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Russia and China challenge the liberal order and rule of law on a global and regional level. The Trump administration has facilitated the support of the move away from the liberal international order and the "Westphalian" system of states that America had defended for centuries. Extremism is thriving around the world, including in sub-Saharan Africa, fuelled by the aftermath of colonialism, poverty and Islamist ideologies. Regions with limited statehood became failed states where violent conflicts threatened regional security and stability. Russia benefited from the resulting power vacuum. Moscow focused on countries that were formerly French and Portuguese colonies, which Moscow believed are easier to infiltrate. Under these conditions, Putin is free to exploit the political and social contradictions in Africa and destabilize the Western order, even at the risk of the rise of Islamic terrorism. Terrorist criminal pipelines and corrupt states have been exploited by Russian arms dealers across Africa for decades. These included notorious support for the Taylor regime in Liberia in the early 2000s, including the infamous Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, dubbed the 'merchant of death'. The cooperation was based on state control of ports of entry and exit for criminal organizations to safeguard profit-sharing, diplomatic passports, including associated immunity, and the rule of law, which ensured the smooth marketing of these companies. Today, Russia benefits primarily from providing "security" to autocratic leaders, including arms sales, advice and training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against Islamic terrorism in exchange for access to African resources and markets. Aside from Al-Quida, the Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram other local Islamic organizations are fuelling terrorism in SSA. Moscow is particularly interested in the Horn of Africa to control important trade routes of global importance., La Russie et la Chine défient l'ordre libéral et l'État de droit au niveau mondial et régional. L'administration Trump a facilité le soutien à l'abandon de l'ordre international libéral et du système d'États "westphalien" que l'Amérique avait défendu pendant des siècles. L'extrémisme prospère dans le monde entier, y compris en Afrique subsaharienne, alimenté par les séquelles du colonialisme, de la pauvreté et des idéologies islamistes. Les régions à statut d'État limité sont devenues des États défaillants où des conflits violents ont menacé la sécurité et la stabilité régionales. La Russie a profité du vide de pouvoir qui en a résulté. Moscou s'est concentré sur les pays qui étaient autrefois des colonies françaises et portugaises, que Moscou croyait plus faciles à infiltrer. Dans ces conditions, Poutine est libre d'exploiter les contradictions politiques et sociales en Afrique et de déstabiliser l'ordre occidental, même au risque de la montée du terrorisme islamique. Les pipelines criminels terroristes et les États corrompus sont exploités par les marchands d'armes russes à travers l'Afrique depuis des décennies. Ceux-ci comprenaient un soutien notoire au régime de Taylor au Liberia au début des années 2000, y compris le tristement célèbre marchand d'armes russe Viktor Bout, surnommé le « marchand de la mort ». La coopération reposait sur le contrôle par l'État des ports d'entrée et de sortie des organisations criminelles afin de préserver la participation aux bénéfices, les passeports diplomatiques, y compris l'immunité associée, et l'état de droit, qui garantissait la bonne commercialisation de ces entreprises. Aujourd'hui, la Russie bénéficie principalement de la "sécurité" offerte aux dirigeants autocratiques, notamment par la vente d'armes, des conseils et une formation aux opérations de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme contre le terrorisme islamique en échange de l'accès aux ressources et aux marchés africains. Outre Al-Quida, l'État islamique (IS

Russia and China challenge the liberal order and rule of law on a global and regional level. The Trump administration has facilitated the support of the move away from the liberal international order and the "Westphalian" system of states that America had defended for centuries. Extremism is thriving around the world, including in sub-Saharan Africa, fuelled by the aftermath of colonialism, poverty and Islamist ideologies. Regions with limited statehood became failed states where violent conflicts threatened regional security and stability. Russia benefited from the resulting power vacuum. Moscow focused on countries that were formerly French and Portuguese colonies, which Moscow believed are easier to infiltrate. Under these conditions, Putin is free to exploit the political and social contradictions in Africa and destabilize the Western order, even at the risk of the rise of Islamic terrorism. Terrorist criminal pipelines and corrupt states have been exploited by Russian arms dealers across Africa for decades. These included notorious support for the Taylor regime in Liberia in the early 2000s, including the infamous Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, dubbed the 'merchant of death'. The cooperation was based on state control of ports of entry and exit for criminal organizations to safeguard profit-sharing, diplomatic passports, including associated immunity, and the rule of law, which ensured the smooth marketing of these companies. Today, Russia benefits primarily from providing "security" to autocratic leaders, including arms sales, advice and training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against Islamic terrorism in exchange for access to African resources and markets. Aside from Al-Quida, the Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram other local Islamic organizations are fuelling terrorism in SSA. Moscow is particularly interested in the Horn of Africa to control important trade routes of global importance., Russland und China fordern die freiheitliche Ordnung und Rechtsstaatlichkeit auf globaler und regionaler Ebene heraus. Die US-Regierung unter Trump hat die Abwendung von der liberalen internationalen Ordnung und dem "westfälischen" Staatensystem, das Amerika jahrhundertelang verteidigt hatte, noch unterstützt. Der Extremismus blüht weltweit auf, einschließlich Subsahara-Afrika, genährt von den Nachwirkungen des Kolonialismus, der Armut und islamistischen Ideologien. Regionen mit begrenzter Staatlichkeit wurden zu gescheiterten Staaten in denen gewalttätige Konflikte, die die regionale Sicherheit und Stabilität gefährdeten. Russland profitierte von dem daraus resultierenden Machtvakuum. Moskau konzentrierte sich dabei auf Länder, die früher französische und portugiesische Kolonien waren, die aus Sicht Moskaus leichter zu unterwandern seien. Unter diesen Bedingungen hat Putin freie Hand, um die politischen und sozialen Widersprüche auszunutzen und die westliche Ordnung zu destabilisieren, selbst wenn er den Aufstieg des islamischen Terrorismus dabei in Kauf nimmt. Terroristische kriminelle Pipelines und korrupte Staaten wurden bereits seit Jahrzehnten von russischen Waffenhändlern in ganz Afrika genutzt. Dazu gehörte die berüchtigte Unterstützung des Taylor-Regimes in Liberia in den frühen 2000er Jahren, einschließlich des verrufenen russischen Waffenhändlers Viktor Bout, der als "Kaufmann des Todes" bezeichnet wurde. Die Zusammenarbeit basierte auf der staatlichen Kontrolle von Ein- und Ausreisehäfen für kriminelle Organisationen um die Gewinnbeteiligung, Diplomatenpässen, einschließlich der damit verbundenen Immunität, sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit, zu gewährleisten, welche die reibungslose Absatzpolitik dieser Unternehmen gewährleistete. Heute profitiert Russland hauptsächlich von der Bereitstellung von "Sicherheit" für autokratische Führer, einschließlich Waffenverkäufen, Beratung und Schulung in Anti-Aufstands- und Anti-Terror-Operationen gegen den islamischen Terror

