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Following the deaths of ten Irish republican hunger strikers in 1981, radical Basque nationalists and Irish republicans of the Basque izquierda abertzale (‘patriotic left’) and Irish republican movement respectively, began to develop ever closer ties of transnational “solidarity”. In addition to the relationship between Herri Batasuna and Sinn Féin, more ad hoc organisational links in areas such as youth, prisoner, and language advocacy, fostered a shared political culture at the intersection of both movements, which was periodically reflected through the prism of cultural expression (e.g., music, political art [murals], literature, audiovisual media). Utilising a wide array of primary sources, this article explores and analyses the emergence and development of this transnational nexus, from the hunger strikes of 1981 to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998., Tras la muerte de diez republicanos irlandeses en huelga de hambre en 1981, nacionalistas vascos radicales y republicanos irlandeses de la izquierda abertzale y del movimiento republicano irlandés respectivamente, empezaron a estrechar cada vez más, lazos de “solidaridad” transnacional. Además de la relación entre Herri Batasuna y Sinn Féin, otros vínculos organizativos más ad hoc en los ámbitos, por ejemplo, de la juventud, de la defensa de los presos y de la lengua, fomentaron una cultura política compartida en la intersección de ambos movimientos, que se reflejaba periódicamente a través del prisma de la expresión cultural (música, arte político [murales], literatura, medios audiovisuales). Utilizando una amplia gama de fuentes primarias, este artículo explora y analiza el surgimiento y desarrollo de este nexo transnacional, desde las huelgas de hambre de 1981 hasta la firma del Acuerdo de Viernes Santo en 1998.

Aquest article estudia la història de vida i l’activitat política d’Ambrose Victor Martin, nacionalista irlandès que milità en el Sinn Féin, combaté en la Guerra de la Independència irlandesa, i més endavant prengué part en la Guerra Civil irlandesa en tant que integrant de les forces antitractadistes. L’interès que suscita aquest personatge per a la historiografia catalana i espanyola rau en el fet que durant els anys vint establí relacions amb Estat Català i alguns nacionalistes bascos. L’article presta una especial atenció a aquestes relacions, en particular a l’associació de l’irlandès amb Estat Català, així com a la defensa del País Basc que Martin dugué a terme a Irlanda durant la Guerra Civil espanyola., This article surveys the life and political engagement of Ambrose Victor Martin, Irish nationalist who joined the Sinn Féin party, fought with the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of Independence, and took part in the Irish Civil War in the ranks of the anti-treaty forces. This article shall certainly be relevant for Catalan and Spanish historiography because Martin established a direct relation with Estat Català and some Basque nationalists during the twenties. The pages that follow focus on those relations, as well as on the defence of the Basque Country that Martin undertook in Ireland during the Spanish Civil War.

Afin de participer, d’aspirer à gouverner et de ne pas s’aliéner de potentiels électeur·trice·s, des partis autrefois marginaux peuvent s’institutionnaliser et modifier leur agenda et leurs stratégies. Au lendemain des cinquante ans du Parti québécois, quel bilan peut-on dresser de cette organisation ? Cet article explore dans une perspective comparative les raisons derrière le processus d’institutionnalisation, en étudiant également les cas du Scottish National Party en Écosse et du Sinn Féin en Irlande du Nord. Les données utilisées sont théoriques et empiriques, relevant de l’analyse de leurs plateformes électorales. Cela permet d’évaluer également leur caractère antisystémique, tout en considérant leur contexte sociopolitique respectif.

The 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Peace Agreement was almost universally supported by nationalists in Northern Ireland, and Sinn Féin’s high-profile role in the discussions was the foundation upon which it would transform itself from the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to second biggest party at Stormont. However, dissidents pointed out that the compromises made by Sinn Féin during the Peace Process were a sell-out of the political and ideological aspirations held by republicans for at least a century. New dissident groups emerged in opposition to the course taken by Sinn Féin, and the period since 1998 has been one of the most dynamic in republican history since the Irish Civil War. New political parties and organisations like the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, éirígí, Republican Network for Unity and Saoradh emerged reflecting this state of flux and the existential fears felt by those for whom the Good Friday Agreement fell far short of delivering the republican aspiration of a united Ireland. Although Brexit provided a curious and fortunate opportunity for momentary public attention, these groups have remained peripheral actors in the Irish and British political public spheres.

The transitioning of armed actors into political parties following a peace accord is not a new phenomenon and the debate for how we can facilitate such a transition is well explored. A grey area of the debate, however, concerns transitioned actors’ long-term commitment to peace, as relapses are known to have occurred on many occasions. How are successful transitions sustained and what are the facilitating mechanisms? Through a case study of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, this thesis aims to contribute to the very limited debate on the facilitation of peace continuity of transitioned actors. Interviews were conducted in Belfast during the fall of 2018. The present-time contextual changes posed by the United Kingdom exiting the European union, which endangers the 1998 peace agreement that helped facilitate Sinn Féin’s transition, provides a good case for studying the institutional resilience to violent relapse of a transitioned actor. The findings show that Sinn Féin display strong levels of institutional resilience, which can help the institution to abstain from relapses into violence caused by contextual changes such as Brexit.

