics, traditionalism and futurism (see also Leidig 2023; Tebaldi 2021). In the second chapter, Katherine Kondor argues that the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures implemented by various governments tended to foster specific far-right conspiracy theories. Particularly concerning was the perception of pandemic measures as support for the New World Order conspiracy theory, which suggested that the pandemic was part of a grand plan for total control. More specifically, Kondor starts from the premise that throughout history people have adopted conspiratorial beliefs to explain the origins of various pandemics, with the coronavirus being surrounded by alternative explanations for the origins of the virus and the efficacy of safety measures; these correlate with studies showing that conspiracy beliefs increase when people feel powerless as they offer individuals some sense of control in being able to reject official narrat

This year, beyond the numerous electoral victories (as in Italy), the real result at the political level has been a gradual but unstoppable convergence among the right-leaning of the political spectrum. That convergence is in fact a two-way process that has occurred both (a) with the extreme right going mainstream and (b) the ‘moderate’ right radicalising. The result is that it is now very difficult to distinguish where one ends or the other begins. Another equally important element is that this gradual but continuous process of interpenetration between centre-right and far right, often labelled as conservative, represents fertile ground for an overall ideological shift increasingly to the right.

The objective of this study is to analyse the self-definitions provided by Brazil’s far-right digital newspapers and how they align themselves within “independent” journalism. These are the digital newspapers with the highest frequency of participation in Bolsonaro-aligned media. The theoretical framework used is Critical Discourse Analysis, and the methodology employed is qualitative. The Synchronous-Diachronic Method of Linguistic Text Analysis is applied to the corpus. The corpus consists of five texts extracted from the “About Us” section of self-proclaimed independent digital portals during 2022: Aliados Brasil, Foco do Brasil, Jornal da Cidade, Terra Brasil Notícias, and Relevante News. The findings indicate a mobilization of passions, with exaltation of a national hero and his achievements, religious ideals, and discursive representations framed within argumentative paradigms opposing a left considered by them as carrier of drug trafficking, increased censorship, and a supposed gender ideology. The discursive construction of opposition between friend and foe, mobilized by these portals, reveals an oppressive social practice aimed at maintaining ideological hegemony., O objetivo deste estudo é analisar as autodefinições dos portais de notícias mais compartilhados na mídia digitais de ultradireita, em 2022, a partir de como eles se representam no âmbito do jornalismo independente. O referencial teórico utilizado é a Análise Crítica do Discurso, e a metodologia empregada é qualitativa, contando com a aplicação do Método Síncrono-Diacrônico de Análise Linguística de Textos. O corpus é composto por cinco textos extraídos da seção ‘Sobre Nós’ de portais digitais autoproclamados independentes: Aliados Brasil, Foco do Brasil, Jornal da Cidade, Terra Brasil Notícias e Relevante News. Os resultados indicam a mobilização de paixões, com a exaltação de um herói nacional e suas conquistas, ideais religiosos e construções apresentadas dentro de um paradigma argumentativo oposto à esquerda, representado pelo tráfico de drogas, aumento da censura e ideologia de gênero. A representação da oposição entre amigo e inimigo, mobilizada por estes portais, revela uma prática social opressiva produzida através do discurso para manter a hegemonia ideológica., El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las definiciones que los diarios digitales de ultraderecha de Brasil hacen sobre sí mismos y cómo estos se inscriben en el periodismo «independiente». Se trata de los diarios digitales con mayor frecuencia de participación en los medios bolsonaristas. El marco teórico es el del análisis crítico del discurso y la metodología es cualitativa. Se aplica el método sincrónico-diacrónico de análisis lingüístico de textos. El corpus está compuesto por cinco textos tomados de la pestaña Quiénes somos de los portales digitales autodenominados independientes durante el 2022: Aliados Brasil, Foco do Brasil, Jornal da Cidade, Terra Brasil Notícias y Relevante News. Los resultados indican una movilización de pasiones con exaltación de un héroe nacional y sus conquistas, ideales religiosos, representaciones discursivas presentadas en paradigmas argumentativos de oposición a una izquierda considerada por ellos como portadora del narcotráfico, del aumento de la censura y de una supuesta ideología de género. La construcción discursiva de oposición entre amigo y enemigo movilizada por los portales revela una práctica social opresiva para mantener la hegemonía ideológica.

Examining how gender and sexuality norms are expressed through nationalist ideology, this article argues that homonationalist hegemony is being reinforced through media representations of nationalist social movements attacking LGBTQ people, events, and symbols. The argument builds on a critical discourse analysis of 320 newspaper articles published between 2016 and 2020. The discourses in the material manifest how the neo-Nazi groups the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) and Nordic Youth (NY), as well as the nationalist party Sweden Democrats (SD), have respectively been represented as threats to Swedish national unity in media due to their anti-LGBTQ attacks or statements. The analysis concludes that nationalism is reproduced through struggles over its symbolic expressions, especially through changing articulations of who belongs to the nation and who constitutes its “Others”. The symbolism of gendered and sexual norms is crucial to these struggles, as the evolvements of homonationalist discourse highlights the struggle to define national unity.

La extensión del reconocimiento de derechos y libertades para la comunidad LGTBIQ+ en diferentes países de Europa y América ha desencadenado una reacción conservadora que pone en tela de juicio estos avances sociales. Entre los opositores a la aplicación de la agenda LGTBIQ+, destacan partidos políticos de extrema derecha, lobbies conservadores y activistas religiosos. Estos actores están unidos por el discurso de la ideología de género, que tiene su origen en la Iglesia Católica. En este artículo se estudia el discurso de Vox sobre las leyes trans con la finalidad de desentrañar cómo construye su oposición. Específicamente, se analiza cómo justifica sus posicionamientos y cómo se relaciona este discurso con los discursos de otros actores sociales. Para ello, se analizaron varias intervenciones parlamentarias del partido político mediante el análisis sociológico del discurso. Los resultados demuestran que el discurso de Vox sobre las leyes trans está secularizado al utilizar la ciencia para respaldar su oposición. A este respecto, Vox entiende que el sexo es una realidad biológica inmutable y que la transexualidad es un trastorno mental que debe ser abordado por la ciencia. Además, el estudio revela que el partido político construye su discurso a partir de elementos provenientes de otros discursos de oposición., The extension of the recognition of rights and liberties for the LGTBIQ+ community in different European and American countries has triggered a conservative backlash which calls into question this social progress. Among the opponents to the implementation of the LGTBIQ+ agenda, far-right parties, conservative lobbies and religious activists stand out. These stakeholders are united by the gender ideology discourse originated in the Catholic Church. This article studies Vox discourse about trans laws with the purpose of unravelling how their opposition is constructed. Specifically, it analyses the way in which they justify their positions and how this discourse is related to other stakeholders. For this purpose, several parliamentary interventions of the political party were analysed using the sociological discourse analysis. Results show that Vox discourse about trans laws is secularised by using science to support their opposition. In this regard, Vox believes that sex is an immutable biological reality and that transsexuality is a mental disorder that needs to be addressed by science. Furthermore, the study reveals that the political party constructs its discourse from elements coming from other oppositional discourses.

