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The central question of the present article focuses on the extent and scope of the transformation of Heideggerian methodics, insofar as the question of being must open up to the possibility of the political in the 1930s. This reworking of certain practical aspects of his thought happens for Heidegger largely through a specific mode of treatment of the concept of spirit that begins to take shape in his famous rectorate speech, where the geistig appears as a fundamental structure of the project that begins to be set in motion, and which is consolidated, precisely, in the seminar Hegel, On the State that gives rise to this analysis. It will be argued, throughout this article, that the spirit, categorically rejected in Being and Time in view of its temporal status, is transformed in the development of Heideggerian metapolitics into the essential nexus between Dasein and people., La pregunta central del presente artículo se centra en el grado y alcance de la transformación de la metódica heideggeriana en la medida en que la cuestión del ser debe abrirse a la posibilidad de lo político en la década de los 30. Esta reelaboración de ciertos aspectos prácticos de su pensamiento sucede para Heidegger en gran parte a través de un modo específico de tratamiento del concepto de espíritu que comienza a tomar forma en su famoso discurso del rectorado donde lo geistig aparece como una estructura fundamental del proyecto que se empieza a poner en marcha y que se consolida, precisamente, en el seminario Hegel, Sobre el Estado que da pie a este análisis. Se planteará a lo largo de este artículo que el espíritu, tajantemente rechazado en Ser y tiempo en vistas a su status temporal, se transforma en el desarrollo de la metapolítica heideggeriana en el nexo esencial entre Dasein y pueblo.

This article explores one of the issues that, although discreetly, engenders and motivates many aspects of the reading proposed by Heidegger in Being and Time regarding the human phenomenon taken from everyday life, that is, Dasein. Although it is not intended to be a completely authorial reading of the theme, there is a certain originality in the exploration carried out. In short, we try to read the issue of silence in its different modulations, that is, in the different accents through which the German philosopher wanted to touch it in his most representative work of the first phase. For this, the approach is concentrated around the two main paragraphs from which the discussion on silence emerges, as follows: § 34, which thematizes language as a way of being of the human being, and § 60, which gives visibility to the problem of conscience as a way of restoring an authentic life. In the end, it is possible to perceive some relationship between the two moments, constituting, perhaps, precisely what is presented as the central objective of the article: to provide for the catalyzing and articulating character of the problem of silence for the understanding of the ways of being of the human condition according to Heidegger. Principled as an interpretation of Heideggerian thought, the text gains moments of greater intuitive freedom and, perhaps, a contribution to the present moment of thought and philosophical reflection., Este artigo explora uma das questões que, embora de maneira discreta, engendra e motiva muitos aspectos da leitura proposta por Heidegger em Ser e Tempo a respeito do fenômeno humano tomado da vida cotidiana, isto é, o Dasein. Embora não se pretenda uma leitura completamente autoral do tema, há na exploração praticada certo ineditismo. Em suma, procura-se ler a questão do silêncio em suas diferentes modulações, isto é, nos diferentes acentos por meio dos quais o filósofo alemão quis tocá-la em sua obra de maior representatividade da primeira fase. Para isso, a abordagem concentra-se ao redor dos dois principais parágrafos a partir dos quais eclode a discussão sobre o silêncio, como segue: o § 34, que tematiza a linguagem como modo de ser do ser humano, e o § 60, que dá visibilidade ao problema da consciência como forma de restauração a uma vida autêntica. No fim das contas é possível perceber alguma relação entre os dois momentos, constituindo, talvez, justamente o que se apresenta como objetivo central do artigo: dispor sobre o caráter catalizador e articulador do problema do silêncio para a compreensão dos modos de ser da condição humana segundo Heidegger. Principiado como interpretação do pensamento heideggeriano, o texto ganha momentos de maior liberdade intuitiva e, quiçá, contribuição ao momento presente do pensamento e da reflexão filosófica.

