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À quelques mois des élections régionales, fédéraleset européennes de 2024, le spectre des partis de l’extrêmedroite plane sur la Belgique. Dans l’agendade ces partis, les questions touchant aux droits despersonnes LGBTQIA+ (lesbiennes, gays, bisexuelles,trans, queers, intersexuées, asexuées et autres) sontbien présentes. Parler de la relation entre les personnesLGBTQIA+ et l’extrême droite peut paraîtrecontradictoire du fait des liens de ces partis avecdes mouvements religieux, conservateurs et hostilesaux personnes LGBTQIA+ dans de nombreux payseuropéens. L’objectif de ce chapitre est de décrypterle lien complexe et les stratégies mises en place parles partis d’extrême droite autour des questions liéesaux personnes LGBTQIA+., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Although they belong to different spheres, popular culture and populism can in some cases become intertwined and interlocked because they are both built around the antagonism between people and elite. Populist parties are often happy to associate themselves with popular culture as this allows them to strengthen their bond with the (signifier) people. This chapter looks at an inverse movement: the contestation of a populist party's claim on the people through popular culture. It analyzes the discursive struggle between the Flemish extreme-right populist party Vlaams Belang and 0110. On 1 October 2006, a series of concerts “for tolerance, against racism, against extremism, and against gratuitous violence” featuring many of Belgium's most popular artists from all kinds of genres, were held in four Belgian cities. The chapter shows how the organization behind the 0110 concerts managed to turn popular culture against the Vlaams Belang, thus questioning this party's claim on the signifier “people”.

Une des caractéristiques du style populiste est la critique du système politique, institutionnel et partisan dans lequel les partis populistes tentent d’émerger et/ou de se développer. Les commentaires et propositions anti-establishment visent à mobiliser les électeurs déçus par l’offre partisane traditionnelle et qui se sentent éloignés d’une élite politique, socio-économique et culturelle qui ne les comprendraient pas. Ces propositions des partis populistes visent non seulement les élus des partis traditionnels, les médias, les acteurs socio-économiques, etc. mais également les réformes du système politico-institutionnel. Ce chapitre étudie les positions des principaux partis populistes de droite radicale en Belgique sur les thématiques liées à la démocratie dans leurs programmes électoraux. Les positions de ces partis sur des thématiques telles que l’immigration, la criminalité ou l’avenir de la Flandre ont été étudiées par de nombreux chercheurs, mais on connait moins leurs promesses électorales en matière de démocratie.

A new phase in the development of radical right populist parties (RRPP) has questioned the role of these parties since the beginning of the 2000s. While increasingly legitimized and increasingly gaining access to power, they tend to be perceived as normalized political parties. At the same time, many researchers argue that they are a threat to the quality of democracy. Yet, their real – direct or indirect – influence on policy-making has barely been investigated and the existing literature dealing with this subject remains limited. My paper thus aims to fill this gap by apprehending the relationship between populist parties and the policy-making process. The research thus contributes to discover if, to what extend and how radical right populist parties try to influence policy-making. In order to do so, the process-tracing method is used, based on original data. Three West European cases are compared in this research: the Swiss Union démocratique du centre (UDC), the French Front national (FN), and the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB), and their respective influence on policy-making in the foreigners’ criminality policy sector is assessed. The results of the research show that RRPPs influence policy-making, but only regarding a very limited number of pledges and indirectly. Because they are perceived as dangerous parties for democracy, measure of militant democracy prevents them from exercising a direct influence on policy-making. Therefore, RRPPs develop other strategies to exercise a policy influence in the long term. The results finally suggest a reflexion regarding militant democracy.

Une nouvelle phase dans le développement des partis populistes de droite radicale (PPDR) a conduit à questionner le rôle exercé par ces partis, classiquement reconnus comme constituant une menace à l’égard de la démocratie. Dans certains cas, ils parviennent à atteindre le pouvoir alors que, dans d’autres cas, ils sont réputés exercer une influence importante sur la fabrique des politiques publiques bien que n’étant pas au pouvoir. Néanmoins, très peu d’études ont tenté d’évaluer empiriquement l’influence réelle de ces partis. Par ailleurs, presqu’aucune étude analyse les stratégies qu’ils emploient pour exercer cette influence. La présente communication propose donc de répondre à la question suivante, sur la base de trois cas de PPDR (UDC suisse, FN français, VB belge) : quelle influence les PPDR exercent-ils sur la fabrique des politiques publiques, et comment procèdent-ils ? La méthode du process-tracing permet d’étudier dans quelles mesures et comment les PPDR parviennent à développer leurs promesses électorales à travers le processus de fabrique des politiques publiques, depuis la problématisation et la mise à l’agenda jusqu’à l’adoption de décisions concrètes. Sur la base de données issues de 102 entretiens, d’archives et d’observations participantes, le recours à cette méthode a l’avantage d’ouvrir la boite noire de ces processus et de vérifier des liens de causalité. Les résultats suggèrent que l’influence des PPDR sur la fabrique des politiques publiques est existante mais aussi particulièrement limitée pour plusieurs raisons. Par ailleurs, ils permettent d’établir un répertoire de tactiques développé par les PPDR dans leur tentative d’influence.