El presente artículo pretende analizar el papel jugado por la prensa de orientación republicana y unionista en el camino hacia el Acuerdo de Viernes Santo, firmado entre el nacionalismo irlandés, los sectores más moderados del unionismo y los gobiernos irlandés y británico, además de ser auspiciado por la comunidad internacional, y en la implementación de los acuerdos de paz en Irlanda del Norte. El estudio se centra en dos cabeceras de fuerte compromiso editorial con sus respectivas causas: The Irish News (nacionalista) y The Newsletter (unionista), y en la convergencia de su postura sobre los acontecimientos que han marcado los últimos quince años en el Ulster., This paper analyzes the role played by the Republican and Unionist press on the road towards the Good Friday Agreement, signed between Irish nationalists, the most moderate Unionists, and the Irish and British governments, and sponsored by the international community, in addition to the implementation of the agreement in Northern Ireland. It also analyzes two newspapers strongly committed to their respective causes – The Irish News (nationalist) and The Newsletter (unionist) – and their surprisingly convergent stance as regards the events marking the last 15 years in Ulster.

Finding a political framework for self-government in Northern Ireland that will be supported by both nationalists and unionists is referred to as a modern day attempt to do the impossible-to 'square the circle.' During the latest phase of the Troubles, from 1968 to 1996, there have been many attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland by creating a negotiated settlement, but none has worked. This thesis compares two of the most significant attempts, the first in 1973 and the second in 1993, to evaluate prospects for peace in the future. Although the goals of both attempts were the same (a devolved government, economic recovery, and the cessation of terrorist violence), a comparison shows important differences in the political atmosphere and style of the peace process, effected especially by the changing role of the Irish Republican Army's political wing, Sinn Fein, and the intervention of third party mediators, http://archive.org/details/squaringcirclett109459001, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The purpose of this essay is to study the republican and socialist Northern Ireland political party Sinn Féin and to examine its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens of Northern Ireland. Is it possible to have a political agenda that includes violence and still maintain legitimacy? The Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) military struggle was for a long time a part of the party’s political agenda. This strategy has been described as to have a ballot paper in one hand and an Armalite in the other, and successfully made Sinn Féin one of the province’s largest political parties. I have examined the time period from 1989 to present time. My concept of legitimacy is based on a theory by the political scientist Mikael Axberg, who describes legitimacy to be a concept that contains three different parts: a legal, a democratic and a sociological perspective. Methodically this essay is both a qualitative and quantitative study. The main question of the essay is:”Can Sinn Féin be considered to be a political party of a legitimate foundation in the eyes of the citizens?”. In order to examine this question I have used three sub questions: 1) Is Sinn Féin, from a legal understanding of legitimacy, a legitimate party? 2) Is Sinn Féin, from a democratic understanding of legitimacy, a legitimate party? 3) Is Sinn Féin, from a sociological understanding of legitimacy, a legitimate party? Of course this is not the only way to understand legitimacy and approach this problem, but it is the way I find most useful in order to answer the question. The sub questions have a wide range and include three different perspectives, which provides a good foundation for answering the main question of the essay. The essay comes to the conclusion that Sinn Féin is a legitimate party in the eyes of the citizens, if the polarisation of the society is considered. Catholic and protestant citizens have very different views on the legitimacy of Sinn Féin. The essay concludes that if a society is as polarised

The current conflicts facing the United States and its allies around the world have brought the discussion of counterinsurgency to the forefront of security studies and international politics. Dr. Thomas Henriksen's monograph on Northern Ireland wades into the discussion as a good historical case study that can provide insight into our current situation. He provides an excellent, short, historical background to frame his analysis. Understanding the historical antecedents of an insurgency is a critical element in any case study because insurgencies are local, not global events. International issues may influence what occurs in an insurgency, but locals rise up in rebellion for their personal grievances or desires. Readers should view the case study through the prism of a "whole of government" approach to dealing with insurgency. The ultimate goal of this whole of government approach is to wean the population away from supporting the insurgents. Is Northern Ireland a viable or valid model for today's world? It is, but the reader must be careful in drawing quick conclusions. Some underlying issues need to be addressed while using this case study, and the key one is the role of the United Kingdom's government. In other words, the United Kingdom is a wealthy, capable, modern, liberal democracy with a well-developed state system and civil society. In today's conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the local states do not approach the capacity and capabilities of the United Kingdom. Is an outside power capable of playing the role of "arbiter" that the central government was able to project during the 30-year "Troubles" in Northern Ireland? How does an outside power provide the security necessary for political and economic reforms? Can a weaker state support these necessary reforms? The answers to these questions will be borne out in the coming years., ISBN 1-933749-28-8

