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Electoral authoritarian regimes have sought to use a variety of tactics to remain in power even as they have opened themselves up to competition through multiparty elections. These tactics have included an array of measures targeting opposition women. They became significant in Africa after the 1990s as most countries adopted multiparty systems and ruling parties needed to maintain vote share. Ruling parties in African authoritarian countries strengthened their patronage networks by promoting women as leaders. At the same time, women in opposition parties have fared poorly compared to women in ruling parties and male opposition candidates. This has been the case even where one finds the special dispensation of a gender quota in the form of reserved seats. This article looks at how Uganda's ruling party has used various tactics to advance women leaders, responding to pressures from both the women’s movement and international actors while seeking to ensure its continued dominance. It reveals an essential feature of authoritarianism in Africa today, namely the instrumental use of women leaders to entrench the ruling party in power.

COVID-19 broke out in the period that Uganda was due to have presidential and parliamentary elections, posing a very precarious human security challenge. The ruling party (National Resistance Movement; NRM) faced the challenge of passing power to the Speaker of parliament if elections were not to be held. To mitigate the public health challenges and maintain power, the government acquiesced to an election process without public campaigns. Instead, campaigns were to be held over the radio, TV, and social media in what came to be known as 'scientific elections.' However, in a country hamstrung by massive political and bureaucratic corruption and an entrenched regime that uses violence against opponents, little attention was paid to the fairness of the process, especially in terms of access to media resources by the opposition. Conversely, as elections are about crowds and showmanship, the Ugandan Electoral Commission struggled with the ever-evolving electoral campaign process, especially as large spontaneous crowds sprang up on the campaign trail of the political candidates. The opposition needs a large crowd for legitimacy and a show of popularity. To mitigate this, the ruling party used violence against opposition members as an excuse to enforce standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the prevention of COVID-19, yet its candidates were left to gather crowds. This radicalized some of the opposition that used media outlets to call for violence and ethnic cleansing. This qualitative study delves into the extent to which the 'scientific elections' process was designed to produce a fair outcome of the 2021 elections in Uganda. This study uses the rational choice theory to explore the calculations of different stakeholders. The study relies on secondary data, especially available in media outlets, but also primary data through reports and social media and speeches of key figures in the political landscape in Uganda. The study finds that the Independent Electoral Commissi

Economic voting is multidimensional (covering valence, patrimony and positional dimensions), and a growing number of research contributions have explored the existence and strength of the effect of these dimensions on voting. However, we know comparatively little about the interplay between these dimensions. This article fills that void by focusing on how the interplay between the rise of income inequality (the valence dimension) and redistribution preferences (the positional dimension) influences support for incumbents. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Modules 4 and 5, I find that preferences for income redistribution reduce the likelihood of voters supporting incumbent parties. Modest evidence demonstrates that this relationship is stronger in countries where inequality increased to a greater degree between elections. Voters who want more redistribution tend to re-elect left-wing governments and want to throw out right-wing incumbents. However, rise of inequality hurts both left-wing and right-wing incumbents.

Turkey's new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population. Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail. Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system. Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting. The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader - the President. Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair. Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states. (author's abstract)

Blame games between governing and opposition parties are a characteristic feature of domestic politics. In the EU, policymaking authority is shared among multiple actors across different levels of governance. How does EU integration affect the dynamics of domestic blame games? Drawing on the literatures on EU politicisation and blame attribution in multi-level governance systems, we derive expectations about the direction and frequency of blame attributions in a Europeanized setting. We argue, first, that differences in the direction and frequency of blame attributions by governing and opposition parties are shaped by their diverging baseline preferences as blame avoiders and blame generators; secondly, we posit that differences in blame attributions across Europeanized policies are shaped by variation in political authority structures, which incentivize certain attributions while constraining others. We hypothesize, inter alia, that blame games are "Europeanized" primarily by governing parties and when policy-implementing authority rests with EU-level actors. We test our theoretical expectations by analysing parliamentary debates on EU asylum system policy and EU border control policy in Austria and Germany.

Political parties are a crucial link between the public and policy outcomes. However, few studies have considered who political parties are responsive to when they take positions on specific policy proposals. This article explores the links between public opinion and the policy positions of political parties on 102 specific policy proposals in Germany using a novel application of multilevel regression with poststratification to estimate the policy preferences of party supporters. While there is a link between general public preferences and the positions of political parties, this connection weakens considerably once political parties are in government. In fact, the study shows that the link between party positions and general public opinion is severed once parties enter government, whereas it is only weakened in the case of party supporters. Finally, the article finds mixed evidence for differences between niche parties and mainstream parties.

Retrospective voting is arguably one of the most important mechanisms of representative democracy, and whether or not the public holds the government accountable for its policy performance has been extensively studied. In this paper, we test whether retrospective voting extends to parties in the opposition, that is whether and how parties’ past performance evaluations affect their vote, regardless of whether they were in government or in opposition. Taking advantage of a rich set of questions embedded in a representative German national elections panel, we update our knowledge on the retrospective voting mechanism by modeling retrospective voting at the party level. The findings indicate that the incumbent status is not the only criterion for retrospective voting, ultimately suggesting that both government and opposition parties can expect credit and blame for their conduct and this should provide some impetus for responsive performance of all parties.

This article analyses factionalism within ruling and opposition parties in Malaysia, with a focus on party splits and/or the toppling or near-toppling of dominant factions at the national level. Political parties are either composed of clientelist or programmatic factions or represent hybrids that combine clientelist and programmatic factionalism. The strength and the type of factionalism depend upon policy space and the intensity of control over party groups. Programmatic factionalism is more probable if policy space is wide. Policy space is an effect of the positioning (relatively dependent or independent from other parties in the coalition) and the basic ideology of a party, that is, the major stance on religion, ethnicity, and the shape of the political system at large. If there is hardly any policy space, factionalism will be clientelistic rather than programmatic. Whether this type of factionalism arises is contingent upon the intensity of control over groups within the party and the availability of patronage goods. The control of party members is dependent upon the strength of the party leader and the centralisation of party organisation. This is demonstrated with reference to UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) (from programmatic to clientelist factionalism), some coalition partners of UMNO such as the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) (clientelist factionalism), and the Islamist PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) (programmatic clientelism). Moreover, a brief analysis of East Malaysian parties in Sabah and Sarawak helps to further elucidate the major dynamics of factionalism.

