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This thesis seeks to answer the question: Does philosophy aim for truth? To address this question, I must first ask a more general question: What is it to aim for truth? My approach to answering this latter question uses pragmatism as its frame of reference by exploring the practical significance of the aim for truth. Huw Price argues that this aim provides a common purpose that helps us to engage with each other, turning our inquiry into a shared enterprise. (Price 2003) Price's theory gives an apt description of the practical role of aiming for truth. However, I argue that this aim, conceived as such, is not advantageous to all of our inquiries. This thesis formulates a distinction between shared inquiry that aims for truth - such as scientific inquiry - and personal inquiry that lacks this aim - such as the inquiry into matters of taste. While this distinction is practical, it has many theoretical reverberations that this thesis tries to trace. It cuts across many topics of philosophical concern, such as the mechanics of disagreement, the nature of truth, objectivity, rationality, and knowledge. After dressing up the practical distinction between personal and shared inquiry in these theoretical layers, I apply it to the inquiry to which this thesis belongs. I argue against the popular belief that philosophical inquiry is scientific and thus shared. An analysis of philosophical practices shows that philosophical inquiry is personal. As a result, my thesis concludes that philosophy does not aim for truth.

In the standard theory of human decision making a rational agent faced with a set of options chooses an option that maximizes the total value of expected consequences. This theory introduces a number of characteristic variables: a set of options, a set of possible consequences of each option, and a measure of value, probability, and futurity for each possible consequence given that a particular option is chosen. A widely discussed question is whether the value attributed to any consequence does, or should, depend on its futurity. Observed behaviour appears to show that attributed value commonly decreases with futurity. There is an argument that this discounting is rational provided that it leaves the relative preference order among options unchanged as alternative consequences approach. But research in behavioural economics provides apparently compelling evidence that observed human decision making frequently exhibits a form of discounting - hyperbolic discounting - that violates this condition. If the inference is correct it appears to deprive the standard theory of its usually assumed explanatory merit. On examination, this conclusion rests on a number of questionable assumptions. In this thesis I examine these assumptions and provide an alternative analysis of the process of rational decision making in terms of its adaptive basis and procedural constraints. I investigate, in particular, the causal structure of agency and associated issues of valuation, option definition, and probability assignment including, inter alia, the role of predictive accuracy, the combinatorial structure of valuation, proxies, the variety of alternatives, achievability, and the reference class problem. I derive a principle theory of rational decision making that generates a number of characteristic dynamical value profiles in response to various typically prevailing conditions. They exhibit exponential, hyperbolic, and other characteristic second order effects. I discuss issues of rational evaluation, amendment, testing, and wider philosophical implications.

Performance management involves formulating a common vision of the organisation's aims and purposes, supporting employees in understanding how they contribute to the vision and purposes, and helping employees align their performance accordingly. This sequential mixed methods single case study was conducted at a large publicly traded agribusiness in Saudi Arabia ("Organisation A") with the aim of conducting a formative evaluation of its performance management system. The aim was to identify needed design and delivery features, oversight and accountability features, and impacts of the system. Using a sample of 311 survey respondents from across the professional roles in the organisation, 18 employees distributed across two employee focus group interviews, and 24 managers distributed across two manager focus group interviews, data were gathered regarding participants' evaluations of and suggestions for optimizing the organisation's performance management system. Survey data were subjected to descriptive statistical analysis, while open-ended survey and interview data were examined using thematic analysis. The present study offers a framework to support Organisation A in implementing a more effective performance management system characterized by (a) design and delivery features of clarifying and improving policies and procedures; improving alignment with organisational structures and staff; clarifying and enforcing roles and responsibilities; and incorporating effective, user-friendly software and tools; (b) oversight and accountability features of increased executive sponsorship; monitoring guidance, and oversight by human resources; use by employees and managers; employee commitment and engagement to the process; and training for managers and employees to use the process; and (c) impacts such as informing promotion and compensation decisions, career planning and development, training opportunities, and employee-valued outcomes. This framework constitutes a substantial contribution to research and practice by filling gaps and adding to previous frameworks related to performance management in Saudi Arabia. Implementation and use of the framework should lead to improved assessment and understanding of the firm's human capital and yield strategic benefits such as improved staffing decisions, training and development, productivity, and employee satisfaction. These results, in turn, should improve the company's financial bottom line. The findings may additionally have some transferability to other organisations in Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and other regions of the world.

