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The identification of an empirically adequate theoretical construct requires determining whether a theoretically predicted effect is sufficiently similar to an observed effect. To this end, we propose a simple similarity measure, describe its application in different research designs, and use computer simulations to estimate the necessary sample size for a given observed effect. As our main example, we apply this measure to recent meta-analytical research on precognition. Results suggest that the evidential basis is too weak for a predicted precognition effect of d = 0.20 to be considered empirically adequate. As additional examples, we apply this measure to object-level experimental data from dissonance theory and a recent crowdsourcing hypothesis test, as well as to meta-analytical data on the correlation of personality traits and life outcomes., Die Autor*innen schlagen ein simples Ähnlichkeitsmaß vor, beschreiben seine Anwendung in verschiedenen Forschungsdesigns und verwenden Computersimulationen, um die erforderliche Stichprobengröße für einen bestimmten beobachteten Effekt zu schätzen.

This position paper of Working Group 2 of the European Network for Argumentation and Public Policy Analysis (COST Action CA17132; https://publicpolicyargument.eu) reviews goals and functions of public argumentation. Drawing on a variety of disciplines, the paper introduces basic distinctions and charts out options. It is meant to guide reflection on the conceptual basis for the Action’s subsequent research regarding the analysis, evaluation, and design of public argumentation.

This position paper of Working Group 2 of the European Network for Argumentation and Public Policy Analysis (COST Action CA17132; https://publicpolicyargument.eu) reviews goals and functions of public argumentation. Drawing on a variety of disciplines, the paper introduces basic distinctions and charts out options. It is meant to guide reflection on the conceptual basis for the Action’s subsequent research regarding the analysis, evaluation, and design of public argumentation.

A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in cognitive neuroscience and are mapped to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory respectively. This article investigates and integrates the neuroscientifically grounded account with knowledge-accounts from cognitive ethology and cognitive psychology. It is found that procedural and semantic memory, on a neuroscientific level of analysis, matches an ethological reliabilist account. This formation also matches System 1 from dual process theory on a psychological level, whereas the addition of episodic memory, on the neuroscientific level of analysis, can account for System 2 on the psychological level. It is furthermore argued that semantic memory (conceptual knowledge-what) and the cognitive ability of categorization are linked to each other, and that they can be fruitfully modeled within a conceptual spaces framework.

This chapter makes use of two data sources, terminological schemas for wine descriptions and actual wine reviews, for the investigation of how experiences of sensory perceptions of vision, smell, taste and touch are described. In spite of all the great challenges involved in describing perceptions, professional wine reviewers are expected to be able to give an understandable account of their experiences. The reviews are explored with focus on the different types of descriptors and the ways their meanings are construed. It gives an account of the use of both property expressions, such as soft, sharp, sweet and dry and object descriptors, such as blueberry, apple and honey. It pays particular attention to the apparent cross-sensory use of descriptors, such as white aromas and soft smell, arguing that the ontological cross-over of sensory modalities are to be considered as symptoms of ‘synesthesia’ in the wine-tasting practice and monosemy at the conceptual level. In contrast to the standard view of the meanings of words for sensory perceptions, the contention is that it is not the case that, for instance, sharp in sharp smell primarily evokes a notion of touch; rather the sensory experiences are strongly interrelated in cognition. When instantiated in, say smell, soft spans the closely related sense domains, and the lexical syncretism is taken to be grounded in the workings of human sensory cognition.

This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific frameworks when these are treated as spatial structures rather than as linguistic entities. The theory is briefly introduced and five types of changes are presented. It is then contrasted with Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantian account that seeks to render Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” as a communicatively rational historical event of conceptual development in the sciences. Like Friedman, we refer to the transition from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics as an example of “deep conceptual change.” But we take the communicative rationality of radical conceptual change to be available prior to the philosophical meta-paradigms that Friedman deems indispensable for this purpose.

The (dynamic) frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences (allegedly) suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of frame-reconstructed taxonomic change are presented. This occurs for purposes of comparison with an alternative tool, conceptual spaces. The main claim is that conceptual spaces save the merits of the frame model and provide a powerful model for conceptual change in scientific knowledge, since distinctions arising in measurement theory are native to the model. It is suggested how incommensurability as incomparability of theoretical frameworks might be avoided (thus coming on par with a key-result of applying frames). Moreover, as non(inter-)translatability of worldviews, it need not to be treated as a genuine problem of conceptual representation. The status of laws vis à vis their dimensional bases as well as diachronic similarity measures are (inconclusively) discussed.

Review of "Thinking, Fast and Slow" by Daniel Kahneman (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2011, ISBN 978-0-474-27563-1)

This volume collects contributions to the international workshop on Bayesian Argumentation held 22-23 October 2010 at the Philosophy Department of Lund University, Sweden.

Citing an epistemic or cognitive asymmetry between experts and the public, it is easy to view the relation between scientists and citizens as primarily based on trust, rather than on the content of expert argumentation. In criticism of this claim, four theses are defended: (1) Empirical studies suggest that content matters, while trust(worthiness) boasts persuasiveness. (2) In social policy controversies, genuine expert-solutions are normally not available; if trust is important here, then a clear role for cognitive asymmetry is wanting. (3) Social policy controversies pivot on values, so that biases and ideologies may explain participant behavior. (4) Few experts communicate perfectly; rather than cognitive ones, one might cite social differences

I Lunds Universitets database - hvor redaktøren sidder - er udgivelsesåret angivet til 2011: http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24732&postid=2295559. Så det tænker jeg er bedst at holde fast i.

I Lunds Universitets database - hvor redaktøren sidder - er udgivelsesåret angivet til 2011: http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24732&postid=2295559. Så det tænker jeg er bedst at holde fast i.

I Lunds Universitets database - hvor redaktøren sidder - er udgivelsesåret angivet til 2011: http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24732&postid=2295559. Så det tænker jeg er bedst at holde fast i.

I Lunds Universitets database - hvor redaktøren sidder - er udgivelsesåret angivet til 2011: http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24732&postid=2295559. Så det tænker jeg er bedst at holde fast i.

I Lunds Universitets database - hvor redaktøren sidder - er udgivelsesåret angivet til 2011: http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24732&postid=2295559. Så det tænker jeg er bedst at holde fast i.