Zbigniew Rau, who was appointed foreign minister on August 26, will help align the trajectory of Polish diplomacy with the government's general line. His appointment fits into the logic of a larger government reshuffle, expected this fall, which aims for a greater centralization of power. His higher standing in the governing PiS party may, however, halt the gradual loss of relevance of Poland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Trotz bestätigter Covid-19-Fälle hält Burundi bisher am Zeitplan für die Wahlen fest, die am 20. Mai 2020 stattfinden sollen. Der bisherige Präsident Pierre Nkurunziza tritt nicht mehr an. Stattdessen kandidiert sein Parteifreund, der General Evariste Ndayishimiye. Die Regierungspartei hat seine Nominierung als Zeichen der Demokratisierung des Landes dargestellt. Als Mitglied ihres Führungszirkels steht Ndayishimiye jedoch nicht für einen glaubwürdigen Wandel. Dem jüngsten Bericht der Untersuchungskommission der Vereinten Nationen zu Burundi zufolge stellen die Wahlen ein großes Risiko für das Land dar, das bereits im Jahr 2015 infolge der umstrittenen dritten Amtszeit Nkurunzizas eine politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Krise erlebte. Burundi hat sich in Richtung eines Einparteienstaates entwickelt. Die Arbeit der größten Oppositionspartei Congrès National pour la Liberté (CNL) wird systematisch behindert. Im Vorfeld der Wahlen bedroht vor allem die Jugendmiliz Imbonerakure CNL-Mitglieder. Die Presse-, Meinungs- und Versammlungsfreiheit ist stark eingeschränkt. Unabhängige Medien sehen sich mit Zensur oder Auflösung durch die nationale Medienkommission konfrontiert. Auch die Aktivitäten von in- und ausländischen Nichtregierungsorganisationen werden streng überwacht und für viele im Exil lebende Burundierinnen und Burundier ist eine Rückkehr nicht möglich. Trotz des zu erwartenden Wechsels an der Spitze des Staates ist die politische Entwicklung in Burundi von Kontinuität geprägt. Ndayishimiyes versöhnliche Rhetorik seit seiner Nominierung bietet dennoch die Chance einer Annäherung an die internationale Gemeinschaft. Die Einflussmöglichkeiten von außen sind begrenzt, da eine direkte Zusammenarbeit mit der autoritären Regierung die Glaubwürdigkeit des bisherigen Engagements für Demokratie und Menschenrechte unterminieren würde. Ein völliger Rückzug ist jedoch ebenfalls kontraproduktiv. Stattdessen sollten Zivilgesellschaft und demokratische Opposition weiter unte

Die indische Innenpolitik war im Berichtsjahr von fortgesetzten Friktionen zwischen der dominanten Regierungspartei und ihren kleineren Koalitionspartnern sowie zwischen ersterer und ihren radikalen Vorfeldorganisationen bestimmt. Diese reichten aber an Schärfe nicht an die Auseinandersetzungen des Vorjahres heran. Außerdem waren ebenfalls eher moderate Konflikte in der wichtigsten Oppositionspartei und eine langsame, durch Unterbrechungen gekennzeichnete Entspannung der Lage in Kaschmir zu verzeichnen. Diese war ein Reflex zunehmender Kriegsmüdigkeit und internationalen Druckes auf Indien und Pakistan, das Ihre zur Entspannung der Lage in diesem Unionsstaat beizutragen.

This study examines how a government’s majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties’ electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister’s party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.

In the Russian regional elections on 8 September 2019, the ruling party United Russia managed to largely hold on its control over state assemblies and governorships. Even in Moscow, where United Russia was significantly weakened, there was no liberal breakthrough. But the elections did not solve any of the inherent political and social tensions - it only made them more visible. Thus, protest potential is going to remain high, which will likely cause the regime to become even more repressive.

Präsident Kim Dae-jung konnte im Jahr 2000 "Halbzeit" seiner fünfjährigen Amtszeit feiern. Mit der Verleihung des Friedensnobelpreises erreichte seine internationale Anerkennung einen Höhepunkt, und das Gipfeltreffen mit Nordkoreas Führer Kim Jong-il hatte zweifellos historische Bedeutung. So stieg auch in Südkorea die Popularität des Präsidenten vorübergehend wieder an. Phasenweise war die Popularitätskurve Kim Dae-jungs unter 50% gesunken, in der zweiten Hälfte 2000 erreichte sie wieder über 70%. Die Wirtschaftsdaten in dieser Phase zeigten positive Tendenzen, wenn auch die Gefahr einer weiteren Währungs- und Finanzkrise nicht gebannt war. Der Amtsantritt Kim Dae-jungs war begleitet von überschwänglicher Zustimmung, "with all the expectation of an over-hyped movie" - bis Anfang 2001 war die Popularität des Präsidenten um mindestens 60 Prozentpunkte abgestürzt. Diese Kurve entspricht durchaus dem Muster, das auch die Regierungszeit der anderen demokratisch gewählten Präsidenten begleitete: ein Schwingen zwischen übersteigerten Erwartungen und tiefer Enttäuschung.

Das Jahr 1995 wird sich der südkoreanischen Bevölkerung als Jahr der Katastrophen, der Zusammenbrüche von Bauwerken und politischen Fundamenten einprägen: Im April kamen bei einer Gasexplosion in Taegu 101 Menschen um, im Juni stürzte in Seoul ein Warenhaus ein und begrub mehr als 500 Menschen in den Trümmern. Gegen Jahresende geriet die gesamte politische Struktur ins Wanken: Der ehemalige Präsident Roh Tae-woo gab öffentlich zu, während seiner Amtszeit 500 Mrd. Won "schwarzes" Vermögen angehäuft zu haben - die meisten Gelder wohl aus Schmiergeldzahlungen; 170 Mrd. Won von diesen 500 Mrd. Won waren als "politische Kriegskasse" gedacht, also zu Zwecken der Bestechung.

As of yet, Islamization by secular ruling parties has hardly been investigated in depth. To bridge this gap, the present article reviews the existing literature on Islamization, synthesizes the scattered existing theoretical insights on Islamization by secular actors and applies them to the case of Bangladesh. It argues that, especially when they act in conjunction, three main conditions can drive secular rulers to Islamize public policy: first, the rise of Islamist social movements; second, fierce political competition; and third, (semi-)authoritarian rule. Focusing on the current Awami League (AL) government, the article shows how these three factors have interacted to produce a top-down process of state-led Islamization in Bangladesh.