Los liderazgos populistas de extrema derecha están en auge. Ejemplo de ello son los casos de Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen y Matteo Salvini. Los resultados obtenidos por sus partidos a nivel nacional y en las últimas elecciones al Parlamento europeo, los sitúa en un plano destacado dentro de los liderazgos populistas de extrema derecha en Europa. Las redes sociales y la difusión de sus discursos a través de ellas han resultado una herramienta fundamental para ganar presencia mediática y ocupar un espacio importante en el panorama político de sus países. Así pues, el objetivo fundamental de la presente investigación es comparar, desde el Análisis Crítico del Discurso, los discursos emitidos por estos líderes en Twitter en períodos de campaña electoral1. Para ello, se han realizado diversos tipos de análisis. En primer lugar, un análisis pragmático mediante el cual se extraen los mensajes implícitos de sus postulados. En segundo lugar, se examina la representación de los actores, a nivel léxico, en el discurso de estos líderes. Con todo ello, se realiza un análisis comparado entre los discursos. De este, se concluye que existe una matriz ideológica transversal camuflada bajo la idea de sentido común y que busca crear las condiciones para una nueva forma de entender lo político., Extreme right-wing populist leaderships are on the rise. Examples of this are the cases of Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Matteo Salvini. The results obtained by their parties at a national level and in the last elections to the European Parliament place them in a prominent position among the extreme right-wing populist leaders in Europe. Social networks and the dissemination of their speeches through them has been a fundamental tool to gain media presence and occupying an important space in the political landscape of their countries. Thus, the main objective of this research is to compare, from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, the discourses delivered by these leaders on Twitter during election campaigns. For this purpose, several types of analysis have been carried out. First, a pragmatic analysis through which the implicit messages of their postulates are extracted. Secondly, the representation of the actors, at the lexical level, in the discourse of these leaders is examined. With all this, a comparative analysis of the discourses is carried out. From this, it is concluded that there is a transversal ideological matrix camouflaged under the idea of common sense that seeks to create the conditions for a new way of understanding politics.

This article highlights the increasingly prevalent process of so-called “conceptual flipsiding”: that is, of strategic reversal of notions once closely associated with liberal democracy, and of its key values of freedom, equality, tolerance, and the like, for the pronouncedly illiberal gains. Viewing the said process as part and parcel of the wider normalization of an illiberal imagination through strategic discourses and practices in and beyond the field of politics, the article contends that conceptual flipsiding increasingly allows recontextualizing and eventually normalizing a deeply illiberal understanding of polity, society, and community. Seeing these as increasingly redefined in recent years in many formerly liberal-democratic contexts by, especially, the far right and its numerous affiliates in politics, media, and/or un-civil society, the article argues for theoretical and analytical elaboration of conceptual flipsiding in order to depict its wider exploratory usability in grasping the current illiberal conceptual and discursive fluidity. The article emphasizes that, following the discourse-conceptual logic behind the conceptual flipsiding dynamics, one is able to deconstruct the ongoing infusion of key social and political concepts and discourses with new and often deeply illiberal understandings.

Antonio Campati, Martino Mazzoleni and Andrea Scavo find, based on survey evidence, that Italians do not perceive an authoritarian risk in the far-right government led by Giorgia Meloni. However, they also discover a generational difference in attitudes towards democracy that may cause problems in the future

This chapter discusses the recent sudden move (in August 2023) by the Italian executive led by Giorgia Meloni to tax the extraprofits of Italian banks, largely welcomed by the governing majority and the political opposition. Within the framework of “external constraint” (vincolo esterno) – so avoiding any conflict with European Union institutions, international organisations and alliances of which Italy is a member (including NATO, G7), or the international financial markets – the executive’s actions in the first year carefully respected this constraint, in continuity with the Draghi government, including at a foreign policy level as the Ukrainian dossier demonstrates. All this makes the tax exceptional, and its rationale – which merely sparked international investor uncertainty and stock market volatility – hard to understand. The chapter concludes that rather than a populist, well-conceived marketing device, the taxation of the Italian banks, or at least the first draft of the tax that was then subsequently downsized, was pure improvisation a likely initiative of some key but dissatisfied members of the governing majority

Este artículo presenta las características, fundamentos teóricos, objetivos,metodología y algunos resultados del proyecto de extensión “Educación, teorías críticas yprocesos emancipadores”, desarrollado en la Universidad Federal de Bahía entre 2018 y2023, en la ciudad de Salvador. El artículo muestra cómo el proyecto desarrolló, junto con losagentes sociales atendidos, algunas reflexiones sobre cuestiones políticas urgentes en el Brasilde hoy, tanto para la democracia como para los movimientos sociales, especialmente en estemomento de lucha contra la hegemonía fascista. El artículo muestra cómo el proyecto seinspiró teóricamente en el humanismo crítico, definido aquí como un enfoque amplio y no como una teoría específica. Dentro de este planteamiento general, el principal referente teórico-metodológico utilizado en este proyecto de extensión fueron las teorías de la liberación latinoamericanas, especialmente la educación popular. Finalmente, presenta como resultadoscualitativos las reflexiones desarrolladas a lo largo del proyecto con agentes de losmovimientos sociales, sobre cuatro temas: 1. La extrema derecha en el poder; 2. El papel dela clase media en la reconstrucción de la democracia; 3. ¿Qué es el Estado? 4. Democraciaparticipativa., Este artigo apresenta as características, a base teórica, os objetivos, a metodologia e alguns resultados do projeto de extensão “Educação, teorias críticas e processos emancipatórios”, desenvolvido na Universidade Federal da Bahia entre 2018 e 2023, na cidade de Salvador. O artigo mostra como o projeto desenvolveu, junto com os agentes sociais atendidos, algumas reflexões sobre questões políticas urgentes no Brasil hoje, tanto para a democracia como para os movimentos sociais, especialmente neste momento de luta contra a hegemonia fascista. O artigo mostra como o projeto se inspirou teoricamente no humanismo crítico, definido aqui como uma grande abordagem e não como teoria específica. Dentro desta abordagem geral, a principal referência teórico-metodológica usada neste projeto de extensão foram as teorias latino-americanas da libertação, especialmente a educação popular. Finalmente apresenta como resultados qualitativos as reflexões desenvolvidas ao longo do projeto com os agentes dos movimentos sociais, sobre quatro questões: 1. A extrema-direita no poder; 2. O papel da classe média na reconstrução da democracia; 3. O que é o estado; 4. A democracia participativa., This article presents the characteristics, theoretical basis, objectives, methodology and some results of the extension project “Education, critical theories and emancipatory processes”, developed at the Federal University of Bahia between 2018 and 2023, in the city of Salvador. The article shows how the project developed, together with the social agents served, some reflections on urgent political issues in Brazil today, both for democracy and social movements, especially at this time of struggle against fascist hegemony. The article shows how the project was theoretically inspired by critical humanism, defined here as a broad approach and not as a specific theory. Within this general approach, the main theoretical-methodological reference used in this extension project was Latin American liberation theories, especially popular education. Finally, it presents as qualitative results the reflections developed throughout the project with agents of social movements, on four issues: 1. The extreme right in power; 2. The role of the middle class in rebuilding democracy; 3. What is the state; 4. Participatory democracy.