This project is concerned with the attempt to diagnose certain types of deductive inferences as exhibiting failure of transmission of justification. The canonical example of alleged transmission failure is G. E. Moore's infamous 'proof' of the external world, in which Moore reasoned here is a hand, therefore the external world exists. If the transmission failure diagnosis is correct, then this inference is incapable of providing a route to learning of its conclusion on the grounds that it is only if one already has some justification to believe its conclusion that one can acquire justification for its premise. The thesis presents two novel problems for the transmission failure diagnosis. Firstly, this diagnosis is only appealing if it is able to safeguard epistemic closure, but it is unclear whether it is able to do this once we distinguish between propositional and doxastic justification. Secondly, a dilemma is presented for entitlement theory, the traditional framework for understanding how there could be justification for believing the conclusions at issue. The dilemma arises once we consider the question of what the apposite degree of confidence is that is licenced by an entitlement, the upshot of which is that either entitlement theory is unmotivated, or it leads to irrational doxastic attitudes. In light of these problems, an alternative framework for understanding the phenomenon of transmission failure is presented. This framework rejects a common assumption in the literature that we can only accommodate the phenomenon by appealing to internalist notions of justification. The resulting externalist framework is defended against two potentially devastating objections. Finally, implications for how these views regarding the structure of justification bear on issues in the epistemology of testimony are considered, and it is argued that a certain family of views in the literature on testimony are committed to certain problematic views regarding the structure of justification.

This thesis explores consumers' purchasing behaviour under risk and uncertainty. Specifically, the role of subjective beliefs, risk and ambiguity attitudes, and information. I focus on food purchasing decisions with uncertainty about the quality generated by food fraud. The first essay uses an artefactual field experiment to explore bidding behaviour under risk and uncertainty in homegrown value (HGV) and induced value (IV) settings using Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM) and second price Vickrey auctions (SPVA). It investigates if deviations from theoretical predications can be ascribed to bidding behaviour that is inconsistent with standard theories of decision making (i.e. Expected Utility Theory and Subjective Expected Utility Theory). In the HGV setting, non-monetary lotteries are used. Participants bid for a high-quality seafood product, but there is a chance (known or unknown) they receive a lower quality seafood product. The second essay uses the artefactual field experiment to explore consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) a price premium to avoid food fraud. The influence of subjective probabilities, risk and ambiguity preferences on premiums are also investigated. Results show that consumers are willing to pay a price premium to avoid food fraud and purchase a fully authentic PDO fish product. The third essay explores if consumers update their beliefs on food authenticity and their preferences for potentially fraudulent food after receiving information. Whether consumers are Bayesian updaters and if belief updating is correlated to a shift in their WTP is tested. I examine if changes in beliefs and WTP depend on whether news is perceived as good or bad and on the source of information. An online survey is split into two groups: one receiving information about food authenticity from other consumers, the second from experts.

This thesis has two distinct aims. The first is to shed light on our practice of attributing rationality to others. To begin, Chapter 2 demonstrates that we cannot rely on questions of what rationality requires to make sense of this practice. Chapter 3 explores a different strategy and directly engages with rationality attributions. It lays out some desiderata for an adequate account of such attributions. Chapter 4 develops a novel account of rationality attributions. This account focusses on explicitly mentioning sets of an agent's attitudes, and also includes a measure for the attribution's robustness. Thanks to these features, the account meets the desiderata, and also allows for progress on persisting disagreements in the debate. Chapter 5 further illustrates the account by contrasting it with an alternative contextualist understanding of rationality attributions. The second aim of this thesis is to defend the Normativity of Rationality. In Chapter 6, I consider problems for a reasons-based understanding of the Normativity of Rationality which arise from so-called transmission principles, and point out strategies to defend rationality's normativity. Chapter 7 provides further support for one of these strategies. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my positive argument. I propose to understand rationality's normativity in terms of commitment - if you are rationally required to x, you are committed to x. Commitment can avoid the counter-examples of alternative understandings in terms of reasons or ought by combining features of both notions. This makes commitment a promising normative notion in its own right.