In this research we will try to make explicit to what extent Being and Time is a kind of attempt to take up again, in a correct way, the original philosophical project that Kant unfolded in his Critique of Pure Reason. In order to justify our conjecture, we will focus especially on Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). In this text we will find a controversial interpretation that the Meßkirch thinker developed of Immanuel Kant’s opus magnum. This interpretation could suggest that his Being and Time would not only be twinned with the Critique of Pure Reason, but that it would be a correct continuation of the path traced there by the philosopher from Königsberg., En esta investigación intentaremos explicitar hasta qué punto Ser y Tiempo es una suerte de tentativa por retomar, en forma correcta, el originario proyecto filosófico que Kant desplegó en su Crítica de la razón pura. Para lograr justificar nuestra conjetura nos centraremos especialmente en la obra de Heidegger Kant y el problema de la Metafísica (1929). En dicho texto nos encontraremos con una controvertida interpretación que el pensador de Meßkirch elaboró del opus magnum de Immanuel Kant. Interpretación que, justamente, podría sugerirnos que su Ser y Tiempo, no sólo estaría hermanado con la Crítica de la razón pura, sino que vendría a ser una correcta continuación del camino allí trazado por el filósofo de Königsberg.

The objective of this article is to clarify the Heideggerian rejection of the idea of ​​reflection as the method of philosophy. The need for such explanation lies on the counterintuitive nature of this philosophical thesis and on the interpretive problems that this criticism presents in Being and Time. In order to solve them, a brief historical-conceptual examination of the reflection is realized, leading to two different meanings of the concept, a psychological and a transcendental one. Thanks to this distinction, it is possible to expose systematically the double criticism presented in Being and time and, therefore, clarify the ultimate reasons underling the Heideggerian rejection of the very idea of ​​reflection., El objetivo del siguiente artículo consiste en aclarar el rechazo heideggeriano de la idea de reflexión como método del filosofar. La necesidad de tal elucidación radica en lo contraintuitivo de esta tesis y en los problemas interpretativos que esta crítica presenta en Ser y tiempo. Para resolverlos el artículo realiza un breve examen histórico-conceptual de la reflexión mediante el cual se diferencian dos sentidos del concepto: el sentido psicológico y trascendental. Gracias a esta distinción se confía exponer sistemáticamente la doble crítica de Ser y tiempo a este concepto, aclarando así los motivos que articulan el rechazo heideggeriano de la misma idea de reflexión.

В статье раскрывается сущность нравственно-этического проекта с позиции экзистенциальной аналитики присутствия. Отмечается открытость, временность и диалогичность данного проекта. Учитываются феноменологические и герменевтические аспекты самопознания личности., The article reveals the essence of the ethical project from the perspective of existential analytics of presence. In article are noted openness, temporality and dialogism of this project and also phenomenological and hermeneutic aspects of selfknowledge of the personality.

A través de la analítica existenciaria de Sein und Zeit, se busca establecer, mediante el análisis de la Befindlichkeit en tanto que modo esencial de apertura del Dasein, la cooriginariedad entre Verstehen y Befindlichkeit, así como prestar una especial atención a la angustia (Angst), y la posibilidad de pensar una experiencia afectiva -como apertura directa y preteórica- de la Zeitlichkeit, el sentido temporal del ser del Dasein. Para ello, será necesario analizar tanto la dimensión temporal de la Befindlichkeit, como el papel fundamental de la angustia en su hacer patente la muerte, el cuidado y, con ello, la resolución precursora del Dasein. Así, alcanzaremos a ver cómo la Zeitlichkeit sólo es abierta, en el proyecto propio de Sein und Zeit, bajo la forma de una experiencia fundamental de carácter afectivo, esto es, mediante la Grundbefindlichkeit de la angustia., Through Sein und Zeit existential analytic, we will try to establish, by the analysis of Befindlichkeit as an essential disclosedness way of Dasein, the equi-primordiality between Verstehen and Befindlichkeit, and a special attention to anxiety (Angst), the possibility of thinking an affective experience -as a direct and pre-theoretical disclosedness- about Zeitlichkeit. For that purpose, it will be necessary to analyze both the Befindlichkeittemporary dimension and the fundamental role of anxiety disclosing death, care and, with all that, resoluteness. Thus, we will get to see how Zeitlichkeit is only disclosed, on the project of Sein und Zeit, by the way of a fundamental and affective experience, rather, by the Grundbefindlichkeit of anxiety.

