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“On Four Immanent Ontologies in Gilles Deleuze at the Crosspoint between The Movement Image and Difference and Repetition”. By serially arranging Difference and Repetition (1968) and The Movement Image (1983) this paper sketches four trails in Gilles Deleuze’s divergent ontology, showing how each of the montage schools of classical cinema implies a determinate inversion in relation to four facets of the philosophical tradition represented by Hume, Spinoza, Hegel and Descartes. The taxonomy of the cinema studies opens clear paths in Deleuze’s obscure ontology. The book of 1968 reveals the philosophical load implicit in the cinematographic developments; at the same time, it shows the divergencies and incompatibilities that growl under the apparent neatness of the classification of cinematographic images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The alētheia of Cats. Balthus, Rilke and the Problem of the 'Open'". This paper takes as a starting point the artistic collaboration between Rainer Maria Rilke and Balthazar Klossowski -Balthus-, which took the form of a book entitled Mitsou. Story of a Cat, illustrated by the young painter and foreworded by the poet. This case study serves as a guiding thread running through a deep analysis of the problem of the "Open", a noumenic concept coined by Rilke in his creative exchange with Balthus. This concept was specifically discussed by Martin Heidegger. Thus, the present paper attempts to address the implications of affinity and confrontation between Rilke and Heidegger and to explore the metaphorical figure of the cat as the expression of certain animality within the unveiling that takes place in the Da-sein. For this purpose, it will also be necessary to explore theoretical key approaches taken from Ortega y Gasset and Schopenhauer, as well as critical positions particularly relevant in this field defended by Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida, which tend towards an animalistic ontology of alētheia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to reconstruct the spinozian theory of individuation as presented by Deleuze in his works about Spinoza, relating it to his ontology in Difference and Repetition (his main ontological work), with the purpose of elaborating a critical reading on the ambiguities that emerge concerning the spinozian-deleuzian notion of joy. The latter occur, for example, when an excessive value is given to the series of stages in the course of learning that leads to the spinozian salvation, reason why the approach is reduced to an accumulative, end-oriented race towards maximizing joy, an accumulation of joyful passions considered an end in itself. I think that fracturing the image of "Deleuze's Spinoza" is one way to highlight and delve in the question on the place of negativity in deleuzian philosophy. This will also allow us to free it from those readings that aim to make it an ideological ally of neoliberalism, contributing, instead, to the formulation of an ethics of intensive quantities -this being the ethical approach in Difference and Repetition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As it is well known, throughout Being and Time Heidegger distinguishes between an ontic (Entdecken) and an ontological (Erschlossenheit) sense of truth. Whereas the first one involves truth, insofar as a way in which the Dasein can be concerning beings, the second one corresponds to the manner in which the Dasein opens and comprehends their being. In this paper, we will focus on developing the phenomenological aspect of the second sense of truth and its relation with the first one. We will recreate, first and foremost, Heidegger's characterization of the ontological sense. Then, we will make use of the asymmetry between both kinds of senses to inquire about the problem of normativity presupposed in his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to carry out a comparative exercise between the comparisons made by me and those made by the Toba people (qom) of the Argentinean Chaco. I will try to elucidate the tools with which they and I made these comparisons possible. I will refer to three events that occurred during my fieldwork carried out from 1997 to the present. These cases are related to the context of that we may call as «madness», and that have ontological implications. The events show the contrasts explained by my indigenous interlocutors between a non indigenous and a qom way of conceiving madnessbecoming- other. These ethnographic cases will allow us to reflect upon the challenges involved in concentrating on the quid of the comparison from the Toba point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Derrida often says that the question of other living beings, i.e., of the other than the human, has always concerned his writing, even when it was not an explicit theme of his formulations. This paper aims to address this assertion as an occasion to question whether such concern was similarly treated in all cases, or if perhaps the different topics, interlocutors and, in short, textures that Derridian writing goes through, do not bring relevant philosophical impacts for the approach of such problem. To do so, The voice and the phenomenon (1967) will be studied through the main thesis of plantism as developed by M. Marder and J.T. Nealon, recognizing nevertheless that plants do not usually constitute the non-human living beings Derrida refers to. In this sense, and without pretending to "reveal what Derrida really meant", this research seeks to examine a series of tools that we find particularly interesting to approach subjectivity from a postmetaphysical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy has been frequently underestimated as a result of the misunderstanding of his ontological proposal, specifically because of the complexity of his concept of idea. The aim of this paper is then to clarify and explain that concept because from it depends the correct understanding of Berkeley's ontological and immaterialist proposal. To do this, 1) I will show some examples of the misunderstanding that the berkeleian proposal has had, mainly due to his concept of idea; 2) I will track how this notion was being developed in Berkeley's early notes, known as Philosophical Commentaries; 3) I will analyze and explain the concept of idea from the published work of Berkeley, that is, from the Principles and Dialogues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are we to understand the contradiction of a philosophy that claims to be a legitimate heir of the phenomenological tradition but, at the same time, intends to break free from its limits to allow an unconditioned manifestation? Should we comprehend Jean-Luc Marion's work as a true renovation of phenomenology -as he and his followers do-, or should we instead consider it as a pure theology independent from the phenomenological movement? Why would the theological way be the only possible way out of the crisis of contemporary metaphysics denounced by Marion and, even more, a necessary way? To answer these and other questions, this paper develops some of the paradoxes that arise from the Marionian theological turn, distinguishing two possible ways of understanding its Kehre: either as a deviation that allows extending phenomenology to new fields, or as a return to and abandonment of the phenomenological project. Finally, we wonder if Marion's proposal of a gradual ontology does not encourage a third possible way, which would lead us to think of his thought not as phenomenology anymore, but as a gradualist-theological fansiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]