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PR, IFPRI3; ISI; CRP4; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; DCA, PHND; A4NH, CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH), Background: Small-quantity lipid-based nutrient supplements (SQ-LNSs) have been shown to reduce the prevalence of child anemia and iron deficiency, but effects on other micronutrients are less well known. Identifying subgroups who benefit most from SQ-LNSs could support improved program design. Objectives: We aimed to identify study-level and individual-level modifiers of the effect of SQ-LNSs on child hemoglobin (Hb), anemia, and inflammation-adjusted micronutrient status outcomes. Methods: We conducted a 2-stage meta-analysis of individual participant data from 13 randomized controlled trials of SQ-LNSs provided to children 6–24 mo of age (n = 15,946). We generated study-specific and subgroup estimates of SQ-LNSs compared with control, and pooled the estimates using fixed-effects models. We used random-effects meta-regression to examine potential study-level effect modifiers. Results: SQ-LNS provision decreased the prevalence of anemia (Hb < 110 g/L) by 16% (relative reduction), iron deficiency (plasma ferritin < 12 µg/L) by 56%, and iron deficiency anemia (IDA; Hb < 110 g/L and plasma ferritin <12 µg/L) by 64%. We observed positive effects of SQ-LNSs on hematological and iron status outcomes within all subgroups of the study- and individual-level effect modifiers, but effects were larger in certain subgroups. For example, effects of SQ-LNSs on anemia and iron status were greater in trials that provided SQ-LNSs for >12 mo and provided 9 (as opposed to <9) mg Fe/d, and among later-born (than among first-born) children. There was no effect of SQ-LNSs on plasma zinc or retinol, but there was a 7% increase in plasma retinol-binding protein (RBP) and a 56% reduction in vitamin A deficiency (RBP < 0.70 µmol/L), with little evidence of effect modification by individual-level characteristics. Conclusions: SQ-LNSs can substantially reduce the prevalence of anemia, iron deficiency, and IDA among children across a range of individual, population, and study design characteris