Das neue Präsidialsystem in der Türkei ist für seine Verfechter der Schlüssel, um alle Probleme des Landes zu lösen - ob es um die endgültige Überwindung bürokratischer Vormundschaft über die gewählte Regierung geht oder um eine Verkürzung der Entscheidungswege, die eine effektive Wirtschaftspolitik ermöglichen soll. Doch bietet das System tatsächlich die Grundlage dafür, dass die Türkei innenpolitisch zur Ruhe kommt? Garantiert es wirk­lich mehr Stabilität, und eröffnet es so die Chance, allmählich zu demo­kratischen Reformen zurückzukehren? Schafft es vielleicht sogar die Bedin­gungen dafür, den EU-Beitrittsprozess des Landes wieder aufzunehmen, wie es die türkische Regierung in den letzten Wochen und Monaten verkündet hat? Pragmatiker hoffen darauf, dass Präsident Erdoğan sich bereits nach den nächsten Wahlen seiner Macht vollkommen sicher sein und deshalb zu einer gemäßigten Politik zurückkehren werde. Denn nach den Kommunalwahlen, die für den 31. März 2019 angesetzt sind, habe die türkische Regierung fast fünf Jahre ohne Urnengänge vor sich und könne deshalb erneut Reformpolitik betreiben. Doch wie ist es um die Reformfähigkeit der Türkei bestellt, wenn die Konzentration aller Macht in den Händen des Staatspräsidenten dessen politischen Spielraum gar nicht erweitert, sondern im Gegenteil beschränkt? Wenn die Sicherung der eigenen Kontrolle mit dem Verlust politischer Gestaltungskraft erkauft wird? Wenn nur der Schulterschluss mit Kräften, die jegliche Reformagenda ablehnen, das Monopol der Macht erhält? Vieles spricht dafür, dass genau damit die heutige Situation in der Türkei umschrieben ist. (Autorenreferat)

Benjamin Netanjahu und sein Likud haben zwar die Parlamentswahl gewonnen, sind aber zur Regierungsbildung auf ultrarechte Parteien angewiesen. Netanjahu braucht sie auch, um gesetzlich seine Immunität gegen drohende Korruptionsverfahren zu sichern. Das macht ihn erpressbar durch potenzielle Koalitionspartner, die Israels Demokratie abbauen und die Annexion des Westjordanlands einleiten wollen. Die internationale Gemeinschaft, Europa und Deutschland müssen Strategien entwickeln, um dem entgegenzuwirken.

Der Regierungswechsel in Bonn hat, wie jeder Regierungswechsel in Deutschland und Frankreich, zumal nach so langer Zeit, in Paris zu neuen Unsicherheiten geführt. Skeptische Stimmen sind, insbesondere in Frankreich, auch von offizieller Seite in ungewöhnlicher Deutlichkeit zu vernehmen.

This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova's (2008) distinction between clientelistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these authors classification of patrons' motivations for making appointments, specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin America’s presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees' play vis-à-vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration - one that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the findings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors associated with the respective governments' own political projects. The article concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay., Este articulo hace las siguientes contribuciones al estudio de la política de los nombramientos de patronazgo en América Latina: En lo conceptual adopta la distinción empleada por Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova’s (2008) entre formas clientelares y no clientelares de políticas de patronazgo, como un lente para el estudio específico de prácticas de patronazgo en regímenes presidencialistas en América Latina. En lo analítico, construye una nueva taxonomía de nombramientos de patronazgo basada en los roles que los nombrados cumplen en relación al executivo, el partido gobernante y la administración pública, la cual puede ser usada para el estudio comparado de la política del patronazgo. En lo empírico, aplica la taxonomía a un estudio piloto de la política del patronazgo en Argentina y Uruguay bajo dos administraciones de centro-izquierda. En lo teórico, contribuye a la elaboración de teoría al relacionar los hallazgos de investigación a diferencias en los sistemas de partidos y en los poderes presidenciales en los dos países objeto de estudio, así como factores de agencia asociados a los proyectos políticos de los respectivos gobiernos. El articulo concluye que diferencias en las prácticas de patronazgo son una manifestación de dos formas diferentes de ejercicio del poder gubernamental: una de tipo híper-presidencialista, populista, en Argentina y otra de tipo partido-céntrica, social democrática, en Uruguay.

For the first time since 1984, the 2014 general elections handed a majority in the Lok Sabha to a single party. This article provides a critical assessment of what the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party has meant for the dynamics of center-state relations in India. In doing so, the article first engages with the concept of "competitive-cooperative federalism" and more widely with a framework that allows us to locate shifts in center–state relations across three dimensions: the political, the fiscal, and the administrative. Overall, we argue that despite the BJP's promise to put "center-state relations on an even keel" these relations have become more centralized under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi. At the same time, this process of centralization has not been uniform across the three identified dimensions: centralization is strongest in the political domain, but weakest in fiscal matters, where the central government felt bound by the recommendations of the XIV Finance Commission and by long standing intergovernmental discussions on overhauling India's complex indirect taxation system with a polity-wide Goods and Services Tax, the management of which relies on center-state consent.

Die vorgezogenen Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Türkei am 24. Juni haben unerwartet an Dynamik gewonnen. Dank eines charismatischen Spitzenkandidaten und einem neuen Wahlgesetz ist die Opposition aus dem Dornröschenschlaf aufgewacht. Zugleich schwächen wirtschaftliche Probleme Präsident Erdoğan und seine Regierungspartei AKP. Für einen Abgesang auf Erdoğan ist es sicher zu früh, aber die neuen Allianzen zeigen, dass auch eine autoritäre Regierung keine Machtgarantie besitzt.

This article addresses the transition from the presidency of Hugo Chávez to that of Nicolás Maduro, in the light of the effects of the dynamics in domestic politics and the changing international order on the formulation of Venezuela's foreign policy. We start from a central question: how does Maduro's government, amid a less favourable global scenario, face the international commitments made by its predecessor under complex and different domestic conditions? Our central hypothesis is that the historical currents of sociopolitical fragmentation, regional tensions and the energy market, pose difficulties to the continuation of an expansive foreign policy, but in turn act as a stimulus for greater centralisation of power internally, and the politicisation of the foreign policy agenda, in line with the objectives and general trends pursued by the governing party.

