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"Es gibt wissenschaftlich keine begründeten Hindernisse, die Biodiversität in ihrer Schönheit und Vielfalt zu schützen. Es bleiben nur noch sechs Jahre, um die Biodiversitätsziele bis 2030 zu erreichen. Dafür müssen wir jetzt gemeinsam anpacken."In den 10 Must-Knows aus der Biodiversitätsforschung 2024 haben 64 Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler ihre fundierten und vielseitigen Erkenntnisse und Empfehlungen aus den 10MustKnows22 weiterentwickelt. Die zehn ausgewählten Schlüsselbereiche des Erde-Mensch-Systems werden inhaltlich durch relevante Publikationen von 2022 und 2023 ergänzt und mit den im Dezember 2022 verabschiedeten 23 globalen Zielen des Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) verknüpft. Den Autorinnen und Autoren ist bewusst, dass die kommenden sechs Jahre bis 2030 wesentlich sind, um mittel- und langfristig ein ökologisch nachhaltiges und sozial gerechtes Leben auf unserer Erde zu erreichen. Mit den 10MustKnows24 möchten sie durch wissenschaftlich gesicherte Empfehlungen für Politik und Gesellschaft ihren aktiven Beitrag leisten, um die sozial-ökologische Transformation zu beschleunigen.Das sind die 10MustKnows24: 1. Klima- und Biodiversitätsschutz gemeinsam verwirklichen 2. Ein gesundes Leben auf einem gesunden Planeten ermöglichen 3. Unentdeckte Biodiversität beachten 4. Sprachliche, kulturelle und biologische Vielfalt verknüpfen 5. Vielfältige Nutzung von Waldökosystemen und Biodiversitätsschutz in Einklang bringen 6. Agrar- und Ernährungssysteme transformieren 7. Land und Ressourcen schützen 8. Transformativen Wandel durch internationale Zusammenarbeit und Bildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung bewirken 9. Freien Zugang und offene Nutzung von biodiversitätsbezogenen Daten sicherstellen 10. Auswirkungen des Lebensmittelkonsums auf die Biodiversität verringern

In contrast to the United States' unilateral China policy under President Donald Trump, the Joe Biden administration has renewed its ties with European and Asian allies. In its struggle with China for supremacy, the US strives to build a "united front" based on similar values. Although European countries share many values with the US, the China policies of the European Union and some of its member states substantially differ, not least due to diverging threat perceptions and economic interests. Against all expectations, the Biden administration continued Trump's policy of containing China's development through tariffs, exports controls, investment blockades, and visa restrictions. With the US CHIPS and Science Act and new export controls, the US government seeks to slow down China's further technological rise. Security issues have become more important in both the US and EU approach. European countries are, however, still reluctant to apply the same threat assessment for China as for Russia and to disengage from China. Europe's dependency on China as a key market and production base is still high, and most EU member states are not yet prepared for an economic decoupling. Although governments and research institutes in Europe have become more aware of the risks of science and technology cooperation with China, to discontinue it is not seen as an option. Despite the US and EU attempting to coordinate their China policies, the new US export controls on semiconductors were criticised by many European companies as unilateral decisions. The US and EU struggle to align their diverging interests on important topics such as the use of subsidies to support their economies. Therefore, the chances of them developing a unified China policy remain limited. The relationship between the US and China has turned into a new Cold War in which the coexistence of different economic and political systems does not seem possible. For European countries, decoupling from China would undermine

International cooperation in dealing with epidemics and pandemics was developed significantly during the 20th century. In 1921, following the Spanish influenza pandemic, the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) was created, a precursor to the World Health Organization (WHO) which was subsequently established in 1948. The purpose of these international efforts was to coordinate actions in order to improve citizens’ health as well as to prevent and constrain the transmission of dangerous diseases. Their contribution has been particularly important in preventing and protecting against pandemic crises through specific interventions-regulations which set limits and rules. This paper focuses on the contribution of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) in preventing and responding to major epidemic and pandemic crises over the last hundred years. A focus will be placed on the management of pandemic crises or risks, specifically HIV, cholera (in Yugoslavia in the 1970s), SARS-CoV, H1N1, Ebola, Zika and SARS-CoV2. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the contribution of the WHO and the LNHO in responding to pandemics and dangerous epidemics, by focusing on the political-organizational framework they adopted in terms of international health cooperation and of individual responses-policy measures.

Seit dem Koreakrieg 1950-53 basierte die Sicherheitsarchitektur der lange Zeit als "Asien-Pazifik" bezeichneten Region auf einem US-geführten System bilateraler Allianzen, dem sogenannten Nabe-und-Speichen-System. Ein multilaterales System kollektiver Verteidigung, ähnlich der Nato in Europa, gab es in der Region bislang nicht. 2014 begann die Volksrepublik China unter Xi Jinping, eigene Ideen zur Neugestaltung des regionalen Sicherheitssystems zu entwickeln. Xi nannte das Nabe-und-Speichen-System ein Relikt des Kalten Krieges und forderte eine regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur "von Asiaten für Asiaten". Das Konzept "Indo-Pazifik" gilt weithin als strategischer Gegenentwurf zu einer sinozentristischen Neustrukturierung der Region. Dabei wird die Sicherheitsarchitektur mehrheitlich als antagonistische Ordnung verstanden, in der Sicherheit gegen und nicht mit China hergestellt wird. Diese Architektur ist stärker als bisher »asianisiert«: Nicht nur wächst die Bedeutung der US-Alliierten in der Region im Verhältnis zu Washington. Immer wichtiger werden auch bi- und minilaterale Partnerschaften außerhalb des Nabe-und-Speichen-Systems, etwa diejenigen mit Beteiligung von Staaten wie Indien oder Indonesien. Strukturell dominieren bilaterale Allianzen und Partnerschaften, die zunehmend um minilaterale Formate wie AUKUS oder Quad ergänzt werden. Für die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten bedeutet all dies, dass die Verwirk­lichung der Idee eines inklusiv ausgerichteten Indo-Pazifik in weite Ferne gerückt ist. Auch der effektive Multilateralismus, den die EU propagiert, gerät zusehends ins Hintertreffen, da die regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur sich mehr und mehr zu einem Nebeneinander bi- und minilateraler Kooperationsformate wandelt. (Autorenreferat)

