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The study of quantum reference frames (QRFs) is motivated by the idea of taking into account the quantum properties of the reference frames that we use, explicitly or implicitly, in our description of physical systems. Like a classical reference frame, a QRF can be used to define physical quantities such as time, position, momentum, and spin relationally. Unlike its classical analogue, it relativises the notions of superposition and entanglement of quantum systems. Here, we provide a novel explanation for the frame-dependence of superposition and entanglement by tracing it back to the question of how configurations or locations are identified across different branches in superposition. We show that, in the presence of symmetries, whether a system is in “the same” or “different” configurations across the branches depends on the choice of QRF. Thus, sameness and difference — and, as a result, superposition and entanglement — lose their absolute meaning. We apply these ideas to the context of semi-classical spacetimes in superposition and use coincidences of four scalar fields to construct a comparison map between the spacetime points in the different branches. This allows us to determine whether a given event is located at “the same” or “different” points in the superposed spacetimes. Because this feature depends on the choice of QRF, we argue that the localisation of an event should not be seen as an inherent property of the event. This alleviates previously voiced concerns that QRF changes could have empirical consequences for interference experiments, such as the Bose et al.-Marletto-Vedral proposal. Moreover, it implies that the number of events is equal in both the flat and the curved spacetime implementations of quantum-controlled causal order. We conclude with the “quantum hole argument” as a generalisation for the quantum context of Einstein’s famous hole argument, arguing that not just spacetime points but also their identification and the localisation of eve

I present aspects of causal set theory (a research programme in quantum gravity) as being en route to achieving a reduction of Lorentzian geometry to causal sets. I take reduction in philosophers' sense; and I argue that the prospects are good for there being a reduction of the type envisaged by Nagel. (I also discuss the prospects for the stronger functionalist variant of Nagelian reduction, that was formulated by Lewis.) One main theme will be causal set theory's use of a physical scale (viz. the Planck scale) to formulate how it recovers a Lorentzian manifold. This use illustrates various philosophical topics relevant to reduction, such as limiting relations between theories, and the role of analogy. I also emphasise causal set theory's probabilistic method, viz. Poisson sprinkling: which is used both for formulating the reduction and for exploring its prospects.

In this two-part paper, we review, and then develop, the assessment of the hole argument for general relativity. This first Part reviews the literature hitherto, focussing on the philosophical aspects. It also introduces two main ideas we will need in Part II: which will propose a framework for making comparisons of non-isomorphic spacetimes. In Section 1 of this paper, we recall Einstein’s original argument. Section 2 recalls the argument's revival by philosophers in the 1980s and 1990s. This includes the first main idea we will need in Part II: namely, that two spacetime points in different possible situations are never strictly identical—they are merely counterparts. In Section 3, we report---and rebut---more recent claims to “dissolve” the argument. Our rebuttal is based on the fact that in differential geometry, and its applications in physics such as general relativity, points are in some cases identified, or correspond with each other, between one context and another, by means other than isometry (or isomorphism). We call such a correspondence a “threading” of points. This is the second main idea we shall use in Part II.

In this two-part paper we review, and then develop, the assessment of the hole argument for general relativity. The review (in Part I) discussed how to compare points in isomorphic spacetimes, i.e. models of the theory. This second Part proposes a framework for making comparisons of non-isomorphic spacetimes. It combines two ideas we discussed in Part I---the philosophical idea of counterparts, and the idea of threading points between spacetimes other than by isomorphism---with the mathematics of fibre bundles. We first recall the ideas from Part I (Section 1). Then in Section 2 and an Appendix, we define a fibre bundle whose fibres are isomorphic copies of a given spacetime or model, and discuss connections on this fibre bundle. This material proceeds on analogy with field-space formulations of gauge theories. Finally, in Section 3, we show how this fibre bundle gives natural expressions of the philosophical ideas of counterparts, and of threading.

We develop some ideas about gauge symmetry in the context of Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism in the Hamiltonian formalism. One great benefit of this formalism is that it pairs momentum and configurational degrees of freedom, so that a decomposition of one side into subsets can be translated into a decomposition of the other. In the case of electromagnetism, this enables us to pair degrees of freedom of the electric field with degrees of freedom of the vector potential. Another benefit is that the formalism algorithmically identifies subsets of the equations of motion that represent time-dependent symmetries. For electromagnetism, these two benefits allow us to define gauge-fixing in parallel to special decompositions of the electric field. More specifically, we apply the Helmholtz decomposition theorem to split the electric field into its Coulombic and radiative parts, and show how this gives a special role to the Coulomb gauge (i.e. div(A) = 0). We relate this argument to Maudlin's (2018) discussion, which advocated the Coulomb gauge.