Oskar Lafontaine’s resignation as finance minister of the Federal Republic, as chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and as member of the German parliament on 11 March 1999 was widely perceived as a dramatic episode in the debate about the future direction of social democracy in Europe. Directly after the resignation of the second most important politician of the ruling SPD-Green Party coalition, his decision was explained on four accounts. First, the relationship between Lafontaine and the German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, was understood as a power struggle between the leader of the major party in government on the one hand, and the leader of the government on the other. Second, Lafontaine was presented as a ‘traditionalist’, who preached doctrines about state intervention in the economy that were no longer acceptable in the global discourse of economic deregulation. Third, in the short period between the defeat of the Kohl government on 27 September 1998 and his resignation, Lafontaine had gained a certain degree of notoriety as “the most dangerous man in Europe” (The Sun ). In the media, he was presented as too left- wing a politician to fit into the supposedly more ‘modern’ political project of the ‘new centre’ in Germany or the ‘third way’ in Britain. Fourth, for the first time in the history of the German SPD, the resignation of its leader had a strong impact on the markets: a short term rise of the Euro against the Dollar, and a sharp rise of stock market prices underlined the satisfaction of some observers about the end of a long political career. In the following article, Oskar Lafontaine’s political life will be discussed in or- der to highlight the shifting meaning of ‘modernity’ in social democratic dis- course in the Federal Republic and in Europe. The focus will be on Lafontaine’s failure to transfer successfully his standing as a social democratic ‘moderniser’ (which he possessed in the 1980s) into the 1990s. It will be argued here

Civil society in Israel has been undergoing a growing conflict that mirrors broader trends taking place in Israeli society, namely the conflict between the rising conservative nationalist social forces and the dwindling liberal and humanist camp represented by human rights organizations (HROs). There has been a clear rise in the power of conservative nationalist civil society organizations (CSOs), which receive firm support from politicians who have influential positions in the Israeli government. These organizations have been leading aggressive political and media campaigns against HROs, especially those involved in defending the rights of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and under siege in the Gaza Strip. The conservative nationalist CSOs accuse HROs of being anti-patriotic and cooperating with the enemies of society and the state. They utilize three strategies to promote their agenda. The first is delegitimizing HROs through naming and shaming tactics. They lead well-orchestrated political and media campaigns that associate HROs with terrorist organizations. The second is silencing HROs by shaming the institutions – educational, cultural, and media – that invite the former to speak to their audiences. The third strategy is cutting off the sources of funding for HROs through lobbying activities in donor countries and putting pressure on governments to stop their funding of the former. (Autorenreferat)

The article analyzes the relationship between the drastic electoral decline of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the party's earlier leadership role in retrenching the German welfare state in the Hartz reforms after 2002. Starting with a survey of the SPD's recent political history, the article explains how the government of Gerhard Schröder advanced welfare retrenchment policies that abandoned the SPD's core electorate. The conclusion refers to party sociologist Otto Kirchheimer's theory of the catch-all party to demonstrate how welfare retrenchment policies create new structural barriers against the ability of the SPD to compete successfully in elections.

Seit den Parlamentswahlen am 7. Juni 2015 und dem zwischenzeitlichen Verlust der absoluten Mehrheit verfolgt die Regierungspartei AKP in der Türkei einen zunehmend autoritären Kurs gegenüber der Opposition und setzt auf eine Eskalation des Krieges gegen die kurdische Bewegung. Dieses Vorgehen sorgt auch außerhalb des Landes für großen Unmut. So fordert eine Resolution des Europaparlaments, die EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei einzufrieren. Allerdings ist das Verhalten der AKP kein Bruch mit ihrer vorangegangenen Politik, sondern deren Fortsetzung mit anderen Mitteln.

The successful national liberation movements of southern Africa have become dominant-party regimes. However, many now face a series of political and economic crises that have the potential to put the region's stability at risk. Dominant-party regimes in southern Africa base their legitimacy on liberating the nation from colonialism and being an expression of the people's will. However, they preside over an exclusionary social order. The promotion of formal measures of democratisation which focus on periodic elections, formal constitutions, and the existence of opposition parties have had limited success in loosening the political stranglehold of dominant parties. In fact, the adoption of such formal measures has given dominant parties a measure of international legitimacy, to varying degrees, while many of these nominally democratic regimes are restricting the expression of dissent, closing spaces for opposition, and clinging to power by constitutional amendments or popular referenda of questionable democratic credentials. The promotion of economic liberalisation measures - such as creating a "business friendly" environment and courting foreign direct investment (FDI) - especially for the extractive sector and its associated infrastructure, has not provided growth in ways perceived by many to be socially just. Instead, it has tended to concentrate wealth in relatively narrow ruling circles, bolstering the power of ruling parties while contributing to growing social polarisation. Many of the social crises facing dominant-party regimes in southern Africa are based on complex issues of distributional justice and inclusion, which are rooted in their particular social contexts. Foreign partners and donors should focus less on promoting formal measures of democratisation and economic liberalisation, which can be counterproductive, and instead promote more inclusive social and economic programmes, such as universal basic income.

South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), will elect a new president in December 2017. This person will also stand for the office of President of South Africa at the beginning of 2019 when President Jacob Zuma reaches the maximum number of two consecutive terms allowed by the country’s constitution. It is currently unclear whether he can finish his final term. Since the dismissal of finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, resistance against Zuma has reached a new climax. A broad alliance of civil society groups, trade unions and party representatives, even some from within his own party, have called for his resignation. Although these protests are aimed directly at Zuma, the causes of the dissatisfaction lie deeper. The ANC has not been able to successfully address the country’s social challenges. In addition, corruption and mismanagement have shaken confidence. For a long time, the former liberation movement was considered the only party to vote for by the black population. In the past four years, however, the ANC has faced serious competition from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Given the loss of meaning of the ANC, the South African party system is changing. (author's abstract)