The implementation of the European Union's (EU) Green Deal to reduce emissions by 2030 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 will have an impact on the EU's trade policy and on its trade relations with its non-EU partners. With the ongoing decarbonisation process of European economic sectors, the EU's climate policy will be in­creasingly integrated into its trade policy through measures such as the Carbon Bor­der Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and by strengthening the environment chapters of its trade agreements. Therefore, the debate on the future of Turkey-EU trade rela­tions should focus on future prospects for decarbonisation and trade if both sides are keen to maintain or deepen their trade relations. In the current context, which is rife with geopolitical and energy security considerations, a long-term vision and a holistic approach are needed now more than ever. (author's abstract)

In a press conference in Buenos Aires in October 2022, Josep Borrell, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, declared that 2023 must be the year of Latin America in Europe and of Europe in Latin America. There is renewed European interest in Latin America as a strategic partner, but many Latin American governments prefer an active non-alignment in international politics. The Spanish EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2023 will open a window of opportunity for deepening EU-Latin American and the Caribbean relations. A summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the first since 2015, is planned to be held from 17-18 July 2023 in Brussels. As the EU is pursuing open strategic autonomy, Latin America is perceived as a possible strategic partner supportive of its agenda in international politics. Strategically important raw materials are imported from Latin America, and the latter's countries have the potential to become important producers and exporters of green hydrogen. While Europe has lost ground as a trading partner with Latin America to China, European companies are still a leading investor in the region, and Europe has still soft power or power of attraction in Latin America. The results of the recent elections in Latin America, especially the victory of Lula da Silva in Brazil, open new possibilities for EU cooperation with the region. It will be easier to find common positions on climate change and the protection of the Amazon rainforest. But Latin American governments will demand more protection for their domestic industries in free trade agreements and expect more European funding for measures against climate change and for environmental protection, and they will not automatically support European positions in international politics. If the EU wants to win over Latin America as a strategic partner, it must also act strategically. The signing of the association agreem

US-Präsident Donald Trump verkündete am Nachmittag des 1. Juni 2017 im Rosengarten des Weißen Hauses, dass er das Pariser Klimaabkommen aus dem Jahr 2015 kündigen wolle. Was bedeutet dieser Schritt der USA für den globalen Klimaschutz? Dieser in brief zeigt, in welcher Weise die an Klimaschutz interessierten Staaten sich am besten organisieren, um das Pariser Klimaabkommen und die globale Klimapolitik erfolgreich weiterzuführen.

Since the Korean War of 1950-53, the security architecture of the region previously referred to as the "Asia-Pacific" has been based on a US-led sys­tem of bilateral alliances known as the "hub-and-spokes" system. A multi­lateral system of collective defence, similar to NATO in Europe, has not existed in the region. In 2014, the People's Republic of China under Xi Jinping began to develop its own ideas for reshaping the regional security system. Xi called the hub-and-spokes system a relic of the Cold War and called for a regional security architecture "by Asians for Asians". The "Indo-Pacific" is widely regarded as a strategy to counter a Sinocentric restructuring of the region. The majority of actors involved conceives its security architecture as an antagonistic order in which security is estab­lished against, and not with, China. This architecture is more "Asianised" than before. The region's US allies are gaining significance in relation to Washington. What's more, bilateral and minilateral partnerships outside the hub-and-spokes system are becoming increasingly important, for example those involving states such as India or Indonesia. Structurally, bilateral alliances and partnerships dominate. They are in­creasingly supplemented by minilateral formats such as AUKUS or the Quad. For the EU and its member states, all this means that realising the idea of an inclusive Indo-Pacific has become a distant prospect. The effective multi­lateralism propagated by the EU is also gradually falling behind as the regional security architecture is increasingly being transformed into a web of bilateral and minilateral cooperation formats.

Die internationale Klimapolitik tritt in ein neues Zeitalter unter teils widersprüchlichen Vorzeichen ein: Während das US-Wahlergebnis auf erschwerte Rahmenbedingungen für die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels hindeutet, konnten auf der UN-Ebene bei der COP22 in Marrakech einige Fortschritte erzielt werden. Die Autoren zeigen die verschiedenen Szenarien auf, die sich damit für eine ambitionierte internationale Klimapolitik ergeben.

While the world's attention is focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine and the inten­sifying conflict between the US and China, the security situation on the Korean Pen­insula has continued to deteriorate. North Korea is steadily advancing the expansion of its military capabilities and recently undertook significant changes in its nuclear doctrine. At the same time, the rapidly changing geopolitical context makes a reso­lution of the North Korean nuclear conflict even less likely. North Korea’s unilateral change of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula poses a serious challenge to the international community, which has few options to counter this threat that is far too dangerous to ignore. (author's abstract)