This thesis uses a constructivist grounded theory approach to investigate nonprofit corporate governance in the UK; using data obtained from participatory observations of board and associated meetings, workshops, and unstructured elite interviews. Open codes are generated and brought together as concepts, which are then iteratively compared and grouped in open categories. These categories are then reassembled using the paradigm model into five axial codes: the clash of orthodoxies; clash of motivations; regulator versus board power; clash of rationalities; and effective board duality. A dialectical approach is then used to create the core category of the ‘clash of neoliberal and public service world views which exists at every level of the nonprofit sector’. This core category is analysed in terms of the subordinate contradictions: at an environmental level - regulatory power versus sector power; at board level - accountability; the SMT; board practices and rituals (professionalism, actual and symbolic authority, boards meetings as theatre, and ethical standards); the concept of challenge as an expression of power relations; and rationality and decision making; and at the individual level - motivations of directors, moral duty and social purpose, social group membership, identification, credibility and trust. The substantive theory is then situated within psychology, governance, and corporate governance theories. The contribution made by the thesis are identified as the: use of ethnography to describe the inner workings of the board; creation of a model of nonprofit corporate governance; identification of the importance of political, ideological, regulatory, and ethical contexts; and concept of power, and the senior management team as a component of the board. Further research is suggested into: (i) a comparison of corporate governance in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors; (ii) challenge within the nonprofit culture; and (iii) the SMT as a major player in governance.

This thesis is submitted for the award of PhD by publication. It comprises four interconnected, published research papers linked by a contextualising narrative. The publications are all peer-reviewed research articles published between 2012 and 2017 in relevant UK journals. I am the sole author of three of the papers and first author of one paper. My thesis considers how social workers make sense of complex and uncertain information in child welfare and protection social work. My first paper considers the how an understanding of human judgement and sense-making can influence social worker's capacity of child-focused thinking. My synthesis of the literature indicated that social workers' styles of judgement are strongly bounded or influenced by external factors such as complexity of information and time available to make decisions. It is this "bounded" model of rationality which I have employed to provide the theoretical and conceptual framework for this thesis. I have included two papers exploring data which I collected in a non-participatory ethnographic study of social workers' sense-making in a local authority children and families team. These papers represent a valuable contribution to current understandings of social work sense-making. This naturalistic study identified a number of key themes and processes in sense-making which are directly relevant to developing and maintaining best practice. The final paper was developed over the period of my PhD studies. The paper builds on existing research and develops theories of bounded rationality into a conceptual model which I have referred to as an "Ecology of Judgement" for child welfare and protection social work. By modelling the complex interplay between the mind of the social worker and the information environment in which they are operating the model has utility in practice development and research.

For several decades, causal decision theory (CDT) has been the orthodox version of philosophical decision theory. However, ever since CDT was first developed there have been those who have disputed the adequacy of this theory. Then, in the last decade and a half, opposition to this theory has intensified, with a vast array of novel objections to CDT emerging. As a result, the field of philosophical decision theory has splintered, with a large number of new versions of decision theory being developed to try to plug the gap left by the apparent collapse of CDT. However, in this thesis I will defend CDT against the objections raised against it and so dispute the need to develop a new version of decision theory. In doing so, I will address old challenges to CDT, based around Newcomb’s Problem and cases where CDT provides unstable guidance. These challenges have been around for some time. While existing solutions have been presented here, these have failed to fully resolve the disquiet that these objections raise. In this thesis, I will have more to say to resolve this disquiet so that we can set these old objections aside. In this thesis, I will also address new challenges to CDT, which have arisen in the past decade and a half. These challenges are based on appeals to quantum mechanics, prophecy, and the laws of nature, among other things. Many of these objections have not previously been addressed. However, I will argue that these challenges fail to appropriately construe CDT and so fail to truly undermine this theory. Causal decision theory, I will conclude, is a robust theory. As such, while there is much work to be done in philosophical decision theory this work involves building on, rather than replacing, CDT.