Im Dezember 2017 wählt die südafrikanische Regierungspartei African National Con­gress (ANC) einen neuen Vorsitz. Diese Person soll auch für das Amt des Präsidenten Anfang 2019 kandidieren, wenn Präsident Jacob Zuma die von der Verfassung zugelas­senen maximal zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Amtszeiten erreicht hat. Derzeit ist unklar, ob er diese beenden kann. Seit der Entlassung des Finanzministers Pravin Gordhan hat der Widerstand gegen Zuma einen neuen Höhepunkt erreicht. Ein breites Bündnis von zivilgesellschaftlichen Gruppen, Gewerkschaften und Parteivertretern, teilweise sogar aus seiner eigenen Partei, fordert seinen Rücktritt. Zwar richten sich die Proteste direkt gegen Zuma, doch liegen die Ur­sachen der Unzufriedenheit tiefer. Dem ANC ist es nicht gelungen, die sozialen Heraus­forderungen im Land erfolgreich anzugehen. Korruption und Misswirtschaft haben das Vertrauen zusätzlich erschüttert. Lange Zeit galt es unter der schwarzen Bevölkerung als alternativlos, für die ehemalige Befrei­ungsbewegung zu stimmen. In den letzten vier Jahren ist dem ANC mit den Eco­nomic Freedom Fighters (EFF) aber eine ernst­zunehmende Konkurrenz erwachsen. Mit dem Bedeutungsverlust des ANC wandelt sich das südafrikanische Parteiensystem. (Autorenreferat)

Seit ihrer Gründung vor etwa zehn Jahren durchläuft die Regierungspartei UMP einen Prozess der Professionalisierung. Der Grad der Institutionalisierung der Partei ist dagegen bis heute gering. Zeugnis hiervon geben der Einfluss vielfältiger Strömungen und Reflexionszirkel in der Partei sowie die häufig freie Auslegung der Parteistatuten. Angesichts des Erstarkens der rechtsextremen Partei Front National (FN) wählt die UMP auf nationaler Ebene die Strategie einer Abgrenzung, während zugleich zentrale Themen des FN - wie die Debatten um nationale Identität oder die Rolle des Islam - in die eigene Agenda übernommen werden. Die Strategie der UMP für eine Schwächung des FN durch eigene Radikalisierung und die Aneignung seiner zentralen Themen birgt die Gefahr einer schleichenden Legitimierung radikaler Positionen, ohne dass die UMP langfristig Wähler hinzugewinnt.

This paper studies the territorial scope of the bills presented by members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Argentine National Congress) during Juan Domingo Perón's first two terms in office (1946-1955). Its main objective is to observe the effect that modifying the electoral system (switching from incomplete party ballots in multimember districts to relative majorities in single-member districts) had on that scope. Experimental techniques (an interrupted time-series and a within-subjects design) are used to analyze a novel database including every bill presented in the Chamber of Deputies during the period in question. Contrary to theoretical expectations, an increase is observed in the share of bills with a territorial scope that goes beyond deputies' districts - especially for those presented by legislators from the opposition and from larger provinces. In addition, by separately analyzing the effect on the ruling party and the opposition, the paper uncovers a plausible explanation for previous nonconclusive findings., El artículo estudia el alcance territorial de los proyectos de ley presentados por los miembros de la Cámara de Diputados durante las dos primeras presidencias de Juan Domingo Perón (1946-1955). Su objetivo principal es observar el efecto que la modificación del sistema electoral (de boletas partidarias con lista incompleta en distritos plurinominales a distritos uninominales con mayoría simple) tuvo en dicho alcance. Técnicas experimentales (interrupted time-series y within-subjects design) se utilizaron para para analizar una base de datos inédita que incluye todos los proyectos de ley presentados por diputados durante el período bajo estudio. Contrario a lo teóricamente esperado, se observa un aumento de la proporción de proyectos con alcance territorial más amplio que el distrito del legislador - especialmente en los proyectos presentados por legisladores opositores y de provincias grandes. Además, analizando separadamente el efecto de la reforma en diputados oficialistas y opositores, el artículo señala una posible explicación para hallazgos previos no concluyentes.

On 3 August 2016 South Africa held its fifth local government elections (LGE) since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Against a backdrop of increasing political frustration with the ruling party’s poor performance and continued debates about corruption and cronyism in the highest government circles, the African National Congress (ANC) maintained its dominant position but lost 8 per cent of the aggregate vote (53.91 per cent). The Democratic Alliance (DA) gained some 3 per cent (26.89 per cent) of the vote, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), first-time LGE campaigners, garnered 8.02 per cent. Importantly, the ANC lost control of three of the seven big metropolitan municipalities it had previously held. Since there was no clear-cut majority in four of the eight metros, coalition politics and the art of compromise will become a major feature of South African politics in the coming years. The elections were highly competitive and considered free and fair. At 57.97 per cent, voter turnout was slightly higher than in 2011., Am 3. August 2016 wurden in Südafrika die fünften Kommunalwahlen seit dem Ende der Apartheid im Jahr 1994 abgehalten. Vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender politischer Frustration wegen der schwachen Leistungen der Regierungspartei und anhaltender Debatten über Korruption und Vetternwirtschaft in höchsten Regierungskreisen konnte der African National Congress (ANC) seine führende Position wahren, verlor aber 8 Prozent der insgesamt abgegebenen Stimmen und kam auf 53,91 Prozent. Die Democratic Alliance (DA) konnte 3 Prozent zulegen und kam auf 26,89 Prozent der Stimmen, und die Partei Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), die zum ersten Mal an Kommunalwahlen teilnahm, erreichte 8,02 Prozent. Von Bedeutung ist, dass der ANC die Kontrolle über drei der sieben von ihm bislang gehaltenen Großstadtregionen (Metropolitan Municipalities) verloren hat. Weil es in vier der bestehenden acht Metropolregionen keine eindeutigen Mehrheitsverhältnisse gibt, werden Koalitionspolitik und die Fähigkeit zur Kompromissfindung in den kommenden Jahren wesentliche Merkmale südafrikanischer Politik sein. Die Wahlen waren durch einen lebendigen Parteienwettbewerb gekennzeichnet und werden als frei und fair angesehen. Mit 57,97 Prozent lag die Wahlbeteiligung geringfügig über der von 2011.

