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Trust-based management has been a subject for discussion in the Swedish government resulting from shortcomings of New Public Management, a method inspired by the KPI-driven (Key Performance Indicator) nature of the private sector, which has turned into a form of micromanagement when applied in the public sector. In order to address this, the Swedish government gave the delegation of trust the assignment to spread knowledge about how the alternative, trust-based governance, can be used in the public sector. The aim of our research is twofold. Firstly, finding out how the two different management styles, trust-based management and micromanagement, are characterized in the organization of home care. And secondly, understanding the experience from the home care staff's point of view and how different forms of management affects the receivers of home care. We have used semi-structured interviews and, employing content analysis, found that the home care staff needs to be more involved in the organizational planning and have more freedom to make decisions based on their own judgment and experience rather than following standardized temples, such as minute-level schedules.

Trust-based management has been a subject for discussion in the Swedish government resulting from shortcomings of New Public Management, a method inspired by the KPI-driven (Key Performance Indicator) nature of the private sector, which has turned into a form of micromanagement when applied in the public sector. In order to address this, the Swedish government gave the delegation of trust the assignment to spread knowledge about how the alternative, trust-based governance, can be used in the public sector. The aim of our research is twofold. Firstly, finding out how the two different management styles, trust-based management and micromanagement, are characterized in the organization of home care. And secondly, understanding the experience from the home care staff's point of view and how different forms of management affects the receivers of home care. We have used semi-structured interviews and, employing content analysis, found that the home care staff needs to be more involved in the organizational planning and have more freedom to make decisions based on their own judgment and experience rather than following standardized temples, such as minute-level schedules.

Researchers argue that micromanaging behaviour has now become a common trait of management and been perceived as negative. Furthermore, there is little research on the technical perspective of micromanagement and why and how it occurs in an engineering environment. While each research covers only a few segments of the origin, symptoms and reasons of micromanagement, our thesis tries to consolidate all these segments to present the whole picture. Our research seeks to reveal and analyse the symptoms of micromanagement in an engineering environment. Additionally, quantitative and statistical analysis is performed to determine which factors of micromanagement are influential when managing a group of technical personnel. Through our analysis, we establish that the attitude of managers and subordinates towards the symptoms of micromanagement is rather different. The agreement of managers on the five symptoms were found to be greatly consistent while subordinates present an inconsistency in their opinions. From the examination of consistency of responses across the two groups, we determine that both groups are of the same opinion on the three out of five symptoms. However, the rank of each symptom in the two groups is slightly different. Through this study, we contribute towards academic learning of general micromanagement while strengthening the research of micromanagement in the field of engineering management. Moreover, this will also assist technical managers to identify the existence of micromanagement in their managerial role.

Researchers argue that micromanaging behaviour has now become a common trait of management and been perceived as negative. Furthermore, there is little research on the technical perspective of micromanagement and why and how it occurs in an engineering environment. While each research covers only a few segments of the origin, symptoms and reasons of micromanagement, our thesis tries to consolidate all these segments to present the whole picture. Our research seeks to reveal and analyse the symptoms of micromanagement in an engineering environment. Additionally, quantitative and statistical analysis is performed to determine which factors of micromanagement are influential when managing a group of technical personnel. Through our analysis, we establish that the attitude of managers and subordinates towards the symptoms of micromanagement is rather different. The agreement of managers on the five symptoms were found to be greatly consistent while subordinates present an inconsistency in their opinions. From the examination of consistency of responses across the two groups, we determine that both groups are of the same opinion on the three out of five symptoms. However, the rank of each symptom in the two groups is slightly different. Through this study, we contribute towards academic learning of general micromanagement while strengthening the research of micromanagement in the field of engineering management. Moreover, this will also assist technical managers to identify the existence of micromanagement in their managerial role.