We develop some ideas about gauge symmetry in the context of Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism in the Hamiltonian formalism. One great benefit of this formalism is that it pairs momentum and configurational degrees of freedom, so that a decomposition of one side into subsets can be translated into a decomposition of the other. In the case of electromagnetism, this enables us to pair degrees of freedom of the electric field with degrees of freedom of the vector potential. Another benefit is that the formalism algorithmically identifies subsets of the equations of motion that represent time-dependent symmetries. For electromagnetism, these two benefits allow us to define gauge-fixing in parallel to special decompositions of the electric field. More specifically, we apply the Helmholtz decomposition theorem to split the electric field into its Coulombic and radiative parts, and show how this gives a special role to the Coulomb gauge (i.e. div$({\bf A}) = 0$). We relate this argument to Maudlin's (2018) discussion, which advocated the Coulomb gauge., Comment: 29 pages

An argument is presented that if a theory of quantum gravity is physically discrete at the Planck scale and the theory recovers General Relativity as an approximation, then, at the current stage of our knowledge, causal sets must arise within the theory, even if they are not its basis. We show in particular that an apparent alternative to causal sets, viz. a certain sort of discrete Lorentzian simplicial complex, cannot recover General Relativistic spacetimes in the appropriately unique way. For it cannot discriminate between Minkowski spacetime and a spacetime with a certain sort of gravitational wave burst., Comment: 47 pages, 2 figures

This three-part paper comprises: (i) a critique by Halvorson of Bell's (1973) paper "Subject and Object"; (ii) a comment by Butterfield; (iii) a reply by Halvorson. An Appendix gives the passage from Bell that is the focus of Halvorson's critique.

An argument is presented that if a theory of quantum gravity is physically discrete at the Planck scale and the theory recovers General Relativity as an approximation, then, at the current stage of our knowledge, causal sets must arise within the theory, even if they are not its basis. We show in particular that an apparent alternative to causal sets, viz. a certain sort of discrete Lorentzian simplicial complex, cannot recover General Relativistic spacetimes in the appropriately unique way. For it cannot discriminate between Minkowski spacetime and a spacetime with a certain sort of gravitational wave burst.

Why is gauge symmetry so important in modern physics, given that one must eliminate it when interpreting what the theory represents? In this paper we discuss the sense in which gauge symmetry can be fruitfully applied to constrain the space of possible dynamical models in such a way that forces and charges are appropriately coupled. We review the most well-known application of this kind, known as the ‘gauge argument’ or ‘gauge principle’, discuss its difficulties, and then reconstruct the gauge argument as a valid theorem in quantum theory. We then present what we take to be a better and more general gauge argument, based on Noether’s second theorem in classical Lagrangian field theory, and argue that this provides a more appropriate framework for understanding how gauge symmetry helps to constrain the dynamics of physical theories.

This three-part paper comprises: (i) a critique by Halvorson of Bell’s (1973) paper ‘Subject and Object’; (ii) a comment by Butterfield; (iii) a reply by Halvorson. An Appendix gives the passage from Bell that is the focus of Halvorson's critique.

We review three broadly geometrodynamical---and in part, Machian or relational---projects, from the perspective of spacetime functionalism. We show how all three are examples of functionalist reduction of the type that was advocated by D. Lewis, and nowadays goes by the label `the Canberra Plan’. The projects are: (1) the recovery of geometrodynamics by Hojman et al. (1976); (2) the programme of Schuller and collaborators (Schuller 2011; Duell, Schuller et al. 2018) to deduce a metric from the physics of matter fields; (3) the deduction of the ADM Hamiltonian by Gomes and Shyam (2016). We end by drawing a positive corollary about shape dynamics: namely, it has a good rationale for the Hamiltonian it postulates.

This is the first of four papers prompted by a recent literature about a doctrine dubbed spacetime functionalism. This paper gives our general framework for discussing functionalism. Following Lewis, we take it as a species of reduction. We start by expounding reduction in a broadly Nagelian sense. Then we argue that Lewis’ functionalism is an improvement on Nagelian reduction. This paper thereby sets the scene for the other papers, which will apply our framework to theories of space and time. (So those papers address the space and time literature: both recent and older, and physical as well as philosophical literature. But the four papers can be read independently.) Overall, we come to praise spacetime functionalism, not to bury it. But we criticize the recent philosophical literature for failing to stress: (i) functionalism’s being a species of reduction (in particular: reduction of chrono- geometry to the physics of matter and radiation); (ii) functionalism’s idea, not just of specifying a concept by its functional role, but of specifying several concepts simultaneously by their roles; (iii) functionalism’s providing bridge laws that are mandatory, not optional: they are statements of identity (or co-extension) that are conclusions of a deductive argument, rather than contingent guesses or verbal stipulations; and once we infer them, we have a reduction in a Nagelian sense. On the other hand, some of the older philosophical literature, and the mathematical physics literature, is faithful to these ideas (i) to (iii)—as are Torretti’s writings. (But of course, the word ‘functionalism’ is not used; and themes like simultaneous unique definition are not articulated.) Thus in various papers, falling under various research programmes, the unique definability of a chrono-geometric concept (or concepts) in terms of matter and radiation, and a corresponding bridge law and reduction, is secured by a precise theorem. Hence our desire to celebrate these results as rigorous r

Hans Halvorson has recently criticised Bell’s (1973) paper ‘Subject and Object’. I maintain that his criticism is unfair.

