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Florida’s approach to urban and regional development focusing on innovation and the creative class spurred an awareness of how space and particularly soft locational characteristics are related to economic performance. In the light of two decades of theoretical discussions and empirical findings, this chapter reflects on three aspects of Florida’s creative class approach. First, the definition and measurement of the creative class, second, the role of contextual differences for the outcome of the relations that are argued in the approach, and third, a discussion of what has changed in the last 20 years since Florida launched his book and to what extent the arguments are valid today with a specific reference to Europe.

We use a theoretical political-economy model with three cities and analyze three questions. First, should police in these cities have access to contentious crime fighting technologies such as facial recognition software? We describe a condition involving benefit, cost, and spatial spillover terms which tells us when the police ought to be provided with this technology. Second, if police are to be offered this technology then what are the properties of a policy regime that provides this technology in a decentralized way? We identify a condition that depends only on benefit and cost terms which tells us when this technology is to be made available in the cities in a decentralized way. Finally, what are the properties of a policy regime that provides the technology in a centralized way with equal cost sharing by the cities? We obtain two conditions involving benefit and spatial spillover terms that describe scenarios in which (i) the technology is provided with majority voting in a city even though it is inefficient to do so and (ii) it is efficient to provide the technology in a city but majority voting will lead to this technology not being provided.

We use a theoretical political-economy model with three cities and analyze three questions. First, should police in these cities have access to contentious crime fighting technologies such as facial recognition software? We describe a condition involving benefit, cost, and spatial spillover terms which tells us when the police ought to be provided with this technology. Second, if police are to be offered this technology then what are the properties of a policy regime that provides this technology in a decentralized way? We identify a condition that depends only on benefit and cost terms which tells us when this technology is to be made available in the cities in a decentralized way. Finally, what are the properties of a policy regime that provides the technology in a centralized way with equal cost sharing by the cities? We obtain two conditions involving benefit and spatial spillover terms that describe scenarios in which (i) the technology is provided with majority voting in a city even though it is inefficient to do so and (ii) it is efficient to provide the technology in a city but majority voting will lead to this technology not being provided., QC 20201110

We study aspects of economic growth in a stylized smart city with two distinct features. First, the modeled inhabitants of this city are smart because they possess skills. Using the language of Richard Florida, these inhabitants comprise the city's creative class and hence they possess creative capital. Second, the city is smart because it uses information and communication technologies (ICTs) and we model one specific kind of ICT use. In this setting, we first derive expressions for three growth related metrics. Second, we use these metrics to show that the economy of smart city A converges to a balanced growth path (BGP). Third, we compute the growth rate of output per effective creative capital unit on this BGP. Fourth, we study how heterogeneity in initial conditions affects outcomes on the BGP by introducing a second smart city B into the analysis. At time t = 0 two key savings rates in city A are twice as large as in city B. We compute the ratio of the BGP value of income per effective creative capital unit in city A to its value in city B. Finally, we compute the ratio of the BGP value of skills per effective creative capital unit in city A to its value in city B., QC 20190412

We study aspects of economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. We model creativity by supposing that the region under study has two sectors. The first sector uses physical capital {K(t) } and trained workers {A(t) W(t) } to produce creative capital {R(t) }. The second sector uses physical and creative capital to produce a final consumption good {Q(t) }. In this setting, we accomplish four tasks. First, we derive the equations of motion for physical capital per trained worker (k) and creative capital per trained worker (r). Second, we find combinations of k and r for which k˙ = r˙ = 0. Third, we investigate whether the economy of our creative region has a balanced growth path (BGP). Finally, assuming that our region is initially on a BGP, we study the impact of a permanent increase in the savings rate (s) on the trajectory of output per worker., QC 20210928

type:text, We exploit the known links between natural habitats and biodiversity to pose and study the biodiversity conservation question as an optimal stopping problem. We extend the extant literature on this question by studying the role that autonomous and nonautonomous policies play in the decision to conserve biodiversity over time and under uncertainty. We first construct a dynamic and stochastic model of decision making in the context of biodiversity conservation. Next, we use this model to analyze the expected utility of a social planner when this planner uses, respectively, autonomous and nonautonomous policies. Finally, we compare and contrast the properties of autonomous and nonautonomous conservation policies and we discuss the magnitude of the flexibility premium stemming from the maintenance of temporal flexibility in decision making.

Tokyo, We exploit the known links between natural habitats and biodiversity to pose and study the biodiversity conservation question as an optimal stopping problem. We extend the extant literature on this question by studying the role that autonomous and nonautonomous policies play in the decision to conserve biodiversity over time and under uncertainty. We first construct a dynamic and stochastic model of decision making in the context of biodiversity conservation. Next, we use this model to analyze the expected utility of a social planner when this planner uses, respectively, autonomous and nonautonomous policies. Finally, we compare and contrast the properties of autonomous and nonautonomous conservation policies and we discuss the magnitude of the flexibility premium stemming from the maintenance of temporal flexibility in decision making.

type:text, We analyze environmental policy in a two country world in which national governments and polluting firms behave strategically. Two general issues are examined. First, we specify the conditions under which the pursuit of one-sided environmental policy by a country in a Bertrand game, will immiserize that country. Second, we examine the effects of pollution control by means of alternate price control instruments in a Bertrand game in which national governments care about global pollution but polluting firms do not. We find that there are reasonable circumstances in which the conduct of one-sided environmental policy is immiserizing. Next, we show that when the two countries are similar, the joint policy instrument is the most desirable pollution control instrument. However, when the two countries are dissimilar, there is no clear answer as to which control instrument is the most desirable.

Tokyo, We analyze environmental policy in a two country world in which national governments and polluting firms behave strategically. Two general issues are examined. First, we specify the conditions under which the pursuit of one-sided environmental policy by a country in a Bertrand game, will immiserize that country. Second, we examine the effects of pollution control by means of alternate price control instruments in a Bertrand game in which national governments care about global pollution but polluting firms do not. We find that there are reasonable circumstances in which the conduct of one-sided environmental policy is immiserizing. Next, we show that when the two countries are similar, the joint policy instrument is the most desirable pollution control instrument. However, when the two countries are dissimilar, there is no clear answer as to which control instrument is the most desirable.