Researchers argue that micromanaging behaviour has now become a common trait of management and been perceived as negative. Furthermore, there is little research on the technical perspective of micromanagement and why and how it occurs in an engineering environment. While each research covers only a few segments of the origin, symptoms and reasons of micromanagement, our thesis tries to consolidate all these segments to present the whole picture. Our research seeks to reveal and analyse the symptoms of micromanagement in an engineering environment. Additionally, quantitative and statistical analysis is performed to determine which factors of micromanagement are influential when managing a group of technical personnel. Through our analysis, we establish that the attitude of managers and subordinates towards the symptoms of micromanagement is rather different. The agreement of managers on the five symptoms were found to be greatly consistent while subordinates present an inconsistency in their opinions. From the examination of consistency of responses across the two groups, we determine that both groups are of the same opinion on the three out of five symptoms. However, the rank of each symptom in the two groups is slightly different. Through this study, we contribute towards academic learning of general micromanagement while strengthening the research of micromanagement in the field of engineering management. Moreover, this will also assist technical managers to identify the existence of micromanagement in their managerial role.

ABSTRAKT Titel: Prestationsmätningar med individperspektiv – En fallstudie Nivå: C-uppsats i ämnet företagsekonomi Författare: Lisa Edman och Anna Edström Handledare: Tomas Källquist och Stig Sörling Datum: 2014-05 Syfte: Syftet är att belysa och skapa förståelse för hur verksamhetsledningar kan använda sig av prestationsmätningar med individperspektiv och vilket värde de kan tillföra verksamheter. Metod: Studien har tillämpat en kvalitativ forskningsansats i form av en fallstudie. Primärdata har samlats in genom 15 kvalitativa halvstrukturerande intervjuer, respondenterna bestod av verksamhetens samtliga chefer på olika nivåer. Sekundärdata har främst samlats in utifrån vetenskapliga artiklar. Primärdata har sedan kopplats ihop med den teoretiska referensramen för att analyseras. Genom analysen har resultatet framkommit. Resultat & slutsats: Hur verksamhetsledningar hanterar prestationsmätningar som mäts på individnivå är en balansgång. Balansgången sker mellan att kontinuerligt föra uppföljningar för att motivera anställda till att utveckla sin prestation och att styra anställda på ett sådant sätt att prestationsmätningarna riskerar att leda till att individerna i verksamheten känner sig övervakade och därigenom bidra till omotiverade anställda. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: I studien har samtliga respondenter besuttit en chefsposition. I vår mening vore det intressant att studera uppfattningen om prestationsmätningar ur ett individperspektiv hos anställda utan en chefsposition. Uppsatsens bidrag: Det finns både för-och nackdelar med att använda sig av prestationsmätningar för varje individ. Resultatet av användandet beror på hur verksamhetsledningen förmedlar prestationsmätningarnas utfall till de anställda individerna., Title: Performance measurement with individual perspective – A case study Level: Final assignment for Bachelor Degree in Business Administration Author: Lisa Edman och Anna Edström Supervisor: Tomas Källquist och Stig Sörling Date: 2014-05 Aim: The aim of this study is to illustrate and create a greater understanding for how management in organizations can use performance measurements with an individual perspective and what value it brings to the organization. Method: This Study applied a qualitative research method in the form of a case study. Primary data has been collected through 15 qualitative half structured interviews, the respondents comprised of all the managers in the organization. Secondary data has been collected mainly from scientific journals. The primary data has been subsequently linked with the theoretical framework for the discussion and analysis. Through the analysis the results of the study has emerged. Result & Conclusions: How management operates with performance measurements at an individual level is a balancing act. The balancing act consists of continuously follow-ups with the ambition to motivate employees to develop their performance and to control employees with the performance measurements which could lead to the experience for the individuals to feel monitored in a way that could lead to employees feeling a lack of motivation. Suggestions for future research: In this study all the respondents possessed a manager position. I our point of view it would be interesting to further study the conception about performance measurements through an individual perspective by the employees in on organization without a manager position. Contribution of the thesis: There are both advantages and disadvantages to the use of performance measurements for each individual. The success of the use depends on how management communicates the outcomes of the performance measurements to each individual.