The purpose of this article is to analyze one of the main modes that Bolsonaro used to communicate with his supporters during his entire administration —the weekly Instagram live streams from his official account. We, therefore, studied a sample of his ten live stream videos and described how his nonverbal communication could trigger a humanization and approximation process of the leader, there by normalizing forms of violence and strengthening political polarization. The methodology used in the analysis is based on the grounded theory. This theory structures a qualitative research through the construction of hypotheses and theories by means of data collection and analysis. This analysis procedure proposes an inductive methodology; this extracts the categories of nonverbal communication by describing and classifying the material and data sources to be analyzed. The contextualization and interpretation of the results are supported by ethnographic fieldwork conducted during the electoral campaign. The results indicate the use of amateur elements in the videos that bring Bolsonaro closer to the citizens. Further, results show the inclusion of body movements that demonstrate his charisma as an imperfect leader and of paralanguage based on humor to build a violent character., Neste artigo, analisamos um dos principais cenários utilizados por Bolsonaro para se comunicar com os cidadãos durante todo o seu mandato: as lives semanais transmitidas na sua conta oficial do Instagram. A amostra inclui o estudo de dez lives, em que descrevemos como a comunicação não-verbal do ex-presidente brasileiro poderia ativar um processo de humanização e aproximação do líder, normalizando formas de violência e fortalecendo a polarização política. A metodologia utilizada na análise se baseia na grounded theory, que sistematiza a pesquisa qualitativa por meio da construção de hipóteses e teorias mediante a coleta e análise de dados. Este procedimento de análise abarca uma metodologia indutiva que extrai as categorias da comunicação não-verbal por meio da descrição e classificação do material e das fontes de dados a analisar. A contextualização e interpretação dos resultados é apoiada pelo trabalho de campo etnográfico durante a campanha eleitoral. Os resultados indicam o uso de elementos amadores nos vídeos, que geram uma aproximação do Bolsonaro com os cidadãos, assim como a inclusão de movimentos corporais que mostram seu carisma como um líder imperfeito e da paralinguagem baseada no humor para a construção de um personagem violento., En el presente artículo analizamos uno de los principales escenarios que Bolsonaro utilizó para comunicarse con sus bases durante toda su legislatura: los lives semanales en su cuenta oficial de Instagram. Así, estudiamos una muestra de diez lives, describiendo cómo su comunicación no verbal podía activar un proceso de humanización y aproximación del líder, normalizando formas de violencia y fortaleciendo la polarización política. La metodología empleada en el análisis se sustenta en la grounded theory, que sistematiza la investigación cualitativa a través de la construcción de hipótesis y teorías mediante la recolección y el análisis de datos. Este procedimiento de análisis propone una metodología inductiva que extrae las categorías de la comunicación no verbal a través de la descripción y clasificación del material y de las fuentes de datos por analizar. La contextualización e interpretación de los resultados se apoya en un trabajo etnográfico de campo durante la campaña electoral. Los resultados apuntan al uso de elementos amateurs en los videos que generan una aproximación de Bolsonaro con los ciudadanos, así como la inclusión de movimientos corporales que muestran su carisma como un líder imperfecto y del paralenguaje basado en el humor para la construcción de un personaje violento.

The aim of this article is to elucidate the transfer of votes from the Popular Party to VOX, from the General Elections of April 2016 to the elections held in November 2019. Likewise, we will try to highlight how the emotional component is positioned as an explanatory factor of the vote for the extreme right-wing formation in Spain. For this purpose, a quantitative analysis will be carried out based on the data from the survey conducted by the Political Research Team of the University of Santiago de Compostela. The focus will be on positive emotions (presence and intensity) towards Pablo Casado, leader of the PP until 2022, and towards Santiago Abascal, leader of VOX. Likewise, the emotions of both electorates towards the two political formations indicated will also be analyzed. The main results show a clear emotional profile of the voters of the extreme right in Spain, both towards their leader and the party. With respect to the transfer of votes, it can be seen that the main source of votes for the extreme right comes from the PP., El objetivo del presente artículo radica en dilucidar el traspaso del voto del Partido Popular hacia VOX, desde las elecciones generales de junio de 2016 a los comicios celebrados en noviembre de 2019. Asimismo, se tratará de poner de relieve de qué modo el componente emocional se sitúa como un factor explicativo del voto a la formación de extrema derecha en España. Para ello, se llevará a cabo un análisis cuantitativo a partir de los datos de la encuesta realizada por el Equipo de Investigaciones Políticas de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela. Se pondrá el foco de atención en las emociones de carácter positivo (presencia e intensidad) hacia Pablo Casado, líder del PP hasta 2022, y hacia Santiago Abascal, líder de VOX. Asimismo, se analizarán las emociones de ambos electorados hacia las dos formaciones políticas indicadas. Los principales resultados manifiestan un claro perfil emocional de los votantes de la extrema derecha en España, tanto hacia su líder como al partido. Respecto al traspaso del voto, se podrá comprobar cómo el principal caladero del voto a la extrema derecha proviene del PP

Far-right ideologies are gaining strength and visibility in Europe and in North America. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis have seemingly had important repercussions on both continents, reenergizing sentiments and parties that were dismissed as marginal and negligible until then. Contrary to the past, far-right parties would be willing to cooperate and find a common stance on major issues. With a little help from Donald Trump’s former chief strategist Steve Bannon, the European far-right seems to have found a set of issues it can unite around, becoming a transnational force. Right-wing extremist groups have apparently undergone a similar revival, with far-right political violence accounting for the majority of terrorist incidents in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this trend. In this article, we assess the narrative of the cross-national, even cross-continental links between far-right parties. To this end, we first conduct a literature review to highlight the transnational nature of extreme-right parties and movements. Then we analyze how the European far-right may have spurred negative sentiments against migrants to unleash the feeling of ontological insecurity and foment the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy. In particular, we discuss the tactics employed by the Hungarian government and explain why Italy risks becoming the epicenter of a new far-right earthquake.