In this contribution in honour of Paul Busch, we criticise the claims of many expositions that the time-energy uncertainty principle allows both a violation of energy conservation, and particle creation, provided that this happens for a sufficiently short time. But we agree that there are grains of truth in these claims: which we make precise and justify using perturbation theory.

The microscopic state counting of the extremal Reissner-Nordström black hole performed by Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa in 1996 has proven to be a central result in string theory. Here, with a philosophical readership in mind, the argument is presented in its contemporary context and its rather complex conceptual structure is analysed. In particular, we will identify the various inter-theoretic relations, such as duality and linkage relations, on which it depends. We further aim to make clear why the argument was immediately recognised as a successful accounting for the entropy of this black hole and how it engendered subsequent work that intended to strengthen the string theoretic analysis of black holes. Its relation to the formulation of the AdS/CFT conjecture will be briefly discussed, and the familiar reinterpretation of the entropy calculation in the context of the AdS/CFT correspondence is given. Finally, we discuss the heuristic role that Strominger and Vafa's microscopic account of black hole entropy played for the black hole information paradox. A companion paper analyses the ontology of the Strominger-Vafa black hole states, the question of emergence of the black hole from a collection of D-branes, and the role of the correspondence principle in the context of string theory black holes.

This is one of a pair of papers that give a historical-cum-philosophical analysis of the endeavour to understand black hole entropy as a statistical mechanical entropy obtained by counting string-theoretic microstates. Both papers focus on Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa's ground-breaking 1996 calculation, which analysed the black hole in terms of D-branes. The first paper gives a conceptual analysis of the Strominger-Vafa argument, and of several research efforts that it engendered. In this paper, we assess whether the black hole should be considered as emergent from the D-brane system, particularly in light of the role that duality plays in the argument. We further identify uses of the quantum-to-classical correspondence principle in string theory discussions of black holes, and compare these to the heuristics of earlier efforts in theory construction, in particular those of the old quantum theory.

We advocate an account of dualities between physical theories: the basic idea is that dual theories are isomorphic representations of a common core. We defend and illustrate this account, which we call a Schema, in relation to symmetries. Overall, the account meshes well with standard treatments of symmetries. But the distinction between the common core and the dual theories prompts a distinction between three kinds of symmetry: which we call `stipulated', `accidental' and `proper'., Comment: 44 pages. Published in Synthese, in a special issue on `Symmetries and Asymmetries in Physics' edited by M. Frisch, R. Dardashti, and G. Valente

This is one of a pair of papers that give a historical-\emph{cum}-philosophical analysis of the endeavour to understand black hole entropy as a statistical mechanical entropy obtained by counting string-theoretic microstates. Both papers focus on Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa's ground-breaking 1996 calculation, which analysed the black hole in terms of D-branes. The first paper gives a conceptual analysis of the Strominger-Vafa argument, and of several research efforts that it engendered. In this paper, we assess whether the black hole should be considered as emergent from the D-brane system, particularly in light of the role that duality plays in the argument. We further identify uses of the quantum-to-classical correspondence principle in string theory discussions of black holes, and compare these to the heuristics of earlier efforts in theory construction, in particular those of the old quantum theory., Comment: 40 pages

The microscopic state counting of the extremal Reissner-Nordstr\"om black hole performed by Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa in 1996 has proven to be a central result in string theory. Here, with a philosophical readership in mind, the argument is presented in its contemporary context and its rather complex conceptual structure is analysed. In particular, we will identify the various inter-theoretic relations, such as duality and linkage relations, on which it depends. We further aim to make clear why the argument was immediately recognised as a successful accounting for the entropy of this black hole and how it engendered subsequent work that intended to strengthen the string theoretic analysis of black holes. Its relation to the formulation of the AdS/CFT conjecture will be briefly discussed, and the familiar reinterpretation of the entropy calculation in the context of the AdS/CFT correspondence is given. Finally, we discuss the heuristic role that Strominger and Vafa's microscopic account of black hole entropy played for the black hole information paradox. A companion paper analyses the ontology of the Strominger-Vafa black hole states, the question of emergence of the black hole from a collection of D-branes, and the role of the correspondence principle in the context of string theory black holes., Comment: 70 pages

In this paper we present a schema for describing dualities between physical theories (Sections 2 and 3), and illustrate it in detail with the example of bosonization: a boson-fermion duality in two-dimensional quantum field theory (Sections 4 and 5). The schema develops proposals in De Haro (2016, 2016a): these proposals include construals of notions related to duality, like representation, model, symmetry and interpretation. The aim of the schema is to give a more precise criterion for duality than has so far been considered. The bosonization example, or boson-fermion duality, has the feature of being simple, yet rich enough, to illustrate the most relevant aspects of our schema, which also apply to more sophisticated dualities. The richness of the example consists, mainly, in its concern with two non-trivial quantum field theories: including massive Thirring-sine-Gordon duality, and non-abelian bosonization. This prompts two comparisons with the recent philosophical literature on dualities:--- (a) Unlike the standard cases of duality in quantum field theory and string theory, where only specific simplifying limits of the theories are explicitly known, the boson-fermion duality is known to hold exactly. This exactness can be exhibited explicitly. (b) The bosonization example illustrates both the cases of isomorphic and non-isomorphic models: which we believe the literature on dualities has not so far discussed.