We investigate principles of rationality based on symmetry in Polyadic Pure Inductive Logic. The aim of Pure Inductive Logic (PIL) is to determine how to assign probabilities to sentences of a language being true in some structure on the basis of rational considerations. This thesis centres on principles arising from instances of symmetry for sentences of first-order polyadic languages. We begin with the recently introduced Permutation Invariance Principle (PIP), and find that it is determined by a finite number of permutations on a finite set of formulae. We test the consistency of PIP with established principles of the subject and show, in particular, that it is consistent with Super Regularity. We then investigate the relationship between PIP and the two main polyadic principles thus far, Spectrum Exchangeability and Language Invariance, and discover there are close connections. In addition, we define the key notion of polyadic atoms as the building blocks of polyadic languages. We explore polyadic generalisations of the unary principle of Atom Exchangeability and prove that PIP is a natural extension of Atom Exchangeability to polyadic languages. In the second half of the thesis we investigate polyadic approaches to the unary version of Constant Exchangeability as invariance under signatures. We first provide a theory built on polyadic atoms (for binary and then general languages). We introduce the notion of a signature for non-unary languages, and principles of invariance under signatures, independence, and instantial relevance for this context, as well as a binary representation theorem. We then develop a second approach to these concepts using elements as alternative building blocks for polyadic languages. Finally, we introduce the concepts of homomorphisms and degenerate probability functions in Pure Inductive Logic. We examine which of the established principles of PIL are preserved by these notions, and present a method for reducing probability functions on general polyadic languages to functions on binary languages.

This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.

The idea that humans are prone to widespread and systematic biases has dominated the psychological study of thinking and decision-making. The conclusion that has often been drawn is that people are irrational. In recent decades, however, a number of psychologists have started to call into question key claims and findings in research on human biases. In particular, a body of research has come together under the heading of adaptive rationality (henceforth AR). AR theorists argue that people should not be assessed against formal principles of rationality but rather against the goals they entertain. Moreover, AR theorists maintain that the conclusion that people are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably successful once assessed against their goals and given the cognitive and external constraints imposed by the environment. The growth of literature around AR is what motivates the present investigation, and assessing the plausibility of the AR challenge to research on human biases is the goal of this thesis. My enquiry analyses several aspects of this suggested turn in the empirical study of rationality and provides one of the first philosophically-informed appraisals of the prospects of AR. First and foremost, my thesis seeks to provide a qualified defence of the AR project. On the one hand, I agree with AR theorists that there is room for a conceptual revolution in the study of thinking and decision-making: while it is commonly argued that behaviour and cognition should be assessed against formal principles of rationality, I stress the importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that people entertain. However, I also contend that AR theorists have hitherto failed to provide compelling evidence in support of their most ambitious and optimistic theses about people’s rationality. In particular, I present a great deal of evidence suggesting that people are often unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals and I argue that AR theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, optimistic claims about human rationality could be defended.

In my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.

We propose and investigate several new principles of rational reasoning within the framework of Pure Inductive Logic, PIL, where probability functions defined on the sentences of a first-order language are used to model an agent's beliefs. The Elephant Principle is concerned with how learning, modelled by conditioning, may be uniquely `remembered'. The Perspective Principle requires that, from a given prior, conditioning on statistically similar experiences should result in similar assignments, and is found to be a necessary condition for Reichenbach's Axiom to hold. The Abductive Inference Principle and some variations are proposed as possible formulations of a restriction of C.S. Peirce's notion of hypothesis in the context of PIL, though characterization results obtained for these principles suggest that they may be too strong. The Finite Values Property holds when a probability function takes only finitely many values when restricted to sentences containing only constant symbols from some fixed finite set. This is shown to entail a certain systematic method of assigning probabilities in terms of possible worlds, and it is considered in this light as a possible principle of inductive reasoning. Classification results are given, stating which members of certain established families of probability functions satisfy each of these new principles. Additionally, we define the theory of a principle P of PIL to be the set of those sentences which are assigned probability 1 by every probability function which satisfies P. We investigate the theory of the established principle of Spectrum Exchangeability by finding separately the theories of heterogeneous and homogeneous functions. The theory of Spectrum Exchangeability is found to be equal to the theory of finite structures. The theory of Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate is also found. Consequently, we find that Spectrum Exchangeability, Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate and the Finite Values Property are all inconsistent with the principle of Super-Regularity: that any consistent sentence should be assigned non-zero probability.

