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Various Islamic groups see recent events as presaging an ‘apocalypse’ that will see the destruction of the West. Some of these groups believe they can ‘hotwire’ this, i.e. bring it about through the use of WMD in anti-Western attacks. However, their ability to do so is doubtful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter explores various aspects of medical counter-measures–mainly, hospital-based, following a terrorism chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack in urban environment. It points why the medical community does not seem to be ready to handle mass casualties following dispersal of weapons of mass destruction and attempts to provide certain guidelines that might help address the problem in the near future based on the international experience and the experience gained during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combining China, Japan, and South Korea at the core with eventual inclusion of other areas, from the eastern edge of Russia to North Korea, regionalism is taking shape in NEA after a rough decade of false starts and uncoordinated, if repeatedly refreshed, hopes. The process has been arduous because of the historical legacy in the region, the difficulty in building on truncated forces of globalization and localism, and domestic uncertainties in defining priorities at a time of resurgent nationalism. Examining the record of failure to realize regional goals in the transitional decade after the cold war, we can draw useful lessons on how regionalism in NEA can be fully realized. From the chronology of past efforts we discern that a drive for regionalism is likely to come from: 1) the extraordinary pace of intraregional trade and investment, driven of late by the dynamism of coastal China as well as the spillover from increased openness with entry into the WTO; 2) a backlash from assertive unilateralism by the United States, pressing down on nations anxious to gain foreign-policy leverage; 3) a common interest in stabilizing systemic change in North Korea and Sino-Japanese volatility; and 4) a shared competitive streak that recognizes the limited influence of each of their separate economies, along with the compelling benefits to be achieved from the larger scale and international recognition of a regional voice on economics first of all. Why does regionalism matter to the nations of NEA? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The balance shifted in 2001 to greater globalization, interpreted as priority for security and insistence on active U.S. leadership. The change began when the Bush administration took office and accelerated after the September 11 attack on the United States. This shift altered the environment for regionalism, which was squeezed between new U.S. assertiveness and resurgent nuclear blackmail by North Korea. By 2003 Japan's growing military activism and South Korea's reinforced soft posture toward the North aroused doubts that could have complicated the search for regionalism. If it seemed that divisive forces would overwhelm integrative ones, we can also find reminders that the main actors continued to pursue regionalism and now had additional reasons to work together. Looking ahead to the year 2002, boosters of regionalism in early 2001 had seen the possibility of a breakthrough. Japan and South Korea would jointly hold the World Cup, drawing close together in this shared experience. Power in China would pass to a younger generation of better-educated leaders at the 16th Party Congress just as China would be implementing its WTO commitment to openness. Moving pragmatically closer to the West, Vladimir Putin would become a more reliable partner in Asia too as well as an energy supplier with a need for Asian markets. A new style of leadership in Japan by Koizumi Junichiro, who took office in April, would at last accelerate economic reforms and raise that country's leadership profile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization swept forward as the U.S. economy reached the apex of its boom and the successful conclusion of the war over Yugoslavia confirmed the unlimited reach of U.S. military force. The futile objections of China and Russia during the war period demonstrated that great-power differences no longer could exercise a restraining force. United States triumphalism reached its peak. No rival challenged the military dominance of the world's lone superpower, and only isolationist states such as North Korea resisted its economic penetration. Cultural diffusion also intensified, to the alarm of national elites as well as the various losers in globalization. A backlash was building that found only two outlets: 1) terrorism to use destructive force surreptitiously so that retaliation would be difficult; and 2) regionalism to pool multiple national resources in order to find balance against one or another form of U.S. hegemony. Regionalism in NEA found new life both as a by-product of increased economic interaction and as expression of a desire to balance the overwhelming power of the United States. Given the ambivalence of nationalist elements, each country was tempted to take a shortcut to make regionalism appear unthreatening. In 1999 and 2000 the United States was preoccupied with first the war in Yugoslavia, then the political struggle over Clinton's personal life, and finally a nail-biting presidential election. Apart from a late burst of talks with North Korea, it was satisfied with a holding operation in NEA, even as other countries explored new cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 1993 ended with the Seattle APEC summit, the first occasion when the leaders of this organization established in 1989 met to set an agenda for cooperation. This upgraded meeting conveyed the unmistakable message that a more robust organization was sought, but for what purpose? The balance between regionalism and globalization was at stake. On the one hand, Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia had advocated creation of the EAEC to exclude non-Asians, notably all nations with white Anglo-Saxon majorities. If initially this idea had been rejected, it still resonated in some circles and talk of some sort of regional entity in NEA or together with SEA persisted. On the other hand, Bill Clinton had invited the leaders to Seattle to further institutionalize their activities within a global context, seeking a commitment to reduce trade barriers and new financial openness consistent with the U.S. global agenda. After all, the United States had greeted APEC as a mechanism for placing trans-Pacific interests over Asian ones, and in the uncertainty of 1993 after the euphoria of 1991–2 this goal required reinforcement. In the background a transnational discussion of Samuel Huntington's provocative warning about an emerging “clash of civilizations” helped to place issues of regionalism in a context of questions of cultural disposition toward the role of the state, the place of the market, and the degree of openness to foreign ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1990s were supposed to be the decade when the countries of Northeast Asia (NEA) coalesced into a region that is greater than the sum of its parts. Still a major center of development through the eighteenth century with the world's two largest cities (Tokyo and Beijing), it fell on hard times: first with an intensified inward-orientation in each country, then with the arrival of imperialism, and finally with impassable dividing lines lasting throughout the cold war. Suddenly, hope arose that a spirit of cooperation would turn NEA from the depths of division to the heights of integrated development. The result could be a rival for the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a framework for reconfiguring great power relations. Instead, the residue of the cold war suffocated the sprouts of regionalism. The potential remains; a breakthrough could be reached although further delay is likely due to reluctance to embrace regionalism by balancing globalization and nationalism. At first glance, NEA would seem to have what it takes to establish a recognized community with its own formal organizations and regional consciousness. Parts of the area enjoy a high level of prosperity accompanied by determination to achieve economic integration with surrounding countries. The three core states of China, Japan, and South Korea have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), committing to reduce barriers to economic ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]