Search

Background: The European Association of Urology guidelines recommend a risk-based strategy for prostate cancer screening based on the first prostate-specific antigen (PSA) level and age. Objective: To analyze the impact of the first PSA level on prostate cancer (PCa) detection and PCa-specific mortality (PCSM) in a population-based screening trial (repeat screening every 2–4 yr). Design, setting, and participants: We evaluated 25 589 men aged 55–59 yr, 16 898 men aged 60–64 yr, and 12 936 men aged 65–69 yr who attended at least one screening visit in the European Randomized Study of Screening for Prostate Cancer (ERSPC) trial (screening arm: repeat PSA testing every 2–4 yr and biopsy in cases with elevated PSA; control arm: no active screening offered) during 16-yr follow-up (FU). Outcome measurements and statistical analysis: We assessed the actuarial probability for any PCa and for clinically significant (cs)PCa (Gleason ≥7). Cox proportional-hazards regression was performed to assess whether the association between baseline PSA and PCSM was comparable for all age groups. A Lorenz curve was computed to assess the association between baseline PSA and PCSM for men aged 60–61 yr. Results and limitations: The overall actuarial probability at 16 yr ranged from 12% to 16% for any PCa and from 3.7% to 5.7% for csPCa across the age groups. The actuarial probability of csPCa at 16 yr ranged from 1.2–1.5% for men with PSA <1.0 ng/ml to 13.3–13.8% for men with PSA ≥3.0 ng/ml. The association between baseline PSA and PCSM differed marginally among the three age groups. A Lorenz curve for men aged 60–61 yr showed that 92% of lethal PCa cases occurred among those with PSA above the median (1.21 ng/ml). In addition, for men initially screened at age 60–61 yr with baseline PSA <2 ng/ml, further continuation of screening is unlikely to be beneficial after the age of 68–70 yr if PSA is still <2 ng/ml. No case of PCSM emerged in the sub

In recent years, "smart city" has become a buzzword in discussions about urbanisation. While in Europe and North America the initial utopian optimism has now receded, due to booming implementation costs and surveillance concerns, the smart city model has taken root in rapidly urbanising Asia in particular, thanks to the activism of China and Japan. For the latter, smart city technologies and technical know-how represent the new frontier of export goods. In April 2018, the Government of Japan and that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam announced the construction of a new smart city on the outskirts of the Vietnamese capital Hanoi that is set to become Japan's largest ODA project to date. Despite changes in the global hegemonic narratives on smart cities, the new project bears the features of an urban settlement that revolves around technological data collection for the sake of perfect efficiency, rather than for its prospective inhabitants. Against this backdrop, how did the Government of Japan succeed in constructing a convincing narrative for made-in-Japan smart cities? Since 2011, thanks to specific initiatives by Japan's government and investments by Japanese tech companies in the sector, a Japanese discourse on smart cities has emerged. Through an examination of earlier critiques of the smart city model and a close analysis of official policies and books by energy policy intellectuals, this paper will identify the main features of the Japanese discourse on smart cities and place it in the context of an evolving broader global narrative. The study demonstrates how the Japanese discourse on smart cities largely reflects a corporate managerial vision of the city and, at the same time, a “technonationalist” approach that informs the country's foreign policy.

In the late 1980s, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam, hereafter) underwent a period of reforms known as doi moi (renovation), opened its economy to global flows of goods and capitals and adopted an “omnidirectional” strategy aimed at building relations with former “enemy” states like Japan and the US. These multiple transitions presented the country’s communist leadership with new challenges: first and foremost, transforming the country’s governance from socialist to a partially neoliberal one in the attempt to accommodate international partners’ and investors’ demands. The present study will address the following research question: by which means did the Vietnamese leadership succeed in surviving the demise of the USSR and conform to the emerging neoliberal global order? Against the backdrop of the global rise of the good governance model for international development, this article will shed light on Japan’s role during Vietnam’s first phase of reforms in the early 1990s through its government-led knowledge-based aid initiatives up until the draft of the country’s first Comprehensive Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy. It will argue that Japan offered a certain development know-how and a model of state-mediated growth which suited Vietnam’s Communist party’s needs to keep the single-party rule.

Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt die Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Vietnam unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines spezifischen Kooperationsprogramms: des "Japanese Grant Aid for Human Development Scholarship" (JDS); ein Stipendienprogramm, das in den zahlreichen japanischen Entwicklungshilfe-Initiativen in Entwicklungsländern Asiens enthalten ist. Das JDS-Programm, das im Jahr 2000 gestartet wurde, bietet jungen Staatsbeamten und zukünftigen Führungskräften aus Entwicklungsländern in Zentral-, Süd- und Südostasien sowie Afrika Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten in Bereichen wie Recht, Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung an öffentlichen und privaten Universitäten in Japan. Es wird argumentiert, dass Japan auch durch die JDS seine regionalen Beziehungen, insbesondere mit einigen Nationen Südostasiens, neugestaltet hat. Aus diesem Grund werden in der vorliegenden Studie die Hilfsbeziehungen zwischen dem südostasiatischen Land und Japan von 2000 bis 2015 dargestellt. Die ausgewählte Fallstudie zeigt eine diskursive Ambiguität der heutigen japanischen Außenpolitik auf. Es wird argumentiert, dass Hilfsinitiativen Japans für die Humanressourcenentwicklung von den verschiedenen Akteuren der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe diskursiv konzipiert wurden. Anstatt das Konzept der Entwicklung als einen einzigen diskursiven Apparat zu analysieren, untersucht diese Forschungsarbeit, wie unterschiedliche Diskurse und "Denkstile" zwischen Geber- und Empfängerland, Geber und anderen Gebern und sogar zwischen verschiedenen Geberorganisationen interagieren. Diese Denkstile wurden durch qualitative Interviews und dokumentarische Analysen ausgewertet. Zusammenfassend wird argumentiert, dass ein Zusammenspiel von Überlegungen, wie Japans "nationalem Interesse", Japans Zugehörigkeit zur internationalen Gesellschaft und Humanität die japanische wissensbasierte Hilfe seit 2000 geprägt habe. Das nationale Interesse scheint jedoch immer noch der stärkste Antrieb bei der Auszahlung von Beihilfen zu sein., The study sheds light on contemporary Japan-Vietnam relations from the point of view of a specific cooperation program : the “Japanese Grant A id for Human Development Scholarship” (JDS), a scholars hip program included in the vast range of Japanese foreign aid initiatives in developing Asia. The JDS programme, started in 2000, offers training in areas like law, economics and public administration to young state officials and future leaders from developing countries in Central, South and Southeast Asia and Africa, in public and private universities in Japan. It is argued that also through the JDS, Japan has reshaped its regional relations, in particular with a number of Southeast Asian nations. The present study aid relations between the Southeast Asian country and Japan from 2000 to 2015 are presented. The study aims to shed light on an apparent discursive ambiguity of today’s Japanese foreign policy. It is assumed that aid initiatives in human resource development, have been discursively conceptualised by the different actors participating in Japanese official development assistance (ODA). Instead of looking at the concept of development as a single discursive apparatus, this research looks at how different discourses and “styles of thought” interact between donor/recipient country, donor/other donors and even among different donor’s agencies. These styles of thought have been assessed through qualitative interviews and documentary analysis. It is argued, in sum, that an interplay of considerations such as Japan’s “national interest”, Japan's affiliation to the international society and humanitarianism have shaped Japanese knowledge-based aid since 2000. National interest, however, still appears to be the strongest drive in aid disbursement.

Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt die Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Vietnam unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines spezifischen Kooperationsprogramms: des "Japanese Grant Aid for Human Development Scholarship" (JDS); ein Stipendienprogramm, das in den zahlreichen japanischen Entwicklungshilfe-Initiativen in Entwicklungsländern Asiens enthalten ist. Das JDS-Programm, das im Jahr 2000 gestartet wurde, bietet jungen Staatsbeamten und zukünftigen Führungskräften aus Entwicklungsländern in Zentral-, Süd- und Südostasien sowie Afrika Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten in Bereichen wie Recht, Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung an öffentlichen und privaten Universitäten in Japan. Es wird argumentiert, dass Japan auch durch die JDS seine regionalen Beziehungen, insbesondere mit einigen Nationen Südostasiens, neugestaltet hat. Aus diesem Grund werden in der vorliegenden Studie die Hilfsbeziehungen zwischen dem südostasiatischen Land und Japan von 2000 bis 2015 dargestellt. Die ausgewählte Fallstudie zeigt eine diskursive Ambiguität der heutigen japanischen Außenpolitik auf. Es wird argumentiert, dass Hilfsinitiativen Japans für die Humanressourcenentwicklung von den verschiedenen Akteuren der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe diskursiv konzipiert wurden. Anstatt das Konzept der Entwicklung als einen einzigen diskursiven Apparat zu analysieren, untersucht diese Forschungsarbeit, wie unterschiedliche Diskurse und "Denkstile" zwischen Geber- und Empfängerland, Geber und anderen Gebern und sogar zwischen verschiedenen Geberorganisationen interagieren. Diese Denkstile wurden durch qualitative Interviews und dokumentarische Analysen ausgewertet. Zusammenfassend wird argumentiert, dass ein Zusammenspiel von Überlegungen, wie Japans "nationalem Interesse", Japans Zugehörigkeit zur internationalen Gesellschaft und Humanität die japanische wissensbasierte Hilfe seit 2000 geprägt habe. Das nationale Interesse scheint jedoch immer noch der stärkste Antrieb bei der Auszahlung von Beihilfen zu sein., The study sheds light on contemporary Japan-Vietnam relations from the point of view of a specific cooperation program : the “Japanese Grant A id for Human Development Scholarship” (JDS), a scholars hip program included in the vast range of Japanese foreign aid initiatives in developing Asia. The JDS programme, started in 2000, offers training in areas like law, economics and public administration to young state officials and future leaders from developing countries in Central, South and Southeast Asia and Africa, in public and private universities in Japan. It is argued that also through the JDS, Japan has reshaped its regional relations, in particular with a number of Southeast Asian nations. The present study aid relations between the Southeast Asian country and Japan from 2000 to 2015 are presented. The study aims to shed light on an apparent discursive ambiguity of today’s Japanese foreign policy. It is assumed that aid initiatives in human resource development, have been discursively conceptualised by the different actors participating in Japanese official development assistance (ODA). Instead of looking at the concept of development as a single discursive apparatus, this research looks at how different discourses and “styles of thought” interact between donor/recipient country, donor/other donors and even among different donor’s agencies. These styles of thought have been assessed through qualitative interviews and documentary analysis. It is argued, in sum, that an interplay of considerations such as Japan’s “national interest”, Japan's affiliation to the international society and humanitarianism have shaped Japanese knowledge-based aid since 2000. National interest, however, still appears to be the strongest drive in aid disbursement.

BACKGROUND: Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) screening and concomitant treatment can be implemented in several ways. The authors investigated how the net benefit of PSA screening varies between common practice versus “good practice.”. METHODS: Microsimulation screening analysis (MISCAN) was used to evaluate the effect on quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) if 4 recommendations were followed: limited screening in older men, selective biopsy in men with elevated PSA, active surveillance for low-risk tumors, and treatment preferentially delivered at high-volume centers. Outcomes were compared with a base model in which annual screening started at ages 55 to 69 years and were simulated using data from the European Randomized Study of Screening for Prostate Cancer. RESULTS: In terms of QALYs gained compared with no screening, for 1000 screened men who were followed over their lifetime, recommended good practice led to 73 life-years (LYs) and 74 QALYs gained compared with 73 LYs and 56 QALYs for the base model. In contrast, common practice led to 78 LYs gained but only 19 QALYs gained, for a greater than 75% relative reduction in QALYs gained from unadjusted LYs gained. The poor outcomes for common practice were influenced predominantly by the use of aggressive treatment for men with low-risk disease, and PSA testing in older men also strongly reduced potential QALY gains. CONCLUSIONS: Commonly used PSA screening and treatment practices are associated with little net benefit. Following a few straightforward clinical recommendations, particularly greater use of active surveillance for low-risk disease and reducing screening in older men, would lead to an almost 4-fold increase in the net benefit of prostate cancer screening. Cancer 2016;122:3386–3393.

Overdiagnosis, the detection through screening of a breast cancer that would never have been identified in the lifetime of the woman, is an adverse outcome of screening. We aimed to determine an estimate range for overdiagnosis of breast cancer in European mammographic service screening programmes.

Overdiagnosis, the detection through screening of a breast cancer that would never have been identified in the lifetime of the woman, is an adverse outcome of screening. We aimed to determine an estimate range for overdiagnosis of breast cancer in European mammographic service screening programmes.