Introduction: This research has analyzed the visual discourse on Instagram of the European far-right parties in Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Austria and Poland on the COVID-19 vaccines carried out during 2021. The main objective has been focused on in discovering the position of these parties regarding the vaccination process against the coronavirus and the use of biased strategies or frames linked to misinformation. Methodology: (N=1050) Instagram posts have been analyzed using visual content analysis. The results show that the European far-right parties studied have not used their Instagram accounts to spread health strategies to alleviate the effects of COVID-19. Results:The contents disseminated have turned out to be individualistic and consistent with the ideals of each party. Except for specific exceptions, in general all the parties have shown a neutral position without being very explicit in their positions. Discussion: What these findings reveal is an inclination not to make decisive speeches that could make them lose voters, despite maintaining a critical position that pretends to be an alternative to the official one. Conclusions: Their main speeches allude to the lack of individual freedom, the voluntariness in the administration of the dose, the rejection of vaccination of children and the denial of the COVID passport.Keywords: Disinformation; Content analysis; Far right; Instagram; Image.Traducción por Paula González (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Venezuela)1. IntroducciónVivimos tiempos de grandes cambios globales en la comunicación. El fenómeno de la desinformación ha irrumpido en la arena pública, con una arquitectura de Internet que se ajusta perfectamente a la actividad política de las nuevas generaciones: más informal, orientada por sus pares y alérgica a la autoridad (Storsul, 2014), donde los actores políticos pueden producir y difundir sus propios contenidos mediáticos (Crilley y Gillespie, 2019). Esta situación ha permitido a, En esta investigación se ha analizado el discurso visual en Instagram de los partidos de extrema derecha europeos de Italia, Alemania, Francia, España, Bélgica, Austria y Polonia sobre las vacunas contra la COVID-19 realizados durante 2021. El objetivo principal se ha centrado en descubrir el posicionamiento de estos partidos frente al proceso de vacunación contra el coronavirus y el empleo de estrategias o encuadres sesgados vinculados con la desinformación. Metodología: Se han analizado (N=1050) publicaciones de Instagram mediante un análisis de contenido visual. Los resultados evidencian que los partidos de extrema derecha europeos analizados no han empleado sus cuentas de Instagram para difundir estrategias sanitarias con las que paliar los efectos de la COVID-19. Resultados: Los contenidos difundidos han resultados ser individualistas y acordes con los ideales propios de cada partido. Salvo excepciones puntuales, en general todos los partidos han mostrado una posición neutra sin ser muy explícitos en sus posiciones. Discusión: Lo que revelan estos hallazgos es una inclinación para no realizar discursos determinantes que puedan hacerles perder votantes, a pesar de mantener una postura crítica que pretende ser alternativa a la oficial. Conclusiones: Sus discursos principales aluden a la falta de libertad individual, a la voluntariedad en la administración de la dosis, al rechazo de la vacunación a niños y a la negación ante el pasaporte COVID.

In recent years, we have witnessed the growing political relevance of the far right. Part of the reasons for the rise of this new wave of the far right is related to its ability to use social media. By aligning disinformation strategies with the information production and mediation modes of social media platforms, extremist movements have impacted public discourse while their ideas gain notoriety. In this context, it is understood that social media serve as instruments through which the far right employs disinformation to manipulate and influence the public sphere. Thus, this study, through a theoretical discussion based on the concept of information regimes, aims to analyze and discuss how the instrumentalization of social media by far-right groups influences and distorts the public sphere in their favor. The study leads to conclusions about how the infrastructures of social media, by providing a personalized and algorithmically constructed information regime for each user, are exploited by the far right. These infrastructures, aligned with disinformation strategies, influence the ways knowledge is created, which in turn affects the development of formative actions that impact the "way of life." In this sense, the instrumentalization of social media platforms has allowed the far right to channel (mis)informational power to create distortions and crises aimed at affecting the deliberative processes of the public sphere., Nos últimos anos tem-se presenciado o ganho de relevância política da extrema direita. Parte das causas da ascensão desta nova onda da extrema direita está relacionada a sua capacidade de uso das mídias sociais. Por meio do alinhamento de estratégias de desinformação com o modo de produção e mediação da informação das plataformas de mídias sociais, movimentos extremistas têm afetado o debate público ao tempo que suas ideias ganham notoriedade. Nesse contexto, entende-se que as mídias sociais são instrumentos pelos quais a extrema direita utiliza a desinformação para manipular e influenciar a esfera pública. Assim, o presente trabalho, por meio de uma discussão teórica baseada pelo conceito de regimes de informação, pretende analisar e discutir como a instrumentalização das mídias sociais por grupos de extrema direita influencia e distorce a esfera pública ao seu favor. O trabalho leva a conclusões sobre como as infraestruturas das mídias sociais, ao propiciarem um regime de informação personalizado e algoritmicamente construído para cada usuário, são instrumentalizadas pela extrema direita. Estas infraestruturas alinhadas a estratégias desinformativas influenciam nos modos de criação do conhecimento, que por sua vez, afetam o desenvolvimento de ações formativas que impactam na “forma de vida”. Neste sentido, a instrumentalização das plataformas de mídias sociais tem permitido a extrema direita canalizar o poder (des)informacional para criar distorções e crises, cuja finalidade é afetar os processos deliberativos da esfera pública., En los últimos años, hemos presenciado el aumento de relevancia política de la extrema derecha. Parte de las causas de la ascensión de esta nueva ola de la extrema derecha está relacionada con su capacidad para utilizar las redes sociales. A través de la alineación de estrategias de desinformación con el modo de producción y mediación de la información de las plataformas de redes sociales, los movimientos extremistas han impactado en el debate público, al mismo tiempo que sus ideas ganan notoriedad. En este contexto, se entiende que las redes sociales son instrumentos a través de los cuales la extrema derecha utiliza la desinformación para manipular e influenciar la esfera pública. Por lo tanto, el presente trabajo, a través de una discusión teórica basada en el concepto de regímenes de información, tiene como objetivo analizar y discutir cómo la instrumentalización de las redes sociales por parte de grupos de extrema derecha influye y distorsiona la esfera pública a su favor. El trabajo llega a conclusiones sobre cómo las infraestructuras de las redes sociales, al proporcionar un régimen de información personalizado y construido algorítmicamente para cada usuario, son instrumentalizadas por la extrema derecha. Estas infraestructuras, alineadas con estrategias desinformativas, influyen en los modos de creación del conocimiento, que a su vez afectan el desarrollo de acciones formativas que impactan en el "modo de vida". En este sentido, la instrumentalización de las plataformas de redes sociales ha permitido a la extrema derecha canalizar el poder (des)informativo para crear distorsiones y crisis, cuyo propósito es afectar los procesos deliberativos de la esfera pública.

This anthology explores the memory work performed by Baltic and Central and East European far-right actors in the online space. Situated at the crossroads between memory studies, far-right studies, and media studies, the volume’s seven chapters show how a wide range of far-right actors, from small movements to major parties, have exploited digital communication technologies in order to establish their plays with the past in the mainstream discourses of their respective national contexts. With a focus on the online memory work of the far right in Austria, Belarus, Czechia, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, and Ukraine, the anthology dissects the nexus between politics, media, and memory to show how digital communication have empowered the memory work of marginal but dangerous societal actors. As the different contributions show, the online space has raised the visibility and success of organised intolerant groups and, consequently, it has magni ed the societal impact of their memory work. Thanks to digital media, the memory work of the far right can compete on an equal footing with state-endorsed memory politics. rough manipulation of the historical narrative and thereby the perception and understanding of the past in civil societies, on websites, blogs, and social media, the far right has succeeded in overcoming its marginality and in normalising its messages of intolerance on a continental scale., Åke Wibergs Stiftelse, H20-0051

The purpose of this thesis aimed at trying to find out why the Sweden Democrats have increased their support, to become the second largest party in the Swedish parliament, while, the Danish People’s Party, has lost the majority of their support after being the second largest party in the Danish parliament to almost falling out a few years later. Is it possible for the Sweden Democrats to share the same fate? To find this out, we’ve decided to conduct this study using a qualitative comparative method, with a Most Similar System Design. The analysis mainly consists of two concepts to explain this phenomenon which are “Cordon Sanitaire” and “Normalization”. The results of the analysis show that in Denmark, the Danish People’s Party’s views and policies on migration, have gotten normalized across the political spectrum. As such, they can no longer argue that they are anti-establishment, but instead, they have become a part of the establishment themselves. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats have been kept out of power, with a “cordon sanitaire”, and thus their view and policies have not gotten normalized and adopted by other parties, and therefore they have continued to grow. An interesting aspect of this is that recently, the Sweden Democrats have gotten normalized and they are now a support party for a right-wing government, which we argue might lead to a similar situation as in Denmark, meaning that the Sweden Democrats might lose support in the future.

