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Well in advance of Calvin's entry into his vocation as a reformer of the church in Geneva and Strasbourg, the sixteenth century had already displayed a remarkable preoccupation with biblical interpretation and, as a consequence, an unprecedented eruption of exegetical publications. Factors contributing to this eruption are not difficult to identify, and Calvin's career and character as a biblical interpreter would recapitulate most of them. To begin with, the medium of intellectual exchange was forever altered by the dissemination of the printing press throughout Europe. As the costs of printing fell, books ceased to be a luxury item. Coupled to the growth of printing was a rising tide of scholarship that both consumed and produced those books. The humanist cry: Ad fontes - “back to the sources” - fueled scholars' appetites for these same sources as they emerged from the presses. Scholarship itself, along with scholarly standards, kept pace. A mastery of Latin alone was no longer enough to make one a respectable scholar: Greek and Hebrew were also required, and the growing competence of sixteenth-century scholars nourished, in turn, keener critical skills. For example, if these burgeoning sources, editions, and tools reminded scholars and preachers that there were new discoveries to be made in their old Bibles, Erasmus' early textual criticism of the New Testament undermined the magisterium of the Latin Vulgate and warned his readers they could not take even the wording of the Bible for granted, much less its theological content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This account of Jordan's role in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war has highlighted many aspects of the difficulties imposed upon Jordan as a result of the contradictions arising from its impoverished state, its pro-Western policies and its commitment to Arabism. It has also stressed the deep divisions within the Arab world that characterized the 1950s and 1960s, as well as revealing aspects of the 1967 war which have only previously been fleetingly described. The intimate relationship between foreign and domestic affairs in Jordan has been evident throughout this study. Two reasons for this coalescence can be discerned: Jordan's political and economic dependence on other nations and its Palestinian population. Political dependence stems from its weak military capability and fear that its powerful neighbour, Israel, had never forsaken its desire to expand its territory. Consequently, Jordan turned to other nations for financial support for the maintenance of its army and sought to belong to a regional defence system. Jordan's economic dependence stems from its meagre natural resources and its underdeveloped economy, forcing it into a position of dependence on foreign financial aid. Its limited internal market also made it essential for Jordan to seek markets abroad, particularly in neighbouring Arab states. As a result Jordan has been vulnerable to external pressures. Jordan's Palestinian population is also responsible for the intimate relationship between Jordan's foreign and domestic affairs. Over half of Jordan's citizens are Palestinians and, prior to 1967, many were highly susceptible to the propaganda of Egypt, Syria and the PLO which accused the Jordanian government of failing to meet its commitments to the Palestinians and to the ideal of Arab co-operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war record On 3 June King Hussein received the Turkish Ambassador who informed him that Israel would start its offensive on 5 or 6 June with an air strike on Egypt's air bases. According to Juma'a this information was confirmed by the Iraqi Ambassador who visited him on 4 June and told him that according to their information Israel would open hostilities the following morning, that is, on 5 June. Juma'a and the Iraqi Ambassador then visited King Hussein to inform him of this development. King Hussein immediately told Khammash who informed Riad of the news. At King Hussein's request it was conveyed at once to the Egyptian High Command in Cairo. The Egyptians replied that they were expecting such an attack and were prepared for it. This was the third time that Jordan had warned Egypt that Israel was likely to commence hostilities in this way. The previous occasions had been at the meeting with Nasser on 30 May and 3 June when King Hussein had told Nasser that all the information coming into Jordan pointed to a surprise attack by Israel on Egyptian airfields on 5 or 6 June. At 7 a.m. the next day the Jordanian radar station at Ajloun showed intense aerial activity over Israel. This information was conveyed to Riad who immediately passed it on to the Egyptian High Command. However, the Egyptian High Command did not receive this message and consequently no alert was issued to its air force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of military operations in Jordan The universal feeling amongst the Jordanian and military leaders who were either observers or actively involved in the 1967 war was that their major mistake was to rely on the help and leadership of other Arab nations. Although they do not believe that Israel could have been prevented from seizing the West Bank they do feel that they would have put up a harder fight on their own. King Hussein later commented: In my view our first error was the fact that we did not organize our military operations on the basis of our own plans and according to our own capabilities. For so many years they talked to us about the Arab Command, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Arab armies and the assistance we could expect from our brethren … We relied on that which was natural. We should not have done so. For if we had not depended on the potential of outside support … war with Israel would undoubtedly have taken a totally different course. When one expects the air cover that I expected it was imperative that one acted the way I did. If our men had known from the beginning that they could not expect support from either Egypt, Syria or Iraq our strategy would have been different and Jerusalem would have been ours today. For during the first few days of this rapid war we placed Arab interest above our own. This is how I understood solidarity. Unfortunately no one else adhered to the same principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]