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Background: Adverse drug/device reactions (ADRs) can result in severe patient harm. We define very serious ADRs as being associated with severe toxicity, as measured on the Common Toxicity Criteria Adverse Events (CTCAE)) scale, following use of drugs or devices with large sales, large financial settlements, and large numbers of injured persons. We report on impacts on patients, clinicians, and manufacturers following very serious ADR reporting. Methods: We reviewed clinician identified very serious ADRs published between 1997 and 2019. Drugs and devices associated with reports of very serious ADRs were identified. Included drugs or devices had market removal discussed at Food and Drug Advisory (FDA) Advisory Committee meetings, were published by clinicians, had sales > $1 billion, were associated with CTCAE Grade 4 or 5 toxicity effects, and had either >$1 billion in settlements or >1,000 injured patients. Data sources included journals, Congressional transcripts, and news reports. We reviewed data on: 1) timing of ADR reports, Boxed warnings, and product withdrawals, and 2) patient, clinician, and manufacturer impacts. Binomial analysis was used to compare sales pre- and post-FDA Advisory Committee meetings. Findings: Twenty very serious ADRs involved fifteen drugs and one device. Legal settlements totaled $38.4 billion for 753,900 injured persons. Eleven of 18 clinicians (61%) reported harms, including verbal threats from manufacturer (five) and loss of a faculty position (one). Annual sales decreased 94% from $29.1 billion pre-FDA meeting to $4.9 billion afterwards (p<0.0018). Manufacturers of four drugs paid $1.7 billion total in criminal fines for failing to inform the FDA and physicians about very serious ADRs. Following FDA approval, the median time to ADR reporting was 7.5 years (Interquartile range 3,13 years). Twelve drugs received Box warnings and one drug received a warning (median, 7.5 years following ADR reporting (IQR 5,11 years). Six

Background: Adverse drug/device reactions (ADRs) can result in severe patient harm. We define very serious ADRs as being associated with severe toxicity, as measured on the Common Toxicity Criteria Adverse Events (CTCAE)) scale, following use of drugs or devices with large sales, large financial settlements, and large numbers of injured persons. We report on impacts on patients, clinicians, and manufacturers following very serious ADR reporting. Methods: We reviewed clinician identified very serious ADRs published between 1997 and 2019. Drugs and devices associated with reports of very serious ADRs were identified. Included drugs or devices had market removal discussed at Food and Drug Advisory (FDA) Advisory Committee meetings, were published by clinicians, had sales > $1 billion, were associated with CTCAE Grade 4 or 5 toxicity effects, and had either >$1 billion in settlements or >1,000 injured patients. Data sources included journals, Congressional transcripts, and news reports. We reviewed data on: 1) timing of ADR reports, Boxed warnings, and product withdrawals, and 2) patient, clinician, and manufacturer impacts. Binomial analysis was used to compare sales pre- and post-FDA Advisory Committee meetings. Findings: Twenty very serious ADRs involved fifteen drugs and one device. Legal settlements totaled $38.4 billion for 753,900 injured persons. Eleven of 18 clinicians (61%) reported harms, including verbal threats from manufacturer (five) and loss of a faculty position (one). Annual sales decreased 94% from $29.1 billion pre-FDA meeting to $4.9 billion afterwards (p<0.0018). Manufacturers of four drugs paid $1.7 billion total in criminal fines for failing to inform the FDA and physicians about very serious ADRs. Following FDA approval, the median time to ADR reporting was 7.5 years (Interquartile range 3,13 years). Twelve drugs received Box warnings and one drug received a warning (median, 7.5 years following ADR reporting (IQR 5,11 years). Six

As the United States enters the 21st century, the readiness of its over 1.4 million all-volunteer armed forces is as important today as anytime during the 27 year history of the modern all-volunteer force (AVF). Over the last several years, the AVF has faced significant retention and recruiting challenges while the nation's economy has enjoyed record low unemployment placing great demand on the AVF retaining the highly skilled and dependable professional forces. Hence, a significant debate on Capitol began on whether or not basic pay compensation is adequate, fair and comparable to civilian wages within the context of retention within the armed forces. This paper asks the question whether retention in the AVF would benefit from a more predictable and consistent basic pay policy. Those responsible for basic pay policy must understand and articulate the fundamental motivational underpinnings of the AVF in context with a national determination of what is fair and adequate basic pay for the future success of the AVF. The paper analyzes the historical, current and future underpinnings of the modern AVF as related to basic pay policy. Analysis is provided on periods of volunteerism in the 20th century; the decision for the U.S. to switch to a modern AVF in the early 1970s; and the lessons learned from the hollow force crisis (late 1970S's) with emphasis on the application of Charles Moskos' Institutional and Occupational motivational theory. The paper assesses the current forces that shaped basic pay policy in CY1999 for FY2000 and highlights differing opinions as to the adequacy of basic pay. Finally, the paper looks at future fiscal and workplace environment forecasts, the adequacy of indexes used to develop current basic pay policy and differing opinions on whether basic pay is comparable to civilian wages.