This thesis investigates strategic media practices of the ‘new nationalist’ political parties in Western Europe. It provides an extensive literature review, interviews and a review of media artefacts, to establish how the parties have achieved substantial public support. It uses four case studies: the French Front National (FN), the Flemish Vlaams Belang (VB), Danish Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and the Europeanist-regionalist movement, Bloc Identitaire (BI). It draws on work by Cas Mudde, to define the parties as authoritarian, nativist and populist – ANPs. It describes their central concern with Islam in Europe (mass immigration, integration or otherwise of Muslim populations, and associated tensions), and their developing of the issue to gain support. The research concludes that the ANPs have been successful in campaigning through mass media to substantially improve their political position.

EU är ett unikt samarbetskoncept för 28 stater som anses vara välfungerande både på ett ekonomiskt och socialt plan. Trots det kan man nu se en tydlig trend av att främlingsfientliga partier växer sig allt större. Vi frågar oss i denna uppsats om det kan bero på EU som organisation i sig och ett lands grad av integrering. Vi tittar huvudsakligen på hur den ekonomiska integreringen påverkar främlingsfientliga partiers förekomst men också xenofobi i allmänhet. Genom en teorikonsumerande, komparativ fallstudie undersöker vi relationen mellan variablerna utan att leta efter kausala samband. Studien tar upp teorier som behandlar hur främlingsfientlighet sprids. Med hjälp av dessa analyserar vi skillnader och likheter i både i låg och hög integrationsgrad och pekar på hur grad av integration kan påverka främlingsfientliga partiers framgångar. Slutsatsen vi drar är att det inte går att påvisa ett kausalt samband men vår fallstudie visade trots det att integrationen har en viss påverkan när det kommer till främlingsfientliga partiers ökade väljarstöd.

EU är ett unikt samarbetskoncept för 28 stater som anses vara välfungerande både på ett ekonomiskt och socialt plan. Trots det kan man nu se en tydlig trend av att främlingsfientliga partier växer sig allt större. Vi frågar oss i denna uppsats om det kan bero på EU som organisation i sig och ett lands grad av integrering. Vi tittar huvudsakligen på hur den ekonomiska integreringen påverkar främlingsfientliga partiers förekomst men också xenofobi i allmänhet. Genom en teorikonsumerande, komparativ fallstudie undersöker vi relationen mellan variablerna utan att leta efter kausala samband. Studien tar upp teorier som behandlar hur främlingsfientlighet sprids. Med hjälp av dessa analyserar vi skillnader och likheter i både i låg och hög integrationsgrad och pekar på hur grad av integration kan påverka främlingsfientliga partiers framgångar. Slutsatsen vi drar är att det inte går att påvisa ett kausalt samband men vår fallstudie visade trots det att integrationen har en viss påverkan när det kommer till främlingsfientliga partiers ökade väljarstöd.

Despite the proliferation of studies exploring the success of the populist radical right, there is a lack of research on why these parties decline or fail. And when this question is addressed, the literature focuses on supply-side variables such as leadership battles or a lack of organizational structure. These explanations largely fall short, however, in understanding the strange decline of the Belgian Vlaams Belang at the latest elections. Instead, it is argued that there is less space available for the populist radical right. Survey data suggests that two competing parties succeeded in exploiting issues that were previously owned exclusively by the Vlaams Belang (VB). More surprising, however, is the impact of the cordon sanitaire on the decline of the VB. This study shows that although populist radical right parties might not perform well in government, they will face difficulties too if they stay in permanent opposition, because they become perceived as irrelevant in the long run. © 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Despite the proliferation of studies exploring the success of the populist radical right, there is a lack of research on why these parties decline or fail. And when this question is addressed, the literature focuses on supply-side variables such as leadership battles or a lack of organizational structure. These explanations largely fall short, however, in understanding the strange decline of the Belgian Vlaams Belang at the latest elections. Instead, it is argued that there is less space available for the populist radical right. Survey data suggests that two competing parties succeeded in exploiting issues that were previously owned exclusively by the Vlaams Belang (VB). More surprising, however, is the impact of the cordon sanitaire on the decline of the VB. This study shows that although populist radical right parties might not perform well in government, they will face difficulties too if they stay in permanent opposition, because they become perceived as irrelevant in the long run. © 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Although they belong to different spheres, popular culture and populism can in some cases become intertwined and interlocked because they are both built around the antagonism between people and elite. Populist parties are often happy to associate themselves with popular culture as this allows them to strengthen their bond with the (signifier) people. This article looks at an inverse movement: the contestation of a populist party's claim on the people through popular culture. It analyzes the discursive struggle between the Flemish extreme-right populist party Vlaams Belang and 0110. On 1 October 2006, a series of concerts ''for tolerance, against racism, against extremism, and against gratuitous violence'' featuring many of Belgium's most popular artists from all kinds of genres, were held in four Belgian cities. The article shows how the organization behind the 0110 concerts managed to turn popular culture against the Vlaams Belang, thus questioning this party's claim on the signifier ''people''.