ABSTRAKT Titel: Prestationsmätningar med individperspektiv – En fallstudie Nivå: C-uppsats i ämnet företagsekonomi Författare: Lisa Edman och Anna Edström Handledare: Tomas Källquist och Stig Sörling Datum: 2014-05 Syfte: Syftet är att belysa och skapa förståelse för hur verksamhetsledningar kan använda sig av prestationsmätningar med individperspektiv och vilket värde de kan tillföra verksamheter. Metod: Studien har tillämpat en kvalitativ forskningsansats i form av en fallstudie. Primärdata har samlats in genom 15 kvalitativa halvstrukturerande intervjuer, respondenterna bestod av verksamhetens samtliga chefer på olika nivåer. Sekundärdata har främst samlats in utifrån vetenskapliga artiklar. Primärdata har sedan kopplats ihop med den teoretiska referensramen för att analyseras. Genom analysen har resultatet framkommit. Resultat & slutsats: Hur verksamhetsledningar hanterar prestationsmätningar som mäts på individnivå är en balansgång. Balansgången sker mellan att kontinuerligt föra uppföljningar för att motivera anställda till att utveckla sin prestation och att styra anställda på ett sådant sätt att prestationsmätningarna riskerar att leda till att individerna i verksamheten känner sig övervakade och därigenom bidra till omotiverade anställda. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: I studien har samtliga respondenter besuttit en chefsposition. I vår mening vore det intressant att studera uppfattningen om prestationsmätningar ur ett individperspektiv hos anställda utan en chefsposition. Uppsatsens bidrag: Det finns både för-och nackdelar med att använda sig av prestationsmätningar för varje individ. Resultatet av användandet beror på hur verksamhetsledningen förmedlar prestationsmätningarnas utfall till de anställda individerna., Title: Performance measurement with individual perspective – A case study Level: Final assignment for Bachelor Degree in Business Administration Author: Lisa Edman och Anna Edström Supervisor: Tomas Källquist och Stig Sörling Date: 2014-05 Aim: The aim of this study is to illustrate and create a greater understanding for how management in organizations can use performance measurements with an individual perspective and what value it brings to the organization. Method: This Study applied a qualitative research method in the form of a case study. Primary data has been collected through 15 qualitative half structured interviews, the respondents comprised of all the managers in the organization. Secondary data has been collected mainly from scientific journals. The primary data has been subsequently linked with the theoretical framework for the discussion and analysis. Through the analysis the results of the study has emerged. Result & Conclusions: How management operates with performance measurements at an individual level is a balancing act. The balancing act consists of continuously follow-ups with the ambition to motivate employees to develop their performance and to control employees with the performance measurements which could lead to the experience for the individuals to feel monitored in a way that could lead to employees feeling a lack of motivation. Suggestions for future research: In this study all the respondents possessed a manager position. I our point of view it would be interesting to further study the conception about performance measurements through an individual perspective by the employees in on organization without a manager position. Contribution of the thesis: There are both advantages and disadvantages to the use of performance measurements for each individual. The success of the use depends on how management communicates the outcomes of the performance measurements to each individual.

In today's volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment, leaders will be called upon to deal with multifaceted emerging threats within a global context. Leaders will be required to understand, learn, and adapt certain requirements to properly perform their duties. The purpose of this paper is to examine military leadership and determine the qualities that allow a leader to lead organizations through difficult and challenging situations. The paper will define and discuss the desired characteristics and competencies of future leaders, and investigate the need for adaptive military leaders who can transform organizations into learning organizations. The paper also examines shared leadership and the power of the group to solve complex problems. Finally, the paper will examine the changes a Battalion Commander implemented in a traditional Army Recruiting Battalion to fully leverage the organization and allow it to change rapidly within its environment to achieve success. The concepts and approaches described in this paper provide leaders with the means to transform their organizations into learning organizations., USAWC Strategy Research Project.

The leadership philosophy of Mission Command has been identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a critical enabler to the implementation of Joint Force 2020. Technological advances in information distribution, manifested in the internet and the 24-hour news media, and network connectivity, manifested in the development of a network-enabled force, have significantly challenged the effective implementation of Mission Command. These Information Age challenges have provided operational commanders the motive and the means to micromanage their forces and move away from the decentralized execution espoused by Mission Command. Operational commanders must possess specific leadership traits to overcome these challenges, the two most important being boldness and interpersonal communication skills. The criticality of these leadership traits will be proven through an analysis of the principles of Mission Command, the nature of the Information Age challenges, the characteristics of the identified leadership traits, and two historical examples. The historical examples show the benefits of these traits, as well as the dangers that exist when they are lacking. The examples involve Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson during the Battle of Trafalgar, and General Wesley Clark during Operation Allied Force. By recognizing the significance of these leadership traits, appropriate measures can be taken to ensure their development in our current and future leaders.