Nach einem jahrzehntelangen Bürgerkrieg erlangt die Republik Südsudan am 9. Juli 2011 ihre Unabhängigkeit. Doch trotz aller Bemühungen um einen friedlichen Staatsaufbau nimmt die erste Dekade der Eigenstaatlichkeit einen gewaltsamen Verlauf: Im Dezember 2013 schlittert der Südsudan in einen blutig geführten Bürgerkrieg, der sich nicht als einheitlicher Konflikt mit klar definierbaren Parteien, sondern zu einem Amalgam komplex verschachtelter Konfliktlandschaften entwickelt. In analytischen Vignetten, die verschiedene Regionen sowie die nationale und internationale Dimension des Bürgerkrieges untersuchen, gibt der Autor einen Einblick in die südsudanesische Konfliktrealität.

Die Idee zur Unterstützung von zwei Institutsbibliotheken im Südsudan entstand 2018 im Gespräch mit dem Leiter der Presbyterianischen Kirche im Lesesaal der Fachbibliothek Mission 21 in Basel. Es ging dabei um die wichtige Rolle von Bildung und kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen Geschichte beim Aufbau einer friedlichen Zukunft des kriegsversehrten Landes. Nicht zuletzt profitierte auch die Bibliothek in Basel in verschiedenster Hinsicht von der friedensfördernden Initiative., The idea of supporting two libraries in South Sudan arose while meeting the president of the Presbyterian Church of South Sudan 2018 in Basel. Sitting in the lecture room of the Mission 21 Specialised Library, the conversation turned around the importance of higher education for a peaceful future of the country and the urgence of reflecting critically on one’s own history. In the end, our library in Basel could also benefit in many ways from our peace promoting initiative., Peer Reviewed

On reaching the Horn of Africa, the corona virus will have encountered countries already facing a multitude of challenges. Prolonged armed conflict, drought and insecurity have turned more than eight million people into refugees in their own countries, and a further 3.5 million have fled to neighbouring countries where they live in overcrowded refugee camps. All the countries in this region are in a fragile state of political transformation or have been severely weakened by war and govern­ment failures. They possess neither the capacity to contain the Covid pandemic nor to mitigate the resulting unemployment, poverty and hunger. In order to guard against jeopardising the process of democratisation in Sudan and Ethiopia, special emphasis should be placed on social security systems and gaining the trust of the popu­lation. This requires an emergency aid package from abroad that will ensure the economic survival of all countries in the region. However, long-term support should be con­ditional on guaranteeing that most of the investment goes into developing state capacities for critical infrastructure and social security. (Autorenreferat)

This case study provides an overview on protracted displacement in the Horn of Africa and aims to uncover evidence on transnational and translocal connectivity and mobility of displaced populations in the region. The case study contributes to the elaboration of the working paper “Protracted Displacement in the postWWII period” in the framework of the three-year project “Translocal Figurations of Displacement” (TRAFIG), which is financed by the European Union within the Horizon 2020 work programme (Societal Challenge 5 ‘Europe in a changing world’; call MIGRATION-08-2018 ‘Addressing the Challenge of Forced Displacement’). The objective of this case study is to review academic and literature issued by relevant actors in the field of protracted displacement such as international organisations, NGOs or governments to answer the questions whether and how transnational and translocal connectivity and mobility contributes to selfreliance and resilience of displaced populations, both internally and across borders, in the region. In addition, the study looks at policy responses to protracted displacement in the Horn of Africa. For the purpose of this study, the Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. These countries are all members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional economic community formed to promote regional cooperation and integration to add value to its Member States’ efforts in achieving peace, security and prosperity. When drawing on figures of protracted displacement, the study follows UNHCR’s definition of a protracted refugee situation “as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country” (UNHCR, 2018c, p. 22). When drawing on specific examples from the literature, a wider definition of protracted displacement is applied, following TRAFIG’s definition of protracted displacement situations

Am Horn von Afrika trifft das Corona-Virus auf Staaten, die ohnehin mit einer Viel­zahl von Problemen konfrontiert sind: Anhaltende bewaffnete Konflikte, Dürre und Unsicherheit haben mehr als acht Millionen Menschen zu Flüchtlingen im eigenen Land gemacht, weitere 3,5 Millionen sind in die Nachbarländer geflohen, wo sie in überfüllten Flüchtlingslagern leben. Alle Staaten der Region befinden sich in einem fragilen Zustand politischer Transformation oder sind durch Krieg und Regierungs­versagen enorm geschwächt. Ihre Kapazitäten reichen weder für die Eindämmung der Covid-Pandemie aus noch für die Abfederung der Folgen, wie Arbeitslosigkeit, Armut und Hunger. Um die Demokratisierung im Sudan und in Äthiopien nicht zu gefährden, ist es notwendig, den Fokus auf soziale Sicherungssysteme zu richten und das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung zu gewinnen. Dazu ist ein Soforthilfepaket aus dem Aus­land erforderlich, das den Staaten das wirtschaftliche Überleben sichert. Langfristige Unterstützung jedoch sollte an die Bedingung geknüpft werden, dass ein Großteil der Investitionen in den Aufbau staatlicher Kapazitäten fließt. (Autorenreferat)

South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011 after nearly 40 years of civil war, was embroiled in a new devastating conflict at the end of 2013. This happened when political disputes coupled with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines became brutal. This conflict has mostly targeted civilians and most often, ethnic groups, and warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The conflict has resulted in a major humanitarian crisis, mass displacement and mass atrocities against South Sudanese citizens. Notwithstanding, instability in South Sudan has made the country one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian aid workers in the world, especially as majority of them have lost their lives during their operation. In view of this, the article seeks to interrogate the main driving forces that triggered the deadly conflict and also the ramifications brought upon the population as well as the country.