The main aim of this paper is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities between theories, as `duality' is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as `equivalence' is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called `the same theory', though we interpret them as disagreeing---so that they are certainly not equivalent, as `equivalent' is normally understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing---since often neglected. My argument for this is based on the account of duality developed by De Haro: which is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory. Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree in their claims about the world. I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening of it., Comment: 54 pages, 1 figure. Forthcoming in `Philosophy Beyond Spacetime' (Oxford University Press), edited by N. Huggett, B. Le Bihan and C. Wuethrich. Dedicated to Graeme Segal

We advocate an account of dualities between physical theories: the basic idea is that dual theories are isomorphic representations of a common core. We defend and illustrate this account, which we call a Schema, in relation to symmetries. Overall, the account meshes well with standard treatments of symmetries. But the distinction between the common core and the dual theories prompts a distinction between three kinds of symmetry: which we call `stipulated', `accidental' and `proper'.

This is a review of Hossenfelder’s book, Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray. The book gives a breezy exposition of the present situation in fundamental physics, and raises important questions: both about the content of the physics, and the way physics research is organized. I first state my main disagreements. Then, I mostly praise the book: I concentrate on Hossenfelder’s discussion of supersymmetry, naturalness and the multiverse.

In this paper we present a schema for describing dualities between physical theories (Sections 2 and 3), and illustrate it in detail with the example of bosonization: a boson-fermion duality in two-dimensional quantum field theory (Sections 4 and 5). The schema develops proposals in De Haro (2016, 2016a): these proposals include construals of notions related to duality, like representation, model, symmetry and interpretation. The aim of the schema is to give a more precise criterion for duality than has so far been considered. The bosonization example, or boson-fermion duality, has the feature of being simple yet rich enough to illustrate the most relevant aspects of our schema, which also apply to more sophisticated dualities. The richness of the example consists, mainly, in its concern with two non-trivial quantum field theories: including massive Thirring-sine-Gordon duality, and non-abelian bosonization. This prompts two comparisons with the recent literature on dualities:--- (a) Unlike the standard cases of duality in quantum field theory and string theory, where only specific simplifying limits of the theories are explicitly known, the boson-fermion duality is known to hold exactly. This exactness can be exhibited explicitly. (b) The bosonization example illustrates both the cases of isomorphic and non-isomorphic models: which we believe the literature on dualities has not so far discussed., Comment: 72 pages, 13 figures. To appear in a volume dedicated to the centenary of Hilbert's work on the foundations of mathematics and physics: "Foundations of Mathematics and Physics one century after Hilbert". Editor: Joseph Kouneiher. Collection Mathematical Physics, Springer 2017. v2: minor corrections

Can there be `peaceful coexistence' between quantum theory and special relativity? Thirty years ago, Shimony hoped that isolating the culprit (i.e. the false assumption) in proofs of Bell inequalities as Outcome Independence would secure such peaceful coexistence: or, if not secure it, at least show a way---maybe the best or only way---to secure it. In this paper, I begin by being sceptical of Shimony's approach, urging that we need a relativistic solution to the quantum measurement problem (Section 2). Then I analyse Outcome Independence in Kent's realist one-world Lorentz-invariant interpretation of quantum theory (Sections 3 and 4). Then I consider Shimony's other condition, Parameter Independence, both in Kent's proposal and more generally, in the light of recent remarkable theorems by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater (Section 5). For both Outcome Independence and Parameter Independence, there is a striking analogy with the situation in pilot-wave theory. Finally, I will suggest that these recent theorems make some kind of peaceful coexistence mandatory for someone who, like Shimony, endorses Parameter Independence.