In this thesis my aims are twofold. First, I provide an auto-history of the concept of reason in Anglophone IR from 1919 to 2009. I uncover the centrality of the language of reason. I show that the concept of reason has constituted, undergirded, and empowered many prominent IR scholars’ discourses. Second, I bring out a taxonomy of four construal of rationality. I argue that IR thinkers have spoken in four languages of reason. Kantian reason stands in a relation opposed to passion, emotion and instinct, and makes the stipulation that to base actions on the intellect is prerequisite for pursuing interest and moral conduct. I argue that the British Liberal Institutionalists, Has Morgenthau, Richard Ashley and Andrew Linklater are bearers of this construal. Utilitarian reason refers to the maximization of interests under constraints, where interest can be defined as strategic preference, emotional attachment, or cultural value and constraints as a two-person game, uncertainty or risk. I demonstrate how Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, Helen Milner, Andrew Moravcsik and many other theorists use the concept. Axiological reason means following rules, cultures and norms, and always uses game as an analytical foundation and attends to the problem of how to enforce rules. I argue that Kenneth Waltz, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and K.M. Fierke have deployed the concept to construct their theories. Historical reason views all values as conditioned within a specific spatial-temporal background, and insists that moral problems, which are constituted in the margin of every political conduct, must be solved by overcoming universal morality and the unilateral pursuit of interest. I show that Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, David Boucher and Christian Reus-Smit have conceived of reason in this way.

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary bioethics. In this thesis, I aim to provide a rationalist account of personal autonomy that avoids the philosophical flaws present in theories of autonomy that are often invoked in bioethics, and that can be usefully applied to contemporary bioethical issues. I claim that we can understand the concept of autonomy to incorporate two dimensions, which I term the 'reflective' and 'practical' dimensions of autonomy. I suggest that the reflective dimension pertains to the critical reflection that agents must carry out on their motivating desires, in order to be autonomous with respect to them. I begin by rejecting prominent desire-based and historical accounts of this dimension of autonomy, before going on to defend an account based upon a Parfitian analysis of rational desires. Following this analysis of the reflective dimension of autonomy, I argue that autonomy can also be understood to incorporate a practical dimension, pertaining to the agent's ability to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. I claim that recognising this dimension of autonomy more comprehensively reflects the way in which we use the concept of autonomy in bioethics, and makes salient the fact that agents carry out their rational deliberations in the light of their beliefs about what they are able to do. I go on to argue that this latter point means that my account of autonomy can offer a deeper explanation of why coercion undermines autonomy than other prominent accounts. Having considered the prudential value of autonomy in the light of this theoretical analysis, in the latter half of the thesis I apply my rationalist account of autonomy to a number of contemporary bioethical issues, including the use of human enhancement technologies, the nature of informed consent, and the doctor-patient relationship.

Reformed Epistemology is an influential view in contemporary philosophy of religion, according to which theistic beliefs that are the product of our native, non-inferential cognitive faculties often constitute knowledge if God exists. My aim in this thesis is to ascertain whether Reformed Epistemology is viable in light of contemporary scientific explanations of the mechanisms of religious belief- formation, especially the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). I argue for a qualified “yes.” To begin with, I attempt to carefully reconstruct and scrutinise some currently popular “debunking arguments” from CSR’s findings, which aim to show that non-inferential religious beliefs are not knowledge, even if true, given the causal origins that CSR ascribes to them. I try to show that in various ways these arguments fail. Subsequently, I attempt to find a better such argument. The strongest debunking argument, I contend, is one that focuses upon the diverse and mutually inconsistent outputs of the religious belief-producing mechanisms described by CSR. However, I go on to argue that even supposing that this argument succeeds in showing that religious beliefs that are partly the product of contingent cultural influences are not knowledge even if true, there remains a body of what I term “core propositions”—propositions concerning the existence of some kind of personal, supernatural creator and moral lawgiver, in which humans are naturally disposed to believe regardless of their particular cultural setting— that can be known if God exists. Finally, I try to show that merely having this core supernaturalistic knowledge would provide someone with the cognitive contact with God that is sufficient for having a personal relationship with God (if God exists), even if only de re relationship. I argue, moreover, that God would have positively good reasons for creating a world in which human beliefs about life’s most important matters, including religious matters, are significantly dependent upon testimony and hence subject to the ebbs and flows of cultural tides.

