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Contrary to the beliefs of New Left historians seeking to revive the once discredited theory that American territorial expansion was driven by a motivation to expand the institution of slavery, a position that I have dubbed the Neo-Abolitionist view, rather that Manifest Destiny developed as an early national security strategy and primitive strategic doctrine, what might be termed in today’s vernacular as a kind of preemptive threat displacement theory. That is, early on in the history of the Republic, many American statesmen believed that the most effective means of preventing a “balance of power” geopolitical system from being established in North America was to reduce the number of independent sovereignties on the frontiers of the United States through the annexation and incorporation of such territories into the Union. Also, how Americans dealt with apprehensions of encirclement and the “problem of neighborhood” in connection with the “balance of power” concept as well as how these concerns related to ongoing fears of domestic insurrections, Indian uprisings, and Slave rebellions is the focus of this dissertation.

This study is a historical analysis of how encirclement operations have been and still are important offensive operations. These operations need to be given priority in planning and execution by the United States Military. Encirclement operations have proven to be decisive military operations throughout history; regardless of the composition and disposition of the enemy encircled. The U.S. military has maintained the decisive edge on the battlefield for over sixty years. Even with the benefits of technology, air supremacy, firepower, mobility, and maneuver, the U.S. military has not yet been completely successful in planning and executing encirclement operations. Today the U.S. military is arguably the best equipped and trained force in history. Even with this professional force, it is questionable whether the U.S. military could successfully execute an encirclement operation. Therefore this monograph provides a historical examination as to why the U.S. military has been unable to reap the benefits of the offensive maneuver of encirclement. This paper concludes the Army must acknowledge and amend its doctrine to reflect the encirclement operation as a stand-alone form of offensive maneuver. Furthermore, encirclement operations are not just a result of a pursuit or exploitation operation. Encirclement operations can and should be planned as an independent operation. Prioritizing these operations by making them an independent mission will ensure U.S. forces have the resources and combat power needed to ensure success on the battlefield., The original document contains color images.

The 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was created on 24 November 1950. On 27 November it had the mission of relieving the Marines of the 1st Marine Division East of the Chosin reservoir and attacking to the North towards the Yalu River. The unit's battalions and separate companies were spread out along the road from the port of Hungnam in the south to forward positions east of the reservoir over 90 miles away when it was hit by the surprise attack of the Chinese 80th Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) Division on the evening of 27 November. Organizational leadership failures at the level of the X Corps, 7th Infantry Division, the 31st RCT and its attached battalions all contributed to the almost complete destruction of the RCT by the evening of 1-2 December 1950. These failures led to a very poor situational awareness prior to the Chinese attack and helped to create the total breakdown of organizational cohesion and effectiveness that occurred during the unit's ill-fated attempt to break out of the Chinese encirclement. This thesis shows how decisions that are made at the organizational level are critical to the success of the unit., The original document contains color images.

History is replete with examples of lost opportunities to decisively defeat an enemy's army on the field of battle. All too often, tactical success has not been followed by actions to ensure operational success. This failure may be attributable to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of operational encirclement. Two case studies highlight these dynamics. The Battles of the Falaise Gap in 1944 and the Ruhr Pocket in 1945 both illustrate the difficulties operational commanders face in conducting this type of operation. In the first case, Allied commanders failed to anticipate the opportunities presented by poor operational planning and tactical execution by their German adversaries and missed an opportunity for a quick and decisive victory. In the second, Allied commanders succeeded in learning from their previous mistakes at Falaise to achieve decisive operational results during the encirclement of the Ruhr. Encirclement, Maneuver, WWII, Military Failure, Envelopment, Generalship, Army Operations.

During the past decade the Soviet Union has shown an increasing capacity and willingness to intervene militarily in regions outside the central NATO-Warsaw Pact area. This Note discusses the likelihood of further "second-area" actions. It also addresses the question of whether the United States should attempt to challenge Soviet clients and allies in second areas, either to affect the overall U.S.-Soviet balance or to counterbalance specific Soviet actions that the United States finds difficult to meet directly. The Note concludes that while the United States must be prudent in planning against Soviet military actions in second areas, it should not overestimate either the gravity of such challenges or the opportunities for exploiting vulnerabilities on the Soviet side. While in theory the USSR has the option of using its enormous military forces for intervention in contiguous and noncontiguous second areas, in reality the Soviets regard as available for second areas only those forces not devoted to filling three central tasks: deterring U.S. strategic nuclear forces, maintaining a favorable balance vis-a-vis Western Europe, and maintaining a favorable balance vis-a-vis China., This report replaces ADE751108. A Series in International Security and Arms Control.

