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When Labour took power in 1997, it all but abandoned the large scale road building plans of the previous Conservative administration and undertook a policy of 'integrated' transport which focused more on public transport as a solution to congestion. However, a number of roads projects survived, pending further review by a series of Multi Modal Studies (MMS). For the first time, a transport study would not be modal-specific. Around the same time, and following a particularly poor turnout at the ballot box, Labour began steps to 'modernise' democracy in the UK and encourage people to become more politically 'involved' through what became known as 'enhanced' participation methods. The Government believed that more public involvement would mean 'better' decisions were made. This thesis examines one of the MMS, the South West Area Multi Modal Study, which took place between April 2000 and May 2003. The central aim of the thesis is to assess the influence and success of 'enhanced' participation in encouraging the general public to become 'involved' in the study process. The study employs predominately quantitative methods of data collection and analysis, including the use of a questionnaire distributed to random addresses. The main findings are that, despite consultants employing 'enhanced' methods of participation, the majority of respondents were unaware of the study taking place. Because of this lack of interest, any decisions made based on the submissions of the public would have been significantly unrepresentative and in no means 'better'. The thesis also uncovered a degree of participation potential amongst respondents and a number of barriers that may encourage more of the general public to participate in the future. If these barriers are addressed 'enhanced' participation would appear to be a workable and useful tool in the Government's quest for a 'modernised social democracy' and 'better' decision making.

This project seeks to explain why Japan developed nuclear power despite its negative experiences with nuclear weapons and fallout. It focuses on the period from the end of the American Occupation in 1952, when the Japanese regained full sovereignty, until the signing of the agreement to import a commercial British nuclear reactor in 1958. The Japanese experience with atomic bombs and radioactive fallout made Japan a seemingly unlikely candidate to develop nuclear power. These fears were renewed following the Lucky Dragon Incident when an American hydrogen bomb test showered a Japanese fishing vessel with radioactive fallout and contaminated deep water tuna throughout the Pacific. Japan, however, had ample reasons to embrace nuclear power as it: provided a potential solutions to Japan’s energy crisis, while offering Japan a way to secure its place in the international community and a means of defining itself as a nation dedicated to scientific, technological, and economic development. Pro-nuclear advocates identified nuclear power as a key to the advancement of Japan, partaking in what Hiromi Mizuno termed “scientific nationalism.” Although Japanese policy makers were interested in the adopting nuclear power before the US offered to extend aid to Japan, the process of doing so was influenced by the American approach to the Cold War and was heavily informed by American efforts to maintain the support of both the government and the general public. While Japanese policy makers moved forward with their investigations of nuclear power, the United States addressed the Japanese public through a series of exhibitions as part of the Atoms for Peace program to direct the national conversation away from nuclear bomb testing. As they toured Japan, these exhibitions presented nuclear power as a suite of technologies that would greatly benefit scientific research, medicine, agriculture, industry, and transportation. Seven different national and regional newspapers cosponsored the various legs of these exhibits and presented media campaigns that proselytized for nuclear power far and wide. These exhibitions and the media campaigns that surrounded them helped forge a pro-nuclear consensus in Japan, which would remain durable for decades.This study combines the political, diplomatic, and social aspects of the adoption of nuclear power. It uses media reports, popular culture, interviews, and polls to gauge the public’s reaction to nuclear power. American efforts to influence nuclear power are examined through the records of the CIA and the United States Information Agency, which was responsible for American public diplomacy efforts. Japanese policy issues are explored using the proceedings of the Diet, the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission’s reports, the Foreign Ministry archives, and trade publications.

This paper examines the origins of the Atoms for Peace program and its implementation in the non-Western world, with specific case studies of Brazil, India and Japan. It argues that although the program was developed as a means of starting a process nuclear disarmament and improving relations with the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower’s inability to control the implementation of the program led to Atoms for Peace being used for propaganda purposes, as a means of securing nuclear raw materials and other Cold War diplomatic objectives, and to improve foreign relations with neutral and allied countries. Ultimately, bureaucratic infighting and Cold War reality made Atoms for Peace fail in its original objectives and actually increased tensions with the Soviet Union.