Die vorliegende kumulative Arbeit untersucht, inwiefern lokale Aushandlungsprozesse im Umgang mit extrem rechten Mobilisierungen zu deren Normalisierung beitragen. Die Studie adressiert zwei Forschungsdesiderate: Erstens externalisieren viele Beiträge die extrem Rechte von städtischen Demokratien. Folglich ist die Literatur nicht in der Lage zu erfassen, wie extrem rechte Agenden und Ideologien innerhalb lokaler partizipativer Prozesse in liberalen Demokratien normalisiert werden. Zweitens sind die Akteure und Prozesse, welchen diesen lokalen Aushandlungen zugrunde liegen, nicht ausreichend untersucht. Um diese Lücken zu schließen, verbindet die Studie Theoriestränge aus der Urban Governance - Literatur mit sozialwissenschaftlichen Debatten über den Aufstieg der extrem Rechten. Der methodische Rahmen der Arbeit besteht aus einem qualitativen Forschungsdesign in Form einer explorativen Einzelfallstudie in der Stadt Cottbus. Die Analyse zeigt, dass das Narrativ der Externalisierung in dreierlei Hinsicht eine falsche Dichotomie zwischen der extremen Rechten und lokalen Aushandlungsprozessen schafft: Erstens ignoriert es, dass deliberative Prozessen zwar das Versprechen auf Demokratisierung innewohnt, dieses aber durch bestehende gesellschaftliche Machtverhältnisse durchkreuzt wird, die Näherböden für autoritäre Mobilisierung bieten können. Zweitens übersieht es die Verflechtung zwischen Rassismus und den städtischen Institutionen, die auf extrem rechte Mobilisierung reagieren, und oftmals Anknüpfungspunkte für extrem rechte Ideologien bieten. Drittens wird argumentiert, dass dies auf den lokalen Staat als umkämpftes Terrain hinweist., This doctoral dissertation explores to what extent local negotiations of far-right contestations contribute to the latter’s normalisation. The project is prompted by the crux that even though the central role of cities and local participatory planning processes in countering far-right contestations is widely acknowledged, far-right contestations have hardly been challenged. It seeks to address two scholarly blind spots: First, mainstream accounts engaging with the question of how municipalities deal with far-right contestations have largely externalised the far right from urban democracy. Consequently, the current literature is not able to grasp how far-right agendas and ideologies can indeed be normalised within local participatory processes. Second, the actors and processes involved in the local negotiation of far-right contestations remain understudied. To fill these gaps, the cumulative dissertation connects discussions on urban governance with recent debates on the rise of the far right. The methodological framework of this thesis consists of a qualitative, explorative single-case study in the city of Cottbus, Germany. The analysis reveals that the liberal narratives of externalisation create a false dichotomy between far-right contestations and local negotiations in liberal democracies in a threefold way. First, they ignore how far-right contestations can be strengthened within traditional deliberative processes, as their promise of equal participation for all citizens is juxtaposed with the inability of such processes to re-negotiate the power relations aggravating the social inequalities giving rise to the far right in the first place. Second, by externalising the divisiveness propagated by far-right contestations, they overlook the interconnectedness between racism and the institutions governing cities, which offers points of contact for far-right ideology. Third, it is argued that this points to the local state as contested terrain.

This thesis examines the role of emotion in manifestations of extreme right-wing thought, feeling and action. There has been a considerable increase in violent and non-violent right-wing extremism in the United States. In Australia, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation has identified an increase in the threat from right-wing extremism since 2019. Previous literature and policy have attempted to force radicalisation into a predictive, deterministic model; however, human behaviour is rarely linear or deterministic. The contemporary multi-modal (online and offline) context is far from linear, while belief systems and right-wing ideology are deeply emotive. Even the labelling of attitudes and actions as “extreme-right” may oversimplify what appears to be a broad and constantly evolving, unpredictable pattern of belief and action. Complexity science may help explain why some individuals do not radicalise while others, with apparently similar levels of vulnerability, do. There is limited literature on the role of emotion within the radicalisation and deradicalization process, despite emotions’ capacity to accelerate or amplify opinion and action. This thesis investigates the qualitative emotional and motivational experiences of current and ‘former’ ‘far-right’ extremists recruited from Twitter, Reddit, and Gab. Interviews were conducted by a clinical psychologist and analysed in accordance with interpretative phenomenological philosophy. Results suggest that emotional experience propelled radicalisation to the far-right through traumatic chaos, an unstable sense of self and fragile identity. Right-wing ideology was maintained through emotional validation and experience with cancel culture. In contrast, emotional experience motivated deradicalization through: diversity of experience, openness and insight, acceptance, and suffering through anger, guilt, embarrassment, shame, and sadness. These findings are important because they are generalisable across ide

This chapter investigates the process of radicalization of the political landscape in Italy that has been taking place over the last decade. The chapter provides an important perspective in examining Fratelli d'Italia (The Brothers of Italy) led by Giorgia Meloni, and the Lega (the League) led by Matteo Salvini, and their links with extreme right-wing movements and groups. Arguably, the politically volatile years of 2012–2013 were key in laying down the foundations for the subsequent development of the far right in Italy, having implications for the current rightwards trajectory of Italian politics. Firstly, in late 2012, Fratelli d'Italia was founded; a year later in 2013, Salvini became the new leader of Lega, undertaking a significant ideological rebranding from the original Lega Nord (Northern League), a federalist party. The two parties share important features, in terms of their ideologies and policy platforms on key issues such as immigration and the European Union (EU) but differ markedly in terms of their (a) leadership style, alongside their (b) historical and ideological roots. These key differences are also reflected in how the parties interact with other actors within the Italian extreme-right and ultraconservative groups in the contemporary Italian political landscape. The second part of the chapter explores the renewed visibility of historical right-wing groups such as CasaPound and Forza Nuova (New Force) who are now back on the scene after years of relative “invisibility,” alongside the success of recently established groups, such as Lealtà Azione (Loyalty Action).

