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The last thirty years witnessed the growth of both globalization and digital transformation, characterized by information systems becoming interconnected and distributed on a worldwide scale with IT aimed to become a commodity. Cloud computing and blockchain being examples of such robust and distributed technologies which have been the main driver of this globalization process. Global technologies and infrastructures paved the way to organic and highly frequent interactions between millions of companies and organizations in multiple countries almost irrespective of geopolitical implications establishing global and complex interconnected supply chains whose aim was mainly keeping software/devices costs low. This created a virtuous loop that generated an exponential increase of countries' digitalization process and globalized industries. Like energy, IT progressively became a strategic geopolitical factor as the nation’s vital services implementation went digital. As a consequence, governments realized IT cannot be a simple commodity and that they have to manage the cyber risk associated with procured IT in strategic sectors like, for instance, telecommunication, finance and transportation. Governments have to understand and mitigate IT risks coming from these globalized supply chains against operations of potential powerful adversaries. Even a single supply chain dependency can be a risk, also from a national security perspective, when such dependency is established by a provider/vendor under the direct political influence of an untrusted nation or a trusted provider/vendor victim of a state-backed cyber attack. The recent Ukrainian crisis and the large degree of tension between US and China are amplifying risks coming from globalized supply chains in a world that is politically liquid polarizing in at least two blocks. In addition, the globalization process has shown its natural limits and frailty culminating with the global supply chain crisis created by the effect

In this paper we consider a static set of anonymous processes, i.e., they do not have distinguished IDs, that communicate with neighbors using a local broadcast primitive. The communication graph changes at each computational round with the restriction of being always connected, i.e., the network topology guarantees 1-interval connectivity. In such setting non trivial computations, i.e., answering to a predicate like "there exists at least one process with initial input a?", are impossible. In a recent work, it has been conjectured that the impossibility holds even if a distinguished leader process is available within the computation. In this paper we prove that the conjecture is false. We show this result by implementing a deterministic leader-based terminating counting algorithm. In order to build our counting algorithm we first develop a counting technique that is time optimal on a family of dynamic graphs where each process has a fixed distance h from the leader and such distance does not change along rounds. Using this technique we build an algorithm that counts in anonymous 1-interval connected networks.