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BACKGROUND: In the UK, the closure of 'long-stay' hospitals was accompanied by the development of community teams (CTs) to support people with intellectual disabilities (IDs) to live in community settings. The self-reported experiences of staff working in such teams have been neglected. METHODS: Focusing on a single county-wide service, comprising five multi-disciplinary and inter-agency CTs, we measured perceptions among the health care and care management Team members of (1) their personal well-being; (2) the functioning of their team; and (3) the organisation's commitment to quality, and culture. RESULTS: Almost three-quarters of the questionnaires were returned (73/101; 72%). The scores of health care practitioners and care managers were very similar: (1) the MBI scores of more than half the respondents were 'of concern'; (2) similarly, almost four in ten respondents' scores on the Vision scale of the TCI were 'of concern'; (3) the perceived commitment to quality (QIIS-II Part 2) was uncertain; and (4) the organisational culture (QIIS-II, Part 1) was viewed as primarily hierarchical. DISCUSSION: The perceived absence of a vision for the service, combined with a dominant culture viewed by its members as strongly focussed on bureaucracy and process, potentially compromises the ability of these CTs to respond proactively to the needs of people with IDs. Given the changes in legislation, policy and practice that have taken place since CTs were established, it would be timely to revisit their role and purpose.

When people receive descriptions or doctored photos of events that never happened, they often come to remember those events. But if people receive both a description and a doctored photo, does the order in which they receive the information matter? We asked people to consider a description and a doctored photograph of a childhood hot air balloon ride, and we varied which medium they saw first. People who saw a description first reported more false images and memories than did people who saw a photo first, a result that fits with an anchoring account of false childhood memories.

False information can influence people's beliefs and memories. But can fabricated evidence induce individuals to accuse another person of doing something they never did? We examined whether exposure to a fabricated video could produce false eyewitness testimony. Subjects completed a gambling task alongside a confederate subject, and later we falsely told subjects that their partner had cheated on the task. Some subjects viewed a digitally manipulated video of their partner cheating; some were told that video evidence of the cheating exists; and others were not told anything about video evidence. Subjects were asked to sign a statement confirming that they witnessed the incident and that their corroboration could be used in disciplinary action against the accused. See-video subjects were three times more likely to sign the statement than Told-video and Control subjects. Fabricated evidence may, indeed, produce false eyewitness testimony; we discuss probable cognitive mechanisms. Copyright (C) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and they have been exposed to false evidence that indicates the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? Subjects observed and copied various simple actions, then viewed doctored videos that suggested they had performed extra actions, and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned two weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; the two techniques in combination appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.