Search

This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]