The quest for information superiority degrades the decision making ability of United States military leaders and the situation will worsen without adjustments to professional military education and training. This pursuit has degraded American military leaders' ability to make intuitive judgments, develop creative solutions, and critically consider a situation. Additionally, this hunt for more information increases a leader's risk aversion and propensity to micromanage subordinate leaders, two trends that can quickly erode trust among the force. Despite the claims of some, information superiority can increase fog and friction of war for military leaders instead of reducing or removing them. It is for these reasons the United States military should address shortfalls in education and training to decrease the chance of self-inflicted decision failures.

A disturbing trend has developed within the Army, as evidenced by several brigade-level commanders being relieved of duty because of toxic leadership practices. The destructive actions of these senior leaders have renewed interest into this leadership issue because of the prevalence and seriousness of the consequences such leadership failures cause. Recent studies and surveys, including the 2009-2010 Annual Survey of Army Leaders conducted by the Center for Army Leadership, have validated the presence of toxic leadership within the Army's ranks. This issue has caught the attention of senior Army leaders, who are focused on rooting these negative leaders from the ranks. This paper explores the concept of toxic leadership, examines recent examples of such leadership in the United States Army, and discusses potential ways to rid the service of this leadership flaw. An analysis of current data shows how large a problem toxic leadership is in the Army today. The paper reviews research on the characteristics of toxic leaders; potential causes of toxic behavior; and toxic leadership styles (i.e., The Narcissist, The Explosive (The Bully), The Gangster, The Turncoat-Backstabber-Accuser, The Casanova, The Invertebrate, and The Zombie). The paper also discusses ways to counteract toxic leadership styles, Army initiatives to improve leadership, and changing Army culture to fix the problem. The paper concludes with recommendations for identifying toxic leaders and changing Army culture to prevent this destructive leadership practice in the future., Strategy Research Project.

ing Prices and Financial Management Practices of Urban Families in IndiaAbstract: The consequences of rising prices and concomitant high cost of living are adverse and cause severe hardships to the families in the form of financial difficulties. The costs associated with financial difficulties are significant for the individuals involved. Personal stress, illness, marital discord, child abuse and loss of home often coincide with financial failure. The close association between financial difficulties and stress related problems within families indicates the need to address and assess the issue of management practices adopted by the families, when confronting inflation. This paper takes a more eclectic view by recognizing that families need to adapt and adjust to rising prices and financial difficulties by altering their priorities and reallocating their expenditure plans. Rising prices of consumer goods often compel families to drastically alter their consumption and the composition of their savings.

The DoD acquisition community frequently reports that micromanagement and overregulation reduce acquisition efficiency. The Defense Enterprise Program (DEP) was an initiative approved by Congress in response to Packard Commission recommendations to improve the acquisition process. The DEP initiative allowed DoD to experimentally reduce regulatory requirements, streamline the acquisition management structure and provide fiscal stability to DoD programs. However, the initiative failed to provide significant benefits for the designated programs. The causes of the DEP failure fell into these three broad categories; 1) Managerial failures in implementation 2) Failure to address organizational resistance to reduced oversight and 3) Political dynamics of DoD acquisition reform. This study analyzes the difference between congressional intent and DoD execution of the DEP as well as the impediments to effective DEP implementation. It also examines the characteristics of the DoD acquisition organization and the relationships between DoD and Congress while assessing the impact on the ability to reform DoD acquisition. Lessons learned from the DEP failure may provide insight on the political dynamics of organizational change and enhance the opportunity for successful implementation of future Department of Defense reforms., http://archive.org/details/thedefenseenterp1094523612, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The past 10 years of conflict have had an enormous impact on our military. Personnel, equipment, families, and the institution as a whole have all been stressed and hastily adapted to support units as they deploy, return, rearm, reequip, retrain, and deploy again. Now is the time to recommit to our profession, take a hard look at the trends of individual and unit behaviors, our policies, doctrine, training, and supporting programs to ensure we can meet the challenges we will face as part of our post-war transition and preparation for an uncertain future. There are three critical and enduring attributes that underpin the profession and the professional. They are trust, discipline, and fitness. The Army as an institution earns its trust from the people, and as a profession, we must earn that trust daily. Discipline is embodied in our faithful adherence to the oath we have taken as members of the profession to protect and defend our Nation and its values. Our fitness prepares us mentally and physically to meet the demands of our profession. When you say it aloud, you think: that's a no brainer. Yet as I review the initial results of the Profession of Arms Interim Report, I am not so sure. The Army has a cohort of young soldiers and future leaders who define those three traits through the prism of their experiences in combat operations, when they return from a deployment, and even when they are away from their duty. Interestingly, their definition changes and their application of those traits change or are inconsistent. So let me discuss those enduring attributes, discuss why they are important, why we need to ensure we maintain these attributes with the highest of standards, and talk to their impact on the Army's move to the future., Published in Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, p5-9, September 2011 (Profession of Arms -- Special Edition).