We discuss some aspects of the relation between dualities and gauge symmetries. Both of these ideas are of course multi-faceted, and we confine ourselves to making two points. Both points are about dualities in string theory, and both have the 'flavour' that two dual theories are 'closer in content' than you might think. For both points, we adopt a simple conception of a duality as an 'isomorphism' between theories: more precisely, as appropriate bijections between the two theories' sets of states and sets of quantities. The first point (Section 3) is that this conception of duality meshes with two dual theories being 'gauge related' in the general philosophical sense of being physically equivalent. For a string duality, such as T-duality and gauge/gravity duality, this means taking such features as the radius of a compact dimension, and the dimensionality of spacetime, to be 'gauge'. The second point (Sections 4, 5 and 6) is much more specific. We give a result about gauge/gravity duality that shows its relation to gauge symmetries (in the physical sense of symmetry transformations that are spacetime-dependent) to be subtler than you might expect. For gauge theories, you might expect that the duality bijections relate only gauge-invariant quantities and states, in the sense that gauge symmetries in one theory will be unrelated to any symmetries in the other theory. This may be so in general; and indeed, it is suggested by discussions of Polchinski and Horowitz. But we show that in gauge/gravity duality, each of a certain class of gauge symmetries in the gravity/bulk theory, viz. diffeomorphisms, is related by the duality to a position-dependent symmetry of the gauge/boundary theory., Comment: 33 pages. Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. This is an expanded version of the paper, "On the Relation between Dualities and Gauge Symmetries", which is forthcoming in Philosophy of Science (PSA2014 Proceedings)

We discuss scientific realism from the perspective of modern cosmology, especially primordial cosmology: i.e. the cosmological investigation of the very early universe. We first (Section 2) state our allegiance to scientific realism, and discuss what insights about it cosmology might yield, as against "just" supplying scientific claims that philosophers can then evaluate. In particular, we discuss: the idea of laws of cosmology, and limitations on ascertaining the global structure of spacetime. Then we review some of what is now known about the early universe (Section 3): meaning, roughly, from a thousandth of a second after the Big Bang onwards(!). The rest of the paper takes up two issues about primordial cosmology, i.e. the very early universe, where "very early" means, roughly, much earlier (logarithmically) than one second after the Big Bang: say, less than $10^{-11}$ seconds. Both issues illustrate that familiar philosophical threat to scientific realism, the under-determination of theory by data---on a cosmic scale. The first issue (Section 4) concerns the difficulty of observationally probing the very early universe. More specifically, the difficulty is to ascertain details of the putative inflationary epoch. The second issue (Section 5) concerns difficulties about confirming a cosmological theory that postulates a multiverse, i.e. a set of domains (universes) each of whose inhabitants (if any) cannot directly observe, or otherwise causally interact with, other domains. This again concerns inflation, since many inflationary models postulate a multiverse. For all these issues, it will be clear that much remains unsettled, as regards both physics and philosophy. But we will maintain that these remaining controversies do not threaten scientific realism., Comment: 52 pages. An abridged version will appear in "The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism", ed. Juha Saatsi

We give an introductory review of gauge/gravity duality, and associated ideas of holography, emphasising the conceptual aspects. The opening Sections gather the ingredients, viz. anti-de Sitter spacetime, conformal field theory and string theory, that we need for presenting, in Section 5, the central and original example: Maldacena's AdS/CFT correspondence. Sections 6 and 7 develop the ideas of this example, also in applications to condensed matter systems, QCD, and hydrodynamics. Sections 8 and 9 discuss the possible extensions of holographic ideas to de Sitter spacetime and to black holes. Section 10 discusses the bearing of gauge/gravity duality on two philosophical topics: the equivalence of physical theories, and the idea that spacetime, or some features of it, are emergent.

We give an introductory review of gauge/gravity duality, and associated ideas of holography, emphasising the conceptual aspects. The opening Sections gather the ingredients, viz. anti-de Sitter spacetime, conformal field theory and string theory, that we need for presenting, in Section 5, the central and original example: Maldacena's AdS/CFT correspondence. Sections 6 and 7 develop the ideas of this example, also in applications to condensed matter systems, QCD, and hydrodynamics. Sections 8 and 9 discuss the possible extensions of holographic ideas to de Sitter spacetime and to black holes. Section 10 discusses the bearing of gauge/gravity duality on two philosophical topics: the equivalence of physical theories, and the idea that spacetime, or some features of it, are emergent., Comment: 49 pages, invited review for Foundations of Physics

We have two aims. The main one is to expound the idea of renormalization in quantum field theory, with no technical prerequisites (Sections 2 and 3). Our motivation is that renormalization is undoubtedly one of the great ideas, and great successes, of twentieth-century physics. Also it has strongly influenced in diverse ways, how physicists conceive of physical theories. So it is of considerable philosophical interest. Second, we will briefly relate renormalization to Ernest Nagel's account of inter-theoretic relations, especially reduction (Section 4). One theme will be a contrast between two approaches to renormalization. The old approach, which prevailed from ca. 1945 to 1970, treated renormalizability as a necessary condition for being an acceptable quantum field theory. On this approach, it is a piece of great good fortune that high energy physicists can formulate renormalizable quantum field theories that are so empirically successful. But the new approach to renormalization (from 1970 onwards) explains why the phenomena we see, at the energies we can access in our particle accelerators, are described by a renormalizable quantum field theory. For whatever non-renormalizable interactions may occur at yet higher energies, they are insignificant at accessible energies. Thus the new approach explains why our best fundamental theories have a feature, viz. renormalizability, which the old approach treated as a selection principle for theories. We also maintain that universality, a concept stressed in renormalization theory, is essentially the familiar philosophical idea of multiple realizability; and that it causes no problems for reductions of a Nagelian kind., Comment: 48 pages, 1 figure, Forthcoming in Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics: a volume of Poznan Studies in Philosophy of Science, eds. T. Bigaj and C. Wuethrich; 2015. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1406.4354