There are many different types and classifications of insurgencies. Two major types are leftist, Maoist-style insurgencies and right-wing, nationalist/religious-style insurgencies. As the right-wing, nationalist/religious-style insurgencies continue to grow and gain momentum, the question becomes, "Are right-wing, nationalist/religious-style insurgencies better structured and equipped to succeed than the leftist-style insurgencies?" To answer this question, this monograph will analyze the structure, tactical levels of discipline, operational focus, and insurgent strategies of two modern insurgencies: the Irish Republican Movement in Northern Ireland and the Maoist Rebels in Nepal. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)) initiated its insurgency in 1996, when it started a "people's war" against the government of Nepal. The CPN(M)'s main goals were to establish a communist government in Nepal, remove the monarchical system, and remove the caste system from the country. The CPN(M) is an egalitarian type of insurgency that uses Mao Tse-Tung's Protracted People's War strategy. However, they have modified the strategy over the past few years to incorporate urban terrorist operations. This new strategy is called the Prachanda Path, named after the leader of the CPN(M)--Prachanda. The Provincial Irish Republican Army (PIRA) ("Oglaigh na hEireann" in Gaelic) started in 1969 when it split from the Official Irish Republican Army. Their initial goals were to protect the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, force the British to leave Northern Ireland, and unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland as one country. They are a secessionist insurgency that uses an urban insurgent strategy. They conduct terrorism in Northern Ireland and abroad to try to force the government of the United Kingdom to the negotiating table. Their political party arm is Sinn Fein., The original document contains color images.

For years, the British and Irish governments sought to facilitate a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Northern Ireland. After many ups and downs, the two governments and the eight parties participating in peace talks announced an agreement on April 10, 1998. However, the implementation of the resulting Good Friday Agreement continues to be difficult. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The author discusses the obstacles in transitioning to the new power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly.

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peer-reviewed, The full text of this article will not be available in ULIR until the embargo expires on the 26/04/2022, At the general election of February 2020, Sinn Féin won a plurality of the vote in the Republic of Ireland for the first time. The party system remained highly fragmented and, with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael refusing to enter government with Sinn Féin, government formation took a record 20 weeks. Those 20 weeks coincided with the emergence of the Covid-19 public health emergency in Europe. A minority caretaker government introduced significant policy measures to address the associated public health and economic crises. At the end of June, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael entered government together for the first time, and the Green Party joined them in a three-party majority coalition. The government faces significant challenges resulting from Covid-19 and from the UK’s exit from the EU, and other policy problems including housing and healthcare.

peer-reviewed, The full text of this article will not be available in ULIR until the embargo expires on the 26/04/2022, At the general election of February 2020, Sinn Féin won a plurality of the vote in the Republic of Ireland for the first time. The party system remained highly fragmented and, with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael refusing to enter government with Sinn Féin, government formation took a record 20 weeks. Those 20 weeks coincided with the emergence of the Covid-19 public health emergency in Europe. A minority caretaker government introduced significant policy measures to address the associated public health and economic crises. At the end of June, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael entered government together for the first time, and the Green Party joined them in a three-party majority coalition. The government faces significant challenges resulting from Covid-19 and from the UK’s exit from the EU, and other policy problems including housing and healthcare.

peer-reviewed, The general election that followed the ‘earthquake’ of 25 February 2011 (Gallagher and Marsh 2011; Hutcheson 2011; Little 2011) was always going to be an important staging post on the journey from the Fianna Fáil party’s predominance towards some new dispensation. That election took place five years and one day later. It delivered the most fragmented Dáil (lower house of parliament) ever and was followed by Ireland’s longest government formation process. Fine Gael’s Enda Kenny succeeded in becoming the first leader of his party since the 1920s to retain the office of Taoiseach (Prime Minister) after a general election. He achieved this by negotiating a minority coalition with several non-party (‘Independent’) TDs (MPs) and a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with Fianna Fáil. However, the durability of these arrangements is in doubt.

peer-reviewed, The general election that followed the ‘earthquake’ of 25 February 2011 (Gallagher and Marsh 2011; Hutcheson 2011; Little 2011) was always going to be an important staging post on the journey from the Fianna Fáil party’s predominance towards some new dispensation. That election took place five years and one day later. It delivered the most fragmented Dáil (lower house of parliament) ever and was followed by Ireland’s longest government formation process. Fine Gael’s Enda Kenny succeeded in becoming the first leader of his party since the 1920s to retain the office of Taoiseach (Prime Minister) after a general election. He achieved this by negotiating a minority coalition with several non-party (‘Independent’) TDs (MPs) and a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with Fianna Fáil. However, the durability of these arrangements is in doubt.