Beobachter sehen in der Parlamentswahl vom 7. Juni 2015, bei der die islamisch-konservative AKP erstmals seit 2002 die absolute Mehrheit verfehlte, eine Zäsur. Gilt dies auch für die Außenpolitik der Türkei, die in den vergangenen Jahren für ebenso viel Kritik sorgte wie der zunehmend autoritäre Regierungsstil Ankaras? Wie viel Spielraum besteht für eine von Oppositionspolitikern geforderte Generalüberholung der Außenpolitik, oder sind kaum radikale Veränderungen zu erwarten? Wie sie auch letztlich aussehen wird, die neue Koalitionsregierung dürfte vor allem pro-westliche Trends in der Außenpolitik verstärken.

Ralf Dahrendorf sprach schon vom "Ende des sozialdemokratischen Zeitalters". Die Entstehung neuer sozialer Schichten, Millieus und Lebensstile, die fortschreitende Individualisierung und Eigensinnigkeit gesellschaftlicher Subsysteme haben ebenso wie die Globalisierung der Kapital- und Gütermärkte traditionelle Handlungsmuster entwertet. Doch reicht dieser Befund schon aus, um vom Niedergang der Sozialdemokratie zu sprechen? Wolfgang Merkel zeigt auf breiter empirischer Basis anhand der Wähler- und Machtentwicklung sowie der konkreten Regierungspolitik sozialdemokratischer Parteien, daß vieles gegen diese Prognose spricht. In seiner vergleichenden Studie, die erstmals nord- und südeuropäische Länder mit einschließt, macht er sehr unterschiedliche Aufstiegs- und Niedergangsmuster innerhalb der europäischen Sozialdemokratie aus. (Autorenreferat)

In this article, we focus on manifest interparty conflict over policy issues and the role of coalition agreements in solving these conflicts. We present empirical findings on the characteristics of coalition agreements including deals over policy controversy and on inter-party conflict occurring during the lifetime of governments in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. We analyze the ways in which parties in government were or were not constrained by written deals over disputed issues. Coalition agreements from all four countries include specific policy deals, one third of which are precisely defined. These policy deals concern both consensual and controversial issues. Our central finding is that, in the case of intra-party conflict, parties almost always fall back on the initial policy deals when these exist. As such, policy statements of the coalition agreement facilitate decision making in each of the countries studied.

"Am 27. April 2003 wählte Paraguay einen neuen Präsidenten, einen neuen Kongress, neue Gouverneure und Stadträte. Nicanor Duarte Frutos, Präsidentschaftskandidat der Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR), besser bekannt als Colorado-Partei, konnte die Wahlen mit 37% für sich und seine Partei entscheiden. Auch im Kongress dominieren Abgeordnete und Senatoren der Colorados; sie konnten mit 53 der insgesamt 125 Sitze im Senat und Abgeordnetenhaus jedoch nur eine relative Mehrheit erlangen. Ein "Machtwechsel", wie ihn einige der Oppositionsparteien gefordert hatten, wurde nicht erreicht. Die Wahlen verliefen im Allgemeinen ruhig und ohne große Zwischenfälle. 46% der Wähler konnten ihre Stimme an einer elektronische Wahlurne abgeben. Nicanor Duarte Frutos, der zur "neuen Generation" innerhalb der Colorado-Partei gezählt wird, kündigte an, einen entschlossenen Kampf gegen die Korruption und die Armut führen und die Wirtschaft ankurbeln zu wollen. Ebenso sprach er sich im Wahlkampf für eine Stärkung des gemeinsamen Marktes des Südens und gleichzeitig strikt gegen ein Aufgehen des MERCOSUR in der geplanten Amerikanischen Freihandelszone ALCA aus." (Brennpunkt Lat.am./DÜI)

The political regime change that occurred in Romania, along with the dismissal of communism, elicited a process of emergence of new political elites and of new patterns in the functioning of the country's political institutions. But new political elites do not emerge ex nihilo and institutional changes are slower in practice than the ambition of change. Given the extensive absence of decision-making or technical expertise among the political actors, the new parties in government conducted a policy of cooption of personnel instituting new patterns of selection. The paper will emphasize the fact that, in the Romanian case, the process of professionalization of governmental personnel took the form of a long process, and that the protocols of the reconfiguration implied divergent strategies in what concerns the governments' ministers and the secretaries of state. It will be shown that although the ministerial careers suggest the institutionalization of recruitment procedures similar to other European parliamentary democracies, the junior ministers' level remained dominated by forms of cooption from outside the political realm.

"Transnationalisierung steht für einen Funktionswandel der Staaten im Zeichen von Globalisierung und neoliberaler Politik, der ihre Rolle als Umverteilungsinstrument schwächt. Insofern sich das Transnationale v.a. als Aktualisierung globaler Ungleichheitsverhältnisse darstellt, gilt es zu fragen, wie das Handeln lokaler Bewegungen in Ländern des Globalen Südens bzw. der europäischen Peripherie, für die eine Zusammenarbeit mit ausländischen Geldgebern immer bedeutsamer wird, durch Dynamiken beeinflusst wird, die vorläufig als abhängige Transnationalisierung gefasst werden können. Der Beitrag geht dem mit Fokus auf die feministische Bewegung nach. Besonderes Gewicht kommt dabei der Heterogenität der Frauenbewegung und den Wirkungen des gesellschaftlich folgenschwersten Militärputsches von 1980 zu. Beeindruckende, mittels der Berufung auf internationale Frauenrechtsnormen errungene Erfolge brechen sich daran, dass eine Zunahme sozialer Macht von Frauen durch Unabhängigkeit sichernde Erwerbsarbeit in den Dekaden der Transnationalisierung nicht erreicht werden konnte. In der jetzigen Situation, die durch umfassende Macht der religiös-konservativen Regierungspartei geprägt ist, stehen Feministinnen in der Türkei überdies vor einer fortschreitenden Marginalisierung." (Autorenreferat), "Women's movement and transnational "projectism" in Turkey Transnationalization points to changes in the functioning of states within the framework of Globalization and neoliberal politics which weakens their role as instruments of redistribution. Thus, transnationalization contributes to a manifestation of global inequalities. As cooperation with foreign funding bodies steadily grows more important, the question is how local movement's agency in countries of the Global South or the European periphery is shaped by dynamics which can preliminarily be grasped as "dependent transnationalization". The article follows this question with a focus on the women's movements. In this context, the women's movements heterogeneity and the social consequences of the military coup in 1980 are of special importance. Impressive achievements made by recourse to international norms of women's rights contrast with the fact that during the decades of transnationalization, an increase of social power of women in terms of material independence could not be reached. At present, as the atmosphere in Turkey is characterized by a concentration of political power in the hands of the religious-conservative governing party, feminists are confronted with an ever-increasing marginalization." (author's abstract)