Den här magisteruppsatsen förenar de tre områdena Svenska kyrkans ekonomiska historia, svensk lönebildningshistoria och Martin Heidegger. Jag hävdar inledningsvis att prästerskapets löner är den bästa utgångspunkten för en ekonomisk-historiker som vill ta sig an Svenska kyrkan, och konstaterar mot bakgrund av tidigare forskning om lönebildning på den svenska arbetsmarknaden att lönebegreppet i bristande utsträckning har bearbetats på den mikrohistoriska nivå jag väljer att kalla ”den mänskliga tillvarons nivå”. För att angripa denna nivå definierar jag lönebegreppet utifrån Martin Heideggers teori om människan och hennes möjligheter i den vardagliga världen. Med grund i Heideggers Vara och tid analyserar jag löneutbetalningarna i kontanter till kyrkoherden i Björklinge församling 1910-1932, samt prästgården som var knuten till tjänsten. Resultaten visar att Heideggers ontologi kan vara fruktbar att använda, men att tillämpbarheten vid empiriska studier ännu är begränsad, och att fortsatt teoretiskt arbete är nödvändigt., This Master's thesis combines three fields of study, namely the economic history of the Church of Sweden, the Swedish history of wage development, and Martin Heidegger. Initially, I suggest that the wages of the clergy is the best starting point for an economic historian wishing to approach the study of the Church of Sweden. I conclude with regards to previous research on the subject of wage development on the Swedish labor market, that the term ”wage” has been dealt with to an unsatisfying degree on the microhistorical level I have opted to call ”the level of the human condition”. To approach this level I define the term ”wage” based on Martin Heidegger's theory about the human being and her possibilities in the everyday world. Starting out with Heidegger's Being and Time, I analyze the payment of cash wages to the vicar of Björklinge parish 1910-1932, as well as the parsonage tied to that position. The results show that the use of Heidegger's ontology can prove fruitful, though its applicability in matters of empirical studies is yet limited, and that continued theoretical work is needed.

Chinua Achebe (1930-2013) published his major novel, Things Fall Apart (1958), in postcolonial Nigeria. In it he presents a colonial narrative using English as its primary mode of communication. However, his use of native Igbo words and the world they invoke problematizes a eurocentric assumption of the totality and universality of a given language, in this case, English. He employs acts of translation and introduces hybrid languages in order to engender dialogue that subverts the dominance of any one language and the world that it creates for its speakers. In a parallel fashion, this thesis uses two different theoretical approaches that have not typically been placed in dialogue with each other — postcolonial theory and hermeneutics — to view and interpret the nuances present in Achebe’s text that neither could illuminate on its own. This dialogical approach reveals insufficiencies in the independent theories and allows them to mutually supplement each other. Together these theories show how the novel subverts the presumed authority of the English language and universalizing discourses in order to identify the confrontation of lived linguistic worlds and horizons in the postcolonial context. The novel reorients those structures of understanding and interpretation around a subject that has historically been denied a voice.

Este trabajo, presentado como material de investigación de mi tesis doctoral sobre la fenomenología de Husserl, su recepción en la filosofía contemporánea y sus derivas actuales, ofrece algunas reflexiones críticas en torno a estas cuestiones, a propósito de una publicación actual: Ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger. Un comentario fenomenológico, estudio coordinado por Ramón Rodríguez. Tras exponer las ideas fundamentales de los tres primeros capítulos -al hilo de la relación entre Husserl, Heidegger y la fenomenología-, realizo un comentario crítico de los mismos., The present paper, which comprises part of the research for my Ph.D. about Husserlian phenomenology, its reception in contemporary philosophy and current drifts, offers some critical remarks on aforementioned issues. The occasion to explore their complexity is a recent publication: Ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger. Un comentario fenomenológico, collective study coordinated by Ramón Rodríguez. After explaining the main ideas of the three first chapters: namely, the relationship among Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenology, I shall expose some critical remarks about them.

When an agent “loses herself” in a project, or becomes completely absorbed in an activity, she has what Heidegger calls “reflected self-understanding”. This kind of reflected understanding allows the agent to find herself out in the world, “in things”, without ever holding any reflexive attitudes about herself. In my dissertation, I develop and defend Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding, which constitutes – for Heidegger – the most basic grip an agent has on who she is. I suggest that Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding is not only a significant contribution to the history of philosophy, but also the central kernel that structures Heidegger’s thought on the topics of understanding, interpretation, truth, and authenticity in Being and Time.

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.

