Search

Lanchester (1916) modeled combat situations between two opponents, where mutual attrition occurs continuously in time, by a pair of simple ordinary (linear) differential equations. The aim of the present paper is to extend the model to a conflict consisting of three parties. In particular, Lanchester's main result, i.e. his square law, is adapted to a triple fight. However, here a central factor besides the initial strengths of the forces determining the long run outcome is the allocation of each opponent's efforts between the other two parties. De- pending on initial strengths, (the) solution paths are calculated and visualized in appropriate phase portraits. We are able identify regions in the state space where, independent of the force allocation of the opponents, always the same combatant wins, regions, where a combatant can win if its force allocation is wisely chosen, and regions where a combatant cannot win itself but determine the winner by its forces allocation. As such, the present model can be seen as a forerunner of a dynamic game between three opponents.

Drug markets have been targeted for increasingly tough enforcement yet retail prices for cocaine and heroin fell by 70-80%. No research has explained adequately why prices have fallen. This paper explores the possibility that part of the explanation may lie in the failure of drug dealers to respond to risks the way the simplest rational actor models might predict.

Drug markets have been targeted for increasingly tough enforcement yet retail prices for cocaine and heroin fell by 70-80%. No research has explained adequately why prices have fallen. This paper explores the possibility that part of the explanation may lie in the failure of drug dealers to respond to risks the way the simplest rational actor models might predict.

"May 1989"--t.p. "August 1989"--p. 1.

"May 1989"--t.p. "August 1989"--p. 1.

In 2001, use of the STRIDE data base for the purpose of analyzing drug prices and the impact of public policies on drug markets came under serious attack by the National Research Council (Manski, et al., 2001; Horowitz, 2001). While some of the criticisms raised by the committee were valid, many of the concerns can be easily addressed through more careful use of the data. In this paper, we first disprove Horowitz's main argument that prices are different for observations collected by different agencies within a city. We then revisit other issues raised by the NRC and discuss how certain limitations can be easily overcome through the adoption of random coefficient models of drug prices and by paying serious attention to drug form and distribution levels. Although the sample remains a convenience sample, we demonstrate how construction of city-specific price and purity series that pay careful attention to the data and incorporate existing knowledge of drug markets (e.g. the expected purity hypothesis) are internally consistent and can be externally validated. The findings from this study have important implications regarding the utility of these data and the appropriateness of using them in econmic analyses of supply, demand and harms.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 1990., Includes bibliographical references (p. 325-340)., by Jonathan P. Caulkins., Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references., by Jonathan P. Caulkins.

Drug use prevention programs are now commonplace in the nation's schools. Their aim is to prevent, or at least delay or diminish, children's use of a variety of substances, including illicit drugs such as marijuana and cocaine and licit substances such as alcohol and tobacco. It is now well established that school-based drug prevention can work to reduce drug consumption, at least in the short run. We emphasize can because large sums of money are still poured into programs whose effectiveness is dubious. However, there are proven models available for implementation. Most successful drug prevention programs are not targeted to specific substances. Which drugs, then, do they affect? Besides differing in the legality of their use, drugs differ in the cost burden they place on society. Where are the benefits of a drug prevention program realized? Through a reduction in crime related to the cocaine market? Through fewer traffic accidents and higher productivity associated with lower alcohol use? Or through less money spent caring for the health of smokers? To put the question more provocatively, are school-based drug prevention programs better viewed as a weapon in the "war" against illegal drugs or as a public health program for decreasing the adverse effects of licit substances?

The Early Childhood Initiative (ECI) of Allegheny County (including the city of Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania, was an ambitious effort to provide high-quality early care and education (ECE) services to at-risk children. Launched in 1996 under the auspices of the United Way (UW) of Allegheny County, ECI aimed within five years to serve 7,600 at-risk children ages zero (birth) to five in 80 low-income neighborhoods, at an average cost of $4,000 to $5,000 per child and a total cost of $59 million over the five-year period. By intervening early in the lives of at-risk children with high-quality services, ECI hoped to improve their preparation for kindergarten, promote their long-term educational attainment, and give them the early tools to help them become productive, successful members of society. While the long-term benefits of high-quality ECE had been suggested by a number of small-scale, demonstration programs, ECI aimed to be the first in the nation to establish a comprehensive system for delivering high-quality ECE services on a countywide scale. Moreover, ECI intended to provide services through programs that were chosen and operated at the community level by local neighborhood agencies. Finally, ECI aimed to become financially sustainable over the long term, when the initial infusion of dollars from foundations and private donors was exhausted. It planned a lobbying effort to persuade the state of Pennsylvania to commit to fund the initiative at the end of the five-year startup period.

