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In this dissertation, I hypothesize that before long we will have to find a (neuro)technological medium that can replace the book (and the eBook) if we do not wish for the literary imagination to entirely disappear under the flood of what is commonly called “visual media”. In order for the art of literature to be preserved via (neuro)technology, however, we must first gain a better understanding of what the literary imagination is in cognitive terms. By way of philosophical-semiotic investigations of the cognitive structure of (literary) language, this dissertation argues that the literary imagination hinges upon a universal reverse-engineering of our phantasmata. The verbal arts appear to be a secret path to the production facility of our imagination. I proceed as follows: After discussing approaches in literary theory (Barthes, Iser, Ingarden, Jakobson, Derrida, Eco) in light of the concepts of referentiality and representationality, I take these two concepts into the realm of philosophy. In reviewing Peirce and Wittgenstein’s non-mentalist theories of language, I define representation as a meaning-conferring act that works with the logical form of referentiality. I then analyze this logical form via a critical analysis of the concept of iconicity (pure icons, diagrams, metaphors), shedding light on the productiveness of indeterminacies in semiosis. Next is an analysis of Peirce’s ontogenesis of language, interlacing theories of Aristotle, Thomas of Erfurt, and Kant, who all heavily influenced Peirce. This part of the dissertation argues that propositionality is the original form of language; not the single word. With an analysis of Nietzsche’s Anschauungsmetapher my reflections on language come full circle, as Nietzsche’s metaphor turns out to be a perceptual-propositional creation. Finally, I step down into the empirical plains of the literary experience, analyzing a few lines from Mann’s Der Tod in Venedig, Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Coetzee’s Disgrace, Duras’s L’Amant, and Hölderlin’s Patmos to demonstrate that the verbal arts force us to activate fundamental and creative levels of our cognition, to “reprogram” our source codes. I close with a note on apperception, film, and VR, showing the cognitive limitations of a future that would evolve solely out of visual media.