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The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

This paper examines the potential risk effects of alliance commitments on dispute onset and escalation. This issue is theoretically framed as a moral hazard problem from the economic literature: if one party (agent) pledges a particular commitment to another party (principal), the moral hazard for the agent arises if the principal's behavior (e.g. a reckless move) raises the risk for an agent to act on its behalf due to its contractual commitment to the principal. In international relations, alliance commitments might pose such a moral hazard risk in the context of extended deterrence. That is, how much can the protege's behavior vis-a-vis another state actually entrap its ally ("defender") into a conflict? I separate an answer to this question into two specific issues: (1) whether states with alliance commitments from others are more likely to initiate conflicts than other states without such alliance provisions; (2) given that a conflict is initiated between the protege and its opponent, whether the protege is likely to get an aid from its ally and at what escalation level. After the conceptual and theoretical discussion, the paper proceeds with a quantitative empirical analysis and draws conclusions for current U.S. policies in cases of its relations with Taiwan in East Asia, India and Pakistan in South Asia, and Israel in the Middle East. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite repeated U.S. claims that its policy toward relations across the Taiwan Strait is ?consistent? and ?clear,? in actuality its policy has long been one of ?strategic ambiguity.? It is widely recognized by scholars and policy-makers alike that the so-called Taiwan question is the most potentially explosive issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations.What is the strategic ambiguity policy all about? What role has it played in influencing the equilibrium outcomes of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades? How are the dynamics of the ?strategic triangle? consisting of the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How effective in preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait is U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity likely to be in the future? Few studies, if any, have provided theoretical answers to these questions. This paper tries to develop a game theoretic model which may provide tentative answers to these interesting, unresolved questions. Supporters of the ?strategic ambiguity? policy argue that it has successfully kept the Strait free of conflict: on the one hand, Mainland China always has to take into account the possibility that the United States might intervene if it were to attack Taiwan, and on the other hand, Taiwan always has to think twice before ?going too far? (such as declaring formal independence from the mainland). The policy, it is said, has served U.S. national security interests and has effectively accommodated changes in cross-Strait relations in past decades. There are opposing opinions, however. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have rendered one of the major imperatives for a U.S.-China rapprochement and compromises on Taiwan?the basis of the strategic ambiguity policy?obsolete. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan and the increasing military threat if faces, such as the deployment of missiles by Mainland China aimed at Taiwan, have brought new variables into the equation. Taiwan?s thriving democracy has added ideological values and moral imperatives to the U.S. commitment of defending the island. The increasing military threat from Mainland China, meanwhile, seems to have strengthened the argument for an increasing commitment to Taiwan?s defense, either in the form of more military sales or coordination between U.S. and Taiwan militaries. A continuing ambiguity in U.S. policy, so the arguments goes, will encourage PRC militancy and frustrate Taiwan?s determination to resisting aggression, and may be prone to disrupt the delicate equilibrium. Above all, it seems to compromise the U.S. moral imperative of defending democratic values.Our model shows that the policy of strategic ambiguity helps preserve the status quo and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The strategic ambiguity policy is a defensive strategy in nature, well-suited at deterring both Mainland China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies. In the long run, the strategic ambiguity policy, however, needs to be supplemented, if not replaced, by more imaginative policies in order to successfully manage the Taiwan issue. For example, the United States could be more forthright in proposals that help to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, such as proposing that Mainland China renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue in exchange for Taiwan?s pledge not to pursue independence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pressure groups have always had a significant impact on U.S. policy, both foreign and domestic. Diasporas constitute a new kind of pressure group with an exclusive focus on foreign and domestic policies that affect the home country. Famous examples include the Israeli lobby, the Armenian lobby, the Cuban Lobby, and the Taiwan lobby. Putnam's concept of the two-level game is useful for explaining the interaction between foreign policy and ethnic lobbies. The concept of social capital is useful for explaining the relative success and failures of different lobbies and getting their preferred policies accepted. Social capital includes bonding, bridging, and linkage social capital. Bonding social capital unites people within a group, bridging social capital unites different groups, and linkage social capital unites government officials with these groups. The Taiwan lobby and the Cuban lobby are analyzed using these concepts to explain their relative success in "capturing" U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba and Taiwan. The Cuba lobby employed the successful strategy of shifting policy from the executive branch to Congress, thereby making U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba more aligned with the interests of Cuban hard-liners, and more difficult to change. The Cuba lobby accomplished this by focusing on U.S. Senators and Representatives who had a large number of Cubans in their states or districts. In contrast, the Taiwan lobby focused on the executive branch, leaving U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan beholden to the prevailing U.S. policies toward China. Consequently, the Taiwan lobby has not been able to change U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the official recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1978, and the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. In contrast, the Cuba lobby has pushed the U.S. government to change its policies toward Cuba by intensifying the trade embargo, despite the fact that the rationale for the embargo no longer exists. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pressure groups have always had a significant impact on U.S. policy, both foreign and domestic. Diasporas constitute a new kind of pressure group with an exclusive focus on foreign and domestic policies that affect the home country. Famous examples include the Israeli lobby, the Armenian lobby, the Cuban Lobby, and the Taiwan lobby. Putnam's concept of the two-level game is useful for explaining the interaction between foreign policy and ethnic lobbies. The concept of social capital is useful for explaining the relative success and failures of different lobbies and getting their preferred policies accepted. Social capital includes bonding, bridging, and linkage social capital. Bonding social capital unites people within a group, bridging social capital unites different groups, and linkage social capital unites government officials with these groups. The Taiwan lobby and the Cuban lobby are analyzed using these concepts to explain their relative success in "capturing" U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba and Taiwan. The Cuba lobby employed the successful strategy of shifting policy from the executive branch to Congress, thereby making U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba more aligned with the interests of Cuban hard-liners, and more difficult to change. The Cuba lobby accomplished this by focusing on U.S. Senators and Representatives who had a large number of Cubans in their states or districts. In contrast, the Taiwan lobby focused on the executive branch, leaving U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan beholden to the prevailing U.S. policies toward China. Consequently, the Taiwan lobby has not been able to change U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the official recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1978, and the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. In contrast, the Cuba lobby has pushed the U.S. government to change its policies toward Cuba by intensifying the trade embargo, despite the fact that the rationale for the embargo no longer exists. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]