Gesetzliche Maßnahmen im Bereich der Auslandsfinanzierung von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen werden inzwischen als zentraler Bestandteil von schrumpfenden zivilgesellschaftlichen Räumen angesehen. Allerdings existiert in der Literatur bisher kein Konsens über die Angemessenheit eines expliziten staatlichen Eingriffs in diesem Bereich. Der Artikel entwickelt deswegen einen konzeptionellen Rahmen, um den einschränkenden Charakter von staatlichen Eingriffen empirisch präziser als bisher bestimmen zu können. Wir plausibilisieren unser konzeptionelles Argument anhand von sechs kurzen Fallstudien zu Deutschland, Österreich, der Türkei, Ungarn, Uruguay und Venezuela. Damit tragen wir in dreifacher Art und Weise zur Debatte über schrumpfende zivilgesellschaftliche Räume bei. Wir zeigen erstens, dass gesetzliche Maßnahmen in Bezug auf die ausländische Finanzierung von Zivilgesellschaft nicht zwangsläufig als Teil eines weltweiten repressiven Trends anzusehen sind. Zweitens schlagen wir eine neue analytische Einordnung vor, die über das bisher dominante binäre Verständnis hinausgeht, welches gerade im Global Süden jeglicher Anpassung gesetzlicher Maßnahmen in diesem Bereich repressive Tendenzen unterstellt. Drittens versuchen wir eine Sicht der internationalen Menschenrechte zur Vereinigungsfreiheit mit einer auf nationalen verfassungsrechtlichen Normen fokussierten Perspektive in Verbindung zu bringen, um damit empirisch-analytisch präziser auf die in vielen Ländern existierenden rechtsnormativen Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Ebenen aufmerksam zu machen.

The term regional security dialogue brings to mind state-organised conferences and events; however, an under-appreciated subset of such dialogues are organised by non-state actors that have unique formal aspects. These quasi-formal dialogues operate alongside, and sometimes in competition to, state-sanctioned processes. Why do some of these forums appear to be more effective at fostering regional dialogue than strictly formal or informal processes with the same goals? Drawing from heterogenous discourse approaches, we address this question by identifying and expanding the concept of the quality of discursive space, as a key feature for the success of security dialogues. We then apply this concept to two of the most successful so-called Track 1.5 security dialogues: the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Europe and the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Asia. We analyse these cases using a mix of interviews with participants and organisers, participant observation, and public outputs with the aim of improving the understanding of the role and impact of Track 1.5 diplomacy in the practice of international security. Our findings highlight that it is what we call the quality of discursive space, as a mix of different components in this space, which differentiates effective dialogues from mere policy 'talk shops'.

A populist surge in Europe is affecting Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 25 years after the Barcelona Process was launched, reinforcing existing trends of de-Europeanization and renationalization of foreign policies. This article analyses the landscape of political contestation of Mediterranean cooperation in Europe in a new age of populism, focusing on France, Italy and Spain as well as the Visegrad 4 states that have turned from bystanders to veto players in Mediterranean affairs. We find that the 'thick' ideologies from which populists are borrowing condition the thrust of their influence. The impact of right-wing populism trumps that of its left-wing counterpart in quantity and quality, while market-liberal populism is in decline and regional populism is mainly an issue only in Spain. Populism has personalized decision-making and shaped political agendas directly and indirectly, most notably on migration. It has whitewashed authoritarian leaders in the southern Mediterranean and fragmented the European Union's position on key issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. National interests and the weight of institutions have, however, formed a counterbalance to the focus on migration emanating from domestic politics. Populism alone cannot be blamed for renationalization trends that have existed before, but it does build on and reinforce them.

Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. won the Philippines' presidential election by a land­slide on 9 May and was officially sworn in on 30 June. During the election cam­paign, Marcos Jr. - the son of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. who was ousted in 1986 - remained extremely vague when it came to describing his foreign and security policies. Some observers initially speculated that Marcos Jr. would con­tinue to pursue the foreign policy shift towards the People's Republic of China that had been estab­lished by his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. Several weeks into Marcos Jr.'s presidency, however, a much more nuanced picture has emerged. It appears that the newly elected president is likely seeking to balance the Philippines' relations with China and the US to a greater extent than his predecessor. He therefore seems to be follow­ing in his father’s foreign policy footsteps. This could open up new opportunities for coopera­tion between the Philippines and Germany and the EU - provided that such collabo­ration considers the high degree to which Manila's current foreign policy agenda seems to be driven by domestic concerns and objectives. (author's abstract)

Do autocracies cooperate internationally? This working paper investigates whether regime-type explains co-sponsorship patterns at the United Nations General Assembly. Co-sponsorship is a relatively costly signal of international cooperation at the UN, which is analyzed based on a novel dataset, including newly validated issue categories and co-sponsorship behavior on 14.995 draft resolutions. Theoretically, the paper unifies three strands of literature: the recent literature on autocratic regional organizations, the growing literature on foreign policy of autocratic regimes and the traditional analysis of the United Nations. The results suggest that regime-type plays a strong role in co-sponsorship behavior: democracies co-sponsor with their peers, whereas autocracies, in line with existing findings, cooperate overall less at the UN. They do, however, prefer to co-sponsor with one another over partners of other regime-types. This seems to be particularly true in issue areas where autocratic regimes could attempt to counter democratic norm-setting, such as human rights. There is mixed results concerning the effect of autocratic regional organizations on autocratic co-sponsorship. Preliminary results suggest at least some positive effect on autocracies and highlight the need for further research.

