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Is artificial consciousness theoretically possible? Is it plausible? If so, is it technically feasible? To make progress on these questions, it is necessary to lay some groundwork clarifying the logical and empirical conditions for artificial consciousness to arise and the meaning of relevant terms involved. Consciousness is a polysemic word: researchers from different fields, including neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, robotics, and philosophy, among others, sometimes use different terms in order to refer to the same phenomena or the same terms to refer to different phenomena. In fact, if we want to pursue artificial consciousness, a proper definition of the key concepts is required. Here, after some logical and conceptual preliminaries, we argue for the necessity of using dimensions and profiles of consciousness for a balanced discussion about their possible instantiation or realisation in artificial systems. Our primary goal in this paper is to review the main theoretical questions that arise in the domain of artificial consciousness. On the basis of this review, we propose to assess the issue of artificial consciousness within a multidimensional account. The theoretical possibility of artificial consciousness is already presumed within some theoretical frameworks; however, empirical possibility cannot simply be deduced from these frameworks but needs independent empirical validation. We break down the complexity of consciousness by identifying constituents, components, and dimensions, and reflect pragmatically about the general challenges confronting the creation of artificial consciousness. Despite these challenges, we outline a research strategy for showing how "awareness" as we propose to understand it could plausibly be realised in artificial systems.

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Contains fulltext : 237221.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access), The macaque middle superior temporal sulcus shares functional properties with the human temporoparietal junction supporting mentalizing. The ability to attribute thoughts to others, also called theory of mind (TOM), has been extensively studied in humans; however, its evolutionary origins have been challenged. Computationally, the basis of TOM has been interpreted within the predictive coding framework and associated with activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Here, we revealed, using a nonlinguistic task and functional magnetic resonance imaging, that activity in a region of the macaque middle superior temporal cortex was specifically modulated by the predictability of social situations. As in human TPJ, this region could be distinguished from other temporal regions involved in face processing. Our result suggests the existence of a precursor for the TOM ability in the last common ancestor of human and Old World monkeys.

Contains fulltext : 237221.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access), The macaque middle superior temporal sulcus shares functional properties with the human temporoparietal junction supporting mentalizing. The ability to attribute thoughts to others, also called theory of mind (TOM), has been extensively studied in humans; however, its evolutionary origins have been challenged. Computationally, the basis of TOM has been interpreted within the predictive coding framework and associated with activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Here, we revealed, using a nonlinguistic task and functional magnetic resonance imaging, that activity in a region of the macaque middle superior temporal cortex was specifically modulated by the predictability of social situations. As in human TPJ, this region could be distinguished from other temporal regions involved in face processing. Our result suggests the existence of a precursor for the TOM ability in the last common ancestor of human and Old World monkeys.

Contains fulltext : 237221.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access), The macaque middle superior temporal sulcus shares functional properties with the human temporoparietal junction supporting mentalizing. The ability to attribute thoughts to others, also called theory of mind (TOM), has been extensively studied in humans; however, its evolutionary origins have been challenged. Computationally, the basis of TOM has been interpreted within the predictive coding framework and associated with activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Here, we revealed, using a nonlinguistic task and functional magnetic resonance imaging, that activity in a region of the macaque middle superior temporal cortex was specifically modulated by the predictability of social situations. As in human TPJ, this region could be distinguished from other temporal regions involved in face processing. Our result suggests the existence of a precursor for the TOM ability in the last common ancestor of human and Old World monkeys.

Contains fulltext : 222203.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 222203.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 222203.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 206128.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 206128.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

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Contains fulltext : 249405.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access)

Contains fulltext : 249405.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access)

Contains fulltext : 249405.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access)

This paper presents a contribution to the active field of robotics research to support the development of social skills and capabilities in children with Autism Spectrum Disorders as well as Typically Developing children. We present preliminary results of a novel experiment where classical roles are reversed: children are here the teachers giving positive or negative reinforcement to the Kaspar robot to make it learn arbitrary associations between toys and locations where to tidy them. The goal is to help children change perspective, and understand that sometimes a learning agent needs several repetitions before correctly learning something. We developed a reinforcement learning algorithm enabling Kaspar to verbally convey its uncertainty along learning, so as to better inform the interacting child of the reasons behind successes and failures made by the robot. Overall, 30 children aged between 7 and 8 (19 girls, 11 boys) performed 16 sessions of the experiment in groups, and managed to teach Kaspar all associations in 2 to 7 trials. Kaspar only made a few unexpected associations, mostly due to exploratory choices, and eventually reached minimal uncertainty. All children expressed enthusiasm in the experiment.

This paper presents a contribution to the active field of robotics research to support the development of social skills and capabilities in children with Autism Spectrum Disorders as well as Typically Developing children. We present preliminary results of a novel experiment where classical roles are reversed: children are here the teachers giving positive or negative reinforcement to the Kaspar robot to make it learn arbitrary associations between toys and locations where to tidy them. The goal is to help children change perspective, and understand that sometimes a learning agent needs several repetitions before correctly learning something. We developed a reinforcement learning algorithm enabling Kaspar to verbally convey its uncertainty along learning, so as to better inform the interacting child of the reasons behind successes and failures made by the robot. Overall, 30 children aged between 7 and 8 (19 girls, 11 boys) performed 16 sessions of the experiment in groups, and managed to teach Kaspar all associations in 2 to 7 trials. Kaspar only made a few unexpected associations, mostly due to exploratory choices, and eventually reached minimal uncertainty. All children expressed enthusiasm in the experiment.