In order to examine the implications different forms and degrees of internationalised constitution making have on ideas of statehood and the legitimacy of a constitution, the study compares two cases - South Sudan and Somaliland - to explore contrasting patterns of international involvement in constitution making. South Sudan is the one 'extreme' case with strong international intervention, with Somaliland at the other 'extreme'. This paper demonstrates that the actual process matters and once again reinforces scepticism about the ways in which internationalised constitution making is conducted in war-torn settings. In Somaliland the societal consensus production, which included negotiating a governmental structure, was in the hands of the local elites for the constitution making period, which lasted a decade. In South Sudan the consensus production has so far been framed and guided by powerful international actors who had a seat at the local negotiating table. Not only does path dependence seem to prevent the production of a broader consensus on the mode of statehood, but the local translations of international 'models' also seem to be contrary to intended Rule of Law ideas. The study indicates that even though a locally driven and owned process supports the production of a legitimate constitution, international support is not generally denied. Inherent tensions between 'local ownership' and 'external intervention' may open space for re-negotiations on different normative perceptions and may support a redefinition of exclusion/inclusion dynamics. Nevertheless, to avoid these tensions becoming un-negotiable as a result of the imposition of international assistance which may lead to international 'models' simply being rejected or manipulated in line with internal power relations, constitution making needs to be conducted in an open manner by the local actors themselves.

Germany should advocate in the UN Security Council for a course correction on the international approach to peace in South Sudan. If high-level mediation, addressing impunity, and grassroots reconciliation are not prioritized, international pressure to form a transitional government by November 12, 2019, is likely to lead to renewed violence.

On 19 October 2017, BICC hosted its annual International Academic Conference on the topic of "'Dirty Peace?' The Political Economy of Peacebuilding" in Bonn. The conference brought together over 100 academics and practitioners from around the world to exchange concepts, empirical observations and lessons learned on the prerequisites, patterns and consequences of peace negotiations. In her welcome address, Beate Wieland, Head of Department for Research at the Ministry of Culture and Science of the German State of North RhineWestphalia, underlined the importance of ensuring a lasting peace to prevent violent conflict in the future. She opined that a lasting peace comes from improving peoples’ living conditions in conflict regions. The first panel examined some of the conditions for successful mediation in peacebuilding negotiations, while the second panel focussed on the consequences inclusivity or exclusivity have on the success of these negotiations. The third panel discussed lessons learned from practical experience and engagement in negotiations and peacebuilding processes in Afghanistan and South Sudan. A concluding roundtable highlighted several takeaways from the conference, including the added value of a political economy perspective, the critical need for capacity and local leadership of peacebuilding initiatives and the need to unpack the various agendas and interests that, left unexamined, make the peace process seem 'dirty' as opposed to what it really is: complex. The conference was generously funded by the Foundation for International Dialogue of the Savings Bank in Bonn and the US Consulate General in Düsseldorf.

On 3 November 2016, BICC hosted its annual International Academic Conference, focussing this year on the pressing global issue of internal displacement and refugee movements. Almost 65 million people are currently displaced worldwide, most of whom have been displaced for more than five years. Entitled "Fleeing Conflict - Trajectories of Displaced Persons", the conference brought together academics from around the world to present and discuss conceptual and empirical research on the causes, consequences of and solutions for forced migration in current conflicts and displacement settings. In his welcome address, Thomas Grünewald, State Secretary at the Ministry for Innovation, Science and Research of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia stressed the importance of innovative research on displacement and integration. Unlike some of the discourse in this field, the conference focussed on the issue of displacement from the perspective of the displaced themselves, highlighting their agency in the sometimes cyclical and often interrupted processes of departure, transit and arrival. Three consecutive panels were convened, beginning with scholarly presentations on the "Causes and Conditions of Displacement", "(Interrupted) Transit and Forced Immobility" and finally, "Durable Solutions for Protracted Displacement". A concluding panel summarized some of the key points of the day, including the need for more political solutions that target the root causes, and not only the consequences, of protracted displacement. The conference was generously funded by the Foundation for International Dialogue of the Savings Bank in Bonn and the US Consulate General in Düsseldorf.

From 2011 until 2014, BICC worked with the government of South Sudan to improve the management of state-owned arms and ammunition. Arms and ammunition management is still weak, with dilapidated infrastructure, untrained staff, and lack of clear and unified rules and regulations. The situation is further complicated by limited institutional capacity to instigate and manage change initiatives, as well as a lack of clarity over which government institution is supposed to drive change. Although awareness had increased and numerous positive developments had started, the situation has again deteriorated with the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013 and the subsequent large-scale proliferation of small arms. This report evaluates the project results, and tries to draw lessons for interventions on arms control in the future, not only in South Sudan but also in other countries.

For the past four years, the Fund for Peace has ranked the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan as the "most fragile states' in the world, in its annual Fragile States Index (FSI). The three countries" almost identical scores suggest comparability; however, critics raise concerns about the FSI's data aggregation methods, and its conflation of causes and consequences. This article treads the uncharted path of unpacking the empirical realities that hide behind FSI indicators. Drawing on data collected during field research in the three states, the authors investigate three security indicators (security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention) and propose an alternative, qualitative appreciation. Each country's fragility is based on how security forces, elites and interventions evolved over time and installed themselves differently in each region of the country. The qualitative assessment presented here shows that not every indicator matters in all cases at all times or throughout the country. Most crucially, the authors unveil enormous differences between and within the FSI's three "most fragile states". Such variations call for better-adapted and more flexible intervention strategies, and for quantitative comparisons to be qualitatively grounded.

As the numbers of returnees in many regions of South Sudan increase, and livelihood opportunities need to be established to foster development and prevent new causes of displacement, aid agencies should address the full cycle of displacement to reintegration at a given location. Programmes therefore have to focus on issues beyond emergency aid and be long-term until returnees have indeed become self-sufficient. Young people are very influential in stabilizing the peace process. To promote local economic development, jobs and higher education, for instance, should therefore be offered not only to returnees, but also to hosts to provide alternatives to engaging in violence. Besides vocational training, “spaces” for recreational activities should also be established. Trainings are particular successful when communities participate in designing the programmes. A diversification of income activities (e.g. rural and urban) also promotes the sustainability of return. Local dynamics have to be studied beforehand to prevent the failure of programmes and enhance sustainability. Dialogue platforms help to share information about the peace process and the situation at the return location. Radio broadcasts, in particular, have proven to be a good practice to share information and spread the word of peace. The media thus can be an important tool for fostering communication between groups and, consequently, the reintegration of returnees.

