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The present project brings together two areas of Platonic scholarship. One area is Plato’s Parmenides, the dialogue that appears to cripple the theory of Forms. Although the theory meets with several seemingly devastating criticisms, Parmenides himself tells the young Socrates that it is in fact possible to save the Forms. Scholars are divided over just how, if at all, this rescue happens.The other area concerns “self-predication,” a particular sort of predication displayed in statements of the form “the F is F,” where the subject term names some Form. Scholars are divided here too, and in two ways. First, there is disagreement about just how we should understand the very notion of self-predication. What does a statement of the form “the F is F” even mean? Second, there is debate over whether Plato himself endorses (or should endorse) some particular understanding of self-predication.My focus here is an interpretation of self-predication on which statements of the form “the F is F” say that the Form is characterized by the very quality it constitutes, or “self-instantiates” as I will often put it. The majority position in the literature is that Plato no longer subscribes to (or should no longer subscribe to) this particular understanding of self-predication after the Parmenides. The reason is simple: self-predication understood in this way is largely responsible for the theory of Forms’ being sunk in the Parmenides. Saving the theory of the Forms requires, it is often claimed, jettisoning from the theory this special sort of predication.I find myself part of a small group of scholars that reject the majority positon. My own reading is that self-instantiation, far from sinking the theory of Forms in the Parmenides, is essential for saving the theory from Parmenides’s criticisms; the theory survives into the late dialogues largely because of this special sort of predication. In addition, I maintain that Plato himself was aware of how to disarm the objections presented in the dialogue, that self-instantiation plays this important role, and that the arguments are marshalled in part to compel us, his readers, to appreciate this for ourselves.The chapters that follow are principally concerned with the former part of my position, establishing the importance of self-instantiation for the theory of Forms post-Parmenides. I shall at times say some things about the latter, but it does not receive a full defense here. Still, I believe that it is nonetheless important to state this part of my view too.Chapters I and II focus on a pair of regress arguments from the Parmenides. It is widely thought that these arguments are successful precisely because of self-instantiation, and that the only way to disarm them is by dispensing with this tenet of the theory of Forms. I argue that this is wrong for both arguments, and offer alternative interpretations of them. Collectively, Chapters I and II show us that we must take seriously questions concerning how some Forms are characterized by the very qualities they constitute, and why this special sort of predication is part of the theory of Forms.Chapter III engages with the Parmenides’s bewildering dialectical display, which is said to be the method of training that will allow a young Socrates to save the theory of Forms. I consider and reject a prominent interpretation of the exercise, and then develop my own that sheds light on the importance of self-instantiation, reinforces earlier conclusions, and paves the way for consideration of Plato’s Sophist. It is in this dialogue, I maintain, that we find answers to the how and why questions.Chapter IV answers these questions. I argue that some Form is an instance of itself just in case that Form participates in itself. In addition, I show that self-participation, and so self-instantiation, is limited to certain Forms. These conclusions naturally invite consideration of the why question. Here my position is that some Form participates in itself just in case that Form plays a “structuring role” in the intelligible and sensible realms. Chapter V considers a question raised by this answer, namely, Does the Form of Change play a structuring role in the intelligible realm? If so, then the Forms, after the Parmenides, lose their immutability. This, interestingly, is another majority position in the literature. I side with the minority once more, arguing that the Form of Change does not play a structuring role in the intelligible realm. The result is that whatever changes the theory of Forms undergoes following its critique in the Parmenides, self-instantiation remains part of the theory and the Forms are still stable, unchanging entities.

According to Epicurus, philosophy’s sole task is to ensure the well-being of the soul. Human souls are often riddled with diseases; the most serious are the fear of the gods and the fear of death. Thus, the Epicureans offered several arguments designed to demonstrate that, for instance, “death is nothing to us,” and should therefore not be feared. Since their creation there has been much discussion, both in antiquity and by contemporary philosophers, about these arguments. In this thesis, I argue that Epicurean philosophical arguments are patient-relative; they necessarily adapt themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended audience. The end result is that when we evaluate Epicurean philosophical arguments, we must do so in light of the audience for whom they were intended.