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The three kingdoms of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary were among the largest in sixteenth-century Europe. Together they filled the area bounded by Germany, the Baltic, Russia and the Balkans, or, in the terms of physical geography, the basins of the Oder, Vistula and middle Danube. They occupied a central position also in respect of political development, for while they lagged behind the western European states they were in advance of Russia and Turkey. It is this central position which constitutes their historical interest: the balance of power between the landowners and the monarchy was so even throughout the century as to give to their relations, whether of conflict or co-operation, a significance that illuminates the more decisive conflicts which were at the same time being waged in the extremer parts of Europe. The accession of Sigismund I ‘the Old’, of the Jagiellon dynasty, to the Polish throne in 1506, and of Ferdinand I of Habsburg, brother of the Emperor Charles V and already ruler of the complex of the hereditary Austrian lands, to the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary in 1526, may be said to mark the beginning of the conflict, for they both succeeded to fainéant kings against whom the landowners had virtually had things all their own way. The kingdoms to which they acceded were still medieval in the looseness of their political structure. Sigismund's inheritance was not even in name a kingdom but a rzecz pospolita or respublica; the half-dozen duchies into which the kingdom of Poland had fallen apart in the twelfth century had not yet all been brought under the direct rule of the king, for the duchy of Mazovia was not incorporated until the failure of heirs to its last duke, who died in 1526. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

the allied coalition breaks By the time the war came to an end in Europe, the victorious Allies, as we have seen, had failed to conclude any prior agreements on the shape of the future peace. The U.S. leaders continued to place much faith in the efficacy of the future United Nations and in such vague statements as the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. Churchill, much more practical and experienced, had attempted to win an understanding on future spheres of influence, at least in the Balkans. With the lack of any previous arrangements, the political structure of the Eastern and Central European countries was in practice to be decided by the armies of occupation. This situation was recognized early by Stalin, who in April 1945 expressed to Tito his opinion on the “distinctive nature” of the situation: “This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.” In 1945, however, many aspects of the future peace settlement could not accurately be foretold. The massive decline in the power and influence of Britain and France and the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two great powers were not yet fully understood. All of the governments devoted their major attention to the immediate issues and the liquidation of the conflict in the Far East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

immediate postwar problems The period between the two great world wars was one of persistent crisis both in Europe and in the Balkans. In fact, only a few years of relative tranquility or prosperity were to be given the Balkan people between 1918 and 1940, when the area again became the scene of major military campaigns. The conflicts among the states and the internal social, political, economic, and national tensions were to be made more intense at the end of the 1920s by the effects of the Great Depression, the most severe period of economic crisis known to the Western world. In the immediate postwar period all of the Balkan states had to meet four major problems: (1) the continuation of the national struggles both within and among the nations; (2) the new economic problems caused in part by the war and the agrarian question; (3) the Bolshevik revolution and its effects on both international relations and the internal politics of the states; and (4) the necessity of read-justing international relations as a result of the removal of Ottoman-Turkish, German, Russian, and Habsburg great-power influence. After a brief review of these issues, we can turn to a discussion of the events in each state in the decade after the war. The national issues The peace settlements in no way settled the national conflicts in Eastern Europe; in fact, in many respects these were to become more tense and bitter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In considering the history of the Habsburg Empire after 1867, it is important to emphasize that the state had in fact three governments. At the top stood the joint Austro-Hungarian administration with the common ministries for foreign affairs, war, and finance. In addition, separate governments existed for Austria and for Hungary. The major unifying figure in this arrangement was Franz Joseph, who was emperor in Austria and king in Hungary. A constitutional monarch throughout his realm, he nevertheless had different powers in each half. In practice, his influence on military affairs and foreign policy was strong, but he could not effectively control domestic events in any part of his domain. A further unifying element was provided by the fact that delegations of sixty members each from the Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian parliament met alternately in Vienna and Budapest to handle certain common problems. However, for the majority of the Habsburg population, the decisions of the separate Austrian and Hungarian governments were more important than the work of the joint institutions. It will be remembered that Austria was assigned Bukovina, Dalmatia, and the Slovenian lands; the great majority of the Habsburg Croats, Serbs, and Romanians, however, lived in the Hungarian crownlands (see Map 2). Although this narrative deals primarily with the South Slav and Romanian populations, their specific problems did not dominate the political life of the monarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]