This paper tries to revise J. M. Coetzee´s autobiographical work Provincial LifeScenes from the theories of autobiography and Martin Heidegger´s existentialanalysis, in order to establish the existing relations between both regarding thebeing and time. In the textual analysis there are some theoretical aspects such as:the being, the world and death as elements that can be traced in “childhood”,“youth” and “adulthood”, these titles are developed in Provincial Life Scenes and Heidegger´s concepts of Being and time., Este artículo tiene la intención de revisar la obra autobiográfica Escenas de una vida de provincias, escrita por J. M. Coetzee, a la luz de la teoría de la autobiografía y de la analítica existencial propuesta por Martin Heidegger, con el fin de determinar las relaciones existentes entre ambas en Ser y tiempo. El análisis del texto considerará aspectos teóricos: el ser, el mundo y la muerte, como elementos rastreables en “Infancia”, “Juventud” y “Verano”, títulos que componen la publicación Escenas de una vida de provincias; y los conceptos heideggerianos en Ser y tiempo.

El presente trabajo tiene por tema el análisis de la noción de disposición afectiva (Befindlichkeit) empleada por Martin Heidegger en Ser y Tiempo (1927) y, en particular, en la indagación de la propuesta acerca de una posible lectura realista que se establecería a partir del rol que en este espacio juega el mencionado fenómeno, en tanto reúne en sí uno de los rasgos existenciales (Existenzial) que con mayor claridad denota el hecho de que el mundo «nos afecta» de determinado modo. Es nuestra intención, mostrar la inviabilidad de tal lectura al considerarla en el contexto de la propuesta del autor., This paper studies the notion of ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) employed in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927). More specifically, it centers in the realistic interpretation of Heidegger, sustained by the view that the moods shows with major clarity the fact that the world affects us in a determinate way. The intention of this task is argues against this possible lecture in the whole context of Being and Time.

This thesis argues that Heidegger’s accounts of practice and temporality in Being and Time are inseparable, and demonstrates the importance of temporality for contemporary dialogues between Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science. It proposes that enactive and action-oriented models of cognition are best suited to engaging with a Heideggerian view of the temporality of practice, and will benefit from the latter’s capacity to explain the purposive self-concern, possibility-directedness, and varying complexity of cognition in richly temporal terms. I begin by showing that Heidegger’s account places temporality and practice in a complex reciprocity in which each fundamentally shapes and permeates the other. The Heidegger of Being and Time conceptualises practice as fundamentally temporal and temporality as intrinsically purposive, meaning that we cannot adequately understand or utilise his analysis of either structure without acknowledging the role of the other. In outlining and defending this reading, I draw out two characteristics of Heidegger’s model of temporality; these features, which affect and are affected by the interconnection of temporality and purposiveness, are an inherent connection to the self-concern of the entity and an emphasis upon a radically indeterminate futurity. I then consider which contemporary approaches in cognitive science represent the most promising interlocutors for this temporality-oriented Heideggerian perspective. After rejecting selected in principle objections to the pursuit of a collaborative, rather than primarily critical, dialogue between Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science, I put forward two candidates for participation in a ‘temporality-oriented Heideggerian cognitive science’: the enactivist tradition and Michael Wheeler’s model of cognition. I set out each approach’s connections to Heideggerian thought (which involves arguing for as-yet unexplored links as well as defending existing ones) before showing

In this paper, we show how the «metaphysical turn» that Heidegger’s path took shortly after the publication of Being and Time (1927) can be explained starting from the erroneous interpretation of that work as a contribution to philosophical anthropology. Presenting the first reviews and critiques, we approach the texts written at the end of the 1920s in which Heidegger reinterprets his fundamental ontology in terms of a non-anthropological «metaphysics of Dasein». We end this article by underlining the role that Max Scheler certainly played in this transitory «conversion» to metaphysics., En este artículo se muestra cómo el «giro metafísico» que tomó el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger después de la publicación de Ser y tiempo (1927) puede explicarse a partir de la interpretación errónea que se hizo de esa obra como contribución a la antropología filosófica. Retratando las primeras reseñas y críticas, nos acercamos a los textos del final de los años 1920 en los que Heidegger reinterpreta su ontología fundamental en términos de una «metafísica del Dasein» que pretende alejarse del planteamiento filosófico-antropológico. Terminaremos haciendo hincapié en el papel que desempeñó Max Scheler en dicha «conversión» transitoria a la metafísica.