Before considering cantonment, it is of utmost importance to reach widespread agreement in society and parliament on political principles guiding the mid-term transformation of the country’s security sector (e.g. ethnic inclusion, militia integration and professionalization) as these will guide the reorganization and demobilization of armed forces. Since many opposition groups are not represented in the current peace process, the cantonment of forces that are party to the peace agreement would be of limited effect as main conflict drivers are left out. On the contrary, the process can even deepen exclusion. To avoid this, the High-Level Revitalization Forum needs to generate inclusive dialogue with the opposition movements - even those that are non-signatories to the ARCSS. Force assembly applies to the opposition as much as to the SPLA-In Government. The ongoing debate in Juba about cantonment, however, only addresses the assembly of SPLA-In Opposition. The transitional government needs to send a strong signal that it is serious about force assembly by moving its troops back to the barracks. From an economic perspective, resource-intensive, long-term programmes linked to cantonment are not feasible. These may also have adverse consequences from a peace perspective as they encourage new armed groups to join the fighting.

This Working Paper investigates the challenges South Sudanese returnees and displaced persons face from their very own perspective. Building on field research in the autumn and winter of 2015 , it analyses the patterns of return and coping strategies of returnees, as well as any assistance that aid agencies can provide. The findings indicate that return is neither a simple, linear nor necessarily durable solution. From the viewpoint of the returnees, the main challenges of return are the lack of physical security, food, water, education and jobs. As resources in South Sudan are very scarce overall because of a collapsing economy and continued fighting, competition over resources between returnees and local communities, as well among returnees, is common. The easy access to small arms, ethnic divisions and mistrust between groups further exacerbate these tensions. The sustainability of return seems to depend largely on how well returnees can access resources at their return location and thus secure a livelihood for them and their families, which, in turn, is not only influenced by the social network and political access the returnees have but also the economic situation at the return location. Aid agencies therefore should support livelihood opportunities and early development programmes at the preferred return locations, including local communities and youth groups in their efforts, to reduce feelings of inequality between groups. Besides diversified and long-term economic development initiatives, higher education opportunities as well as psychological support must also be provided to guarantee self-sufficiency of returnees and prevent renewed displacement.

Past attempts at security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan have made no significant contribution to ‘right-sizing’ the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and were unable to sustainably change South Sudan’s security apparatus. Taking into account lessons learned from previous DDR and SSR attempts, this Working Paper provides hints as to what the key aspects are that need to be re-considered to improve on security sector transformation in South Sudan. The authors argue that DDR and SSR, if not reinvented and reconsidered in a more radical way, are very unlikely to lead to significant change. The government of South Sudan (GoSS), and the SPLA and SPLA In Opposition (SPLA-IO) in particular, continue to function as highly centralized patronage systems. The country’s military is used as a tool to secure the position of key individuals, advance the interest of particular ethnic groups, and to bring wealth and status to their members. Without breaking these patronage networks and addressing the power nodes, any attempt at security sector transformation will be bound to fail.

This paper critically analyzes German bilateral Official Development Aid (ODA) in Sudan, embedding it in a broader review of ‘state-building’ delivered by western capitalist states. It argues that, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan, German ODA became geared towards statebuilding in the now independent South. Even if Germany is not a major player in the country (e.g. compared to other donors, like the US), its ODA supported an explicitly secessionist conflict party even though the CPA called on all parties involved to make unity attractive. Largely ignoring the causes of long-standing conflicts within South Sudan, the German government thus conceded to the probability of new acts of violence. In the first part, this paper briefly outlines the history of civil war between Sudan and South Sudan. The subsequent critique of state-building is followed by a short portrayal of the United States’ policies towards Sudan, being the most important donor in South Sudan. The fourth part turns to German bilateral ODA in Sudan with regard to its geographic and sectoral distribution. The final chapter discusses the impact of this particular development policy in light of imperialist interests.

Nach massivem internationalen Druck hat der südsudanesische Präsident Salva Kiir am 27. August ein Friedensabkommen mit der bewaffneten Opposition unterschrieben, das den seit fast zwei Jahren andauerenden blutigen Bürgerkrieg im Land beenden soll. Obwohl bereits erste Schritte der Implementierung erfolgt sind, konnten die Kämpfe trotz der von beiden Seiten deklarierten Beendigung der bewaffneten Auseinandersetzung noch nicht gestoppt werden. Dies ist nicht zuletzt auf den auf allen Seiten bestehenden Widerstand gegen das Abkommen zurückzuführen. Die Beendigung des Blutvergießens ist derzeit sicher das entscheidende Erfolgskriterium des Friedensschlusses; die für eine nachhaltige Friedensentwicklung dringend notwendige Neuordnung der politischen Landschaft im Südsudan kann es jedoch nicht gewährleisten.

Der südsudanesische Bürgerkrieg nimmt zunehmend Charakterzüge einer ethnopolitischen Auseinandersetzung an. Dennoch wäre es verfehlt, darin die Ursachen des Konfliktes erkennen zu wollen. Vielmehr ist der Alleinvertretungsanspruch der ehemaligen Befreiungsbewegung und jetzigen Regierungspartei SPLM/A ein wesentliches Hindernis für einen friedlichen Verlauf der Aushandlungsprozesse im südsudanesischen "Political Settlement". Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat keine Antworten auf diese Problematik gefunden und durch ihr Engagement diesen Alleinvertretungsanspruch faktisch unterstützt, was zu einer Verschärfung der gegenwärtigen Spannungen beigetragen hat., The South Sudanese civil war is showing an increasing tendency towards an ethno-political conflict. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret these as the root causes of the conflict. Rather, the claim of the former liberation movement and now ruling party SPLM/A to be the sole representative of South Sudanese politics represents a major obstacle to peaceful negotiation processes in the South Sudanese "political settlement". The international community was not able to provide adequate answers to this issue. In fact, it supported SPLM/A’s claim to sole representation by its engagement, and was thus contributing to a worsening of the current tensions.

Der südsudanesische Bürgerkrieg nimmt zunehmend Charakterzüge einer ethnopolitischen Auseinandersetzung an. Dennoch wäre es verfehlt, darin die Ursachen des Konfliktes erkennen zu wollen. Vielmehr ist der Alleinvertretungsanspruch der ehemaligen Befreiungsbewegung und jetzigen Regierungspartei SPLM/A ein wesentliches Hindernis für einen friedlichen Verlauf der Aushandlungsprozesse im südsudanesischen "Political Settlement". Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat keine Antworten auf diese Problematik gefunden und durch ihr Engagement diesen Alleinvertretungsanspruch faktisch unterstützt, was zu einer Verschärfung der gegenwärtigen Spannungen beigetragen hat., The South Sudanese civil war is showing an increasing tendency towards an ethno-political conflict. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret these as the root causes of the conflict. Rather, the claim of the former liberation movement and now ruling party SPLM/A to be the sole representative of South Sudanese politics represents a major obstacle to peaceful negotiation processes in the South Sudanese "political settlement". The international community was not able to provide adequate answers to this issue. In fact, it supported SPLM/A's claim to sole representation by its engagement, and was thus contributing to a worsening of the current tensions.