Since 2017, the Danish far right party Stram Kurs has staged hundreds of Islamophobic demonstrations in neighbourhoods known for their ethnic minority and Muslim communities. Confrontational counterprotesters are filmed by far right activists who widely diffuse the footage on social media. These scenes of “native” bodies under duress from racialized others serve the far right as evidence of an incompatibility between racialized foreigners and the Danish ethnically defined nation. When far right activists subject their bodies to potential violence they are embodying nativism; dramatizing the threat of ethnic impurity to the nation. Embodied nativism denotes how actors imbue bodies with – and physically perform – values linked to essentialized ethnic categories to advance exclusionary claims. We develop this concept through visual analysis, utilizing images to show how scenes of embodied nativism exploit liberal frameworks of free speech, violence, and nonviolence; framing counterprotesters as racialized aggressors on the national body politic.

For years, the construction of social subjectivity has been conditioned by the role of the so‐called mass media, but the multiplicity of media platforms today contributes to the configuration of reality. In this context, this study analyses how the discourse of the far right in Spain effectively criminalised the International Women’s Day (8M) demonstrations in the first year of the pandemic by linking them to an increase in Covid‐19 infections. To implement this strategy, Spain’s far‐ right party, Vox, used its social media accounts, but it also had the support of ultra‐conservative digital media outlets to legitimise its discursive distortions. Taking this into account, this article presents a content and critical discourse analysis of the Twitter and Gab accounts operated by Vox and its leaders, Santiago Abascal and Rocio Monasterio, as well as three ultra‐conservative newspapers, La Razón, OK Diario, and Libertad digital. The period covered is from 8 March 2020 to 8 March 2021.

This position paper argues for an interdisciplinary agenda relating crises to on-going processes of normalization of anti- and post-democratic action. We call for exploring theoretically and empirically the ‘new normal’ logic introduced into public imagination on the back of various crises, including the recent ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Europe, COVID-19 pandemic, or the still ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Gathering researchers of populism, extremism, discrimination, and other formats of anti- and post-democratic action, we propose investigating how, why, and under which conditions, discourses and practices underlying normalization processes re-emerge to challenge the liberal democratic order. We argue exploring the multiple variants of ‘the new normal’ related to crises, historically and more recently. We are interested in how and why these open pathways for politics of exclusion, inequality, xenophobia and other patterns of anti- and post-democratic action while deepening polarization and radicalization of society as well as propelling far-right politics and ideologies.

Radical nationalism is a political ideology centred on tying animagined people to a bordered territory. It grows from nationalism’sroot system into a diversity of political manifestations aimedat sealing the people-territory bond. By theorizing radical nationalism,this article outlines a political-ideological approach that opensnew pathways for studying the so-called far right. The article drawson Michael Freeden’s conceptual-morphological theory and delineateshow nationalism’s thin-centred conceptual core – people andterritory – can thicken into a full-bodied political ideology: fromfootball and flags to systemic discrimination, deportations, andmass violence. In response to the empirical observation that radicalnationalism nurtures historical and contemporary actors across theleft-right spectrum, the article offers a political-ideological lens fortranshistorical analyses of various political manifestations thatsprout and flourish from the exclusionary roots of the modernnation-state.

In this article, I aim to show how populism can be used as an analytical category to make sense of how anti-immigration claims are articulated in far-right political discourse. I will do this by giving examples of and drawing attention to how the anti-immigration claims are articulated via the populist divide, namely anti-elitism and people-centrism, and delve into the issue of which people are mobilised against which elite in articulatory practice. I use narrative analysis to link individual newspaper texts to dominant storylines of the nation (master narratives) in the continuous construction of national identity. The material is based on 169 articles published in the socially conservative online newspaper Samtiden between 2016 and 2022 on national identity. The results from the narrative analysis indicate that far-right populist discourse conveys nostalgia for a golden age and a cohesive and homogenous collective national identity, combining ideals of cultural conformism and socio-economic fairness against the fragmentary political agenda of different elites, spelling out a message that everything was better before.

Russia and Ukraine have shared some characteristics in their political lives before the Russian invasion of the latter state, which, however, have not been equally incorporated into the journalistic and political accounts that have spread in our society since the beginning of the war. For this reason, and while the dominant trend in the media has been the normal substitution of analysis for superficial or merely factual information, the majority of the population finds themselves with an unequal portrait of both States when trying to understand the recent past of the main political agents of the conflict. Starting from the contributions of Carlos Taibo, it is possible to reflect on the confusion between myth and reality that surrounds the description of the political protagonists involved in the current war in Ukraine. Taking their contributions, and resorting to different press media, we can conclude that, while the information is available, it is not incorporated into the most widely disseminated journalistic stories. The omissions, undervaluation or overvaluation of the facts based on Manichean or, at least, naive mystifications are having more utility for the convenient invocation of unity of thought than for public reflection and debate., Rusia y Ucrania han compartido algunas características en sus vidas políticas antes de la invasión rusa de este último Estado que, sin embargo, no se han incorporado por igual a los relatos periodísticos y políticos que se difunden en nuestra sociedad desde el comienzo de la guerra. Por este motivo, y en tanto que la tendencia dominante en los medios ha sido la sustitución con toda normalidad de los análisis por la información superficial o meramente fáctica, la mayoría de la población se encuentran con un desigual retrato de ambos Estados al intentar entender el pasado reciente de los principales agentes políticos del conflicto. Partiendo de las aportaciones de Carlos Taibo es posible hacer una reflexión sobre la confusión entre el mito y la realidad que rodea la descripción de los protagonistas políticos implicados en la actual guerra de Ucrania. Tomando sus aportaciones, y recurriendo a distintos medios de prensa, podemos concluir que, estando la información disponible, esta no se incorpora a los relatos periodísticos con más difusión. Las omisiones, infravaloración o sobrevaloración de los hechos en base a mixtificaciones maniqueas o, al menos, ingenuas están teniendo más utilidad para la conveniente invocación a la unidad de pensamiento que para la reflexión y el debate públicos.

In 2017, a conspiracy known as Tag X (Day X) was uncovered within the German Bundeswehr (Armed Forces). This operation had been articulated from the embryo of a possible 'shadow army', supported by paramilitary organisations, and its aim was to seize power through the use of violence and terror Der Tag X (The X-Day). This dynamic would culminate in the implementation of “ethnic cleansing”, the elimination of “internal enemies” and the establishment of an authoritarian state. Our thesis is that the origin of this military conspiracy is closely associated with a set of political, social, economic and cultural transformations that have taken place since the last decade of the twentieth century and that have created a favourable situation for the rise of the extreme right in Germany and “legitimised” right-wing extremists to intervene in the political decision-making process. We have used two main types of sources for our work. On the one hand, primary sources, consisting of decrees on tradition in the Bundeswehr, and parliamentary investigations and intelligence reports on right-wing extremism in the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, bibliographical and periodicals, which cover the main events connected with the Tag X conspiracy., En 2017 se descubrió en el seno de la Bundeswehr (Fuerzas Armadas) de Alemania una conspiración conocida como Tag X (Día X). Esta operación se había articulado a partir del embrión de un posible “Ejército en la sombra”, apoyado por organizaciones paramilitares, y su objetivo era tomar el poder mediante el uso de la violencia y el terror Der Tag X (El Día X). Esta dinámica culminaría con la puesta en marcha de una “limpieza étnica”, la eliminación de los “enemigos internos” y el establecimiento de un Estado autoritario. La tesis que mantenemos es que el origen de esta conspiración militar está íntimamente asociada a un conjunto de transformaciones políticas, sociales, económicas y culturales que se han producido desde la última década del siglo XX y que han creado una situación favorable para el ascenso de la extrema derecha en Alemania y “legitimado” a militares de esta ideología para intervenir en el proceso de toma de decisiones políticas. Para desarrollar nuestro trabajo, hemos utilizado fundamentalmente dos tipos de fuentes. Por un lado, las primarias, formadas por los decretos sobre la tradición en la Bundeswehr, y las investigaciones parlamentarias y los informes de los servicios de inteligencia sobre el extremismo de derechas en la Bundeswehr. Por otro, las bibliográficas y hemerográficas, donde se recogen los principales acontecimientos vinculados a la conspiración de Der Tag X.