The main aim of this essay is to reflect on the meaning of the concepts of propriety and impropriety (Eigentlichkeit-Uneigentlichkeit) in Martin Heidegger’s Being and time. By means of an expositionof some of the key moments of the existential analytic, we will try to show how in this work two diverse hermeneutic possibilities of the opposition «propriety-impropriety» coexist in permanent tension. Each possibility implies a decidedly different understanding of being-there (Dasein). While it is possibleto derive, either directly or indirectly, a moral evaluation from this dichotomy, the present investigationattempts to make evident those aspects of the text that seem to make such a derivation unfeasible and suggest instead an interpretation beyond an ethical perspective. Finally, we will take up the underlying problematic which could account for the ambivalence within Heidegger’s thinking during this time in relationto the polarity in question., Este trabajo tiene por objetivo fundamental la reflexión acerca del sentido de los conceptos de propiedad e impropiedad (Eigentlichkeit-Uneigentlichkeit) en Ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger.A través de un recorrido por algunos de los elementos clave de la analítica existenciaria, trataremos demostrar cómo en esta obra coexisten, en permanente tensión, dos posibilidades hermenéuticas divergentes de la oposición propiedad-impropiedad de consecuencias muy dispares para la comprensióndel ser-ahí (Dasein): frente a la posibilidad de la que directa o indirectamente se deriva una valoración moral de tal dicotomía, la presente investigación aspira a poner de manifiesto aquellos aspectos deltexto que parecen tornarla inviable y sugieren otra interpretación ajena a la perspectiva ética. Finalmente,se apuntará a la problemática de fondo que podría explicar la ambivalencia del pensamientoheideggeriano de esta etapa con respecto a la polaridad en cuestión.

In recent times, there has been a lot of translation of Heidegger's texts. The complexity of his philosophical expressions and the diversity of translation solutions offered so far need to be unified. In order to open a dialogue among translators we would like to expose briefly some examples that illustrate the problem of translation. On the one hand, we show that the task of translating Sein und Zeit is not yet finished, despite the translations of Gaos and Rivera. We take under consideration some quotes from Gaos's and Rivera's versions, offering in each case our own translation suggestion. On the other hand, we bring up for discussion different Heideggerian terms whose translations are still problematic., Últimamente se ha producido una copiosa traducción de textos de Heidegger. Ante la complejidad de sus expresiones, es necesario un trabajo de revisión y unificación de los términos castellanos. Con el ánimo de abrir un proceso de diálogo entre los traductores, expondremos brevemente algunos puntos en los que se ejemplifica el problema. Por un lado, se trata de mostrar las tareas de traducción todavía pendientes de Ser y tiempo, a pesar de las dos traducciones existentes. A tal efecto se realizan una serie de calas de pasajes, tanto de la versión de Gaos como de la de Rivera, ofreciendo en cada caso las propias sugerencias de traducción. Y, por otro lado, se expone a discusión un elenco de términos que todavía están pendientes de una traducción definitiva.

Tato práce vznikla na základě Heideggerova spisu Bytí a čas a knih, které se věnují Heideggerově filosofii. Ústředním zájmem je koncepce hermeneutické fenomenologie se zaměřením na bytostné struktury pobytu. Vzhledem k velkému rozsahu tématu se v práci klade důraz na strukturu rozumění, která je porovnána s tradicí hermeneutické filosofie., This work was created on the basis of Heidegger´s Being and Time and books that follow Heidegger´s philosophy. Central interest is a conception of hermeneutic fenomenology focusing on the essential structures of Dasein. Regarding to large extensity of this subject I have focused on the structure of understanding (Verstehen) which is compared with the tradition of hermeneutic philosophy., Katedra filosofie, Dokončená práce s úspěšnou obhajobou

This essay aims to discuss the figures with the conscience that appears in the analysis of Heidegger in Being and Time, especially in the paragraphs cited in the title. The goal was to depart from the phenomenological problem of the intentionality of awareness -which no doubt is an unavoidable subject in Heidegger- and building on that diversión, again wonder about the possibilities for thinking about ethical and existential conscience. In that sense, these paragraphs are particularly illuminating, since it helps clear the relations is to be that "in each case are each of us" and his particular situation in the quotidian., En el presente ensayo se pretende hacer dialogar las figuras con las que aparece la conciencia en el análisis de Heidegger en Ser y Tiempo, particularmente en los parágrafos citados en el título del artículo. El objetivo es tratar de apartarse del problema fenomenológico de la intencionalidad de la conciencia -el cual sin duda es un tema ineludible en Heidegger- y aprovechando tal desvío volver a preguntarse sobre las posibilidades de pensar una conciencia ético-existencial. En tal sentido, estos parágrafos resultan particularmente iluminadores, toda vez que ayudan a despejar las relaciones de ese ser que “en cada caso somos cada uno de nosotros” y su particular situación ante la cotidianeidad.