On 1 October 2006 - one week before the municipal elections - the 0110 concerts 'for tolerance, against racism, against extremism, against gratuitous violence' were held in the Belgian cities of Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent and Charleroi. With these concerts the organizers wanted to make a statement against the extreme right Flemish-nationalist party Vlaams Belang (VB). This article looks at the discourse of the artists organizing and participating in the concerts, and at how this was communicated through the concerts, and asks how the VB reacted to 0110. The key to understanding this discursive struggle is populism. After discussing the VB and earlier anti-racist initiatives in Belgium from the perspective of populism, the article presents the results of a discourse analysis of the external communication of the VB and of the 0110 organization, of press coverage of 0110, and of the live coverage of the concerts. It discusses three issues that were central to the struggle between 0110 and the VB: the relationship between 0110 and (institutionalized) politics, the discourse of tolerance, and the participation of popular artists. © The Author(s), 2009., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

On 1 October 2006 - one week before the municipal elections - the 0110 concerts 'for tolerance, against racism, against extremism, against gratuitous violence' were held in the Belgian cities of Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent and Charleroi. With these concerts the organizers wanted to make a statement against the extreme right Flemish-nationalist party Vlaams Belang (VB). This article looks at the discourse of the artists organizing and participating in the concerts, and at how this was communicated through the concerts, and asks how the VB reacted to 0110. The key to understanding this discursive struggle is populism. After discussing the VB and earlier anti-racist initiatives in Belgium from the perspective of populism, the article presents the results of a discourse analysis of the external communication of the VB and of the 0110 organization, of press coverage of 0110, and of the live coverage of the concerts. It discusses three issues that were central to the struggle between 0110 and the VB: the relationship between 0110 and (institutionalized) politics, the discourse of tolerance, and the participation of popular artists. © The Author(s), 2009., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Trad. de : "Het Vlaams blok in elk van ons", Comment en arrive-t-on à voter pour un parti raciste, le Vlaams blok ? En octobre 2000, un Anversois sur trois a voté pour ce parti d'extrême droite. Manu Claeys analyse les mentalités de sa propre communauté pour en extirper des réponses. Il incite tous les démocrates à débusquer leurs propres manquements conduisant au choix irresponsable d'un tel parti.

Notes bibliogr.

This thesis develops an in-depth understanding of a specific case at the intersection of extreme right politics, marketing and language. More specifically, the research focuses on a Flemish extreme right party, the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang which provides a rich site of enquiry for the analysis of political communications, marketing strategies and discursive processes. Critical discourse analysis of the verbal and visual elements of Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang publications reveals, on three levels, the strategic use of lexical, rhetorical and other linguistic devices to brand and differentiate the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang from other political parties. The thesis demonstrates that the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang manages to legitimate its political product by dismissing unfavourable features (such as racism and xenophobia), and repackaging them (as nationalist) for a wider audience as a ready-to-consume product that achieves electoral success. The main contributions of the thesis are fourfold. First, the research provides a marketing-related explanation of the success of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang. The pervasiveness of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang's discourse in Belgian politics makes the analysis of the party interesting in its own right. The critical discursive analysis reveals the underlying market-orientation of the party and the methods and techniques that the party uses to communicate and persuade. Second, this research demonstrates that marketing can be used to advance an ideological discourse that places consumption in a central position in people's lives. The application of critical discourse analysis thus provides a novel and valuable contribution to the understanding of political marketing. Third, the thesis sets the stage for furthering understanding of how marketing is deployed with increasing sophistication outside its traditional, commercial domain, and, more specifically, in politics. Finally, critical discourse analysis has an emancipatory goal in un

This thesis develops an in-depth understanding of a specific case at the intersection of extreme right politics, marketing and language. More specifically, the research focuses on a Flemish extreme right party, the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang which provides a rich site of enquiry for the analysis of political communications, marketing strategies and discursive processes. Critical discourse analysis of the verbal and visual elements of Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang publications reveals, on three levels, the strategic use of lexical, rhetorical and other linguistic devices to brand and differentiate the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang from other political parties. The thesis demonstrates that the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang manages to legitimate its political product by dismissing unfavourable features (such as racism and xenophobia), and repackaging them (as nationalist) for a wider audience as a ready-to-consume product that achieves electoral success. The main contributions of the thesis are fourfold. First, the research provides a marketing-related explanation of the success of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang. The pervasiveness of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang's discourse in Belgian politics makes the analysis of the party interesting in its own right. The critical discursive analysis reveals the underlying market-orientation of the party and the methods and techniques that the party uses to communicate and persuade. Second, this research demonstrates that marketing can be used to advance an ideological discourse that places consumption in a central position in people's lives. The application of critical discourse analysis thus provides a novel and valuable contribution to the understanding of political marketing. Third, the thesis sets the stage for furthering understanding of how marketing is deployed with increasing sophistication outside its traditional, commercial domain, and, more specifically, in politics. Finally, critical discourse analysis has an emancipatory goal in un