Within the framework of the liberal State building process, nineteenth-century Spanish scholarship developed a historical narrative deeply reliant on the idea of Catholicism as the backbone of Spanish national identity. One of the major challenges faced by those promoting the exclusively Catholic identity of the nation was the eight-century-long Muslim presence in Iberia. Together with the breaking up of the liberal historiographical tradition, the Francoist period represents the peak moment of so-called National Catholicism. Counter-intuitively, the most vocal representative of this narrative was C. Sánchez-Albornoz, a committed republican and convinced anti-Francoist but, at the same time, a devout Catholic believer. Having lost the leading role it played before the 1978 arrival of democracy, the Catholic narrative, however, remained influential over the last 45 years, not only thanks to the work done by Catholic historians but also because many of the Catholic prejudices and stereotypes are consistently promoted by non-religious academic sectors., En el marco de la construcción del Estado liberal, la historiografía decimonónica española, fuertemente influida por la tradición católica, elaboró un relato histórico que tuvo entre sus objetivos esenciales establecer la existencia de una unión inextricable entre la nación española y el catolicismo. Evidentemente, uno de los grandes retos a los que se enfrentaban quienes promovían la identidad exclusivamente católica de la nación española era la dilatada presencia musulmana en Iberia durante ocho siglos. El franquismo supone la quiebra de la tradición historiográfica liberal y, al mismo tiempo, el apogeo del nacionalcatolicismo, si bien, paradójicamente, el principal representante de la historiografía medieval fue un republicano antifranquista, aunque profundamente católico, como Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz. A partir del período democrático, la historiografía católica pierde parte de su influencia, pero mantiene una amplia presencia en el estudio del período medieval, tanto gracias a la actividad de autores e instituciones confesionales como a la asunción por parte de otros sectores académicos de los postulados que emanan de dichos sectores.

El auge combinado de nacionalismo populista y autoritarismo observable en los últimos años en Europa y Estados Unidos está imponiendo una representación negativa de la inmigración y el asilo que favorece la adopción de políticas crecientemente restrictivas y hostiles. Estas políticas anteponen la eficacia restrictiva a principios y consideraciones morales y, no pocas veces, también al derecho. Algunas de ellas rayan en la crueldad y la inhumanidad. Es una deriva que está alcanzando el paroxismo en Estados Unidos desde la llegada de Donald Trump a la presidencia, pero la Unión Europea (UE) también participa de ella, especialmente en el terreno del asilo. El artículo pasa revista a los rasgos más destacados de las políticas recientes en materia de inmigración y asilo a ambos lados del Atlántico Norte y a sus implicaciones., The combined rise of populist nationalism and authoritarianism over recent years in Europe and the United States is fostering a negative image of immigration and asylum that favours the adoption of increasingly restrictive and hostile policies. These policies prioritise restrictive efficacy over moral principles and considerations and, quite often, over the law. Some of them border on cruelty and inhumanity. This shift has reached a peak in the United States since Donald Trump’s presidency began, but the European Union (EU) also plays its part, especially in the field of asylum. This paper reviews the most prominent features of recent immigration and asylum policies on both sides of the North Atlantic and their implications., Depto. de Sociología Aplicada, Fac. de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, TRUE, pub

This chapter focuses on the British Satanic organization called the Order of the Nine Angles (ONA), one of the most controversial and infamous Satanic groups of the twentieth century. In contrast to most forms of Satanism, ONA texts include references to and advocacy of certain criminal actions to further the group’s end game. Most controversial are the references to human sacrifice, and the question of whether these are to be taken literally has been much debated. The chapter then considers The Black Book of Satan (1984), which is seemingly an early introduction to the ONA’s version of Satanism and what the organization defines as the “Sinister Way.” It looks at three excerpts from the book: “the 21 Satanic points,” “What is Satanism?,” and one of the ONA’s versions of the Black Mass.

Over the last 15 years, the image of the European Union (EU) has been severely weakened. Following the so-called polycrisis - the euro crisis (2008), the refugee crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016) - the supranational organisation is facing the significant rise of Eurosceptic and populist, predominantly right-wing parties that have emerged in its member states. Among them, Lega in Italy or Vox in Spain demonstrate such an upward trend through the results obtained after the European election campaigns of 2014 and, in particular, 2019. This research sought to analyse the digital communication plans of both parties, reflected in their activity on social networks, more specifically on Twitter, over these electoral periods, in which they shifted the xenophobic nature of their messages towards a patriotic and nationalist approach. With this aim, by means of a mixed quantitative/qualitative analysis methodology, the 1,111 tweets that the Italian party and the 351 that the Spanish party (N total of 1,462 tweets) published from their respective accounts during the last European election campaigns were analysed. In conclusion, the results point to: a professionalisation of digital communication mechanisms by both extreme right- wing parties; achieving greater participation and interaction from their followers, thanks to a more mobilising/populist rather than ideological message, developed in a clearly national key; which renders it impossible for them to be incorporated into the pan- European public sphere., Durante los últimos tres lustros, la imagen de la Unión Europea (UE) se ha visto fuertemente debilitada. Tras la denominada policrisis - crisis del euro (2008), refugiados (2015) y Brexit (2016) - la organización supranacional se enfrenta al significativo auge de partidos euroescépticos y populistas, predominantemente de derechas, que han surgido en sus países miembro. Entre ellos, Lega en Italia o Vox en España demuestran dicha tendencia al alza a través de los resultados obtenidos tras las campañas electorales europeas de 2014 y, especialmente, de 2019. La finalidad de esta investigación es analizar el plan de comunicación digital de ambos partidos, reflejado en su actividad en las redes sociales, más concretamente en Twitter, durante dichos periodos electorales; en los que han llevado el carácter xenófobo de sus mensajes hacia una aproximación patriótica y nacionalista. Para ello, por medio de una metodología de análisis mixta cuantitativa/cualitativa, se analizarán los 1.111 tweets que la formación italiana y 351 que el partido español (N total de 1.462 tweets) publicaron desde sus respectivas cuentas durante las últimas campañas electorales europeas. Como conclusión, los resultados apuntan: a una profesionalización de los mecanismos comunicativos digitales por parte de ambos partidos de extrema derecha; alcanzando una mayor participación e interacción por parte de sus seguidores, gracias a un mensaje más movilizador/populista que ideológico, desarrollado en una evidente clave nacional; lo que les imposibilita su incorporación a la esfera pública pan-europea.