This study examines the disjuncture between the policy transposition of the Liberal Peace Project (LPP) in South Sudan from the country's local context. It underlines how deep rooted historical exclusion from social welfare services reinforces political exclusion and exacerbates poor civic engagement among different ethnicities in the country causing a constant relapse to violence. The study combines a qualitative review of data from Afrobarometer, the National Democratic Institute, international NGOs, and South Sudan's government reports within depth interviews and participants' observation. The research finds that restricted access to formal education alongside the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding, which broadly focus on centralised urban political institutions and exclude diverse local needs and preferences, limit citizenship participation to elections and preclude an equitable social order in South Sudan, establishing a continuum of fragile authoritarian peace, institutional peace and constitutional peace. In an emancipatory approach, the study proposes a framework that prioritizes an extended access to primary and post-primary vocational education as a more credible establishment for sustainable civil peace in the country. The LPP by the international community needs to be tailored to enhance the political will of the South Sudan government to extend free primary education access, incentivize primary education with school feeding programmes and to invigorate vocational training curricula. These will yield civil peace dividends, which avert South Sudan's structural source of relapse into violence with sustainable disincentives. Apart from women's empowerment through education and in all spheres of life, the government needs to ensure sustainability by guaranteeing a sustainable future for the present and for returning refugees by reducing the effects of climate change so as to cope with the increasing pressure on natural resources.

The recent decision of the Republic of South Sudan to stop the oil production due to the deadlock in the negotiations with the North regarding pipeline transportation fees demonstrates that the relations between the two Sudans are still far from normal. Furthermore, the decision can be understood as one cornerstone of the intensified orientation of South Sudan towards its Southern neighbors. This will lead to a strategic deterioration of its relationships with the North.

Am Samstag, den 15. Jänner 2011, endete die siebentägige Abstimmungsfrist des Referendums über die Unabhängigkeit des Südsudan. Sein Ausgang bringt mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Sezession - die Verwirklichung des vom Süden lang gehegten Traums eines eigenen Nationalstaates. Nichtsdestotrotz sind nach wie vor viele mit der möglichen Unabhängigkeit verknüpfte Fragen ungeklärt. Mit möglichen Realitäten, In(ter)dependencen, aber auch Risiken befasst sich Jan Pospisil in seiner neuesten Kurzanalyse.

Das vorgelegte Project analysiert die Strukturzusammenhänge und den sich verändernden Kontext in denen Legitimität existiert. Das Projekt verwendet auf der existierenden Literatur basierende Kriterien für die Definition von Legitimität und adaptiert diese anhand der empirischen Fallbeispiele Ägypten, Bosnien und Süd-Sudan. Die Hypothese, dass die gewählten Kriterien für die Etablierung von institutioneller Legitimität notwendig sind, aber ihre Bedeutung vom Kontext abhängt, wird durch eine vergleichende qualitative Methode bewiesen. Die Empfehlungen und Ergebnisse des Projektes sollen eine Basis für Entscheidungsträger werden, um zu entscheiden ob internationale Unterstützung oder Intervention notwendig ist um Stabilität herzustellen., This project analyzes the structural environment and the evolving context in which legitimacy exists. The project uses the criteria for the definition of legitimacy based on existing literature and adapts them according to the empirical cases of the project: Egypt, South-Sudan, and Bosnia. Through a comparative qualitative method, the project proves its hypothesis that all of the selected criteria are necessary for the establishment of institutional legitimacy, but that their importance depends on the context. The recommendations and findings of the project provide a basis for decision-makers on whether international support or intervention is necessary to create stability.

American enthusiasm for promoting democracy has waned since the longer term consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq became apparent. The neo-cons misplaced confidence in the superiority of their ideals appeared to blind them to lessons from history. Indeed, they might have been more cautious about encouraging electoral transfers of power had they studied experiences following the post-colonial imposition of democracy. This paper draws out some of those lessons, arguing that examples of newly independent sub Saharan African nations highlighted the lag between the notion of universal suffrage and levels of mutual interdependence that enable stable and secure transitions of power. The lag legacy continues to cast a considerable shadow over sub Saharan African politics resulting in elections being accompanied by killings in the pursuit of power by plebiscite. Despite complicity in the roots of these political problems Western governments and international institutions continue with their ‘hopeful prognosis’. Rather than confront underlying failings, blame is localised, directed at corruption and ‘big men’. Such targeting fails to understand that these factors are indicative of wider problems requiring deeper rooted exploration and consideration. Hence figurational insights are applied in order to gain a broader understanding of long term social processes and activities that result in failures to entrench democracy within political arrangements. Particular attention is placed upon interweaving balances of power, competition and cooperation and we/I which are applied to a number of case studies including South Sudan, Nigeria and Kenya.

Nach der Unabhängigkeit des Südsudan im Jahr 2011 wurde die Landreform zu einem wesentlichen Aspekt der Staatsbildung, teils um historisches Unrecht auszugleichen, teils aber auch, um künftige Konflikte um Land zu verhindern. Im Verlauf der Zeit wurde jedoch Land zum Ausgangspunkt für Konflikte, auch zwischen Gemeinden, in denen es keine Geschichte "ethnischer Konflikte" gab. Anhand zweier Fallstudien ländlicher Gebiete im Yei River County im Südsudan zeigen die Autoren, dass diese Konflikte vor allem aus Widersprüchen im bestehenden Rechtsrahmen für Land und Boden entstehen. Die Widersprüche selbst führen sie auf den Top-down-Ansatz der Staatsbildung zurück, der den gesellschaftlichen und ländlichen Wandel - ein Ergebnis von Kolonialismus und Bürgerkriegen - vielfach außer Acht lässt., Following South Sudanese independence in 2011, land reform became a major aspect of state building, partly to address historical injustices and partly to avoid future conflicts around land. In the process, land became a trigger for conflicts, sometimes between communities with no histories of "ethnic conflict." Drawing on cases in two rural areas in Yei River County in South Sudan, this paper shows that contradictions in the existing legal frameworks on land are mainly to blame for those conflicts. These contradictions are influenced, in turn, by the largely top-down approach to state building, which has tended to neglect changes in society and regarding land resulting from colonialism and civil wars.