Interpretationism about the mind claims that we can gain a philosophical understanding of the nature of thought by considering how we interpret the thoughts of others. My thesis aims to develop a version of this theory which is plausible in the sense that: (1) it has the potential to retain certain advantages attaching to theories of mind which focus on the behaviour, rather than the internal make-up of candidate thinkers; (2) it can fend off certain apparent counterexamples. The thesis is split into four parts. Part I explains why one might want to answer ‘No’ to the question ‘Are there particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order to count as a thinker?’ It then introduces interpretationism as a position which will allow us to answer ‘No’ to this question. My version of interpretationism claims that a being has a thought iff it is interpretable as having that thought, and that all thinkers are rational. Both claims face several apparently obvious counter-examples. Parts II and III address these counterexamples by developing the crucial notions of interpretability and rationality. Part II starts by considering the problem of seemingly hidden thoughts which occur during dreams, and uses this to develop an account according to which a subject is interpretable as having a thought if either a) there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual situation and actions, or b) there would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable counterfactual situation. I consider and reject an objection that this understanding of interpretability is incompatible with a commitment to the holism of interpretation, and then show how it can be used to address further proposed counter-examples, such as cases involving deception or paralysed thinkers. However, I agree with Block (1981) and Peacocke (1983) that their string-searching machine and Martian marionette must be counted as thinkers by this account. I argue that these are not counterexamples to the theory, however, because the intuitions against counting such beings as thinkers can be discredited. Part III uses considerations about human limitations and propensities towards reasoning errors to argue that the interpretationist cannot adopt a deontological understanding of rationality that seems prevalent in the literature, nor a purely consequentialist account of rationality. I explain how Cherniak’s (1986) conception of minimal rationality may be adapted for the interpretationist’s purposes. I then consider and reject the idea that the emphasis on the rationality of thinkers will leave us unable to fit paradigmatically non-rational thoughts and thought processes (dream thoughts, imaginings and association) into our account. Part IV shows why interpretationism so developed is well placed to retain the advantages of a theory of mind which focuses on behaviour, and outlines potential avenues for further research.

This thesis addresses decision mechanisms in foraging situations, using laboratory experiments with European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris). Building on previous work from the Behavioural Ecology Research Group, I chose the Sequential Choice Model (SCM; reviewed in Kacelnik et al., 2011 − Appendix 1) as a starting point, and tested its premises and predictions generalising it to different experimental protocols. Classical decision models do not relate choice preferences to behaviour towards isolated options, and assume that choices involve time-consuming evaluations of all alternatives. However, previous work found that starlings’ responses to isolated options predict preference in choices, and that response times to single-option encounters are not reliably longer than response times in choices. Since, in the wild, options are normally encountered sequentially, dealing with isolated options can be considered of greater biological, and possibly psychological, significance than simultaneous decisions. Following this rationale, the SCM postulates that when multiple simultaneous stimuli are met they are processed in parallel, each competing against the memory of background opportunities, rather than comparing present options to each other. At the time of launching this research, these ideas had only been applied to protocols involving just two deterministic alternatives and offering no chance to explore the influence of learning history (i.e., how animals learn to choose; see Chapter 4). To increase their relevance and offer more rigorous tests, I generalised them to situations with multiple (see Chapters 2, 4 and 5), and in some cases probabilistic alternatives (see Chapter 3), controlling the learning regime. I combined these extensions with tests of economic rationality (see Chapter 6), a concept that is presently facing sustained debates. Integrating the result of all experimental chapters (see Chapter 7), my results support the notion that behaviour in single-option encounters is fundamental to understand choice behaviour. The important issue of whether choices involve a decision time cost or the opposite, a shortening of response times, remains unsolved, as neither could be evidenced reliably.

