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The trade policies of Brazil, India and South Africa have significant historical similarities: these countries are original WTO members; they adopted import-substitution industrialization; promoted neoliberal reforms; have been playing important roles in their regional contexts; and, more recently, they have also formed alliances and coalitions (IBSA, G20) in order to increase their capacity to influence the trade regime. At the same time, they are intensifying bilateral and regional ties which are different in scope and degrees of institutionalization. The result is that, despite of having similar roles which are derived from their status as middle powers, these three countries have developed different strategies concerning their trade policy. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze comparatively the trade policies of Brazil, India and South Africa in the multilateral and regional environments. Our contention is that there are significant differences in their conduct on those two levels, in such a way that it is not possible to establish a fixed pattern of trade policy amongst middle powers, at least not amongst these three. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2003, India, Brazil, and South Africa inaugurated the IBSA Alliance, which aimed to become what South African President Thabo Mbeki hailed as a "G-8 of the South." The three nations would try to expand the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, modify the TRIPS laws, and impel the US and EU to eliminate agricultural subsidies. The countries also agreed to cooperate in agricultural research, IT, trade, and defense (among other issues). This paper asks four broad questions: 1. Can the paradigms of international relations (e.g., realism, pluralism, Marxism, etc.) explain the IBSA alliance? 2. Will IBSA be able to accomplish its stated goals? 3. Has the IBSA alliance modified the foreign policies of the participant states? 4. Is the creation of IBSA emblematic of a new global architecture? I argue that none of the IR paradigms alone can explain IBSA; IBSA may achieve success in its clearly stated goals but will be unsuccessful in its other goals; the alliance has slightly modified the countries' foreign policies; the creation of IBSA does indeed represent a change in the world political-economic system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions can central governments control or reverse processes of decentralization? Why do some central governments actually push for certain decentralizing moves, when it would seem this concedes power to subnational governments? In this paper I explore developments in intergovernmental relations in Brazil and South Africa since 1994. I conclude that processes of decentralization over the last decade have not always enhanced, but have sometimes actually reduced the autonomy of subnational governments. In both cases, central governments have increasingly worked through bureaucratic channels to earmark the money that flows to the states (estados) and provinces. Central governments in both countries have also recently placed restrictions on the ability of states and provinces to borrow money. The comparison shows that similar changes in intergovernmental relations can occur across countries with different histories and institutions. In limiting or reducing subnational autonomy, strong presidential leverage within governing coalitions was crucial; this leverage can be wielded either in the legislative arena, or within the executive. At the same time, variations across the cases point to an additional causal factor affecting the outcomes in these countries: economic crisis. The Brazilian president’s successful reckoning with a generalized economic crisis gave him leverage that South Africa’s president did not have, and this enabled the more dynamic set of (re)centralizing changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]