This paper examines the Army's perceived need for a written professional ethic. Through a Profession of Arms Campaign, the Army intends to redefine itself as a profession and publish a professional ethic. The relevant literature asserts that current doctrine, values, oaths, and creeds are insufficient to guide ethical leader behavior. It cites marquee examples of ethical failures that might not have occurred had there existed a comprehensive professional ethic to guide leaders. While there are relatively few examples of this type, the hypothesis is that these failures constitute an Army ethic problem, not an individual leader problem. The paper asserts to the contrary; that it is an individual leader problem. That Army leadership doctrine, while not perfect, is sufficient to guide leaders if it is understood, internalized, and modeled. It analyzes three of the marquee cases noted above through the lens of FM 6-22 Army Leadership. It shows that each ethical failure correlates directly to an individual leader's failure to adhere to current doctrine. Just as our doctrine is not perfect, neither are our leaders. As such, it offers a realist approach to appreciating (and ultimately accepting) the fact that none of our leaders are perfect, and that not all are professional., Civilian Research Project.

Leaders fascinate us. From the smallest shop to the largest corporations, employees observe, speculate on, and talk about their chiefs; if you are ever at a loss for a conversation starter, Tell me about your boss will work. Another great question is, What's the difference between a leader and a manager? Early in my career, I thought there was no significant difference between managers and leaders and that talking about distinctions between the two was a waste of time, just an exercise in semantics. Now I am convinced of the opposite; although the positions do overlap, there is a real difference between the roles of manager and leader, and the distinction is important. In fact, those in a position of responsibility who do not understand the differences between managers, leaders, and a third category, bosses, are likely to be mistaken about their own role and the effect they have on others. Every organization includes supervisors who lack general or technical skills, or who neither inspire nor benefit the people under their control. A good manager knows how to effectively work with the human resources within their span of supervision. A great leader moves the organization forward to new capabilities by enabling and enhancing workers. I label the people who do neither of these bosses. In contrast to helping the organization by supporting workers, bosses concentrate on their image, power, and future gains. Narcissism is a trait common to these anti-leaders., Published in Defense AT&L Magazine, v40 n4 p76-78, July-August 2011.

Air transport is the most modern, the quickest and the latest addition to the modes of transport. Because of speed with which aeroplanes can fly, travel by air is becoming increasingly popular. As far as the world trade is concerned it is still dominated by sea transport because air transport is very expensive and is also unsuitable for carrying heavy, bulky goods. However, transportation of high value light goods and perishable goods is increasingly being done by air transport. The financial health of companies declined despite liberal Government patronage, particularly from 1949, and an upward trend in air cargo and passenger traffic. The trend, however, was not in keeping with the expectations of these airlines which had gone on an expansion spree during the post-World War II period, acquiring aircraft ad spares. The Government set up the Air Traffic Enquiry Committee in 1950 to look into the problems of the airline. Though the Committee found no justification for nationalization of airlines, it favored their voluntary merger. Such a merger, however, was not welcomed by the airlines