Rationality is very widely regarded as a normative notion, which underwrites various everyday normative practices of evaluation, criticism, and advice. When some agent behaves irrationally, she is likely to be critically evaluated, and advised to change her ways. Such practices seem to presuppose that agents ought to behave as rationality requires. But some philosophers question this thought. They argue that at least some requirements of rationality cannot be ones that we ought to comply with. This thesis aims to dispel such sceptical doubts over the normativity of rationality; it defends the idea that the requirements of rationality are indeed normative, in the sense that if one is rationally required to F, one ought to F because rationality requires one to F. The normativity of three requirements of practical rationality in particular is the main target for defense in the following pages. They are: [ENKRASIA] Rationality requires of A that, if A believes she ought to F, then A intends to F. [MEANS-ENDS] Rationality requires of A that, if A intends to E, and believes that she will not E unless she intends to M, then A intends to M. [INTENTION CONSISTENCY] Rationality requires of A that, if A intends to F, and believes that she cannot both F and G, then A does not intend to G. After presenting some of the grounds for scepticism about the normativity of these three requirements in chapter 1, the thesis goes on in chapters 2 & 3 to critically examine several different accounts of why rationality is normative, concluding that they are all unsuccessful; a novel account is called for. An account of this kind is offered over the course of the two following chapters, 4 & 5. Each requirement is shown to be constituted by a certain kind of ought, while at the same time corresponding to a rule of correct reasoning. Chapter 6 is devoted to answering an objection to that account, according to which the rules of reasoning are given by permissions rather than requirements. Chapter 7 offers a digression into a related issue in action theory: it unfavorably explores the idea that reasoning is a factor that can be used to analyse not only rational action, but also intentional action more broadly; the chapter suggests that treating intentional action as irreducible is the more fruitful approach. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis and comments on some remaining questions.

Bayesian epistemology provides a promising framework for a theory of epistemic rationality. But the way in which this framework has been built upon thus far yields an unfortunately mechanical picture of rationality, on which rational agents are mere data crunchers who receive evidential input and spit out numeric credal output. This picture is rightly criticized, most prominently by Bas van Fraassen, for being too narrow and restrictive and thus failing to account for certain features which rationality plausibly has, such as a degree of permissiveness, and for certain unconventional rational phenomena, such as conversions. Unfortunately, van Fraassen’s apt criticism of mechanistic rationality overshoots its mark in seeking to topple the entire Bayesian framework. Bayesian epistemology suffers a guilt by association with the robotic picture. This dissertation aims to restore Bayesianism from the mechanistic but often implicit assumptions which corrode it, and to rebuild, from the Bayesian foundation, an alternative picture of rationality as a property of sentient agents who are capable of understanding and mentally engaging with the objects of their credences. Along the way I account for some basic Bayesian objects such as credence and evidential input. I also accord a central role to the ability of representational experiences, largely sidelined in many Bayesian discussions, to give rise to surprising evidence. On these building blocks I develop theory of rationality, Expansive Bayesianism, which evades the criticisms launched at the robotic picture and shows that Bayesianism itself is a fruitful and powerful framework for a theory of rationality.

Two contrasting forms of advice for decision-makers are to either follow one’s heart (emotions) or one’s head (reason). This is a false dichotomy – but how should decision-makers combine heart and head? Decisions can be fruitfully analysed as a set of components: a decision-problem embedded within an on-going situation, with values-at-stake, possible options-with-consequences, choice, action and review. Structured decision-making models (head theories) approach this multifaceted nature of decisions by a divide-and-conquer strategy with thinking tasks provided to help decision-makers clarify the decision-problem, identify important values-at-stake, find credible options, choose the most credible option, act effectively and fairly review the outcomes of the choice. Emotions are complex and can also fruitfully be analysed as a set of components: an appraisal of a situation’s implication for the actor’s goals and values, bodily and cognitive changes, phenomenological experience and desires. Emotions can both help and hinder decision making, so wise decision-makers should neither ignore nor rely upon emotions, but instead treat emotions as fallible resources. The complex nature of emotions implies that different emotion-enabled tasks might assist decision-makers for different components of the decision. On the basis of this analysis an emotion-enabled, structured, decision-making procedure was developed and investigated by taking ten participants with decision dilemmas through the procedure. This investigation, based on repeated use of the Hermeneutic Single-Case Efficacy Design, provided some initial support for the effectiveness of the model: participants found the procedure generally helpful (p < 0.005), had increased confidence in their final choice (p < 0.005), which at follow-up they were satisfied with (p < 0.005). The use of emotions as fallible resources was also investigated through tracing emotion-enabled changes in participants’ decision making. Suggestions for further development and investigation of integrating emotions into structured approaches are offered.