This thesis examines the social unfolding of the recent deplatformization of the far-right extremes on Telegram. Leaving prior approaches to moderation behind, this study asks questions around how moderation imprints itself on the complex terrain of meaning and practice, interacts with intensified reflexiveness of the social agents, and leaves affected collectivities changed in unanticipated ways. The theoretical framework bridges platform and moderation studies (Gillespie, 2018; Van Dijck, 2018) to Couldry & Hepp’s (2017) account of the interdependencies between media and social actors under deep mediatisation. The digital far-right networks are approached through the lens of cultural sociology of social movements, spotlighting influential far-right Telegram channels as core movement leaders and/or activists. The framing perspective based on Benford & Snow’s work (2000) is adopted as a comprehensive framework to identify symbolic responses, trajectory shifts, mobilisation attempts, and alliance-building practices in the context of deplatformization. The study conducts a qualitative multi-case frame analysis on four prominent far-right activists and their channels in the anglophone Telegram ecosystem. The empirical material represents four complete narratives on the issues of platforms, moderation, and deplatformization that unfolded in a critical period between actors’ mass migration to Telegram in 2019 and the end of 2022, defined by the aftermath of Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter. The analysis follows a two-step approach that first examines the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Second, the analysis incorporates collective identity as a central analytical tenet to examine activists’ boundary work and alliance-building surrounding deplatformization. The analysis reveals ‘Big Tech’ as a potent empty signifier linking diverse grievances, deplatformization as a conflictual issue prompting fractured solutions, and novel micro-level individual action

When do the media cover far-right protests? News coverage matters for the entrenchment of the far right in contemporary democracies, but little comparative research has looked at what drives news attention to far-right mobilization. We apply a classic input–output process model of news selection bias to test the hypothesis that the visibility of far-right protests events depends on the characteristics of protest initiators, type of action, and reactions. We appraise this via logistic regressions on an original dataset of 5972 protest events retrieved from online press releases by far-right groups (input) and national quality newspapers (output) in 11 European countries (2008–2018). The analysis confirms that news media are particularly responsive to contentious action, protest around migration issues, and action–reaction chains between political opponents. Our findings shed light on the role of news organizations in the success of the far-right and on the pathways by which these movements shape public agendas., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Durante los últimos tres lustros, la imagen de la Unión Europea (UE) se ha visto fuertemente debilitada. Tras la denominada policrisis - crisis del euro (2008), refugiados (2015) y Brexit (2016) - la organización supranacional se enfrenta al significativo auge de partidos euroescépticos y populistas, predominantemente de derechas, que han surgido en sus países miembro. Entre ellos, Lega en Italia o Vox en España demuestran dicha tendencia al alza a través de los resultados obtenidos tras las campañas electorales europeas de 2014 y, especialmente, de 2019. La finalidad de esta investigación es analizar el plan de comunicación digital de ambos partidos, reflejado en su actividad en las redes sociales, más concretamente en Twitter, durante dichos periodos electorales; en los que han llevado el carácter xenófobo de sus mensajes hacia una aproximación patriótica y nacionalista. Para ello, por medio de una metodología de análisis mixta cuantitativa/cualitativa, se analizarán los 1.111 tweets que la formación italiana y 351 que el partido español (N total de 1.462 tweets) publicaron desde sus respectivas cuentas durante las últimas campañas electorales europeas. Como conclusión, los resultados apuntan: a una profesionalización de los mecanismos comunicativos digitales por parte de ambos partidos de extrema derecha; alcanzando una mayor participación e interacción por parte de sus seguidores, gracias a un mensaje más movilizador/populista que ideológico, desarrollado en una evidente clave nacional; lo que les imposibilita su incorporación a la esfera pública pan-europea., Over the last 15 years, the image of the European Union (EU) has been severely weakened. Following the so-called polycrisis - the euro crisis (2008), the refugee crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016) - the supranational organisation is facing the significant rise of Eurosceptic and populist, predominantly right-wing parties that have emerged in its member states. Among them, Lega in Italy or Vox in Spain demonstrate such an upward trend through the results obtained after the European election campaigns of 2014 and, in particular, 2019. This research sought to analyse the digital communication plans of both parties, reflected in their activity on social networks, more specifically on Twitter, over these electoral periods, in which they shifted the xenophobic nature of their messages towards a patriotic and nationalist approach. With this aim, by means of a mixed quantitative/qualitative analysis methodology, the 1,111 tweets that the Italian party and the 351 that the Spanish party (N total of 1,462 tweets) published from their respective accounts during the last European election campaigns were analysed. In conclusion, the results point to: a professionalisation of digital communication mechanisms by both extreme right-wing parties; achieving greater participation and interaction from their followers, thanks to a more mobilising/populist rather than ideological message, developed in a clearly national key; which renders it impossible for them to be incorporated into the pan-European public sphere.

This article seeks to analyze the presence of conspiracy theories among organizations and supporters of political ideas located on the extreme right of the traditional political spectrum. We will see how, from the emergence of fascism in the first half of the 20th century to extremist groups today, conspiracy theories remain a fundamental part of an ideological narrative based on the fear of predetermined enemies. Thus, we will be able to perceive the historicity of this practice, its reminiscences and the transformations it has undergone to remain useful to the extreme right in the present. Through this route, we will also be able to verify the changes that extreme right-wing political behaviors have undergone and what are their singularities today., O presente artigo realiza uma breve análise sobre a presença de teorias conspiratórias entre organizações e adeptos de ideias políticas de extrema-direita. Veremos como desde a emergência dos fascismos na primeira metade do século XX até a consolidação de grupos extremistas nos dias de hoje, teorias da conspiração mantém-se como parte fundamental de uma narrativa ideológica embasada no medo dos inimigos pré-determinados. Assim, poderemos perceber a historicidade dessa prática, suas reminiscências e as transformações pelas quais passou para manter-se útil à extrema-direita no presente. Por meio desse percurso, poderemos também verificar as mudanças pelas quais comportamentos políticos de extrema-direita passaram e quais são suas singularidades nos dias atuais.

These contributions, the fruit of original and intense research, helped frame vibrant debates during the February- May 2022 seminars hosted by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, offering lenses through which to interpret phenomena that are current but with distant origins. What emerges is the observation that the European far right, albeit manifested in a rich variety of regional forms, has been capable of going increasingly ‘mainstream’, and that the phenomenon taking place in Europe is merely part of a much broader global picture. The impressive online generation of ‘truths’ by media vehicles, the pervasive and widespread use of social media to mobilize the electorate, the increasingly fundamental association with the environmentalist cause, and the ideological flexibility and opportunism of populism: all of these are contributing factors in a massive sanctioning and normalization of what was once solely associated with the extreme-right fringes of the political spectrum, to such an extent that it has become almost impossible to distinguish what is far right from what is not.