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The essay focuses on the criminal law provisions introduced with the so-called Gelli-Bianco reform, according to a perspective that is called "lateral" or "oblique", in the sense of inspired by that line of studies and experiences that goes under the name of "narrative medicine "or" interpersonal medicine ". In contrast to a certain reading of the guidelines resulting from the reform and towards which some jurisprudential rulings also seem oriented, the text believes that they should not be confused with the precautionary rules whose violation integrates criminal negligence. The observance of the guidelines, for criminal purposes, rather than the expression of evidence based medicine in a purely technical-scientific sense, should undergo a broader, aptly "narrative" and interpersonal reading and thus be read as signal of a medical act (but it would be better to say of the overall relational path) having the main projection to "cure" (in the broadest sense)not sheerly of harm prevention. Hence the starting point for a particular recognition of the medical act, to be classified in the sphere of the permitted risk (erlaubtes Risiko) and therefore subjected to criteria for ascertaining liability within the limits of gross negligence. In the last part of the essay some remarks are spent on the important relationship between individual guilt and organizational responsibility and some proposals de iure condendo are advanced.

Die verschiedenen Konzepte fahrlässiger Mittäterschaft werden dargestellt und als nicht überzeugend befunden. Der Hauptteil der Arbeit analysiert nach der kursorischen Feststel-lung, dass das Analogieverbot der Figur nicht entgegensteht, konkret die Unbegründbarkeit fahrlässiger Mittäterschaft auf der Grundlage des höchstpersönlichen Schuldprinzips, das als verfassungsrechtlicher Grundsatz die Grundlage des gesamten Strafrechtssystems bildet. Die richtige Lösung bei fahrlässigem Zusammenwirken besteht in einer Vorverlagerung des Fahrlässigkeitsschuldvorwurfs unter Annahme eines psychischen Beitrags zum Erfolgseintritt. Dies entspricht sowohl dem Wesen der Fahrlässigkeitsdelikte als auch dem Schuldprinzip., This study critically analyzes the various ideas for negligent co-perpetration and concludes that this legal idea is not convincing. The main part of this study is to analyze that negligent co-perpetration lacks justification based on the guilt principle, which is the foundation of the entire criminal justice system, although negligent co-perpetration could be established, since this does not violate the prohibition of analogy. And the desirable solution for cases of neg-ligent cooperation is concretely presented.: To advance the accusation of negligence in ac-cordance with the nature of the criminal negligence and the guilt principle. The criminal negligence is based on the single concept of perpetrator and the psychological contribution could establish the illegality of behaviour. In order to apply this solution, the illegality of neg-ligent behavior must always be proven. Then there is no need for negligent co-perpetration.

Criminal justice, in the last years, has turned into the first and essential way of promoting security, to the detriment of its function of protecting legal interests. In this context, criminal guarantees weaken and turn into obstacles that must be removed. Also, an absolute normativization of the traditional rules of attribution of criminal responsibility has taken place, resulting from a criminal law doctrine progressively detached from statutory law. As example an example of this there are dogmatic transformations of the concept of intention and its repercussion in judicial decisions. This paper explains the above mentioned phenomenon, from the analysis of the legal and doctrinal frame of the delimitation of intent, the foundation of its punishment, and the criticism of theories that propose a normative conceptualization of intention as mere attribution.

The issue of health professionals facing criminal charges of manslaughter or criminal negligence causing death or grievous bodily harm as a result of alleged negligence in their professional practice was thrown into stark relief by the recent acquittal of four physicians accused of mismanaging Canada’s blood system in the early 1980s. Stories like these, as well as international reports detailing an increase in the numbers of physicians being charged with (and in some cases convicted of) serious criminal offences as the result of alleged negligence in their professional practice, have resulted in some anxiety about the apparent increase in the incidence of such charges and their appropriateness in the healthcare context. Whilst research has focused on the incidence, nature and appropriateness of criminal charges against health professionals, particularly physicians, for alleged negligence in their professional practice in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and New Zealand, the Canadian context has yet to be examined. This article examines the Canadian context and how the criminal law is used to regulate the negligent acts or omissions of a health care professional in the course of their professional practice. It also assesses the appropriateness of such use. It is important at this point to state that the analysis in this article does not focus on those, fortunately few, cases where a health professional has intentionally killed his or her patients but rather when patients’ deaths or grievous injuries were allegedly as a result of that health professional’s negligent acts or omissions when providing health services to that patient.

This discussion focuses on those jurisdictions that have used ordinary negligence to find criminal liability when a person uses an inherently dangerous instrument, engages in an inherently dangerous activity, or engages in conduct that poses a threat of widespread public injury. Part IV analyzes the appropriateness of permitting punishment based on ordinary negligence and concludes that it is entirely responsible to adjust criminal sanctions to respond to a fast-paced and technologically reliant culture that consciously trades due care for greater and swifter achievements. Part IV also offers a model for legislatures to follow when evaluating the appropriateness of criminalizing negligent conduct. Following this model will assure that legislatures will limit punishment to instances when there is a reasonable expectation that criminal sanctions will serve as a deterrent to future harm. This article draws the conclusion that criminal law will not unfairly punish individuals and will provide prosecutors with enhanced tools to respond to dangerously careless conduct that could have been anticipated and averted.