The strategic corporal defines the type of Marine required for success in future warfare. General Charles Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, described three steps for training the strategic corporal: instilling character, providing a commitment to lifelong learning, and leadership. Currently, the Marine Corps is carrying out the first two steps well, but is not doing as well with the third step, specifically with respect to command climate. General Krulak explained that leadership quality may be viewed through a unit's command climate. Commanders should not allow a zero-defects mentality or micromanagement to exist. Unfortunately, a zero-defects mentality and a sense of micromanagement do exist in the Marine Corps and have led to more centralized decision making than was present 10 years ago. Centralized decision making appears to exist to improve force protection and has resulted in a desire to mitigate risks. Although the intentions are good, the rhetoric regarding risk is clouding the issue of force protection because only the symptoms are being discussed and not the disease. Many studies, articles, and real world examples were examined in this paper to determine the unintended consequences of the overly prescriptive decision making that hampers the Marine Corps' development of strategic corporals. Some unintended consequences include a zero-defects mentality that persists in the name of safety, micromanagement found in garrison, and overuse of the word "risk." The atmosphere created by zero-defects, micromanagement, and risk aversion make it difficult to transform the population that make up the strategic corporal -- the Millennial Generation -- into creative and independent decision makers. It is imperative that the Marine Corps continue to recruit strong men and women from society and then develop them into strategic corporals. The primary hindrances to this development are a zero-defects mentality, micromanagement, and misuse of the word "risk."

In the spring of 1975, the United States had suffered some of the most humiliating experiences in its existence. Only months before, our prisoners had been released in North Vietnam. Our forces had withdrawn, and just a couple of weeks before the Mayaguez was captured by the Khmer Rouge, both Saigon and Phnom Penh had fallen to communist forces. Only months earlier, President Richard Nixon had resigned, and President Gerald Ford assumed the office without being elected. On the afternoon of May 12, 1975, the communist Cambodians, exuberant in the wake of their recent victory over their U.S.-sponsored enemies, grabbed the SS Mayaguez. This merchant ship was proceeding through international waters, carrying exchange merchandise. It was headed northwestward toward a destination in southern Thailand. The Mayaguez was not a big ship, but it was under the American flag with a crew of 39 people of various nationalities, including American citizens. As the Pueblo crisis before the Mayaguez suggested, if something can go wrong, it will -- even when there is time for detailed planning and rehearsal. Five years after the Mayaguez incident, Desert One went down in the attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages. It didn't do any more than the Mayaguez case to recommend the efficiency of U.S. joint operations. It was not in the same category because it was a preplanned event, but like President Ford, President Jimmy Carter was to pay the political price for the shortfalls. Both events were factors in the genesis of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, and subsequent joint operations do seem to have improved. During the Mayaguez crisis, the author was the operations officer of the 16th Special Operations Squadron that flew AC-130s to maintain surveillance and halt waterborne traffic between the mainland and Koh Tang island, where the SS Mayaguez was anchored. This article is the author's personal account of the Mayaguez incident, including 20/20 hindsight on what really happened., Published in Joint Force Quarterly, n45 p111-115, 2nd Quarter 2007.

The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only 3 months. However, within 6 months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht's attack outside the gates of Moscow. Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long-standing and professional organization, the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitler's national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Army's capabilities. The war lasted nearly 4 years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead, and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmacht's capabilities and Hitler's ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa. By examining the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, the study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staff's development through the wars of German unification, prelude to World War I, and the interwar period leading up to Hitler's rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staff's efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staff's mistakes.

Mission command is based upon the exercise of local initiative within the framework of command intent. It is enabled by decentralization of authority and responsibility that allows subordinate commanders the latitude to plan and conduct operations based upon their understanding of the local situation. Shifting along a continuum of command approaches represents a form of short-term organizational adaptability that has been dubbed "elasticity" in this paper. It is argued that the roots of this elasticity lie in the concept of command intent, specifically implicit intent. The ability to operate in a decentralized fashion requires that forces create a deep, broad, reservoir of implicit intent. A force that is optimized for centralized operation because of its training, organizational structure, organizational culture, and equipment will not have the same degree of elasticity because it will not have a comparable reserve of implicit intent. All military organizations have a point of equilibrium on the command approach continuum and will experience stress during the period that they move away from this point. These two aspects of a military force -- elasticity and equilibrium -- provide an indication of its capacity for flexibility of command approach. In theory, elasticity increases as the point of equilibrium shifts towards the decentralized end of the continuum. In an age when centralized command is theoretically possible owing to technological advances, forces with the capability for decentralization will retain the advantage. This paper is a defense of mission command. Nevertheless, it is stressed that forces with the capability for decentralized command cannot be created quickly on demand -- no matter how much technology is available. Decentralized command is built on intangible qualities of the force such as trust, expertise, and broad experience, all of which take time to develop and are fragile, thus requiring careful maintenance., Text in English; title, abstract, and executive summary in English and French. The original document contains color images.