"Schwere Korruptionsvorwürfe erschüttern seit über 100 Tagen die Regierung des brasilianischen Präsidenten Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva und seine Arbeiterpartei. Die Enthüllungen des Abgeordneten Roberto Jefferson der Regierungskoalition haben eine Lawine von Ermittlungen losgetreten, die auf ein umfassendes Netzwerk der Bestechung und Veruntreuung in öffentlichen Unternehmen, des Stimmenkaufs von Abgeordneten sowie schwarzer Kassen ausländischer Briefkastenfirmen, Steuerhinterziehung und illegaler Wahlkampffinanzierung gestoßen sind. Führende Politiker der Arbeiterpartei sind bereits zurückgetreten, dem Präsidenten droht ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren. Die Aufklärung der Skandale durch die Arbeiterpartei und zwei eiligst einberufene parlamentarische Untersuchungskommissionen ähneln einer Farce. Nach langem Zögern hat Präsident Lula das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung in seiner Regierung verloren. Er scheint kraft- und orientierungslos, seine Partei ist verschuldet und zersplittert, seine Regierungskoalition hält keine Mehrheit mehr im Parlament, wichtige Reformprojekte sind blockiert und ein Ende der Krise ist nicht in Sicht. Neben der Demokratie drohen auch der Wirtschafts Brasiliens negative Konsequenzen." (Brennpkt. Lat.am/DÜI)

"Die Gemeindewahlen in Chile im vergangenen Oktober waren mehr als nur ein kommunaler Urnengang. Sie galten als wichtiger Stimmungstest für die seit März 2000 amtierende Regierung von Ricardo Lagos, aber auch als Weichenstellung für die Ende 2005 anstehenden Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen. Im Ergebnis bestätigten sie, was Umfragen seit längerem belegen: Das Potenzial der oppositionellen Rechtsparteien, die seit 1996 beständig in der Wählergunst zulegen konnten, scheint ausgeschöpft, der Zenit ihres Dauerpräsidentschaftsanwärters Joaquin Lavin überschritten. Demgegenüber konnte sich die Concertación, ein seit 1990 überaus erfolgreich regierendes Mitte-Links-Bündnis aus Christdemokraten, Sozialisten und Sozialdemokraten, einmal mehr behaupten. Die hohen Zustimmungswerte für die Amtsführung von Präsident Ricardo Lagos machen es zusammen mit den wirtschaftlichen Erfolgen seiner Regierung immer wahrscheinlicher, dass auch das nächste Staatsoberhaupt aus den Reihen der Concertación kommen wird. Das Regierungsbündnis will sich bis Jahresmitte auf eine gemeinsame Kandidatin verständigen: Demnach hätte bei der Wahl um das höchste Staatsamt im Dezember diesen Jahres entweder die derzeit in den Umfragen führende Sozialistin Michelle Bachelet oder die Chrisdemokratin Soledad Alvear gegen Joaquín Lavín anzutreten." (Brennpkt. Lat.am/DÜI)

Authors such as Dryzek, Gough and Meadowcroft have indicated that social-democratic welfare states could be in a better position to deal with development o f the ‘green’ or ‘eco’ state, and the intersection o f social and environmental policies, than conservative or liberal welfare regimes (synergy hypothesis). However, this hypothesis has as yet not been examined in comparative empirical research. Based on comparative empirical data from EUROSTAT, the World Bank, the OECD, the Global Footprint Network and the International Social Survey Programme, we are carrying out two research operations: First, by applying correspondence analysis, we contrast the macro-structural welfare and sustainability indicators of thirty countries and ask whether clusters largely follow the synergy hypothesis. Second, we raise the issue of whether differences in the institutional and organisational capabilities of combining welfare with environmental policies are reflected in people’s attitudes and opinions. With regard to the first issue, our results suggest that there is no ‘automatic’ development o f the ecostate based on already existing advanced welfare institutions. Representatives of all welfare regimes are spread across established, deadlocked, failing, emerging and endangered ecostates. As for the second issue, the results are mixed. While responses to the statements ‘economic growth always harms the environment’ and ‘governments should pass laws to make ordinary people protect the environment, even if it interferes with people’s rights to make their own decisions’ did not vary according to welfare regimes, people from social-democratic countries expressed more often than average their willingness to accept cuts in their standard of living in order to protect the environment. (author's abstract)

This article identifies the determinants of party loyalty while making a distinction between government and opposition voters within an electoral cycle in the two most recent European Union members (Bulgaria and Romania). Both countries are characterized by the perception of widespread corruption and a general distrust of politicians that are likely to hinder the development of strong ties between citizens and parties. We test the explanatory potential of both traditional and revisionist theories of partisanship, suggesting that perceptions of corruption should be treated as equal to evaluations of actual performance. The statistical analysis of comparative study of electoral systems survey data emphasizes the salience of party performance evaluations for party loyalty. Corruption perceptions are significant predictors of loyalty in the Bulgarian case. Voters in both countries assess critically the performance of their preferred party whether it was part of the government or in opposition. A significant difference arises between government and opposition voters with regard to the predictive potential of identification conceptualized as closeness to a party. (author's abstract)

"What is the source of the Partido dos Trabalhadores' (PT) success? And is the PT likely to thrive into the future as a key player in Brazil's party system? In this paper we weigh in on an emerging debate about Lula's role in the PT's rise to power. Without Lula's ability to win more votes than his party, we might not be discussing lulismo at all, much less its difference from petismo. Yet despite Lula's fame, fortune, and extraordinary political capabilities, lulismo is a comparatively weak psychological phenomenon relative to and independently of petismo. Lulismo mainly reflects positive retrospective evaluations of Lula's performance in office. To the extent that it indicates anything more, it constitutes an embryonic form of petismo. The ideas that constitute lulismo are similar to the ideas that constitute petismo in voters' minds, and they have been so since the party's founding - a nonrevolutionary quest to make Brazilian democracy more equitable and more participatory. Both lulismo and petismo are key sources of the PT's strength, but petismo is likely to endure long after Lula has departed the political scene." (author's abstract)