In 1944, the 4th Armored Division played a central role in one of the more remarkable campaigns in American military history -- Third Army's pursuit across France, which was capped off by the encirclement and capture of Nancy. In the course of this campaign, the 4th Armored Division practiced a mode of warfare that has since become known to the Army as AirLand Battle. Inasmuch as the encirclement of Nancy is one of the few historical examples that shows American mechanized forces waging war in accordance with the tenets of AirLand Battle, anyone seeking a deeper appreciation of today's doctrine would do well to study this campaign carefully. "The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy" originated at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as an introductory class for a course on modern division-level operations. It is a companion piece to "The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944," published in February 1985.

In March 1944, the Japanese 15th Army attacked the British 14th Army, seeking to bypass troop units, seize the key communications nodes on Imphal and Kohima, and live off enemy supplies. The British used massive airlift to move both troops and supplies to encircled areas, defeating the Japanese., SBI-AD-E751160

This document describes meeting the Metz defense line, the fortified region of Metz, plan, deployment and opposing forces, pinpointing Metz, encirclement and entry, action in the north, and the march to the Saar for the XX Corps during World War Two.

This monograph examines historical siege operations to identify alternative operational approaches to future urban operations by the US Army. The emerging operational environment will gradually increase the risks of assaulting urban areas. In the two case studies examined, Paris 1870-1871 and Beirut 1982, the attacking armies overcame similar risks by besieging the urban area and defeating the enemy primarily by isolation. The case study analysis suggests that, at the operational level, a siege enables an attacker to hold the initiative, to reduce risks, and to avoid fighting the battles which provide advantages to the defender. The two sieges studied also provide models on how to link tactical actions together to defeat the enemy by isolation and force their capitulation. US Army doctrine should re-introduce siege operations as one more option to defeat adversaries within urban terrain.

The recently published Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations identifies large-scale combat operations as the greatest challenge facing US Army forces in the future. These operations against peer threats will be significantly more demanding in terms of operational tempo and lethality relative to the US Army's recent experiences in overseas contingency operations. The US Army's armored forces must prepare to seize and maintain the initiative by employing the elements of operational art to succeed in large-scale combat operations. Considering this challenge, the US Army 4th Armored Division's application of the elements of operational art — specifically tempo, operational reach, transitions, and risk — in large-scale combat operations provides an example of how armored units seized, retained, and exploited the initiative against a peer threat in the European Theater of Operations of WWII. Insights gathered from case studies of the 4th Armored Division's actions against the German Army in Operation Cobra and the encirclement of Nancy can inform today's commanders and staffs as they wrestle with overcoming the challenges presented by large-scale combat operations.

This study is an historical analysis of how encirclement and envelopment operations are important to current U.S. Army doctrine as professed in FM 100-5, Operations. The basic tenets of AirLand Battle, how doctrine is a guide for commonality within the armed services, and five World War II and School of Advanced Military Studies NATOEX operations are looked at to discover possible lessons learned and their applicability for inclusion in current doctrine and for use by current commanders. Among the many conclusions which were drawn from this investigation area coalition warfare, unless greatly rehearsed, will serve as a detriment to the successful conduct of an encirclement operation; lack of unity of command over the operation, unless created from the onset of the operation will result in less than the desired results because of the respective commanders' concern with their areas of operations and not the big picture; planning considerations must include size and composition of attacking force, use of artillery, reserves, and combat service support at a minimum; and finally educational preparation of the commanders and staffs on the procedures for conducting an encirclement is needed to insure a cogent plan and operation. The study concludes that the conceptual framework furnished in FM 100-5, Operations and other assorted U.S. Army manuals dues not contain the appropriate amount of guidance for conducting an encirclement operation. The doctrine as stated by the Soviets does contain information that could prove beneficial to U.S. Army doctrine writers and should be closely studied for possible ideas and conclusions that might prove applicable to our new style of warfare.