In den global vernetzten Märkten des 21. Jahrhunderts hinterlässt die Covid-19-Pandemie ein Kaleidoskop von Auswirkungen, neuen Rahmenbedingungen und Herausforderungen. Mit Blick nach vorne stellt sich für viele Unternehmen und ihre Mitarbeitenden die Frage, wie sich daraus unternehmerische Potenziale bestmöglich nutzen lassen., + ID der Publikation: hslu_88712 + Art des Beitrages: Fachmedien + Jahrgang: 2022 + Sprache: Deutsch + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2022-03-10 09:40:19

In den global vernetzten Märkten des 21. Jahrhunderts hinterlässt die Covid-19-Pandemie ein Kaleidoskop von Auswirkungen, neuen Rahmenbedingungen und Herausforderungen. Mit Blick nach vorne stellt sich für viele Unternehmen und ihre Mitarbeitenden die Frage, wie sich daraus unternehmerische Potenziale bestmöglich nutzen lassen., + ID der Publikation: hslu_88712 + Art des Beitrages: Fachmedien + Jahrgang: 2022 + Sprache: Deutsch + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2022-03-10 09:40:19

In den global vernetzten Märkten des 21. Jahrhunderts hinterlässt die Covid-19-Pandemie ein Kaleidoskop von Auswirkungen, neuen Rahmenbedingungen und Herausforderungen. Mit Blick nach vorne stellt sich für viele Unternehmen und ihre Mitarbeitenden die Frage, wie sich daraus unternehmerische Potenziale bestmöglich nutzen lassen., + ID der Publikation: hslu_88712 + Art des Beitrages: Fachmedien + Jahrgang: 2022 + Sprache: Deutsch + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2022-03-10 09:40:19

Ferdinand (genannt "Bongbong") Marcos junior gewann am 9. Mai mit einem Erd­rutschsieg die Präsidentschaftswahlen der Philippinen und wurde am 30. Juni offiziell vereidigt. Während des Wahlkampfs war der Sohn des 1986 gestürzten philippinischen Diktators Ferdinand Marcos senior in außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fra­gen äußerst vage geblieben. Einige Beobachter spekulierten zunächst über eine Fort­führung der unter Amtsvorgänger Rodrigo Duterte vollzogenen außenpolitischen Hinwendung zur Volksrepublik China. Mittlerweile zeigt sich jedoch bereits ein deutlich nuancierteres Bild der zu erwartenden Außenpolitik unter Marcos jr. Der neugewählte Präsident dürfte in stärkerem Maße als sein Vorgänger eine Balance im Verhältnis zu China und den USA suchen. Er tritt damit in die außenpolitischen Fuß­stapfen seines Vaters. Ein solcher Kurs könnte Deutschland und der EU neue Koope­rationsmöglichkeiten eröffnen - sofern die Zusammenarbeit den in erster Linie innen­politisch motivierten Zielsetzungen der neuen Marcos-Regierung entspricht. (Autorenreferat)

In recent years, Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has launched fundamental reforms. These are designed to enable bilateral official development cooperation to make a more targeted and effective contribution towards implementing the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. Reform processes such as 'BMZ 2030' and the joint procedural reform are important steps in this regard. In its report on the results orientation and evaluability of development cooperation programmes, DEval delivers initial findings on the application of the new procedures and requirements under the joint procedural reform, and their effects. This policy brief summarises the key findings of this evaluation.

Mit ambitionierten Plänen brechen die Staaten des Golf-Kooperationsrats auf in die Wasserstoffzukunft. Insbesondere Saudi-Arabien, Oman und die Vereinigten Arabi­schen Emirate (VAE) verfolgen ehrgeizige Vorhaben, die Europa und Asien-Pazifik mit Wasser­stoff versorgen sollen. Zahlreiche Absichtserklärungen wurden abgeschlossen, erste Großprojekte auf den Weg gebracht. Für die Golfstaaten geht es nicht nur um Diver­sifizierung, sondern vor allem darum, bestehende Wirtschafts- und Machtstruktu­ren aufrechtzuerhalten. Dies wäre möglich, da sich die Wasserstoffwirtschaft in den vorhandenen institutionellen und fiskalischen Rahmen der Petroleumindustrie ein­fügt. Gleichzeitig ist sie eine wirksame Möglichkeit, den Klimaschutz international voran­zu­tragen, birgt für Deutschland und Europa jedoch Zielkonflikte und offene Fragen. (Autorenreferat)

Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) hat in den letzten Jahren grundlegende Reformen angestoßen, damit die staatliche bilaterale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) gezielter und wirksamer zur Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 und des Pariser Klimaabkommens beitragen kann. Dazu zählen Reformprozesse wie "BMZ 2030", die Gemeinsame Verfahrensreform und ein neues Steuerungsmodell - der Dreiklang - das ein Zielsystem auf drei Ebenen umfasst. In seinem Evaluierungsbericht zur Wirkungsorientierung und Evaluierbarkeit von EZ-Programmen stellt das DEval erste Erkenntnisse zur Anwendung und zu den Auswirkungen der neuen Verfahren und Vorgaben vor und analysiert deren Wirkungsorientierung. Dieser Policy Brief fasst die zentralen Ergebnisse aus dieser Evaluierung zusammen.

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are mapping out agendas to kickstart a hydrogen economy. Especially Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are pursuing ambitious plans to supply Europe and Asia-Pacific with the carbon-friendly fuel. Numerous declarations of intent have been signed, and the first large-scale projects are under way. For the Gulf countries, hydrogen is not only a means of diversification. Since the hydrogen economy blends into the institutional and fiscal framework of the petroleum industry, it is primarily a chance for the GCC economies to maintain current economic and political power structures. While hydro­gen from the Gulf is an effective tool for climate change mitigation, Germany and Europe are faced with trade-offs and open questions. (author's abstract)

While Russia remains chair of the Arctic Council until May 2023, the other seven mem­ber states have suspended their participation in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The impacts on Moscow are multiple. Politically the move sidelines a policy area where Russia still played a significant role after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Economically it creates question marks over important Russian Arctic projects and their markets. The interruption of the Council's work also touches the interests of other states such as China and erodes Russia's standing in the region. All Western part­ners have suspended scientific and research cooperation. While Russia is especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in the Arctic, the disruption of climate-related research is ultimately detrimental to all nations. In the military sphere, Fin­land and Sweden are seeking to join NATO. That outcome would double the length of Russia's border with NATO states, and represents the exact opposite of Moscow's original intention to halt the Alliance's expansion. (author's abstract)