Although Anaconda was successful in achieving its objective of clearing al Qaeda fighters out of the Shah-i-Kot Valley in Afghanistan, the planning and execution errors associated with this operation have provided a wealth of valuable lessons for the United States military. This paper reviews the events of Anaconda and through a detailed analysis, examines the various criticisms it has received. Critical shortfalls associated with CENTCOM's upper-level command and control structure are revealed as the primary source of the confusion and problems surrounding the operation. Particular attention is paid to General Tommy Frank's controversial decision to lead such a large military effort from his Tampa headquarters, 9 1/2 time-zones away from the fight. The author concludes that, despite errors resulting from this decision, it was a viable strategy that offered many inherent benefits. By implementing the lessons learned from General Franks' long-distance leadership, in conjunction with the latest academic recommendations on the subject, valuable guidelines are provided for combatant commanders choosing to lead this country's future conflicts from a headquarters geographically removed from the theater of operation.

Technological advancements in communications provide the operational commander with a significantly enhanced real-time understanding of the battlespace, enabling more robust employment of centralized control. However, along with its benefits, this command, control and communications (C3) network includes the dangerous consequence of eroding the autonomy of tactical command through enhanced micromanagement by risk-averse operational commanders. Selected historical examples demonstrate that advances in C3 technology have been a force multiplier that enables the implementation of broader strategies by drastically improving the operational commander's understanding and control of the battlespace and battleforce. However, as exemplified by operations in Kosovo, technological advancement when put in the hands of risk-averse operational commanders also can serve as an enabler of potentially damaging micromanagement. Ultimately, training, doctrine and incentives will enhance the effectiveness of C3 integration, but the personality and leadership traits of the operational commander will ultimately determine how effectively this technology is integrated into the operational art of warfare toward the achievement of military objectives. The forgiving battlefields of recent conflicts have afforded commanders the opportunity to experiment with the application and misapplication of C3 in a relatively low-risk environment. Failure to maximize the effective employment of C3 in future conflicts against more formidable, multi-dimensional adversaries, would likely prove detrimental to achieving U.S. objectives. (29 refs.), The original document contains color images.

Advancements in Information Technology (IT) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) have promising potential for the military in the 21th Century. While technology offers a distinct advantage to the military, leadership is still a critical aspect of our fighting force. This will not change as we transform our military throughout the 21th Century. The development of operational leaders will continue to be a significant challenge for our military in the coming years. There are many implications to fighting, operating, and developing leaders in an environment of information sharing, networking and easier access to information. One of the problems that we see is the temptation for micromanagement. Some observations about recent conflicts offer evidence that senior leaders are tempted to micromanage based on the capability that information technology provides them. Although there are many other factors that influence this decision, IT certainly facilitates their choice. If we continue to succumb to this temptation and establish a trend in our culture, we will create poor learning environments for the development of operational leaders of the future. The environment created by micromanagement will, among other things, stifle creativity and innovation, and limit the development of decision-making skills required for operational leaders in the 21 Century. This work makes some observations about the effectiveness of the leadership styles used in Kosovo and Afghanistan as background information, and it examines the possible implications of micromanagement on leader development for the future.

Recent advances in communications, sensors, and computers have brought the U.S. military into a new age of technical transformation. This transformation has resulted in a new approach to the conduct of warfare, often referred to as network centric warfare (NCW). NCW possesses incredible potential for the lethal and efficient conduct of future wars, but it also enables a less than desirable aspect of armed conflict--leadership by micromanagement. This is a result of the capabilities inherent in NCW that cause senior leaders, unable to resist the urge to control tactical operations, to directly influence the achievement of strategic objectives. The intent of this paper is to examine micromanagement at the operational level of war, more specifically, from the national-strategic (civilian leaders) and theater-strategic/theater-operational (COCOM) level to the tactical level. Analysis from recent military operations will be conducted to develop short term and long term approaches that will minimize the effects of this ineffective leadership style.

Technical improvements in telecommunications and information management open unprecedented possibilities for mankind, including military applications and effects. Potential advantages are clear, but no less certain is the potential for actually making matters worse if the power of the technology is misapplied. Modern information systems may be used to enable micro-management to a degree unprecedented in history. As the former technical impediments to micro-management disappear, the degree of micro-management applied in a military setting becomes more a matter of choice and decision.

The Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) provides a systematic structure for planning, programming, budgeting, and installing improvements to ships of the active and reserve fleets. The procedures for budgeting and executing the FMP are governed by the rules of the current FMP Fiscal Appropriation. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 1989, a series of FMP appropriation decisions has resulted in each budget year program being budgeted and executed differently. These decisions have directly affected fleet modernization efforts and have increased the complexity of the FMP, a program which is well known for its fragmented infrastructure and misunderstood procedures. This thesis analyzes the budget structure of the FMP and evaluates the impact of changes in the budget structure since FY 1989, primarily as they relate to program execution. The research compares and contrasts funding and procedural differences between the FMP and the TRIDENT modernization program. The final results of this analysis are specific recommendations on how to restructure the FMP budget to improve program execution. Additionally, this research serves as a historical record of the FMP budget structure changes since FY 1989.

The DoD acquisition community frequently reports that micromanagement and over-regulation reduce acquisition efficiency. The Defense Enterprise Program (DEP) was an initiative approved by Congress in response to Packard Commission recommendations to improve the acquisition process. The DEP initiative allowed DoD to experimentally reduce regulatory requirements, streamline the acquisition management structure and provide fiscal stability to DoD programs. However, the initiative failed to provide significant benefits for the designated programs. The causes of the DEP failure fell into these three broad categories; (1) Managerial failures in implementation (2) Failure to address organizational resistance to reduced oversight and (3) Political dynamics of DoD acquisition reform. This study analyzes the difference between congressional intent and DoD execution of the DEP as well as the impediments to effective DEP implementation. It also examines the characteristics of the DoD acquisition organization and the relationships between DoD and Congress while assessing the impact on the ability to reform DoD acquisition. Lessons learned from the DEP failure may provide insight on the political dynamics of organizational change and enhance the opportunity for successful implementation of future Department of Defense reforms. Micromanagement, Regulatory Relief Defense Enterprise Program, Commercial Practices Pilot Program.

The purpose of this thesis was to characterize the current Congressional climate for Naval Aviation budget requests. An objective approach, consisting of the measurement of three key indicators of Congressional behavior during the authorization phases ofthe FY 1978, Fy 1979 and FY 1980 budget cycles, was employed. These indicators were: (1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the Hearings, (2) the funding adjustments recommended and (3) the rationale provided for committee decisions. Examination of the first indicator led to the development of a research typology that used the technique of content analysis of the authorization hearings to measure Congressional attempts at micromanagement. Measurement of the latter two indicators employed techniques developed and commonly used by earlier researchers. The same three indicators were measured for comparable Air Force Tactical Aviation programs to provide a basis for comparison. Several dimensions of the Congressional climate were analyzed, however the major conclusion reached was that Naval Aviation programs have been subjected to less micromanagement and have received larger budget increases than comparable Air Force programs. (Author)

Supervision is a large part of managing the SAC Minuteman ICBM maintenance production effort by providing important factors which lead to job satisfaction and motivation in subordinates. The people who manage, supervise, and perform missile maintenance are uniquely qualified to identify problems in the missile maintenance work environment. A qualitative survey shows that micromanagement, failing to provide challenging and meaningful work, and high work pressure are the three most prevalent problems in missile maintenance supervision. Other problems identified include low officer competence, lack of positive feedback, and NCO supervisory style. (Author)

The purpose of this thesis was to characterize the current Congressional climate for Naval Aviation budget requests. An objective approach, consisting of the measurement of three key indicators of Congressional behavior during the authorization phases of the FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980 budget cycles, was employed. These indicators were: (1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the Hearings, (2) the funding adjustments recommended and (3) the rationale provided for committee decisions. Examination of the first indicator led to the development of a research typology that used the technique of content analysis of the authorization hearings to measure Congressional attempts at micromanagement . Measurement of the latter two indicators employed techniques developed and commonly used by earlier researchers. The same three indicators were measured for comparable Air Force Tactical Aviation programs to provide a basis for comparison. Several dimensions of the Congressional climate were analyzed, however the major conclusion reached was that Naval Aviation programs have been subjected to less micromanagement and have received larger budget increases than comparable Air Force programs., http://archive.org/details/congressionalcli1094518652, Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.