The articulation of the Discourse (Rede) is taken in Being and Timeas a conforming moment of the openness of the world. In this paper we put into question whether we can legitimately assume that an antecedent meaningful articulation is inherent to the world, or whether that introduces an a priori schema lacking concrete phenomenal reality., La articulación del Habla (Rede) se presenta en Ser y Tiempo como un momento conformador de la aperturidad del mundo. Setrata aquí de cuestionar si puede asumirse que el mundo se mueve antecedentemente en una cierta articulación significativa previa o si, más bien, con esa supuesta articulación no se introducirá un esquema carente en el fondo de realidad concreta.

This paper analyses the meaning of the concept of facticity in the lessons given by Heidegger between 1921 and 1923. Facticity will be understood there as a certain dynamism but it will also be hesitatingly assimilated to the “sense of being” of the being we are. Given this, I aim at showing that it is already possible to identify, in the problem posed by this notion, the question about the sense of being in general proposed in Being and time., Este artículo se centra en la interpretación del concepto de facticidad en los cursos impartidos por Heidegger entre 1921 y 1923. La facticidad será allí entendida en términos de cierto dinamismo, al tiempo que vacilantemente asimilada al “sentido del ser” del ente que somos. En relación a ello, trataremos de mostrar cómo en el problema al que esta noción apunta cabe ya reconocer la cuestión por el sentido del ser en general planteada en Ser y tiempo.

El parágrafo 33 de Ser y tiempo conduce a la disolución de la concepción tradicional del juicio como núcleo fundamental de la lógica, mostrando como el juicio -en cuanto juicio apofántico- se asienta en una condición antepredicativa preliminar de tipo hermenéutico y pragmático. Sin embargo, en Ser y tiempo sigue sin resolverse el problema de un análisis específico sobre la naturaleza de las proposiciones acerca del ser del Dasein, proposiciones que son completamente distintas de las que se realizan en torno a los entes a la vista considerados en el mencionado parágrafo 33., Observations on the problem of proposition in Being and Time In the § 33 paragraph of Being and Time Heidegger leads to a dissolution of the traditional view of the judgement as the basic core of the logic, and points out that it, as apophantic proposition, results from a preliminary antepredicative -that is, hermeneutical and pragmatic- condition. Neverthless in Being and Time Heidegger leaves unsolved the problem of a specific inquiry upon the nature of propositions about the Being of Being-there, propositions that are quite distinct from the ones about the present-at-hand beings, considered in the § 33.

This thesis attempts to render a comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's concept of nothingness as it is argued for in Being and Time. This thesis has two main objectives: 1) to reinterpret Heidegger's concept of the anxiety in which Dasein experiences nothingness and to argue against the standard interpretation which states that Dasein experiences anxiety or nothingness when it acknowledges its mortality, and 2) to show that section 40 of Being and Time should be interpreted independently from later sections. The main emphasis of this thesis is to clarify what Heidegger means by nothingness and to criticize those who misinterpret Heidegger. I attempt to provide a more satisfactory account of nothingness and its relation to anxiety and death. In chapter I, merely give an account of Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity, which includes the following concepts: The "they", averageness, distantiality, levelling down, publicness, idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, and falling and throwness. In chapter II, I discuss anxiety and nothingness. refer to Heidegger's essay entitled "What is Metaphysics?" in order to get a deeper understanding of Heidegger's concept of nothingness. I argue against the standard interpretation and show that nothingness can be experienced without the acknowledgement of one's mortality. In chapter III, I attempt to answer the following question: What does Heidegger mean by death? I outline the arguments of various interpreters of Heidegger's concept of death. They equate nothingness with one's acknowledgement of mortality, i.e., the possibility of one's own death. Those who argue for this position do not understand what Heidegger means by nothingness and its significance to death. I criticize these interpreters and reveal their oversights and misinterpretations, and then put forth my own interpretation of what Heidegger means by death., Master of Arts (MA)