Search

This dissertation examines the question of whether a politics of the common good remains possible within contemporary democratic societies, characterized by deep pluralism, division, and contention. To engage this question, it draws on the moral and theological framework of the Catholic common good tradition, and employs that framework to identify, analyze, and theorize a real, practical exemplar of common good politics: the democratic tradition of community organizing founded by Saul Alinsky. By placing these two traditions of practice and theory in sustained dialogue for the first time, this study contributes toward a new understanding of each, while developing an original constructive account of the “politics of the common good.” Chapter 1 introduces Catholic common good theory as a framework of ethical analysis and assesses its current state of development. It argues that while contemporary Catholic thinkers have articulated a rich moral vision of the common good, and reconceived it in democratic terms, they have struggled to adequately account for the role of power conflict in political life. Chapter 2 places the Catholic common good tradition in dialogue with the Alinsky tradition. Analyzing the life, work, and methodology of its controversial founder, Saul Alinsky, it traces his deep relationship to the Catholic church and shows how he sought to embody the Catholic tradition’s vision of the common good in democratic practice, while imbuing it with a greater degree of political realism and attentiveness to power. Chapter 3 offers a historical and ethical analysis of Alinsky-style community organizing as a practice and dynamically developing tradition of democratic politics. Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s practice theory, it shows how organizing forms the moral virtues, practical skills, and political institutions needed to promote the common good in a democratic society. It also further articulates the Alinsky tradition’s historical and intellectual relationship to the Catholic tradition. Chapter 4 examines how community organizing exemplifies a democratic form of political prudence. Reconstructing Thomas Aquinas’s theory of prudence, and employing it to analyze two real case studies of organizing campaigns, it develops a constructive account of political prudence as the virtue that enables morally principled and pragmatically effective collective action for the common good in the public realm. Chapter 5 synthesizes the results of the preceding chapters. It argues that prudent political action, and not merely public deliberation, is the social process by which to promote the common good, social justice, and social solidarity in a democratic society. Integrating key insights from both the Catholic tradition and the Alinsky tradition, it clarifies the role of power conflict in the pursuit of the common good, and identifies further areas for theoretical development.

The influence of Liberation Theology within the pastoral and moral tradition of the Catholic Church has been formative to the contemporary understanding of Catholic Christianity. As a Redemptorist Missionary, the rich tradition of liberation theology is significant. The Constitution and statutes (CS) of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, the guiding document of our apostolic life, explicitly embrace the concept of liberation and the preferential option for the poor. The description of the Gospel of Salvation in article one of the the CS provides the Redemptorist missionary's understanding of the Gospel of Salvation. Article one defines how the work of evangelization is to be understood. The Constitution states: "The Congregations' mandate to evangelize the poor is directed to the liberation and salvation of the whole human person. The members have a duty to preach the Gospel explicitly and show solidarity with the poor by promoting their fundamental rights to justice and freedom." In chapter one we will examine the theory of Liberation Theology presented by Gutierrez. In that discussion, important concepts, such as theological praxis, virtue ethics and the important influence of Thomism and the legacy of virtue theory in the Catholic tradition will be presented. We will also bring into the dialogical dynamic what contemporary virtue theory brings to the context of liberation idealogy. It is through this dialogue of tradition and contemporary critique and response that we will roughly sketch the context of our theological discourse. Chapter two will engage the virtue of Charity as the foundation virtue of Gutierrez's theology of liberation. Here we will engage how Thomas Aquinas' presentation of the virtue of charity and Alphonsus Liguori's pastorally practical approach to the virtue of charity illuminate how Gutierrez engages the virtue of charity in his theology. This chapter will take these three theological points of reference to present how Gutierrez understands the onnection betwwen the virtue of charity and Christian praxis. Through this necessary connection of charity, Christian praxis we will examine Gutierrez's understanding of political charity, and how Chritistian spirituality is a constituent element of political charity and how political charity becomes an eschatological prophetic witness to the liberation of the whole person. It is through this eschatological spirit of political charity that charity becomes epistemological praxis. Chapter three will follow the structure of chapter two by dialogically engaging Aquinas, Liguori and Gutierrez's praxis of the virtue of prudence. We will also examine how prudence is reflected in scripture and how the formation of conscience in the Alphonsian tradition helps us to understand how Gutierrez's theological perspective uses the virtue of prudence through the relationship between conscientization and prudence in the context of liberation theology. The conscientization of a community is the manifestation of prudence as a social virtue. Thus, we will discuss how this dynamic demonstrates the virtue of prudence as a cultural action and a radical form of Christian praxis, which consequence is a metanoic movement of conscience through prudence. The final chapter will conclude this work by examining the implication of political charity and the heuristic praxis of conscientization of prudence, particularly in the context of the Redemptionist missionary. It is towards this end, the practical application of these theological reflections where the fruit of this theological dialogue will find value and will hopefully be an aide to the movement toward the liberation of the whole person.