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57)., This thesis examines the relationship between legislative professionalism and institutionalization in the committee systems of six U.S. states. I examine whether increased professionalization, as defined by increases in levels of member salary, legislative staffing, and time in session, causes legislatures to institutionalize in a manner similar to the U.S. Congress. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the use (or lack thereof) of seniority as an automatic procedure for the assignment to, and transfer between, committees. I find that while it appears that all state legislators value service on committees, legislative professionalization is not an adequate explanatory variable to describe the variation in the institutionalization of committee systems that we see across states in the United States. This finding is especially evident in the analysis of California, the most professionalized state legislature in the U.S., by Keith Malcolm Edwards., S.M.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57)., This thesis examines the relationship between legislative professionalism and institutionalization in the committee systems of six U.S. states. I examine whether increased professionalization, as defined by increases in levels of member salary, legislative staffing, and time in session, causes legislatures to institutionalize in a manner similar to the U.S. Congress. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the use (or lack thereof) of seniority as an automatic procedure for the assignment to, and transfer between, committees. I find that while it appears that all state legislators value service on committees, legislative professionalization is not an adequate explanatory variable to describe the variation in the institutionalization of committee systems that we see across states in the United States. This finding is especially evident in the analysis of California, the most professionalized state legislature in the U.S., by Keith Malcolm Edwards., S.M.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57)., This thesis examines the relationship between legislative professionalism and institutionalization in the committee systems of six U.S. states. I examine whether increased professionalization, as defined by increases in levels of member salary, legislative staffing, and time in session, causes legislatures to institutionalize in a manner similar to the U.S. Congress. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the use (or lack thereof) of seniority as an automatic procedure for the assignment to, and transfer between, committees. I find that while it appears that all state legislators value service on committees, legislative professionalization is not an adequate explanatory variable to describe the variation in the institutionalization of committee systems that we see across states in the United States. This finding is especially evident in the analysis of California, the most professionalized state legislature in the U.S., by Keith Malcolm Edwards., S.M.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57)., This thesis examines the relationship between legislative professionalism and institutionalization in the committee systems of six U.S. states. I examine whether increased professionalization, as defined by increases in levels of member salary, legislative staffing, and time in session, causes legislatures to institutionalize in a manner similar to the U.S. Congress. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the use (or lack thereof) of seniority as an automatic procedure for the assignment to, and transfer between, committees. I find that while it appears that all state legislators value service on committees, legislative professionalization is not an adequate explanatory variable to describe the variation in the institutionalization of committee systems that we see across states in the United States. This finding is especially evident in the analysis of California, the most professionalized state legislature in the U.S., by Keith Malcolm Edwards., S.M.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000., Includes bibliographical references (p. 322-334)., This dissertation examines the regulation of conflicts of interest involving state legislators through the passage of ethics laws during the period from 1954-1996. The aim is to explain why legislators, who are notoriously loathe to regulate their own ethics, enacted a range of ethics laws during this time. I use a mixture of qualitative case studies and regression analysis at the individual and state levels, in order to explain the factors that lead legislators to oppose ethics reforms and the circumstances which facilitated refine success. Three main factors account for legislators' positions on ethics proposals: economic self-interest, institutional power, and ideology. Despite these reasons for opposing regulation, legislators agreed to enact ethics laws under certain conditions. Scandals and media attention to the problem of legislative ethics, as well as the efforts of governors and public interest groups, helped facilitate reform. In addition, the initiative process was a powerful weapon used by reform advocates, both for the enactment of new laws and the authorities of independent ethics commissions. While these outside actors and institutions played a critical role in explaining the likelihood and extent of reform, institutional features within the legislature itself also shaped the outcome of reform efforts. Although many states enacted relatively comprehensive ethics laws, these laws contained important concessions made to legislators in the course of bargaining with governors and public interest groups. Further, when it came to enforcement of the new laws, legislators have maintained close control over the new commissions, using methods such as appointment of commissioners, budgetary control, and legal challenges. Consequently, few state ethics commissions with jurisdiction over legislators have sufficient power and independence to carry out their mandate. Overall, the new legislative ethics laws and their enforcement are consistent with a picture of leg, by Beth Anne Rosenson., Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000., Includes bibliographical references (p. 322-334)., This dissertation examines the regulation of conflicts of interest involving state legislators through the passage of ethics laws during the period from 1954-1996. The aim is to explain why legislators, who are notoriously loathe to regulate their own ethics, enacted a range of ethics laws during this time. I use a mixture of qualitative case studies and regression analysis at the individual and state levels, in order to explain the factors that lead legislators to oppose ethics reforms and the circumstances which facilitated refine success. Three main factors account for legislators' positions on ethics proposals: economic self-interest, institutional power, and ideology. Despite these reasons for opposing regulation, legislators agreed to enact ethics laws under certain conditions. Scandals and media attention to the problem of legislative ethics, as well as the efforts of governors and public interest groups, helped facilitate reform. In addition, the initiative process was a powerful weapon used by reform advocates, both for the enactment of new laws and the authorities of independent ethics commissions. While these outside actors and institutions played a critical role in explaining the likelihood and extent of reform, institutional features within the legislature itself also shaped the outcome of reform efforts. Although many states enacted relatively comprehensive ethics laws, these laws contained important concessions made to legislators in the course of bargaining with governors and public interest groups. Further, when it came to enforcement of the new laws, legislators have maintained close control over the new commissions, using methods such as appointment of commissioners, budgetary control, and legal challenges. Consequently, few state ethics commissions with jurisdiction over legislators have sufficient power and independence to carry out their mandate. Overall, the new legislative ethics laws and their enforcement are consistent with a picture of leg, by Beth Anne Rosenson., Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000., Includes bibliographical references (p. 322-334)., This dissertation examines the regulation of conflicts of interest involving state legislators through the passage of ethics laws during the period from 1954-1996. The aim is to explain why legislators, who are notoriously loathe to regulate their own ethics, enacted a range of ethics laws during this time. I use a mixture of qualitative case studies and regression analysis at the individual and state levels, in order to explain the factors that lead legislators to oppose ethics reforms and the circumstances which facilitated refine success. Three main factors account for legislators' positions on ethics proposals: economic self-interest, institutional power, and ideology. Despite these reasons for opposing regulation, legislators agreed to enact ethics laws under certain conditions. Scandals and media attention to the problem of legislative ethics, as well as the efforts of governors and public interest groups, helped facilitate reform. In addition, the initiative process was a powerful weapon used by reform advocates, both for the enactment of new laws and the authorities of independent ethics commissions. While these outside actors and institutions played a critical role in explaining the likelihood and extent of reform, institutional features within the legislature itself also shaped the outcome of reform efforts. Although many states enacted relatively comprehensive ethics laws, these laws contained important concessions made to legislators in the course of bargaining with governors and public interest groups. Further, when it came to enforcement of the new laws, legislators have maintained close control over the new commissions, using methods such as appointment of commissioners, budgetary control, and legal challenges. Consequently, few state ethics commissions with jurisdiction over legislators have sufficient power and independence to carry out their mandate. Overall, the new legislative ethics laws and their enforcement are consistent with a picture of leg, by Beth Anne Rosenson., Ph.D.

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On loan from Jim Ellis, 2010

Theater program of "Jamaica" by E.Y. Harburg, Fred Saidy, and Harold Arlen. This performance ran from February 26-April 13, 1963. Performers: Laura Green/Brenda Veal as Savannah, Franklin Johnson/J. Herbert Kerr Jr. as Koli, Norma Powell as Ginger, Edwin Brown/Albert Fann as Cicero, Marjorie Hawkins/Florence St. Peter as Grandma, Damon Brazwell/Albert Kirk as Joe Nashua, Philip Mason as Govenor, William Davis/Clarence Bass as Quico, Nathaniel C. Barnett as Snodgrss, J. Herbert Kerr Jr. as Lancaster, and Edwin Brown as Hucklebuck. The Ensemble: Nathaniel C. Barnett, Angela Berry. Edith Bryan, Cozette Craig, La Vern Dix, Margaret Ferguson, Abelson Jones, Albert Kirk, Katherine Moore, Norman Robinson, Charles Sanders, Clifford Stewart, Charles Staples, and Barbara Willis.