This is a discussion of some themes in Max Tegmark’s recent book, Our Mathematical Universe. It was written as a review for Plus Magazine, the online magazine of the UK’s national mathematics education and outreach project, the Mathematics Millennium Project (http://plus.maths.org/content/). Since some of the discussion---about symmetry breaking, and Pythagoreanism in the philosophy of mathematics---went beyond reviewing Tegmark’s book, the material was divided into three online articles. This version combines those three articles, and adds some other material, in particular a brief defence of quidditism about properties. It also adds some references, to other Plus articles as well as academic articles. But it retains the informal style of Plus.

Over the centuries, the doctrine of determinism has been understood, in different ways. In the paper it is discussed how to define "determinism" and how "determinism" bears upon the relation between two different theories.

This paper gives a philosophical assessment of the Montevideo interpretation of quantum theory, advocated by Gambini, Pullin and co-authors. This interpretation has the merit of linking its proposal about how to solve the measurement problem to the search for quantum gravity: namely by suggesting that quantum gravity makes for fundamental limitations on the accuracy of clocks, which imply a type of decoherence that “collapses the wave-packet”. I begin (Section 2) by sketching the topics of decoherence, and quantum clocks, on which the interpretation depends. Then I expound the interpretation, from a philosopher's perspective (Sections 3, 4 and 5). Finally, in Section 6, I argue that the interpretation, at least as developed so far, is best seen as a form of the Everett interpretation: namely with an effective or approximate branching, that is induced by environmental decoherence of the familiar kind, and by the Montevideans’ “temporal decoherence”.

In previous work, I described several examples combining reduction and emergence: where reduction is understood a la Ernest Nagel, and emergence is understood as behaviour or properties that are novel (by some salient standard). Here, my aim is again to reconcile reduction and emergence, for a case which is apparently more problematic than those I treated before: renormalization. Renormalization is a vast subject. So I confine myself to emphasizing how the modern approach to renormalization (initiated by Wilson and others between 1965 and 1975), when applied to quantum field theories, illustrates both Nagelian reduction and emergence. My main point is that the modern understanding of how renormalizability is a generic feature of quantum field theories at accessible energies gives us a conceptually unified family of Nagelian reductions. That is worth saying since philosophers tend to think of scientific explanation as only explaining an individual event, or perhaps a single law, or at most deducing one theory as a special case of another. Here we see a framework in which there is a space of theories endowed with enough structure that it provides a family of reductions.

We have two aims. The main one is to expound the idea of renormalization in quantum field theory, with no technical prerequisites (Sections 2 and 3). Our motivation is that renormalization is undoubtedly one of the great ideas—and great successes--of twentieth-century physics. Also it has strongly influenced in diverse ways, how physicists conceive of physical theories. So it is of considerable philosophical interest. Second, we will briefly relate renormalization to Ernest Nagel's account of inter-theoretic relations, especially reduction (Section 4). One theme will be a contrast between two approaches to renormalization. The old approach, which prevailed from ca. 1945 to 1970, treated renormalizability as a necessary condition for being an acceptable quantum field theory. On this approach, it is a piece of great good fortune that high energy physicists can formulate renormalizable quantum field theories that are so empirically successful. But the new approach to renormalization (from 1970 onwards) explains why the phenomena we see, at the energies we can access in our particle accelerators, are described by a renormalizable quantum field theory. For whatever non-renormalizable interactions may occur at yet higher energies, they are insignificant at accessible energies. Thus the new approach explains why our best fundamental theories have a feature, viz. renormalizability, which the old approach treated as a selection principle for theories. That is worth saying since philosophers tend to think of scientific explanation as only explaining an individual event, or perhaps a single law, or at most deducing one theory as a special case of another. Here we see a framework in which there is a space of theories. And this framework is powerful enough to deduce that what seemed “manna from heaven” (that some renormalizable theories are empirically successful) is to be expected: the good fortune is generic. We also maintain that universality, a concept stressed in renormaliz

