Search

The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Dismantlement and Transparency (DOE/NNSA/ODT) provides direction and funding for the applied development and assessment of effective arms control verification technologies and capabilities for monitoring the reduction and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and associated equipment in the United States and other countries. Nuclear weapon reduction and limitation agreements to date have focused on limiting nuclear weapon delivery systems and attributed or deployed warheads. However, as strategic nuclear forces continue to draw down, it is likely that future arms control treaties will address monitoring deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, and eventually, the dismantlement of these nuclear weapons into weapon components and material for disposition. This type of monitoring and verification will rely much more on advanced technology and capabilities. To meet these future needs, Office of Dismantlement and Transparency is evaluating and supporting the development of a number of technologies, which we believe will become more applicable and necessary with each successive nuclear weapon reduction initiative. This work includes the applied development of passive and active radiation measurement systems to determine the presence of nuclear weapons and/or materials, as well as new analysis software to make the best possible use of the data obtained from these measurements. Since these radiation measurement systems are by their very nature intrusive, they must have a certifiable information barrier as well as be able to be authenticated. Finally, arms control verification technologies are needed to establish and maintain continuity of knowledge of for weapons in storage and undergoing dismantlement, to include robust tamper-indicating devices (TID) and tamper-indicating enclosures (TIEs). These technologies may be applied in the near term to enhance confidence and verification of nuclear weapon reductions, and will be required in the longer term as verification requirements become even more demanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When States enter into treaties or executive agreements, verification of monitoring provisions is included in the agreement to allow the parties to determine whether the other party meets its agreed obligations. In many cases the verification or monitoring provisions require the use of technology. In the area of arms control and nonproliferation, the Office of Dismantlement and Transparency in the National Nuclear Security Administration manages a program focused on developing effective verification and monitoring options for use by the United States Government for dismantling nuclear equipment, weapons, and weapon components and on developing verification and monitoring equipment, technology, and tools to ensure that obligations undertaken by foreign governments are being met. The general purpose of this program is to increase the capability to determine the presence of nuclear materials and/or nuclear weapons that have been declared as part of a bilateral or multilateral agreement, and to establish control and track weapons and/or their components that have been declared as part of an agreement, from deployment through storage, dismantlement and disposition. To effectively implement technology in a regime, both parties need to be familiar with the proposed technology, and confident that the technology will perform as expected without compromising sensitive information. To be prepared to meet this requirement, the U.S. National Laboratories and the Russian Federation Science Institutes have over the past decade engaged in cooperative technology development to explore issues associated with equipment development, application and authentication for potential future arms control initiatives, and in this case developed a generic measurement system for verifying plutonium attributes that incorporated an information barrier to protect sensitive information. Both the historical context and policy rationale for this cooperation will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]