Every generation encounters moral problems. Thus, designing an ethical standard or a moral guide for any generation has been a major concern for great minds who believe in a genuine pursuit of happiness through virtuous life. Ancient philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics debated on this in their time by acknowledging essential virtues such as wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance as moral principles. Marcus Aurelius Cicero followed the moral principles of these ancient Greek philosophers and, to encourage young Romans aspiring for leadership positions, wrote a book titled De Officiis, a handbook on duty and responsibility. Ambrose of Milan, a statesman turned churchman, who also studied the pagan virtues of these Greek philosopher and the work of Cicero, wrote De Officiis Ministrorum, a handbook on duty for clergy, religious, and Christians of his diocese. Ambrose adopted and adapted the pagan virtues into Christian virtues. The virtues of prudence and courage are critical virtues among the cardinal virtues that Ambrose analyzed in his work using biblical exemplars as models for Christians of his time. The current situation in Nigeria needs a reconsideration as corruption and other moral vices have occupied the central stage in Nigeria. Highlighting Ambrose's virtue theory and teaching on prudence and courage as part of daily catechesis and homily will be necessary for the development of moral consciousness and values among the Christians and non-Christians in Nigeria. This work traces the historical development of virtue theory from ancient times to the time of Ambrose. It uses historical analysis to bring forward the Christian virtues taught by Ambrose and their exemplars, and argues for emulation of these tremendous biblical exemplars and suggests modern and local exemplars from the Nigerian perspective and Africa at large.

Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogous to the no-guidance objection to virtue ethics. According to this objection, virtue-based regulative epistemology cannot offer us useful guidance in our deliberations, because an abstract knowledge of virtue does not tell us what we should do here and now, especially in hard cases. We respond to this objection by showing that our making good epistemic decisions cannot simply be a matter of our following the right epistemic rules. In order to reliably inquire and deliberate well, we need epistemic prudence. Thus, while virtue-based regulative epistemology fails to determine how we should inquire and resolve deliberation here and now, this is also true of norm-based regulative epistemology. The upshot of this argument is that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on understanding the nature of epistemic prudence and on understanding how we can promote its development in ourselves and others.

This research explores the influence of cognitive biases, supervisory power and regulatory frameworks on judgement errors in banks' credit risk management practices. The focus is on sources of error in estimates of non-performing assets and loan loss provisions against a backdrop of changes in accounting and prudential regulations and incentives/disincentives embedded in a country’s tax code. The objective was to (i) understand how managerial sentiment and prudence impact credit risk decisions, (ii) examine the effectiveness of accounting and prudential regulation in influencing bank manager behaviour, and (iii) explore the interactions between tax policy and macroprudential frameworks in regulating bank behaviour. The study enabled the exploration of tensions between accounting, prudential and tax regulation, and between the bank manager and their operating environment. Using a concurrent transformative design, quantitative and qualitative data were simultaneously collected for an Australasian sample (Australia and New Zealand), consisting of bank data and nine experts. Though the region abides by international norms and standards, regulators and market participants view Australasia as idiosyncratic, consequently influencing behavioural outcomes. The quantitative analysis using country-specific and combined samples of Australasian banks suggests a negative contemporaneous relationship between managerial sentiment and loan loss provisioning practices. The results also demonstrate the role of managerial prudence in influencing the magnitude of provisioning estimates, further validating the need to understand how short-termism impacts credit risk decisions. The findings reveal the positive impact that banking supervisory power (the regulator) has on the disclosures of non-performing assets and loan loss provisioning. Supervisory intensity is an under-researched topic, but some current studies show that, in some cases, supervisory power might not be the most optimal vehicle to deliver the best behavioural outcomes. Concurrently, the qualitative results from the expert interviews with prudential and tax regulators, academics, consultants and bankers reveal the potential to use the tax code as an adjunct to the prudential regulatory framework as advocated by global organisations like the International Monetary Fund. However, certain ideological thresholds need to be crossed, given hesitancy about the impact of reforms on tax revenues, the power of bank lobbyists and the revolving door between the sector and regulators exposing the regulatory process to intellectual capture. The findings have implications for the timeliness and transparency of recognising provisions and non-performing assets and on contracting decisions given the role of financial reporting quality in facilitating contracts between bank managers, boards, investors and creditors. The study contributes to behavioural finance literature, earnings and capital management literature, accounting and prudential regulation, navigating political agendas in banking, and adds to the global discourse concerning the role of taxation in banking. Given the presence of cognitive biases and short-termism in credit risk management in Australasia and the need to question the merits of traditional banking regulation, this study has broad implications for understanding managerial behaviour, contracting decisions, standard-setting and prudential regulation, financial reporting, and tax reform.