I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates under-determination of theoretical hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions. I emphasize cosmology's concern with what data could in principle be collected by a single observer (Section 2); and I give a broadly sceptical discussion of cosmology's appeal to the cosmological principle as a way of breaking the under-determination (Section 3). I confine most of the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the `standard model', as elaborated since then. But in the closing Section 4, I broach some questions about times earlier than one second.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better conceptual understanding of gauge quantum field theories, such as quantum chromodynamics, by discussing a famous physical limit, the 't Hooft limit, in which the theory concerned often simplifies. The idea of the limit is that the number $N$ of colours (or charges) goes to infinity. The simplifications that can happen in this limit, and that we will consider, are: (i) the theory's Feynman diagrams can be drawn on a plane without lines intersecting (called `planarity'); and (ii) the theory, or a sector of it, becomes integrable, and indeed corresponds to a well-studied system, viz. a spin chain. Planarity is important because it shows how a quantum field theory can exhibit extended, in particular string-like, structures; in some cases, this gives a connection with string theory, and thus with gravity. Previous philosophical literature about how one theory (or a sector, or regime, of a theory) might be emergent from, and-or reduced to, another one has tended to emphasize cases, such as occur in statistical mechanics, where the system before the limit has finitely many degrees of freedom. But here, our quantum field theories, including those on the way to the 't Hooft limit, will have infinitely many degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, we will show how a recent schema by Butterfield and taxonomy by Norton apply to the quantum field theories we consider; and we will classify three physical properties of our theories in these terms. These properties are planarity and integrability, as in (i) and (ii) above; and the behaviour of the beta-function reflecting, for example, asymptotic freedom. Our discussion of these properties, especially the beta-function, will also relate to recent philosophical debate about the propriety of assessing quantum field theories, whose rigorous existence is not yet proven., Comment: 44 pp. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1012.3983, arXiv:hep-ph/9802419, arXiv:1012.3997 by other authors

I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates under-determination of theoretical hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions. I confine the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the `standard model', as elaborated since then. Or rather, the discussion is confined to a (very!) few aspects of that history. I emphasise that despite the under-determination, a scientific realist can, and should, endorse this description.

I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates under-determination of theoretical hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions. I emphasize cosmology's concern with what data could in principle be collected by a single observer (Section 2); and I give a broadly sceptical discussion of cosmology’s appeal to the cosmological principle as a way of breaking the under-determination (Section 3). I confine most of the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the ‘standard model’, as elaborated since then. But in the closing Section 4, I broach some questions about times earlier than one second.

First, I briefly review the different conceptions of time held by three rival interpretations of quantum theory: the collapse of the wave-packet, the pilot-wave interpretation, and the Everett interpretation (Section 2). Then I turn to a much less controversial task: to expound the recent understanding of the time-energy uncertainty principle, and indeed of uncertainty principles in general, that has been established by such authors as Busch, Hilgevoord and Uffink. Although this may at first seem a narrow topic, I point out connections to other conceptual topics about time in quantum theory: for example, the question under what circumstances there is a time operator (Section 4.3).

Using the Hilbert-Bernays account as a spring-board, we first define four ways in which two objects can be discerned from one another, using the non-logical vocabulary of the language concerned. (These definitions are based on definitions made by Quine and Saunders.) Because of our use of the Hilbert-Bernays account, these definitions are in terms of the syntax of the language. But we also relate our definitions to the idea of permutations on the domain of quantification, and their being symmetries. These relations turn out to be subtle---some natural conjectures about them are false. We will see in particular that the idea of symmetry meshes with a species of indiscernibility that we will call `absolute indiscernibility'. We then report all the logical implications between our four kinds of discernibility. We use these four kinds as a resource for stating four metaphysical theses about identity. Three of these theses articulate two traditional philosophical themes: viz. the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (which will come in two versions), and haecceitism. The fourth is recent. Its most notable feature is that it makes diversity (i.e. non-identity) weaker than what we will call individuality (being an individual): two objects can be distinct but not individuals. For this reason, it has been advocated both for quantum particles and for spacetime points. Finally, we locate this fourth metaphysical thesis in a broader position, which we call structuralism. We conclude with a discussion of the semantics suitable for a structuralist, with particular reference to physical theories as well as elementary model theory., Comment: 55 pages, 21 figures. Forthcoming, after an Appendectomy, in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

I have two main aims. The first is general, and more philosophical (Section 2). The second is specific, and more closely related to physics (Sections 3 and 4). The first aim is to state my general views about laws and causation at different `levels'. The main task is to understand how the higher levels sustain notions of law and causation that `ride free' of reductions to the lower level or levels. I endeavour to relate my views to those of other symposiasts. The second aim is to give a framework for describing dynamics at different levels, emphasising how the various levels' dynamics can mesh or fail to mesh. This framework is essentially that of elementary dynamical systems theory. The main idea will be, for simplicity, to work with just two levels, dubbed `micro' and `macro' which are related by coarse-graining. I use this framework to describe, in part, the first four of Ellis' five types of top-down causation.