"This article proposes a set of arguments about the strategic use of cabinet appointments by executives in presidential systems. Although recent work has greatly improved our understanding of government formation in presidential countries, most changes to presidential cabinets happen throughout the lifetime of a government and remain poorly understood. I argue that presidents use cabinet changes in response to unexpected shocks and to adjust their governments to changing political and policy circumstances. Weak presidents are more likely to use this strategic resource, which means that ministerial turnover should be higher when a president's formal authority is weak and he or she has low political support and popularity. To test these claims, I have assembled an original dataset that records individual cabinet changes in 12 Latin American countries between 1982 and 2012. The data provides strong support for the theory." (author's abstract)

"Welche Partei benutzt Gewalt, um Wahlergebnisse zu beeinflussen? Diese kritische Frage wurde bislang aus zwei unterschiedlichen Perspektiven beantwortet: Nach der einen - verbreiteteren - Position setzt eher die Partei an der Macht auf Gewalt, um Wahlen zu beeinflussen, als die Oppositionspartei. Die Gegenposition lautet, dass Gewalt bei Wahlen eher von der schwächsten Partei ausgeht als von der amtierenden. Der Autor versucht, einen Beitrag zu dieser Debatte zu leisten und die Position, wonach eher die etablierte Partei auf Gewalt zur Wahlmanipulation setzt, zu erhärten. Er analysiert vertrauenswürdige Berichte unabhängiger Wahlberichterstatter über verschiedene Wahlperioden in Nigeria und zeigt, dass hier eher die amtierende Partei mit Gewalt bei Wahlen in Zusammenhang gebracht werden kann als die Opposition. Zudem argumentiert er, dass die spezifische Form der Exekutive in Nigeria eine plausible Erklärung für die von etablierten Parteien ausgehende Gewalt liefert." (Autorenreferat), "Which party uses violence to influence election outcomes? There are two existing perspectives that have offered responses to this critical question. One is a more popular position indicating that the incumbent party, more than the opposition party, makes use of violence with the aim of rigging elections; the other is a more radical perspective that suggests that electoral violence is more associated with the weakest party than with the incumbent. This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate and to advance the argument suggesting the dominance of the incumbent in the use of violence to rig elections. With evidence sourced from well-trusted reports from independent election monitors, this paper shows with case studies from Nigeria at different electoral periods that, in terms of influencing election outcomes, the incumbent has been more associated with violence during elections than the opposition. It is further argued in the paper that the existing nature of executive power in Nigeria provides a plausible explanation for the incumbent's violence during elections." (author's abstract)

Tunisia’s main secular party, Nidaa Tounes, emerged as the largest force in the October 2014 parliamentary elections. The party’s leader has also a high chance of being elected president in a runoff ballot in late December. The results risk to increase polarization between Islamists and secularists, especially if Nidaa Tounes forms an all-secular government coalition. It might also deepen frictions between the country’s marginalized regions and the richer Tunis and coastal belt. Already, the success of Tunisia’s main secular party has triggered protests in the poor south, as some people accuse Nidaa Tounes of rejecting more conservative sections of society and criticize its close associations with some former members of Ben Ali’s regime and the business sector. These ties and vested interests are likely to make it more difficult to launch structural economic reforms. They also risk to foster alienation, especially among young Tunisians, and might trigger radicalization. Europe should continue to support Tunisia’s young democracy with financial aid as well as specific economic and security expertise, and, most importantly, promote cooperation between various ideological forces. (Autorenreferat)

Am 30. März 2014 fanden in der Türkei landesweit Kommunalwahlen statt, die sowohl von der Regierung als auch von der Opposition zu einem Referendum über Ministerpräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan und seine Regierung hochgespielt wurden. Während der Premier sich als Opfer »dunkler ausländischer Mächte« und ihrer »inländischen Handlanger« stilisierte und von einem »neuen Unabhängigkeitskrieg« sprach, kaprizierte sich die Opposition fast ausschließlich auf Korruptionsvorwürfe gegen die Regierung. Trotz Stimmeneinbußen von rund fünf Prozentpunkten ist die AKP aus den Kommunalwahlen als eindeutige Siegerin hervorgegangen. Doch Erdoğan sitzt nicht so fest im Sattel, wie allgemein angenommen wird. Sowohl in der Innen- als auch in der Außenpolitik stehen ihm schwierige Zeiten bevor. (Autorenreferat)

What explains the EU compliance of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)? Since it came to power in 2002, AKP has launched legislative reforms in order to meet the European Union’s political membership criteria (i.e., democracy, rule of law, human rights and minority rights). These reforms are puzzling since they happened in the absence of the two conditions of compliance argued in the literature: (1) credible EU political conditionality, (2) liberal ruling parties in EU candidate states. I argue that AKP’s pro-EU reform agenda is explained by neither a belief in the possibility of membership via democratization (credible conditionality) nor liberal political identity. Rather, democratic measures under AKP are instrumentally induced. Two broad political motivations have guided AKP’s reform commitment: (1) the electoral incentive to please Turkey’s pro-EU membership electorate as well as AKP’s conservative/religious constituency eager to see freedom of religion expanded under EU conditionality, (2) the motive to use reforms to weaken domestic secular forces (i.e. the military and high courts) and “survive” as a party with Islamist roots in Turkey’s secular political system. The paper supports the argument with evidence gathered from original coding data for both conditionality and compliance as well as process-tracing.

The October 2013 government reshuffle in Morocco marks the latest round in the drawn-out tug of war between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développement, PJD), which heads the ruling coalition. The Palace came out as the clear winner, and thereby managed to roll back some of the limited concessions granted in response to the protests in early 2011. Regional dynamics – support from the Arab Gulf monarchies and authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt after the July 2013 coup – and the dispute between the PJD and its coalition partner, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party (Parti de l’istiqlal, PI), worked to the Palace’s advantage. Even though the relation between the PJD and the Palace has ameliorated considerably compared to one decade ago, the Palace’s strategic aim is to weaken the party while at the same time using it to stabilize the regime. In the short term, and as long as the PJD is able to retain popular support, it will remain in office and retain a limited margin of maneuver for reform. Profound political reforms as well as structural socio-economic and judicial reforms, however, are likely to be postponed to the mid to long term. European Union policy makers should use the EU’s long and close relations with the Palace to encourage it to allow more substantial reform and cede power to the elected government. (Autorenreferat)