In der vorliegenden Allokationsstudie wird Evidenz zur Verteilung der bilateralen deutschen staatlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus Haushaltsmitteln des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) präsentiert. Im Mittelpunkt stehen insbesondere zwei Fragen: (1) Inwiefern ist es gelungen, entwicklungspolitische Leistungen in der Zeit zwischen 2000 und 2020 geografisch und thematisch zu fokussieren? (2) Nach welchen Kriterien hat das BMZ die untersuchten Mittel alloziert und seine Partnerländer ausgewählt? Hinsichtlich geografischer und thematischer Konzentration ist eine Implementierungslücke festzustellen. Die Allokationsmuster erweisen sich dabei trotz strategischer Umsteuerungsbemühungen seit 2000 als weitgehend stabil. Die Analyse der Bedingungsfaktoren der geografischen Verteilung von bilateralen EZ-Mitteln stützt die Interpretation, dass das BMZ sich bei der Allokation an der Bedürftigkeit und der Herrschaftsform potenzieller Empfängerländer orientiert hat. Darüber hinaus deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass auch die Regierungsführung bei der jüngst erfolgten Überarbeitung der Liste bilateraler Partner berücksichtigt wurde. Gleichzeitig finden sich Hinweise, dass die Mittelvergabe der EZ ebenfalls durch außenwirtschaftliche Interessen beeinflusst wurde und näher gelegene Länder bevorzugt wurden.

Die Umsetzung des 2018 vereinbarten Globalen Pakts für sichere, geordnete und reguläre Migration (kurz Globaler Migrationspakt, GCM) schreitet nur zögerlich voran. Im Nach­gang des ersten International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), einer Zusammenkunft im Mai 2022 in New York zur Überprüfung der Fortschritte, lassen sich dennoch einige signifikante Entwicklungen ausmachen. Inhaltlich gewinnen Geschlechter­gerechtigkeit und klimainduzierte Migration an Bedeutung. Was den Umsetzungsprozess betrifft, stehen Fragen verstärkter Rechen­schaftspflicht und einer systematischeren Beteiligung der Zivilgesellschaft im Vorder­grund. Hinzu kommen Verschiebungen in der Akteurskonstellation der Global Migra­tion Governance: Die Internatio­nale Orga­nisation für Migration (IOM) konsolidiert ihre Rolle im Institutionengefüge der Ver­einten Nationen, und es zeichnet sich ein stärkeres Engagement der Weltbank ab. Diese Veränderungen bieten wichtige Anknüpfungspunkte für die migrationspolitische Agenda der Bundesregierung. (Autorenreferat)

Increasingly, member states of large intergovernmental organisations (IGO) are setting up ad hoc coalitions (AHC) outside of multilateral organisations at regional and global levels. What is motivating countries to circumvent traditional IGOs? Are AHCs undermining global governance institutions? AHCs are attractive short-term instruments for crisis response among like-minded states. They often appear in the security and health sectors, though they are not limited to those areas. AHCs are an expression of institutional adaption to the crisis of major IGOs, which are increasingly unable to create unity on pivotal global order questions. AHCs do not pose a substantial challenge to IGOs, because they are often operational in areas in which IGOs are not willing or able to act. AHCs are part and parcel of a wider system of crisis response. They co-govern dense institutional spaces together with IGOs and form a network of institutions responding to a crisis. German foreign policy has traditionally placed a strong emphasis on multilateral organisations as cornerstones for a rules-based international order. With the emergence of AHCs, a further instrument is available that should not be dismissed as anti-multilateral. For AHCs to make a valuable contribution to the ever more complex global governance system, they need to perform functionally different tasks from IGOs. Germany should consider actively participating in AHCs to avoid being sidelined by partner countries.

Am 2. März 2022 hat eine überwältigende Mehrheit von 141 Staaten der Vereinten Nationen den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine scharf verurteilt. Die Einigkeit verdeckt aber, dass der Krieg mit Russland im globalen Süden anders wahrgenommen wird, als es hier im Westen der Fall ist. Das zeigt nicht zuletzt, dass die Staaten in Afrika, großen Teilen Asiens, Nahost und Lateinamerika nicht bereit sind, die Sanktionen gegenüber Russland mitzutragen. Kleine und mittlere Staaten des globalen Südens sehen den russischen Einmarsch in der Ukraine als abschreckendes Beispiel eines mächtigen Staates, der über die Grenzen und Interessen seines kleineren Nachbarn hinweggeht. Für die allermeisten dieser Staaten ergibt sich daraus aber kein direktes Bedrohungsszenario. Der vom Westen ausgerufene "Epochenbruch" wird nicht geteilt. Russlands Rüstungskooperationen, der Export von Weizen, Düngemitteln und anderen Rohstoffen sind für viele Staaten im globalen Süden weiterhin von herausragender Bedeutung. Die Staaten des globalen Südens möchten wählen können, wo und mit wem sie kooperieren. So erhalten sie sich ihre Autonomie in einer zunehmend von Großmachtkonflikten geprägten, multipolaren Welt. Im globalen Süden ist Russland kein Pariastaat. Wenn die deutsche Außenpolitik das verkennt und ihre Partner im globalen Süden dazu drängt, sich dieser Einschätzung anzuschließen, muss sie mit Unverständnis rechnen. Das gilt umso mehr für China. Eine stärker geopolitisch ausgerichtete deutsche Außenpolitik ist dennoch möglich. Die meisten Staaten im globalen Süden wünschen sich deutsche und europäische Alternativen zu Russland und China, sowohl im Bereich der Rüstungskooperation als auch bei der Finanzierung von Infrastrukturmaßnahmen oder in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Zudem deckt sich die im Koalitionsvertrag der Bundesregierung festgehaltene, stärker wertebasierte Außenpolitik mit den Interessen kleiner und mittlerer Staaten an wirkmächtigen, multilateralen Institutionen, die allen Staat