I discuss three connections between Dummett's writings about time and philosophical aspects of physics. The first connection (Section 2) arises from remarks of Dummett's about the different relations of observation to time and to space. The main point is uncontroversial and applies equally to classical and quantum physics. It concerns the fact that perceptual processing is so rapid, compared with the typical time-scale on which macroscopic objects change their observable properties, that it engenders the idea of a `common now', spread across space. The other two connections are specific to quantum theory, as interpreted along the lines of Everett. So for these two connections, the physics side is controversial, just as the philosophical side is. In Section 3, I connect the subjective uncertainty before an Everettian `splitting' of the multiverse to Dummett's suggestion, inspired by McTaggart, that a complete, i.e. indexical-free description of a temporal reality is impossible. And in Section 4, I connect Barbour's denial that time is real---a denial along the lines of Everett, rather than McTaggart---to Dummett's suggestion that statements about the past are not determinately true or false, because they are not effectively decidable.

In another paper (Butterfield 2011), one of us argued that emergence and reduction are compatible, and presented four examples illustrating both. The main purpose of this paper is to develop this position for the example of phase transitions. We take it that emergence involves behaviour that is novel compared with what is expected: often, what is expected from a theory of the system's microscopic constituents. We take reduction as deduction, aided by appropriate definitions. Then the main idea of our reconciliation of emergence and reduction is that one makes the deduction after taking a limit of an appropriate parameter $N$. Thus our first main claim will be that in some situations, one can deduce a novel behaviour, by taking a limit $N\to\infty$. Our main illustration of this will be Lee-Yang theory. But on the other hand, this does not show that the $N=\infty$ limit is physically real. For our second main claim will be that in such situations, there is a logically weaker, yet still vivid, novel behaviour that occurs before the limit, i.e. for finite $N$. And it is this weaker behaviour which is physically real. Our main illustration of this will be the renormalization group description of cross-over phenomena.

This paper forms part of a wider campaign: to deny pointillisme. That is the doctrine that a physical theory's fundamental quantities are defined at points of space or of spacetime, and represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-sized objects located there; so that properties of spatial or spatiotemporal regions and their material contents are determined by the point-by-point facts. Elsewhere, I argued against pointillisme about chrono-geometry, and about velocity in classical mechanics. In both cases, attention focussed on temporal extrinsicality: i.e. on what an ascription of a property implies about other times. Therefore, I also discussed the metaphysical debate whether persistence should be understood as endurance or perdurance. In this paper, I focus instead on spatial extrinsicality: i.e. on what an ascription of a property implies about other places. The main idea will be that the classical mechanics of continuous media (solids or fluids) involves a good deal of spatial extrinsicality---which seems not to have been noticed by philosophers, even those who have no inclination to pointillisme. I begin by describing my wider campaign. Then I present some elementary aspects of stress, strain and elasticity---emphasising the kinds of spatial extrinsicality they each involve. I conduct the discussion entirely in the context of `Newtonian' ideas about space and time. But my arguments carry over to relativistic physics.

This is one of two papers about emergence, reduction and supervenience. It expounds these notions and analyses the general relations between them. The companion paper analyses the situation in physics, especially limiting relations between physical theories. I shall take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. I shall take reduction as deduction using appropriate auxiliary definitions. And I shall take supervenience as a weakening of reduction, viz. to allow infinitely long definitions. The overall claim of this paper will be that emergence is logically independent both of reduction and of supervenience. In particular, one can have emergence with reduction, as well as without it; and emergence without supervenience, as well as with it. Of the subsidiary claims, the four main ones (each shared with some other authors) are: (i): I defend the traditional Nagelian conception of reduction (Section 3}); (ii): I deny that the multiple realizability argument causes trouble for reductions, or ``reductionism'' (Section 4); (iii): I stress the collapse of supervenience into deduction via Beth's theorem (Section 5.1); (iv): I adapt some examples already in the literature to show supervenience without emergence and vice versa (Section 5.2).

This is a companion to another paper. Together they rebut two widespread philosophical doctrines about emergence. The first, and main, doctrine is that emergence is incompatible with reduction. The second is that emergence is supervenience; or more exactly, supervenience without reduction. In the other paper, I develop these rebuttals in general terms, emphasising the second rebuttal. Here I discuss the situation in physics, emphasising the first rebuttal. I focus on limiting relations between theories and illustrate my claims with four examples, each of them a model or a framework for modelling, from well-established mathematics or physics. I take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. I take reduction as, essentially, deduction. The main idea of my first rebuttal will be to perform the deduction after taking a limit of some parameter. Thus my first main claim will be that in my four examples (and many others), we can deduce a novel and robust behaviour, by taking the limit, N goes to infinity, of a parameter N. But on the other hand, this does not show that that the infinite limit is ``physically real'', as some authors have alleged. For my second main claim is that in these same examples, there is a weaker, yet still vivid, novel and robust behaviour that occurs before we get to the limit, i.e. for finite N. And it is this weaker behaviour which is physically real. My examples are: the method of arbitrary functions (in probability theory); fractals (in geometry); superselection for infinite systems (in quantum theory); and phase transitions for infinite systems (in statistical mechanics).