William Shakespeare’s tragedies dwell upon death, loss, grief, and sacrifice. But one of the common, underlying and at times unexpected components that recurs throughout the tragedies is honor. For Shakespeare’s honor is tied to human life, as Julius Caesar insinuates to his wife, “Cowards die many times before their deaths; / The valiant never taste of death but once” (2.2.32-33). Shakespeare’s honor is largely connected to how one lives their life, whether it be honorably in bravery, or cowardly in fear. The concept is further developed in Othello, when Iago says, “Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, / Is the immediate jewel of their souls” (3.3. 183-184). If one does not possess an honorable character, in other words, he or she owns nothing of import. This is reiterated in Richard II, when Mowbray says, “Take honor from me, and my life is done” (1.1.183). However, Shakespeare’s portrayal of honor often displays an ambivalence between the Christian and the pagan-humanist values of honor in his age. He toys with the concept of honor radically within the minds of several of his most prominent characters, namely the protagonists in King Lear, Coriolanus, and Macbeth. For these three men, honor becomes a moral trap, and they each meet tragic fates as a result. In this paper, I seek to illuminate the different functions of honor and how this coincides with Shakespeare’s overall theme which suggests that honor and (quality of) life go hand in hand, which demonstrates the idea that the pursuit of glory can prove to be a snare for the overly ambitious man.

Individual decision making is the foundation for almost all economic analysis. In this dissertation, I study various choice problems in the absence of perfect information.Related decisions are often observed in isolation without direct measurement of correlation in beliefs across state spaces or complementarity in tastes across prize spaces. In my first chapter, my coauthor David Ahn and I introduce a novel model with two decision problems with distinct states and prizes, which we call small worlds, without observation of bets that are contingent on the realization of both worlds. We characterize an appropriate version of subjective expected utility, where choices are made as if there is a joint distribution over the product of the state spaces and a joint utility index over pairs of prizes from both prize spaces. Turning to identification, the joint utility index over pairs of prizes and the marginal belief over each small world are identified, but the uniqueness of the joint distribution is more subtle. If the utility index is separable across prize spaces, then the correlation across state spaces is unidentified; but if there is any complementarity across prizes, then the joint distribution is exactly identified.A growing literature attributes choice anomalies, such as stochastic choices, to limited attention. Most choice models with limited attention do not model attention itself. In my second chapter, I propose a choice model with gradual attention, in which a decision maker’s attention is limited due to time constraints. With richer choice data including the associated decision time, I provide an axiomatic characterization of this model. I show the model primitives such as the preference can be uniquely identified. To make the model comparable to existing choice models with limited attention, I consider its static version without time data and show identification is not always possible, which highlights the novelty of utilizing the decision time information in understanding choice behaviors. I examine aggregation issues of this model and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a representative agent under heterogeneity. In my model, the decision maker's consideration set is growing monotonically as decision time increases. As a consequence, more time leads to better choices. I test this choice pattern using experimental data from a well-known study and find supportive evidence.In a persuasion problem, an information sender designs an experiment for an information receiver, in order to persuade the receiver to change actions. While persuasion is all about manipulating the receiver’s posterior beliefs, little is known about the effect of changes in receiver's risk attitudes on persuasion outcomes. In my third chapter, I study how the receiver’s risk attitudes affect the set of implementable outcomes in a persuasion problem. I consider a two-period consumption model, where the receiver’s future income is uncertain and he has the option to transfer his wealth intertemporally through saving. I present a local comparative statics result, showing that any marginal change in the receiver’s prudence either expands or shrinks the set of implementable persuasion outcomes. Risk aversion does not affect persuasion outcomes, except through pivoting the receiver’s optimal action under the prior belief. Other higher order risk attitudes have no direct impact on persuasion outcomes.

En el presente texto vamos a intentar probar que, en el orden compositivo de las artes visuales y, en particular, de la Arquitectura, la última palabra no recae en la aplicación u observancia de preceptos o reglas sino en la prudencia y en el gusto. Este ratificará o matizará las simetrías parciales de toda composición, incluso la symmetria total con vistas a la producción de la eurythmia, a saber: el efecto agradable y deleitable que la symmetria provoca. Se pretende advertir que la phronesis y, en última instancia, el gusto, acaban convirtiéndose en los elementos decisivos de la estética y la composición arquitectónica.

El objeto de este artículo es llevar a cabo una reflexión acerca de cómo el proceso de recuperación o rehabilitación de la filosofía práctica de corte aristotélico-tomista que, desde hace ya bastantes décadas, se ha venido desarrollando, fundamentalmente en Alemania y EEUU, ha supuesto una nueva reorientación en ámbitos muy diversos: desde el modo de entender el concepto de derecho –rompiendo con la tradición positivista de fundamentar la validez de éste tan sólo en criterios formales–, hasta en el terreno relativo a la propia praxis de los operadores jurídicos. En concreto, cabe destacar, en este último campo, la recuperación del pensamiento aristotélico sobre la virtud, con aplicaciones prácticas en la reflexión sobre el modo de actuar, y también de ser, del jurista.

To appreciate fully the ethical dimensions inherent in the literature of the eighteenth century it is necessary to understand the moral bias of an author, a bias often best ascertained by a study of the treatment he accords good nature and prudence. Although several scholarly articles and portions of longer studies recognize the importance of these virtues for individual writers, no single work has appeared which traces fully the history of the idea of good nature and prudence as complementary virtues in the eighteenth century. The present study provides a systematic analysis of these virtues as treated in theology, ethical philosophy, and fiction from the later seventeenth century to about 1800.