For well over a century, American higher education has set the world standard for academic excellence and equitable access for all citizens. Over two million degrees are conferred each year across nearly 4,000 public and private institutions, including some two-thirds of the best universities in the world. It is often said that the 'margin for excellence' for this vast enterprise comes from voluntary donations, fully 40 percent of which comes from alumni and other individual donors (see Figure S. 1). Major donors to higher education give for many reasons and, through this giving, seek various rewards. Yet all face a common challenge: how to make enough sense of the U.S. higher education system, the higher education fundraising process, and the options for higher education philanthropy to be able to give intelligently and meaningfully. While higher education fundraising has grown increasingly sophisticated in its approach, higher education philanthropy has remained in large part an 'amateur' exercise. Donors follow the casual advice of friends and colleagues and their own hearts in deciding what to give, to whom, how, and when. The purpose of this book is to augment this approach with insights and strategies for giving based on donor objectives and interests. The collective wisdom presented herein comes from those people who have the most direct and personal experience with giving to higher education: development officers, institutional leaders, and donors themselves., Original contains color plates: All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

The Early Childhood Initiative (ECI) of Allegheny County (including the city of Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania, was an ambitious effort to provide high-quality early care and education (ECE) services to at-risk children. Launched in 1996 under the auspices of the United Way (UW) of Allegheny County, ECI aimed within five years to serve 7,600 at-risk children ages zero (birth) to five in 80 low-income neighborhoods, at an average cost of $4,000 to $5,000 per child and a total cost of $59 million over the five-year period. By intervening early in the lives of at-risk children with high-quality services, ECI hoped to improve their preparation for kindergarten, promote their long-term educational attainment, and give them the early tools to help them become productive, successful members of society. RAND was commissioned by the Heinz Endowments to evaluate the vision, organization, administration, and operation of the Early Childhood Initiative (ECI), a major effort to improve early care and education (ECE) for low-income children from birth through age five in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the surrounding communities of Allegheny County. ECI was conceived and designed from 1994 to 1996, and operated under the auspices of the United Way (UW) of Allegheny County from 1996 through 2000. Its quality of service and child welfare outcomes are being examined separately by a research team from the University of Pittsburgh and Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh.

Agency and program administrators and decisionmakers responsible for implementing early childhood intervention programs are becoming more interested in quantifying the costs and benefits of such programs. Part of the reason for this is that foundations and other funders are putting more emphasis on results-based accountability. At the same time, arguments for the value of early childhood intervention are being made within the public sphere on the basis of published estimates of costs and benefits. Program implementers are naturally attracted by statements that a certain intervention produces $4 in savings for every $1 it costs and would like to make similar statements about their own programs. Meanwhile, decisionmakers without particular interest in any given program would like more quantitative decision aids when it comes time to choose among a variety of possible program models or program improvements to implement. Our objective here is to offer assistance to decisionmakers and program implementers considering an assessment of costs and outcomes. We do not offer a specific step-by-step manual, but we discuss the kinds of issues that must be taken into account and why. We do so in enough detail that readers can decide if this type of quantitative analysis is the right course for them and, if so, can knowledgeably interact with an expert cost-outcome analyst. While we understand that some readers will want to undertake analysis of costs and outcomes to justify a program in which they have a special interest, we take the viewpoint here of an unbiased allocator of funds. What evidence should such a person want to see before concluding that a particular intervention is a wise investment? That sort of evidence is what the implementer seeking to justify further funding will need to present., See Also ADA399318 .