Die Covid‑19-Pandemie hat den internationalen Reiseverkehr stark reduziert. Die wirt­schaftlichen, gesellschaftlichen und menschlichen Folgen der Grenzschließungen und Reisebeschränkungen lassen sich noch nicht vollständig abschätzen, sind aber gewaltig. Die Gräben zwischen Staaten des Globalen Nordens, die Reisen kontrollieren und unregulierte Mobilität unterbinden wollen, und des Globalen Südens, die mehr legale Mobilität für ihre Bürgerinnen und Bürger einfordern, werden tiefer. Reisefreiheit ist ein begehrtes Gut, zu dem alle Zugang haben sollten, sowie Gegenstand politischer Verhandlungen. Unilaterale Bestimmungen sollten durch internatio­nale Vereinbarungen, bei dem sich Staaten auf gemeinsame Regeln und Verfahren für ein Vertrauenssystem einigen, ergänzt oder aufgehoben werden. Derweil sollten die Staaten ihre Visaverfahren modernisieren und digitale Identifikationssysteme aufbauen, die Vertrauen schaffen. Das gilt auch für Deutschland, zumal die Regierungskoalition beschlossen hat, die Visavergabe zu beschleunigen. (Autorenreferat)

This literature review aims to summarise current knowledge on a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to evaluation and improve the basis for further conceptual discussions on this approach. To this end, we reviewed strategies and (publicly available) guidelines of multilateral and bilateral development actors, relevant tools for human rights in monitoring and evaluation, research articles, and evaluation reports published between 2014 and 2021.

In November 2022 South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol unveiled his country's new Indo-Pacific strategy, which shares points of convergence with the European Union's "Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" and Germany's "Indo-Pacific Policy Guidelines." As one of the few liberal democracies in the region, an advocate of inclusive multilateralism, and the world's tenth-largest economy, South Korea is very suited to being a close cooperation partner for the EU and Germany in the Indo-Pacific. Such cooperation can build on a very solid basis of achievements, especially in the economic realm. This includes a "Free Trade Agreement" in place since 2011. A "Digital Partnership," also at the EU level, was also signed very recently. And, as a producer of high-tech goods such as semiconductors, South Korea figures as a critical partner in the quest for more resilient supply chains. The EU, Germany, and South Korea should seek to buttress their oft-emphasised commonalities regarding support for inclusive multilateralism globally with the taking of concrete joint action. Such endeavours should involve the institutions that have been sidelined by the intensification of great-power rivalries - from the G20, to the World Trade Organization, to the United Nations. The EU, member states like Germany, and South Korea see eye to eye on issues of international security, including most recently the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, collaboration on strategic matters has yet to reach its full potential. Its central location in East Asia, alliance with the United States, and rich but ambivalent ties with China make South Korea a particularly interesting partner for consultation and cooperation on regional governance, including on security affairs. In 2023, 60 years of diplomatic ties between the EU and South Korea and 140 years of such relations between Germany and Korea will be celebrated. Summits and high-level official visits on the occasion of these anniversaries should be u

Während die Weltöffentlichkeit auf Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und den sich verschärfenden Konflikt zwischen den USA und China blickt, hat sich die Sicher­heits­lage auf der koreanischen Halbinsel weiter verschlechtert. Nordkorea treibt den Ausbau seiner militärischen Fähigkeiten kontinuierlich voran und hat jüngst seine Nukleardoktrin signifikant modifiziert. Der sich rasch verändernde geopolitische Kontext macht zugleich eine Lösung des Atomkonflikts noch unwahrscheinlicher. Pjöngjang hat den Status quo auf der koreanischen Halbinsel unilateral verändert. Diese neue Realität anzuerkennen ist zwar politisch nicht unumstritten. Doch sind Fortschritte in der Nordkorea-Frage kaum vorstellbar, solange die internationale Gemeinschaft weiter von unbegründeten Erwartungen ausgeht und an dem illusorischen Ziel festhält, das Land zum Verzicht auf seine Atomwaffen zu überreden oder zu zwingen.

In this Position Paper the current status of the establishment of the right to a healthy environment, as well as arguments for and against its establishment by resolution are examined.

In recent months, the implementation of Germany's Indo-Pacific policy from September 2020 has started to take shape. With maritime security concerns as principal drivers, naval deployments have taken centre stage. Yet, as the voyage of the frigate Bayern exemplifies, the German approach - similar to other European policies - suffers from contradictions which are hidden under the "rules-based order" label. Adopting terminology that originated in Australia and Japan, also the German "Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific" employ a variation of the rules-based order concept for describing what they seek to preserve. Symbolically powerful naval deployments aimed at safeguarding the "freedom of navigation" through Southeast Asian waters have spearheaded the implementation of the Guidelines, while overshadowing their many other dimensions. The conflation of legitimate concerns about Chinese expansion in the South China Sea with questionable projections of China's linear path to hegemonic power and concomitant courting of "like-minded" "value partners" altered the Guidelines' characteristically European emphasis on inclusivity, de-escalation, and the rule of international law. The rules-based order has come to signify the common interest among a diverse group of powerful states in curbing Chinese influence. This complicates the question of which shared "values," "rules," and conceptions of "order" are at stake. The increasingly wider usage of "rules-based order" has also led to policymakers glossing over the fact that they have themselves been part of, and are driving, the scramble for new spheres of influence. German policymakers must admit that talking about the rules-based order raises more questions than answers. This is also a precondition for getting clear about whether they seek to help contain China. To play a stabilising role, they and other European governments must listen to what the many less-powerful actors in the Indo-Pacific have to say, and clearly articul