This monograph examines and analyzes two encirclement operations from the Russo-German Front of 1944 in order to determine their costs and benefits to the overall campaigns. Military theorists expect successful encirclement operations to produce high payoffs in war. Unfortunately, say these theorists, encirclements also incur great risks. Soviet encirclement operations at Korsun and Minsk in 1944 validate the promise of increased benefits, but demonstrate that the risks can be overcome by employing sound battlefield techniques and superior numbers. A comparison of the two World War II operations against contemporary warfare conditions identifies surprise, air superiority, and nuclear weapons as major factors contributing to the success or failure of encirclements. This paper concludes that encirclements remain applicable today, but they are not a remedy for all situations. Additionally, campaign planners should know the pros and cons of encirclement employment and should consider incorporating it in their plans when possible.

This monograph discusses the intricacies of liquidating tactical encirclements and bypassed pockets of enemy resistance. Operational employment of U.S. Army doctrine will lead to tactical encirclements in most instances. Contemporary doctrine, however, fails to acknowledge the probability of encirclement. Additionally, doctrine fails to address methods of dealing with enemy pockets. History argues that encircled enemy units often refuse to capitulate and usually require reduction by force. Furthermore, four brief examples of encirclement from the Russo-German front of World War II demonstrate that reduction operations are often difficult and complex. An encircling commander must foresee the consequences of encirclements and attempt to create the most favorable conditions for the reduction of encircled enemy forces. He must select a method and technique of reduction. He must base his selection on the situation, the threat posed by the enemy, the requirement for speed, the available resources, and the likely costs. Regardless of the method and technique chosen, the encircling commander must also consider the following: pausing to organize, establishing maneuver and fire control measures, isolating the enemy, nuclear weapon employment, and psychological operations. This paper concludes that the Army must acknowledge its doctrinal void, research and develop a reduction methodology, and amend its doctrine.

This study analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination Campaigns. Also during these years, changes in the CCP leadership often placed the Red Army in dangerous situations by underestimating the KMT military threat and overestimating Red Army capabilities. This reexamination of the origin and development of the Chinese People's Liberation Army looks at the Chinese Red Army's strategy, tactics, organization, and training, and identifies four themes that helped it adapt and survive: a pragmatic strategy focused on long term success; creating local populace support through adaptation; strong soldier recruiting, training, and retention; and comprehensive officer development system.

This monograph answers the question “What must an encircled unit be provided and do in order to successfully hold?” Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent drawdown, the United States adopted a military strategy of force projection. Given this new strategy, any future adversary of the United States is likely to attack early to deny the points of entry into the theater. The initial deploying U.S. forces must be prepared to fight and defend these points of entry until relieved or reinforced. The author uses historical examples of encirclements from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam to support lessons learned during a major simulation exercise in which a division had to fight encircled. The report presents the preconditions that an operational commander must set for the encircled unit which are: provide the necessary combat power, apply external pressure on the enemy, maintain air superiority, provide logistical support, and give the tactical commander freedom of action. Then the report takes a systems perspective to analyze the tactical commander's mission using the battlefield operating systems as a tool. The author presents the specific tasks the commander must execute and the concepts that he must consider. If the operational commander does not provide the necessary preconditions for success or the tactical commander does not take a systems perspective when setting up the defense, the encircled unit will fail.

Covers the major operations of the 4th Armored Division from the time it was alerted in its rest area in Lorraine in France, through its strategic movement north into southern Belgium and its subsequent attack and operations against the south flank of the 'bulge,' to include the breakthrough into Bastogne and relief of the surrounded 101st Airborne Division.

History is replete with examples of lost opportunities to decisively defeat an enemy's army on the field of battle. All too often, tactical success has not been followed by actions to ensure operational success. This failure may be attributable to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of operational encirclement. Two case studies highlight these dynamics. The Battles of the Falaise Gap in 1944 and the Ruhr Pocket in 1945 both illustrate the difficulties operational commanders face in conducting this type of operation. In the first case, Allied commanders failed to anticipate the opportunities presented by poor operational planning and tactical execution by their German adversaries and missed an opportunity for a quick and decisive victory. In the second, Allied commanders succeeded in learning from their previous mistakes at Falaise to achieve decisive operational results during the encirclement of the Ruhr. This monograph examines the dynamics of operational encirclement and determines what critical factors impact success or failure in achieving decisive results. It concludes that the three most critical factors which directly impact the success or failure of an operational encirclement include: the development of a flexible campaign plan, the establishment of an efficient and effective command and control infrastructure, and an ability to properly read the events on the battlefield. Based on these factors several planning considerations are identified as useful in the planning and execution of operational encirclements.

