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Throughout history, radical individuals have caused violence and tarnished the reputation of many communities and beliefs. Following 9/11, Islamic Terrorism put fear into many individuals. New fronts of the War on Terror began to open as militaries began to engage terrorist groups who sought to take action through radical beliefs. Al Qaeda had opened up a new front and joined the ranks of the Sunni Insurgency to confront the armed forces of the United States as the Invasion of Iraq began to unfold. This new group had radical leaders who were able to incite a stiff and violent campaign against their enemies. The U.S. was able to slow down the group, but not the ideology, tactics, and leadership once it withdrew from the conflict zone. As leaders in the area began to divide their societies by violence and marginalization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria were able to come into power and create small, quasi-legitimate caliphate. Although the group may be somewhat defeated in the region, the ideology will carry on. By using organizational theory, we can better compare both groups and learn from their strengths and weaknesses. Through analyzing this parallel case study, new doors may be opened up for research to be able to slow down radical ideologies and thwart violent actions.

Throughout history, radical individuals have caused violence and tarnished the reputation of many communities and beliefs. Following 9/11, Islamic Terrorism put fear into many individuals. New fronts of the War on Terror began to open as militaries began to engage terrorist groups who sought to take action through radical beliefs. Al Qaeda had opened up a new front and joined the ranks of the Sunni Insurgency to confront the armed forces of the United States as the Invasion of Iraq began to unfold. This new group had radical leaders who were able to incite a stiff and violent campaign against their enemies. The U.S. was able to slow down the group, but not the ideology, tactics, and leadership once it withdrew from the conflict zone. As leaders in the area began to divide their societies by violence and marginalization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria were able to come into power and create small, quasi-legitimate caliphate. Although the group may be somewhat defeated in the region, the ideology will carry on. By using organizational theory, we can better compare both groups and learn from their strengths and weaknesses. Through analyzing this parallel case study, new doors may be opened up for research to be able to slow down radical ideologies and thwart violent actions.

In 2006, a coalition intelligence report was writing off portions of Iraq as being lost to the control of the U.S.-led coalition and the government of Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)--a local manifestation of a transnational movement-- was at its peak, while the U.S.-led coalition was attempting to remove itself from the Hobbesian violence raging throughout the country in the forms of a civil war and an insurgency. Yet, within a year, AQI was a mere shadow of its former self, rejected by the Sunni population and on the run, hounded by coalition forces. This thesis analyzes the many factors that contributed to AQI's demise. Beginning with the premise that Iraq's Sunnis and AQI developed along two distinctly different paths, this thesis traces AQI's demise to disparate cultural and ideological differences. With this rift in place, additional factors widened the gap between the Sunni and AQI, further accelerating the group's decline. This thesis then goes on to develop a theory on insurgent/popular alignment, offering insights into how insurgents build support with the population and how the U.S. Special Forces community can build popular support for Unconventional Warfare efforts as a third party to an insurgency., The original document contains color images.