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Australia's new government is committed to delivering the next defence white paper in 2015. The two previous white papers took a predominantly risk-management approach to Southeast Asia, generally ignored the strategic opportunities in the region, treated it as a stand-alone region largely unrelated to developments in East Asia and failed to link Australia's policies in Southeast Asia with the broader goal of helping to ensure greater strategic stability in Asia by putting constraints on Chinese assertiveness and encouraging its peaceful rise. After offering a summary of recent Australian defence thinking on Southeast Asia, this paper outlines why managing China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability in the region. It then examines how China's strategy and behaviour can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia, and offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that relates to Canberra's China-focused objectives and strategic stability in Asia more broadly If that can be achieved in the 2015 defence white paper, Australia - which is often criticized for being preoccupied primarily with managing the relationship with its superpower ally the United States - will demonstrate to itself and Asia that its heavy reliance on the ANZUS treaty is no barrier to strategic creativity in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ebb and flow of coping with Australia’s identity dilemma as a European settler society located on the geographical edge of Asia leads to bouts of agonising, excitement and temporising. This has been given particular cogency with the power shift underway from the trans-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. The 2012 White Paper set 25 national objectives to be met by 2025, with targets ranging from improving trade links and increasing scholarships to teaching priority Asian languages. But in this transactional embrace of Asia that highlights economic and trade links, gaps might open up between ambition and delivery, especially amidst continuing evidence of insensitivity to how Asians forge lasting relationships. Ties with China are dominated by trade but security concerns remain. Relations with India should improve with the removal of the nuclear issue as an irritant and growing trade and tourist numbers. Japan remains an important trade and diplomatic partner. And geography and demography ensure that Indonesia is no less important to Australia than Asia’s big three. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-war period Australian Prime Ministers have played a proactive role in formulating foreign policy towards Japan. This paper explores the role of executive leadership towards Japan and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The Howard period and current Rudd-led initiatives on whaling, nuclear disarmament, climate change and regional architecture are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the Australian intervention in Solomon Islands as evidence of Mark Duffield's claim that the concept of development has been reinterpreted or 'radicalised' in the post-Cold War period. Duffield's contention that development now incorporates more transformative measures to address the concern among Northern states for conflict resolution is presented as a manifestation of the security-development nexus. The following argues that although Duffield's analysis cannot be applied to Solomon Islands without qualification, his claims provide insights into the disjuncture between Australian governmental declarations, policy and policy outcomes in regard to the ongoing Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the changing nature of Australian-American relations in the aftermath of the Iraq imbroglio and China's rise. While many observers see differences in Australian and US approaches toward China as a reflection of different interests, it is the contention of this paper that these different Australian-US perspectives on China are, in fact, premised more on some highly skewed assumptions and fallacious beliefs, misconceptions and myths that have lately come to underlie Australia's China policy than on divergent Australian-US interests. This article looks at the proposition that China's rise has the potential to divide Australia and America but concludes that Beijing is unlikely to succeed in driving a wedge between Washington and Canberra. The shared values and shared strategic interests ensure broad support for the Australia-US alliance in Australia which has now expanded into a global partnership encompassing the transnational security issues as well as the traditional geopolitical issues of managing the rise of new powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains why Australian scholars have taken such an intense interest in regional security in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In so doing, it explores the growing domestic controversy about the Australia-United States alliance that has seen the former adopt an international position increasingly dependent on the latter's foreign and defence policies. As a result, Australia's capacity to play the role of a neutral, middle-ranking power able to make an original contribution both to the alliance and to complex security issues in the Asia-Pacific region has been eroded. The one exception to this is Australian policy towards North Korea. Given the well-documented arms trade between North Korea and Pakistan, this makes Australian policy directly relevant to the security of South Asia. The second part of this introductory paper comments on the other contributions in this collection. By drawing together the research of the six Australian authors in this special themed issue, the guest editors suggest that the most important conclusion emerging from this collection is the fragility of modern Pakistan, both domestically and internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]