This study has a two fold objective: First, to evaluate the adequacy of current U. S. Army doctrine for the attack of a built-up area by a ROAD division. Second, in those areas where the present doctrine is found either inadequate or lacking, to develop appropriate doctrine. The evaluation is based on the historical experiences of combat in cities during World War II. The first three chapters are studies of eight different cities in which combat took place, with the majority of the account devoted to the seizure of Brest, France. The last two chapters compare present doctrine with the problems and techniques derived from the historical experiences, and develop doctrine in those areas found lacking. The study found five areas that were either inadequately covered or not covered at all in present doctrine. They were: 1) A surprise thrust to the center of a city's defenses using the flexibility inherent in the ROAD division offers to the alert commander a great opportunity to quickly seize a built-up area. Historically, commanders that employed a surprise thrust were successful in seizing a city before it could be adequately defended. 2) Encirclement is the key to the successful capture of a built-up area. Commanders should attempt to envelop a city as soon as possible. In those cases where physical encirclement is impossible due to obstacles or manpower requirements, either a reconnaissance screen or artillery interdiction screen should be established to deprive the enemy free access to the built-up area. 3) Infiltration is an important means of tactical maneuver in a built-up area. This method of attack offers the commander the opportunity to take critical objectives with a minimum loss of personnel. It requires well trained troops and aggressive junior leaders to be correctly executed. 4) The intelligence effort plays an important role in the planning for an attack of a built-up area. This study found that many commanders were not aware of the enemy's city defense p

Throughout history, a common phenomenon of warfare has been the encirclement of the forces of one or both warring factions. The nature of future war -- taking place in a battlefield that will be characterized by fluid activities, greater confusion, and indistinct battle lines -- suggests an increasing likelihood that one's force, or a part thereof, will become encircled at some stage of the conflict. This study reviews the nature of encirclements and tests the hypothesis that there exists a set of historically-justifiable principles that are common to the successful employment of encircled forces at the operational level of war. Three case studies are analyzed from an operational perspective. The substance of these assessments provides some tentative principles which are then tested against other historical examples, reflecting different environmental factors, different antagonists, and different outcomes. The author concludes that the hypothesis is substantiated by nine principles which are considered common to the successful employment of encircled forces at the operational level of war. Not surprisingly, these principles were conspicuously absent among unsuccessful operations involving encircled forces. The author suggests that these principles should be examined further and considered during future reviews of U.S. Army doctrine. He also proposes that the subject be included in the main curriculum of each of the staff colleges. Moreover, he maintains that "encircled forces" should be included in field training, command post exercises, and battle simulations in order to test the applicability of the derived operational principles and, hence, complete the doctrinal cycle.

Using historical analysis and survey, this study examines the sufficiency of U.S. field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques to support the destruction of an encircled enemy. Focus is on identifying existing weaknesses by comparing applicable lessons learned from history with the practices spelled out in current manuals. The Allied attempt to encircle and reduce the German forces within the Falaise-Argentan pocket in central France during August 1944 and the Soviet Belorussian Offensive and subsequent encirclement and reduction of German forces during June 1944 are examined. The results of a survey completed by the V and VII U.S. Corps artillery commanders on the subject are also included. Among the shortfalls identified are: current attention is more focused on breaking out of an encirclement than on forming an encirclement; when encircling an enemy is addressed, discussion stops after the encirclement is formed and before reduction begins; field artillery procedures do not separately address this mission; friendly or enemy use of chemical or nuclear weapons has not been considered; the requirement to simultaneously support reduction and exploitation operations has not been addressed; there is a need for an artillery commander at echelons above corps. The study concludes that the process of reducing a large encircled enemy force is sufficiently different from other operations that it should be separately addressed. Although the "doing" of the component parts of the artillery aspect of this operation are doctrinally established, tying them together into a synergetic package requires innovative attention. Resulting field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques derived are equally applicable in reducing an isolated enemy force that has broken through or been inserted into our rear area as they are in the reduction of an offensively encircled enemy.

This document discusses the tactical and logistical problems peculiar to operations of encircled forces, as well as the problems of air support for encircled ground troop.

The following battle analysis addresses the battle of Chosin Reservoir from 27 November to 11 December 1950 in northeastern North Korea during which the 1st Marine Division and some attached U.S. Army units fought their way out of encirclement by Communist Chinese Forces (CCF). In the process, these United States forces rendered combat ineffective, nine Chinese divisions and brought out their equipment and wounded with them.