Im Juli 2016 ist das rund ein Jahr zuvor geschlossene Friedensabkommen zwischen dem südsudanesischen Präsidenten Salva Kiir und Oppositionsführer Riek Machar gescheitert. Seither verschlechtert sich die Situation im Land zusehends. Vermehrte ethnisch motivierte Gewalt sowie Hassrhetorik von Dinka (der Ethnie des Präsidenten) und Nicht-Dinka sind die Vorboten genozidärer Gewalt. Hauptaufgabe der United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) ist der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung. Zwar wurde im Juli 2016 beschlossen, UNMISS durch eine regionale Schutztruppe zu verstärken. Doch selbst wenn diese entsandt wird, ist zu bezweifeln, dass UNMISS Ausschreitungen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung außerhalb der Hauptstadt vereiteln kann. Die Streitkraft der Friedensmission reicht nicht aus, ihre Kommandostruktur scheint in entscheidenden Momenten zu versagen, die Regierung hindert sie an der Mandatsausübung, es gibt keinen glaubwürdigen Friedensprozess und eine Resolution über ein Waffenembargo scheiterte im VN-Sicherheitsrat. Auch wenn die Möglichkeiten äußerst begrenzt sind, die Zivilistinnen und Zivilisten zu beschützen, könnte die Mission effizienter gestaltet werden. Das gilt ebenso für internationale Sanktionen. (Autorenreferat)

Kein Abstract vorhanden

The conflict in South Sudan flared up again on the fifth anniversary of independence. After almost two years of war between forces controlled by President Kiir and those of Vice-President Machar, the latter had only recently - in April 2016 - returned to the capital Juba with his ministers and some of his troops to form a Transitional Government of National Unity, together with Kiir's cabinet. But both sides obstructed implementation of the August 2015 peace agreement, and repeated breaches of the cease-fire were reported in other parts of the country. On 7 July shooting broke out between the opposing forces in Juba. More than three hundred people died in the following days. In the meantime, Machar and his forces have left Juba and his chief negotiator Taban Deng Gai was installed as his replacement by President Kiir, splitting the leadership of the SPLM in Opposition. The question now is the fate of the peace agreement and the legitimacy of the two leaders. The United Nations has more than 13,000 troops on the ground, and the African Union is preparing an intervention mission to enforce peace. (author's abstract)

Zum fünften Jahrestag der Unabhängigkeit ist der Konflikt im Südsudan erneut aufgeflammt. Nach fast zwei Jahren Krieg zwischen den Truppen von Präsident Kiir und Vizepräsident Machar war dieser erst im April 2016 mit seinen Ministern und einem Teil seiner Truppen zurück in die Hauptstadt Juba gekommen, um gemeinsam mit dem Kabinett seines Gegners Kiir eine Übergangsregierung der Nationalen Einheit zu bilden. Beide Seiten blockierten jedoch die Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens vom August 2015, in anderen Landesteilen wurde der Waffenstillstand mehrfach gebrochen. Am 7. Juli begannen die Sicherheitskräfte der beiden Kontrahenten in Juba aufeinander zu schießen. In den folgenden Tagen starben mehr als 300 Menschen. Keiner der beiden Anführer besitzt die vollständige Kontrolle über die kämpfenden Einheiten. Inzwischen hat Machar mit seinen Truppen Juba verlassen. Nun stellt sich die Frage nach der weiteren Gültigkeit des Friedensabkommens und der Legitimität der beiden Führer. Die Vereinten Nationen (VN) sind mit über 13000 Soldaten vor Ort und die Afrikanische Union (AU) will eine Eingreiftruppe zur Friedenserzwingung entsenden. (Autorenreferat)

Afrikanische Staaten werden oft mit einem ideal-typischen westeuropäischen Nationalstaat verglichen und unweigerlich für unzureichend befunden. Diese Arbeit begegnet diesem theoretischen Missstand, indem sie eine neue Typologie des territorialen afrikanischen Nationalstaats in Abgrenzung vom europäischen Model entwickelt. Die Typologie fungiert als theoretisches Prisma für eine ausführliche Analyse des Südsudan für die Jahre 2005-2014. Gleichzeitig liefert der Vergleich mit dem Sonderfall Südsudan neue Erkenntnisse zum Wandel von Staat und Nation in Afrika. Ausgehend von einer historisch-philosophischen Querschau auf Staat und Nation in Europa, werden die grundverschiedenen Umstände von Nationalstaatsbildung im postkolonialen Afrika dargestellt. Der Autor schöpft aus einer umfangreichen Literatur, die fast sämtliche Staaten in Sub-Sahara Afrika abdeckt, um typisierte Aspekte von Staat und Nation herauszuarbeiten. Für den afrikanischen Staat sind dies der hybride Quasi-Staat, der illegitime Staat, der privatisierte neopatrimoniale Staat und der aufgedunsene Zentralstaat. Die Typologie der afrikanischen Nation besteht aus inklusivem Staatsnationalismus, dem Wiedererstarken politischer Ethnizität sowie dem ausgrenzenden neuen Nationalismus. Auf der Basis von Primär- und Sekundärquellen sowie Feldforschung, haben sich südsudanesischer Staat und Nation als überwiegend kongruent mit der Typologie erwiesen. Abweichungen bestehen jedoch im Ausmaß der Übernahme von Dienstleistungen durch ausländische NGOs, in der Struktur der neopatrimonialen Netzwerke sowie in der Rolle, die Sprache für die nationale Identität spielt. Zudem weist der Südsudan sämtliche Entwicklungstrends des postkolonialen Nationalismus parallel zueinander und nicht aufeinander folgend auf. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass sich die Bedingungen für Nationenbildung im heutigen Afrika dank Urbanisierung, moderner Kommunikationswege und dem Vorherrschen von Bürgerkriegen sehr von der Vergangenheit unterscheiden., African states are often judged by comparison to an ideal-typical Western European nation-state, which inevitably finds the African state wanting. This thesis challenges this theoretical drawback by developing a novel typology of the African territorial nation-state in juxtaposition to the European model. The typology is then applied as a theoretical prism for an in-depth analysis of the case of South Sudan, the world’s newest state, for the period 2005-2014. At the same time, comparison to the anomalous case of South Sudan provides new insights into the changing nature of statehood and nationalism in Africa. Starting out from a historical-philosophical overview of state and nation in the European context, the very different circumstances of nation-state formation in postcolonial Africa are depicted. The author then draws on a large body of literature covering almost all of Sub-Saharan Africa to distil typified facets of state and nation. For the African state, these components are the hybrid quasi state, the illegitimate state, the privatized neopatrimonial state and the swollen centralized state. The typology of the African nation consists of inclusive state-nationalism, the resurgence of political ethnicity and exclusionary new nationalism and the politics of autochthony. Based on primary and secondary sources including fieldwork in South Sudan, the empirical reality of South Sudan’s nascent nation-state is shown to largely match the typology. Important divergences exist however in the degree of service delivery by foreign NGOs, in the dispersed nature of the neopatrimonial networks, and the role of language in nationbuilding. Crucially, South Sudan exhibits all three trends of postcolonial African nationalism at the same time rather than in successive periods. This indicates that in contemporary Africa rapid urbanization, modern communications and the prevalence of civil wars create very different conditions for nationbuilding than in decades past.