Cuando Cuba entra en el año 2022, se avecinan crisis económicas y tensiones sociales. Este capítulo hace un recorrido por las dificultades externas que interactúan con los asuntos domésticos de la isla y los refuerzan. Más allá de la situación inmediata, reflexiona sobre las restricciones y las presiones internacionales subyacentes que configurarán las opciones para la nación cubana durante la próxima década. El análisis abarca las relaciones de Cuba con los Estados Unidos y con la Unión Europea, así como con Venezuela, México, China, Rusia y Canadá, y plantea en qué medida las vacunas contra la COVID-19 fabricadas en Cuba pueden relanzar la proyección del poder blando del país. Desde una perspectiva comparada, el régimen isleño y su perfil internacional siguen siendo en muchos sentidos diferentes de cualquier otro, y los esquemas predictivos basados en analogías falsas corren el riesgo de inducir a errores., As Cuba enters 2022, economic crisis and social tensions loom large. This chapter reviews the external difficulties that interact with and reinforce the island' domestic issues. Looking beyond the immediate situation it reflects on underlying international pressures and constraints that will shape the options for the Cuban nation over the next decade. Its analysis encompasses Cuba's relations with the US and with the EU, as well as those with Venezuela, Mexico, China, Russia and Canada, and it asks to what extent Cuban-made COVID-19 vaccines can re-boost the country's soft-power projection. Putting the Cuban case in comparative perspective, the island’s regime - and its international profile - are in many ways still unlike any other, and predictive schemas based on false analogies risk being misleading.

Iran was one of the most important partners of the West in the post-War period. In particular, the governments of the US and West Germany supported the intense political, economic, and strategic cooperation with Iran under the regime of the Shah. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is known as a turning-point in Iran’s relations to the West. This article analyzes Iran’s dissociation processes from cooperation with the West and Western institutions in a long-term perspective. It argues that we cannot speak of a coherent dissociation process but of different changing forms of integration since the 1960s. While political cooperation decreased already in the 1970s, economic cooperation increased in this period. The nascent Islamic Republic also differentiated between different cases of cooperation with Western states and institutions. A clear break is figured out for institutions like the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), while Iran acted, especially in economic relations, with a certain revolutionary pragmatism that shaped political interactions. Although the conflict between Iran and Western states was highly ideational, it did not lead to a uniform pattern of dissociation. Our comparison of Iran’s post 1979 relations with the US and West Germany shows important differences.

Die Steuerung irregulärer Migration ist zu einem Schwerpunkt der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Türkei geworden. Zwei Sichtweisen dominieren in der euro­päischen Diskussion über dieses Thema: eine "fürsorgliche", die sich auf das Wohl­ergehen der Flüchtlinge konzentriert, und eine "besorgte", deren Fokus auf der Sicher­heit der EU-Außengrenzen und den Ängsten europäischer Bürger liegt. Ein Faktor wird in den europäischen Debatten über Migration weitgehend übersehen: die wachsende Unzufriedenheit der türkischen Bevölkerung mit den sozialen und politischen Verhältnissen im eigenen Land. Schließlich nimmt die Türkei weltweit am meisten Flüchtlinge auf und hat dabei gleichzeitig mit einer schweren Wirtschafts­krise und einer festgefahrenen Regierung zu kämpfen. Die migrationspolitische Zusam­men­arbeit von EU und Türkei wird nur dann langfristig Früchte bringen, wenn dieser wach­senden Unzufriedenheit Rechnung getragen wird. Denn weder die Förderung der Rechte von Flüchtlingen in der Türkei noch eine verlässliche Sicherheitskoopera­tion sind auf Dauer ohne die Akzeptanz der türkischen Aufnahmegesellschaft mög­lich. Im Hinblick darauf sollte die EU der Türkei ihre Absicht signalisieren, mehr Flücht­linge aufzunehmen, und die Integrationsbemühungen vor Ort proaktiver unterstützen. (Autorenreferat)

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments, and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign, and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on these issues and identifies future avenues of inquiry. In this editorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: (a) challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance, (b) the impact of territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, and (c) the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance.

From discrimination against Chinese-read migrant workers, via intraregional competition for China’s favour, to collaboration on infrastructural megaprojects, vaccine development and digital surveillance techniques: Arab-Chinese relations in times of COVID-19 are complex and multi-layered. Yet, established regime-centric approaches often fail to see this complexity by almost exclusively focusing on questions of authoritarian regime collaboration. Such approaches not only ignore the diversity of involved actors and the inherently transregional nature of contemporary authoritarian power, but also bear the risk of reproducing binary notions of authoritarianism vs. liberal democracy that fundamentally ignore the latter’s coercive core. Recent work on the duality of infrastructure as both enabling global flows of goods and (re-)producing social hierarchies helps us overcome the methodological nationalism found in the majority of scholarship on authoritarian power. In this article, we provide a selective overview, through the prism of logistics and infrastructure, of Arab-Chinese authoritarian entanglements in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding authoritarian practices as territorially unbounded modes of governance, our objective is to develop a more in-depth and context-sensitive understanding of the transregionally connected mechanisms of (re-)producing authoritarian power. We argue that the pandemic constitutes a seemingly managerial opportunity for the intensified diffusion of authoritarian practices that both enable certain infrastructural politics and in turn are also rendered possible by them. This emphasis on infrastructure, understood as simultaneously fostering a global circulation of goods and capital, as well as reinforcing containment and facilitating new forms of managing and repressing public discontent, provides us with a helpful lens for the development of a truly transregional understanding of authoritarian collaboration. We discuss this a

Dissociation from international institutions, i.e., states turning away from international cooperation and organizations, is a widespread phenomenon today. It often leads to significant tensions between the states that turn away and those that remain committed to an institution. This introduction to a forum on dissociation from international institutions reviews the state of the art and develops a framework for analyzing the impact of dissociation on relations between departing and remaining states. It centers on the hypothesis that dissociation leads to two types of conflicts between states, ideational and distributive, with ideational conflicts more likely to increase tensions between states. The article then reviews the five cases of dissocia-tion examined in the other contributions to the forum and summarizes their main individual and comparative findings. Taken together, the five cases suggest that dissociation can exacerbate broader structural conflicts between states; that how parties perceive of conflict during the dissociation process matters for its effects on interstate relations and that an emphasis on ideational conflict leads to more confrontational relations; and that domestic politics matter greatly not only for whether dissociation occurs but also for its effects on interstate relations.

