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This article signals the need for an integrated approach to curriculum development and implementation with a focus on a group of disciplines related to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). By highlighting various teaching approaches of LOAC, I argue that there is a risk that LOAC be perceived by many non-legal practitioners, like the cadets, as difficult to grasp, interpreted and corelated with real situations they will face daily in operations, exercises or even during execution of routine peace-time duties. I support the idea that the LOAC, as a horizontal discipline in a military academy curriculum, need to be integrated dynamically, both horizontally (in relation to other operational disciplines) and vertically (along the academic path of a military cadet) into the overall construct of learning the basics of the profession of arms. To operationalise this finding, I propose an integrated educational model that suggests horizontal coordination of the academic schedule and enhanced cooperation among the teaching staff of the relevant disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Manual of International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS process to produce the 'McGill Manual') is currently being developed jointly by The University of Adelaide, McGill University and the University of Exeter. The core participants of this project include practitioners, academics, technical experts, military officers and government lawyers. The production of such a Manual is critical and timely given the international community is increasingly recognizing that warfare conducted in, to and from outer space is both foreseeable and potentially highly damaging to national security interests as well as civilian activities on earth and space. Despite this, there has been little interest in formulating any kind of new legal instrument that grapples with this militarization phenomenon. Moreover, there has also been insufficient research and a lack of clarity on the interactions between international space law and the law relating to the Use of Force and International Humanitarian Law. This paper considers the role of International Operational Law Manuals in providing a non-binding architecture for normative compliance and highlights key legal issues that are being navigated in the MILAMOS process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robotic technology offers great benefits to humanity. However, one of the first uses of this technology is for war. We already have seen the actual use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles to destroy enemy targets in war zones. Some experts believe that robots will change the nature of wars. Even with the current artificial intelligence technology, it is possible to task a robot to kill a human without human intervention. There are many ethical issues surrounding robotic warfare. Current warfare ethics is shaped by the principles of Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). These principles are formed based on the experiences of earlier wars. These wars were fought only by humans. However, in the robotic warfare era, there are new types of combatants. Therefore, we may need a new set of principles for LOAC. Currently, there are international campaigns for a ban on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), in other words, killer robots. Some experts advocate regulating the use of military robots rather than calling for an international ban. In this study, we discuss the current developments regarding the call for a ban and the arguments for a regulation on killer robots. In addition, we introduce a set of principles to guide the development of a Law of Robotic Armed Conflict (LORAC). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an intense debate about the applicability of international law to cyber war and the need for a cyber-specific international treaty. The problem, however, might be that this debate is irrelevant. Both camps misread how the structure of the cyber domain likely precludes strategically 'piggy-backing' on conventional norms of war. There is a civilian/military ambiguity in the cyber domain that makes target differentiation unlikely if not impossible. Thus, Duqu's dilemma: with the focus on establishing legitimate targets and setting limitations on allowable action the United States and its allies are engaged in a futile endeavor that cannot lead to improved cyber governance and likely only exposes them to vulnerabilities. Greater effort should be spent on accepting this structural ambiguity by developing strategy that aims to instill preemptive fear and produce reluctance to action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout history, the law of warfare has evolved to protect non-combatants and limit collateral damage. The same legal and ethical constraints apply to the conduct of cyber warfare, where it is similarly desirable to limit the effects of offensive actions to specific locations and groups. However, conventional wisdom suggests that this is extremely difficult, if not impossible to accomplish in the cyber domain. In this paper, we argue to the contrary. It is possible to constrain the effects of cyber actions to specifically desired, legitimate targets while significantly limiting collateral damage and injury to non-combatants. To this end we present a generalized methodology for analysis of the targeting and effects of cyber operations with respect to principles of lawful conduct in armed conflict. This methodology includes a framework of effects categories, target attributes and control measures to direct and constrain cyber operations. It also includes a process for evaluating these effects and controls against the principles for lawful conduct in armed conflict. We illustrate the methodology in action by applying it to W32. Stuxnet, software widely considered to be a cyber weapon. Our results indicate that it is entirely possible to analyze complex cyber war problems, identify legally authorized courses of action, and focus effects on desired targets while greatly minimizing collateral damage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to its recently published cyber strategy, the U.S. seeks to develop international consensus on how traditional law of armed conflict (LOAC) norms and understandings are modified and applied in cyberspace to help secure this global commons. Although the International Committee of the Red Cross's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities and the recent U.S. cyber strategy documents and policy statements are very different in many ways, examination of the relationships between their different aspects could be very useful in setting terms of reference framing the discussions which must occur to develop consensus on how LOAC rules and understandings regarding direct participation in hostilities could be adapted for use in cyberspace. This requires identification of their respective strengths and weaknesses, and potential areas of common ground between them. To be useful, this examination must include consideration of the significance of rules of engagement, formulations of hostile intent, and the proper inferences to be drawn from intelligence analyses as well as the legal standards by which direct participation in hostilities is determined. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The class of combatant constitutes one of the most important instrumentalities of the law of war. Combatant status resolves critical and enduring legal questions such as immunity from prosecution for warlike acts, susceptibility to intentional targeting, and, in part, treatment upon capture. Since the late nineteenth century, codifications of the international law of war have included criteria for combatant status keyed to ensuring desirable battlefield conduct and, to the extent possible, humanity in war. This paper revisits the author's prior work on the topic of combatancy in cyber warfare. Building on recent public revelations concerning state capacity for offensive cyber attacks, as well as new developments in computer network attack, this paper highlights logical and normative shortcomings in current understandings of combatant status in cyberspace. In place of rote reliance on existing criteria intended for the kinetic battlefield, this paper proposes reliance on State affiliation as the sole criterion for evaluating combatant status in cyber warfare between States. An admitted interpretive gloss on current criteria, the proposed framework offers a workable and realistic reconciliation of humanitarian goals and emerging State practice in cyber warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite a greater willingness on the part of States to enter into a dialogue on the potential implications of cyber warfare, there is continued disagreement on whether new rules are required to govern this ‘new domain’ and, if so, whether such rules should be in codified form or be left to evolve through a natural progression of customary international law. Closely interlinked with these questions is the distinct issue of whether there is a need for an arms control treaty. To speak of an arms control treaty or the regulation of a particular weapon by reference to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) is to presuppose a common conception of the particular type of weapon that is under discussion. This paper therefore poses the question, ‘What is a cyber-weapon?’ before considering whether an arms control treaty is a feasible option, let alone whether such a treaty would be capable of addressing the concerns that have been raised by its proponents. This paper also considers existing LOAC rules to identify the issues that are unique to cyber-weapons and, in doing so, it is argued that further clarification is indeed merited. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Cyber conflict may not be new, but it is far from old. And as with any other major, disruptive global trend, there are vexing questions on which traditional international norms still apply, whether they apply but with modifications, or whether entirely new norms must be invented. One of the most important norms has been for states to be able to remain neutral in response to international conflict, with rights and responsibilities guaranteed by the Hague Convention. Because of the nature of cyber conflict, such legal norm may be less useful than a modified norm of political neutrality. The Internet protocols themselves route cyber attacks through any number of neutral countries, cyber conflicts are usually not so destructive to obviously trigger international law, and the identity or nationality of the belligerents may not be obvious. Nations might (and probably should) accordingly come under political pressure to take reasonable steps to stop cyber attacks, regardless of whether or not it is a formal treaty obligation. This paper explores this issue and ways a nation may be less than neutral, tying this to a ten-point spectrum of state responsibility to help determine just how responsible a nation might be in a cyber conflict. To illustrate potential new norms in action, the paper then describes a notional cyber conflict which shows how the nations' rights and responsibilities are influenced by the four factors of severity, obviousness, “stoppability,” and duration. The paper concludes with a short section on the commercial neutrality during cyber-conflict, given the critical role that the private sector has played in the creation and operation of cyberspace. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

At the time of writing, the author was Assistant Legal Advisor Operational Law, Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO HQ SACT). The views expressed herein are the author's own and to not necessarily reflect the official position or policy of NATO and/or HQ SACT. Abstract: At its Lisbon Summit (November 2010), NATO has adopted its Strategic Concept. The U.S. may soon adopt its Cyberstrategy 3.0 (originally expected for December 2010). Both strategy documents will contribute to a growing policy consensus regarding cyber security and defence as well as provide better policy insights regarding cyber offence. In doing so, they will contribute to a better understanding of how NATO and the U.S. want to prepare for, and conduct cyber warfare in a manner congruent with the law of armed conflict. In addition, they will determine to what extent this branch of the law needs to be better understood, developed, or reformed. Accordingly, this paper indicates how the existing legal and policy frameworks intersect with practical aspects of cyber warfare and associated intelligence activities, analyses how the new strategy documents develop and change the existing policy framework, and what repercussions this may have for the interpretation and application of the law of armed conflict. It also demonstrates how the new strategy documents inform the policy and legal discourse and hence help confirm that NATO and U.S. as well as other NATO Nations' cyber activities are, and will continue to be, lawful and legitimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the legal antecedents of the concepts of neutrality and current enforceability of declarations of neutrality in the context of information operations amongst belligerents. This is a non-trivial point of understanding, given the potential for belligerents to use and abuse infrastructure elements owned and/or operated by nation states desiring to remain neutral. The analysis will consider the instantiated concepts of neutrality, the potential for expanding or contracting the concepts of neutrality in the context of cyberwar, and the possibility of erosion of neutrality in cyberwar scenarios. We have a notion enshrined in international law that says that you don't lose your neutrality if belligerents use your telephone lines or telegraph lines to communicate even if they are crossing your territory, even if they are passing operational orders. The problem with cyberwar is that they are potentially not just transferring orders but also potentially weapons -- cyber-weapons. So it becomes a more complex problem and the challenge is to understand at what point the nation state should be required to act, or if such a point exists at all. This analysis will examine the intersection between technology and law in regards to this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]