This paper investigates the role of state capacity for political violence. Most previous studies have suffered from inadequacies of country-level data, questionable validity of indicators or theoretical shortcomings. This paper aims at overcoming some of these challenges. We focus on one specific aspect of state capacity: the role of governmental manpower. We argue that its subnational effect on political violence follows a non-linear, inverted-U shape. We investigate this hypothesis in the context of southern Sudan, covering the period from 2006 to 2010. We use unique data on the geographical distribution of public personnel across 75 southern Sudanese counties. The data are matched with geocoded data on violent events as well as various socio-economic indicators. Our fixed-effects estimations indicate that particularly low or high levels of state capacity are associated with low levels of violence. Counties with intermediate numbers of state personnel experience the highest numbers of violent events.

This article compares two cases of securitization along South Sudan’s border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By comparing how a security concern – the presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army – was interpreted and responded to, the article shows that border security practices in two borderscapes are improvised, contradictory and contested, and serve to establish authority rather than actually securing the border. This is apparent on three levels: (a) through the multiplicity of security actors vying for authority; (b) in how they interpret security concerns; and (c) in terms of what practice follows. The article argues that by allowing authority at the border to be taken by actors that are not under direct control of the central government, the South Sudanese state is developing as one that controls parts of the country in absentia, either by granting discretionary powers to low-level government authorities at the border or through tactical neglect. Processes of securitization by both state and non-state actors in the borderland are largely disconnected from the South Sudanese central government, which does not claim authority over this border and thus seemingly does not consider the lack of security for its citizens, and the parallel authorities, as a threat to central stability.

A political power struggle between South Sudanese president Salva Kiir and former vice president Riek Machar resulted in violent clashes between ethnic army factions in December 2013. Since then fighting has spread across South Sudan and claimed the lives of around 10,000 people. South Sudan has experienced several insurgencies since gaining independence in 2011. Nevertheless, the current war has the potential to be more destructive to the country than previous ones because both parties - President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and his opponent, former vice president Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer - are instrumentalizing ethnic identities and pulling their communities into their personal feud. A number of latent issues have contributed to the current crisis. These include South Sudan's dysfunctional political system and inadequate political leadership, the historical distrust between the Dinka and the Nuer, and the country's unhealthy dependence on oil rents. The civilian population is carrying the cost of the conflict. More than 10,000 people have been killed and more than one million displaced since the outbreak of the latest violence. Livelihoods have been destroyed and more than 3.7 million people, approximately a third of the population, are estimated to be at risk of food insecurity. The short- and long-term economic consequences for South Sudan are harsh. Oil production has dropped by 40 percent, severely affecting the state’s budget. Trade has suffered. In the long run, political instability will jeopardize foreign direct investment in South Sudan. The international community's reaction has been varied: Neighboring countries have supported the government diplomatically and militarily, while the United States and the European Union plan to impose sanctions on the leaders of both sides of the conflict. China has taken an active role in the ongoing peace process.

"Elections can contribute to peacebuilding by ensuring the representation of formerly excluded groups in parliament. When hurried and poorly designed, however, elections can also threaten the precarious peace in divided countries. This study focuses on the three main features of electoral design that crucially influence the success or failure of elections in conflict-prone divided societies: timing and sequencing, electoral administration, and electoral systems. It goes beyond purely scholarly debates and translates the general insights into specific policy recommendations for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015 in South Sudan; the first elections since the country torn by ethnopolitical conflict gained independence in 2011." (author's abstract)

Am 9. Juli 2013 begeht der Südsudan als jüngster Staat der Welt seinen zweiten Geburtstag. Seit der Unabhängigkeit hat die südsudanesische Regierung teils spektakuläre Entscheidungen getroffen. So stoppte sie für ein Jahr die Ölförderung – ein waghalsiger Schritt für ein Land, das zu mehr als 97 Prozent von Öleinnahmen abhängig ist. Obwohl Sudan und Südsudan nach der Teilung zeitweilig vor einem Kriegsausbruch standen, gelingt den beiden Regierungen insgesamt ein erstaunlicher Balanceakt. Es ist der Führung des Südsudan bislang allerdings nicht gelungen, den Frieden im Innern zu sichern. Die einstige Rebellenbewegung des Landes tut sich schwer in der Rolle einer zivilen Regierung. So stockt die Reform des Sicherheitssektors, Demobilisierungsversuche lassen sich kaum umsetzen, und die Trennung zwischen Polizei- und Armeeaufgaben fehlt bisweilen gänzlich. Gleichzeitig werden Auseinandersetzungen zunehmend ethnisiert, und statt auf politische Partizipation setzt die Regierung in Juba auf Autorität und Kontrolle.(Autorenreferat)