As Cuba enters 2022, economic crisis and social tensions loom large. This chapter reviews the external difficulties that interact with and reinforce the island's domestic issues. Looking beyond the immediate situation it reflects on underlying international pressures and constraints that will shape the options for the Cuban nation over the next decade. Its analysis encompasses Cuba's relations with the US and with the EU, as well as those with Venezuela, Mexico, China, Russia and Canada, and it asks to what extent Cuban-made COVID-19 vaccines can re-boost the country's soft-power projection. Putting the Cuban case in comparative perspective, the island’s regime - and its international profile - are in many ways still unlike any other, and predictive schemas based on false analogies risk being misleading.

At the G7 summit in June 2022, the German government intends to promote inter­national climate cooperation by establishing a climate club. This club is envisioned to foster implementation of the Paris climate goals and, ideally, grow into a global alliance of ambitious countries. In light of Russia's attack on Ukraine, energy policy cooperation is now one of the most pressing issues at the G7 summit. Energy security as a short-term priority must be reconciled with accelerated decarbonisation and the international climate agenda. A climate club can certainly provide an impetus for this through agreements on joint regulatory approaches and climate action projects. In terms of the international political process, however, it is important to prevent the initiative from being perceived as a rich countries' club. The German government should carefully manage expectations: Strong signals are needed for COP27 in Egypt in autumn, first and foremost by way of increasing climate finance commitments. Moreover, it will be crucial to shape the G7 club as an ambitious but inclusive initiative. (author's abstract)

Cooperation between development policy actors and the private sector is becoming increasingly important, among other reasons because the development community anticipates that it will mobilise additional resources for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Until now, however, the only research on whether the goals of such cooperation have been achieved has taken the form of evaluations and academic studies on individual projects and instruments. This evaluation synthesis attempts to fill this gap by systematically analysing the available evidence on private sector engagement within German and international development cooperation. Overall, the evaluations and studies included in the analysis report mainly positive effects on investors and donors, intermediaries, partner countries and target groups. However, various analyses, including an assessment of the quality of the evaluations, suggest that a positive-results bias is present. The evaluation synthesis puts forward recommendations on defining indicators, on measuring and assessing impacts and additionality, on knowledge management, and on considering the transaction costs involved in cooperating with private sector actors.

During the global COVID-19 crisis, China has portrayed itself as a "champion of multilateralism" - defending UN institutions and its own multilateral initiatives in a variety of spheres. China’s approach has, however, often been criticised for undermining multilateralism through its use of multilateral platforms as arenas to contest US leadership. This paper examines the official Chinese discourse on multilateralism during the COVID 19 crisis in the years 2020 and 2021 in light of Beijing’s multilateral diplomacy in the Global South, exemplified by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China-CELAC Forum (China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum). The authors argue that China’s growing multilateral engagement must be understood in the context of a multilateral system that was already in crisis before the pandemic due to its inability to resolve major global challenges. The term "multilateralism" is essentially used by Beijing to discursively oppose "unilateralism". While its active multilateral engagement may be able to prevent and resolve major global crises in the future, Beijing's approach offers limited multilateral spaces for deliberation and contestation by weaker states and non-state acto

Governance institutions of the polar regions, as well as global oceans, may hold room for improvement in terms of effectiveness but, on the whole, their existence can be regarded as a success story. The arrangements managed to pool responsibility for regional resources amid Cold War geopolitics, mostly by delegating discussions to science committees. Changing global climate, however, provides considerable challenges to these governance arrangements. It begs the question of how the success story can be continued into the future. After sketching the emergence of polar and ocean governance and their core organizational principles during the 20th century, this article identifies some of the challenges linked to global warming that have been altering the context of governance fundamentally. The article discusses emerging issues that warrant attention, but which may be difficult to accommodate in present governance networks. Ultimately, the article argues that anchoring principles of “responsibility” that take into account the relational quality of polar and ocean spaces is key to any institutional design that seeks to take governance arrangements into the 21st century and beyond.

Development cooperation has created a range of instruments to support private companies wishing to invest in partner countries whilst also pursuing development goals. These instruments are primarily expected to mobilise the additional funding needed to finance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). But as to how far private sector engagement is achieving this and other objectives, until now the only research has taken the form of evaluations and academic studies on individual projects and instruments. In the evaluation synthesis by DEval (Habbel et al., 2021) the available evidence on private sector engagement is analysed systematically for the first time. This policy brief summarises the most important findings and recommendations from the evaluation synthesis by DEval.

After a voyage through the Indian and Pacific Oceans lasting almost seven months, the frigate Bayern has returned to Wilhelmshaven. Above all, Germany's intention in sending the ship was to signal its political willingness to be more actively involved in the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific. Retrospectively, the mission has helped to vitalize and deepen relationships with partners in the region through military and diplomatic dialogues as well as combined exercises by the armed forces. It is now cru­cial to maintain the relationship momentum this has created, for instance by con­tinuing with consultations. However, Germany has not lived up to the claim - or just barely - that the frigate’s voyage would contribute to maintaining the existing rules-based order and international law. It remains to be seen what conclusions Germany will draw for future engagement in the Indo-Pacific. (author's abstract)