This thesis examines the measurement, applications and properties of consumer inflation expectations in the context of eight European Union countries: France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data proceed mainly from the European Commission's Consumer Survey and are qualitative in nature, therefore requiring quantification prior to use. This study first seeks to determine the optimal quantification methodology among a set of approaches spanning three traditions, associated with Carlson-Parkin (1975), Pesaran (1984) and Seitz (1988). The success of a quantification methodology is assessed on the basis of its ability to match quantitative expectations data and on its behaviour in an important economic application, namely the modelling of wages for our sample countries. The wage equation developed here draws on the theoretical background of the staggered contracts and the wage bargaining literature, and controls carefully for inflation expectations and institutional variables. The Carlson-Parkin variation proposed in Curto Millet (2004) was found to be the most satisfactory. This being established, the wage equations are used to test the hypothesis that the advent of EMU generated an increase in labour market flexibility, which would be reflected in structural breaks. The hypothesis is essentially rejected. Finally, the properties of inflation expectations and perceptions themselves are examined, especially in the context of EMU. Both the rational expectations and rational perceptions hypotheses are rejected. Popular expectations mechanisms, such as the "rule-of-thumb" model or Akerlof et al.'s (2000) "near-rationality hypothesis" are similarly unsupported. On the other hand, evidence is found for the transmission of expert forecasts to consumer expectations in the case of the UK, as in Carroll's (2003) model. The distribution of consumer expectations and perceptions is also considered, showing a tendency for gradual (as in Mankiw and Reis, 2002) but non-rational adjustment. Expectations formation is further shown to have important qualitative features.

The aim of this thesis was to explore the efficacy of the rational choice model in the electoral decision making of young people. The initial view was that this was too narrow a concept to apply to a real world situation. Therefore, consumer behaviour theory was reviewed in order to find out how marketers understand consumer decision making and explore if this could add anything to electoral decision making. Using an ideographic approach, this research revealed a number of different groups that did not conform to the rational choice model. Moreover, it was interesting to discover that many voter and non-voter groups exhibit what can be described as irrational behaviour. Using education as a key variable and the Elaboration Likelihood Model as an analytical framework, it was possible to identify the different ways in which the groups built up their political knowledge and what effect this had upon the extent of their engagement with the electoral process. Two models were developed that described the various groups and their electoral behaviour. The thesis concludes by suggesting that engagement is limited to a small number of groups and the level of engagement is determined by a complex mix of education, life stage and the notion of risk.

The thesis argues that the relationship between liberalism and conservatism is closer than is commonly supposed. Though the 'triumph of liberalism' - whether intellectual or political - is a commonplace it in fact rests on a conceit: liberalism's claim to be able to provide a publicly justified morality founded on the ideas of rationality, tolerance and autonomy. That is the root of, to quote MacIntyre, 'the spectre haunting contemporary liberal theorists [which] is not communitarianism, but their own irrelevance'. I shall argue that this irrelevance is neither the result of liberal theorists' inadequacies nor a corollary of the exigencies of contemporary politics. Rather, it is a structural inevitability. For liberalism can justify its values only by resorting to a conservative axiology. The thesis delineates three strands of liberalism, classical liberalism, libertarianism and perfectionism. I argue that the problem that all these liberalisms have in common is that they all need to use a conservative form of argument to justify liberal norms of rationality, autonomy and tolerance. The origin of this dilemma lies in the nature of liberalism itself. Since liberalism's emergence as a self-conscious form of political discourse it has been founded on a particular view of how people are. Liberal doctrines about the social and political obligations of individuals are derived from the view of man (sic) as a rational choosing individual. However, such individuals are historical artefacts and their flourishing depends on a precise set of historical circumstances. I argue, therefore, that the various species of liberalism examined in this thesis all advocate - to a greater or lesser extent - conservative political prescriptions in defence of the matrix of institutions, laws, manners and mores which allow liberal individuality to flourish.