This article examines debates about national identity in the media landscape of post-referendum and post-independence South Sudan. Having never existed as a sovereign state and with its citizens being a minority group in Sudan, collective action among South Sudanese has historically been shaped in response to external pressures: in particular, the aggressive nation-building pursued by successive Khartoum governments that sought to Arabize and Islamize the South. Today, in the absence of a clear-cut enemy, it is a major challenge for South Sudan to devise a common identity that unites the putative nation beyond competing loyalties to ethnicity, tribe and family. Analysing opinion pieces from South Sudanese online media and placing them in the context of contemporary African nationalism, this article gives an initial overview of the issues that dominate the public debate on national identity: fear of tribalism and regionalism, commemoration of the liberation struggle, language politics, and the role of Christianity., Dieser Artikel widmet sich den Debatten, die in südsudanesischen Medien von der Nachreferendumszeit bis einige Monate nach der Unabhängigkeit über die nationale Identität geführt wurden. Der Südsudan hatte nie als souveräner Staat existiert und innerhalb des Sudan hatten die Südsudanesen eine Minderheit gebildet. In der Geschichte war gemeinschaftliches Handeln der Südsudanesen in erster Linie als Reaktion auf Druck von außen in Erscheinung getreten, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit Arabisierungs- und Islamisierungsbestrebungen von Regierungen in Khartum. Heute fehlt ein eindeutiges Feindbild. Daher ist der Entwurf einer gemeinsamen Identität, die das Land über konkurrierende Loyalitäten zu Stamm, Ethnie oder Familie hinweg zu einen vermag, eine große Herausforderung für den Südsudan. Auf der Grundlage von Meinungsäußerungen in südsudanesischen Online-Zeitungen, die er zum "neuen" afrikanischen Nationalismusdiskurs in Beziehung setzt, gibt der Autor einen ersten Überblick über die Themen, die die nationale Debatte bestimmen: Angst vor Tribalismus und Regionalismus, Gedenken an den Befreiungskampf, Sprachenpolitik und die Rolle des Christentums.

"Der Südsudan ist im Begriff, zum nächsten großen Statebuilding-Projekt der internationalen Gemeinschaft zu werden. Die Geber wollen der Gefahr vorbeugen, dass der Südsudan schon bald wegen interner Spannungen implodiert. Selbst unter einer starken entwicklungsorientierten Führung wären wohl nur sehr langsame Fortschritte beim Aufbau des neuen Staates zu erwarten. Doch die politischen Verhältnisse sind weit davon entfernt, ein günstiges Umfeld für den Staatsaufbau zu bieten. In ihrem Streben nach Stabilität ist die südsudanesische Führung den Ansprüchen zahlreicher rivalisierender Kräfte ausgesetzt, die danach verlangen, politisch eingebunden zu werden und Zugang zu den Ressourcen des Staates zu erhalten. Der Regierung wird es daher kaum möglich sein, eine konsequente Entwicklungsstrategie zu verfolgen. Staatliche Mittel und Institutionen werden vor allem dafür verwendet, Klientelstrukturen zu unterhalten. Darüber hinaus fehlt der Regierung offenkundig der Wille, schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Sicherheitskräfte und endemische Korruption zu ahnden. Die bisherigen Erfahrungen der Geber zeigen, dass internationale Unterstützung in diesem Kontext ihre Ziele nicht nur verfehlt, sondern vielfach unbeabsichtigte oder gar kontraproduktive Folgen zeitigt. Angesichts der geringen Erfolgsaussichten und unabsehbaren Folgen externer Unterstützung sollten die Geber ihre Ambitionen im Südsudan stark herunterschrauben. Angemessener als ein großangelegter internationaler Staatsaufbau dürften Projekte beschränkten Ausmaßes sein, deren Folgen kalkulierbar bleiben. Externe Hilfe sollte sehr viel stärker konditionalisiert und vor allem mit der Forderung verknüpft werden, dass sich die Menschenrechtslage verbessert und Korruption konsequenter bekämpft wird." (Autorenreferat)

Die Rebellengruppe South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) meldete nach schweren Kämpfen mit der südsudanesischen Armee am 29. Oktober 2011 die Eroberung der Stadt Mayom im Bundesstaat Unity (Sudan Tribune 29.10.2011). Seit dem Friedensabkommen von 2005 (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA) steht im Südsudan der Aufbau einer Staatsverwaltung auf der Tagesordnung. Die Regierung Salva Kiir hat den politischen Apparat seither zwar aufgebläht, die administrativen Kapazitäten reichen jedoch bei Weitem noch nicht aus, um elementare staatliche Kernaufgaben erfüllen zu können. Die Sicherheitslage innerhalb des Südsudan ist aufgrund ethnischer Konflikte und marodierender Rebellen- und Banditengruppen sehr instabil. Der ungeklärte Grenzverlauf zum Nordsudan in den Regionen Abyei, Südkordofan und Blue Nile war wiederholt Anlass blutiger Konflikte und Flüchtlingsbewegungen. Das Straßennetz ist erst im Aufbau und in der Fläche unterentwickelt. Zudem sind während der Regenzeit viele Gebiete unzugänglich. Große Teile der Bevölkerung haben deshalb weder Zugang zu medizinischer Versorgung noch zu Grundnahrungsmitteln. Gesundheits- und Bildungssystem existieren allenfalls rudimentär. Seit Jahrzehnten leisten internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen hier Aufbauhilfe – mit der Folge, dass sich der Staat zurückhält, anstatt Eigenverantwortung zu übernehmen. Zwar ist man sich der Unterentwicklung der Landwirtschaft bewusst, die Maßnahmen zu deren Förderung sind jedoch völlig unzureichend. Die Nahrungsmittelknappheit wird ausschließlich von internationalen Hilfsorganisationen abgefedert. Der Staatshaushalt ist zu 98 Prozent von Erdöleinnahmen abhängig und damit äußerst anfällig für Ölpreisschwankungen. Die Verwendung der Erlöse erfolgt weder effizient noch transparent, Korruption ist endemisch.

"Sudan erlebt den ersten Jahrestag des umfassenden Friedensabkommens zwischen der Regierung und der (süd)sudanesischen Befreiungsbewegung SPLM. Der Jahrestag ist Anlass, die bisherige Umsetzung der Friedensvereinbarungen zu analysieren und nach den künftigen Perspektiven zu fragen, steht doch am Ende der vereinbarten sechsjährigen Interimsperiode das Referendum über die Sezession des Südsudan. Das sudanesische Friedensabkommen erweist sich als dadurch belastet, dass es exklusiv zwischen der Regierung und der SPLM geschlossen wurde ohne andere südsudanesische Kräfte und Oppositionsgruppen einzubeziehen. Entscheidend für den Fortgang des Friedensprozesses bleibt der Wille der Regierung in Khartum, die im Friedensabkommen gemachten Zusagen auch de facto zu erfüllen und die Legitimitätsbasis durch Berücksichtigung bislang marginalisierter Bevölkerungsgruppen zu verbreitern. Die SPLM-dominierte südsudanesische Regierung unter Salva Kiir steht vor der Aufgabe, die autoritären Strukturen des 'System Garang' zu überwinden und die ethnische Dominanz der Dinka in den administrativen Strukturen abzubauen. Von Bedeutung für Konsolidierung und Stabilität des Friedensprozesses ist schließlich auch, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft ihre Zusage zur Entsendung einer UN-Friedensmacht zügig umsetzt." (Autorenreferat)