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This thesis has as its focus the reactions of the British Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland to the growth of militant Irish Republicanism and the deteriorating political and social situation in Northern Ireland, during the period 1968-1971. A granular analysis of the various agents of each state allows the complexity of the developing conflict to be shown. What emerges is a picture of strategy and policymaking which emanates from a range of different actors from political, diplomatic, military and civil service spheres. To date, studies of the period have tended to treat the respective states as monolithic; the approach here is to disaggregate, to allow the cross currents ' and purposes of policymaking and strategising, which served the differing agendas of individuals and departments within the states to be fully laid bare. The situation on the ground in Northern Ireland is the backdrop for all state activity, and the analpis offered here of power plays and internal dynamics within the Republican movement itself, shows that movement to be an evolving one during the period, and one which was afforded space to develop and expand by the management of the conflict by the respective states. Northern Ireland, a relative backwater in 1968, was pushed to the top of the political agenda in both Dublin and London, and was on the international stage by 1972. Extensive evidence from primary sources from this crucial period is presented here in an analysis of the activity of the Irish and British States, to gain an understanding of the processes in operation as they reacted to the rapidly-evolving events on the ground.