Agency and program administrators and decisionmakers responsible for implementing early childhood intervention programs are becoming more interested in quantifying the costs and benefits of such programs. Part of the reason for this is that foundations and other funders are putting more emphasis on results-based accountability. At the same time, arguments for the value of early childhood intervention are being made within the public sphere on the basis of published estimates of costs and benefits. Program implementers are naturally attracted by statements that a certain intervention produces $4 in savings for every $1 it costs and would like to make similar statements about their own programs. Meanwhile, decisionmakers without particular interest in any given program would like more quantitative decision aids when it comes time to choose among a variety of possible program models or program improvements to implement. Our objective here is to offer assistance to decisionmakers and program implementers considering an assessment of costs and out- comes. We do not offer a specific step-by-step manual, but we discuss the kinds of issues that must be taken into account and why. We do so in enough detail that readers can decide if this type of quantitative analysis is the right course for them and, if so, can knowledgeably interact with an expert cost-outcome analyst. While we understand that some readers will want to undertake analysis of costs and outcomes to justify a program in which they have a special interest, we take the viewpoint here of an unbiased allocator of funds. What evidence should such a person want to see before concluding that a particular intervention is a wise investment? That sort of evidence is what the implementer seeking to justify further funding will need to present., See Also ADA399317 .

A 1994 RAND study, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs (Rydell and Everingham), drew widely cited conclusions regarding the relative cost-effectiveness of spending additional drug control moneys on treatment and various modes of enforcement. A National Research Council (NRC) committee last year issued a critique of that report concluding that it was not a good basis for policymaking. Modeling is an inexact science, and there is plenty of room for experts to disagree on methods and conclusions. We feel, however, that the NRC's critique warrants a reply, for two reasons. First, it appears to rest on incomplete information regarding the RAND model. Our differences with the assessment are thus not simply a matter of varying judgment or opinion. Second, the critique was issued by a distinguished panel at the request of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Barring objection, we fear that many in the drug policy community may tend to accept the conclusions of the panel as the last word on this topic.

The question has arisen as to whether this is a good time to direct additional law enforcement effort at XTC. Or, might other interventions, such as treatment and prevention, be better alternatives? One constructive way to approach this question is by stepping back and asking, for what types of drugs and at what point in an epidemic of drug use is law enforcement likely to be the preferred intervention? Then one can ask whether XTC is likely to fit that description. Levels and patterns of drug-use rise and fall over time in modest ways as do all sorts of phenomena, but drug use patterns can also change explosively. In particular, drug "epidemics" can begin with low rates of use being replaced by exponential growth up to some plateau, from which drug use gradually declines to some endemic level that may or may not be much greater than the original level (Musto, 1999). In such a dynamic situation, it may make sense for the mix of policy interventions to vary over time as well. Such adaptive or dynamic policies are not uncommon in other spheres. For example, the Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates in response to its perception of where the economy is in the business cycle., Presented to the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, June 15, 2000.

Illegal drug use is a major problem confronting the United States today, and the Congress, in an effort to marshal additional resources to address this problem, directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish pilot outreach programs designed to reduce drug use among youth. Congress also directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the effectiveness of these programs and to recommend whether they should be continued. Researchers from the National Defense Research Institute and the Drug Policy Research Center in RAND's Domestic Research Division assisted in the evaluation, documenting the results of their efforts in Preventing Drug Use Among Youth Through Community Outreach: The Military's Pilot Programs. The following are the five central policy issues investigated and the results obtained.

The United States has a substantial drug problem. The nation could benefit from drug prevention programs, and these are thought to be more effective when many program providers are involved. Congress, in an attempt to marshal additional forces for prevention, directed the military to establish pilot community outreach programs to reduce the demand for illegal drugs among youth.' The military has a number of special assets that can be employed in preventing drug abuse among young people, although there are also limitations. Among the various components of the military, the National Guard has a special niche because of its dual mission of state and federal service. As part of the legislation, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the effectiveness of the pilot outreach programs and make recommendations regarding their continuation. RAND is assisting the Department of Defense with that report, and this document discusses a RAND study that examined the potential suitability of the military for such roles, the pilot programs that were implemented, their effectiveness, how the programs affected the military, and some desirable attributes of military-run prevention programs for youth. The information for the study was gathered largely through site visits and telephone interviews with program administrators, staff, participating youth, parents, and community leaders. A literature review, background research, and supporting calculations supplemented these efforts. JMD