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Security and intelligence are alternative approaches to counter-terrorism policies. Which one of them is more appropriate for Balkan counter-terrorism policies? I argue that the selection of a policy strategy should depend on the risk assessment of the overall Balkan conflict potential. This article aims to show that a major threat to the Balkan politics and state are currently local ethno-national conflicts. The latter – although considerably contained – still destabilise the Balkan region by sporadic campaigns of local terrorism and provide incentives for local terrorist groups to seek co-operation with global terrorism and trans-state crime syndicates. Drawing on regional risk assessment, I argue that security studies and intelligence should inform and complement each other in the planning of counter-terrorism strategies in the Balkans. However, security studies should take the lead and counter-terrorism strategies should be discussed in the context of conventional peace-keeping aimed at the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies and states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The involvement of the United Nations in Somalia was a product of the new international climate created by the end of the Cold War and by the dramatic success of Operation Desert Storm, and its aftermath in 1991. For the UN, the Somali operation, which at its height employed a force of 28,000 at an estimated cost of US $1.5 billion, broke new ground in two ways. Under Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the Charter to authorise the establishment of an Unified Task Force (UNITAF), under United States command and control, ‘in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia'. This was the first time that an unambiguously internal and humanitarian crisis had been designated as a threat to international peace and security, thus justifying peace-enforcement measures. Secondly, with this and subsequent resolutions, the UN dropped the pretence that its involvement in Somalia arose out of an invitation from the government – although the Council continued to refer to ‘urgent calls from Somalia … to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance’ – since no government existed with the authority to issue such an invitation. For the first time, statelessness was acknowledged to be a threat to an international society composed of sovereign states. The United Nations did not extend its prerogatives in these ways either willingly or as the result of a deliberate and carefully worked out international strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experience of the United Nations in former Yugoslavia up to the end of 1994 was a depressing one, especially as it followed the success of the Gulf War, and the prospect of a ‘new world order’ in 1991. Regional organisations like the European Union (EU) and NATO were also infected by the miasma of failure. In this chapter the wreckage is examined: what caused the disappointment of the high hopes of a successful intervention? Was the failure as total as some feared? What lessons can be extracted about relations between the regional and the global organisations in protecting the peace? In the body of the chapter the main currents in the UN's drift to disaster are charted, not in terms of the incidents on the ground, but in the decisions of those who controlled the agenda. In a concluding section some lessons for the future are deduced. The break-up of the Yugoslav Federation Following Tito's death, the rigidities of the Cold War international system held Yugoslavia together for a while, but the demise of communism and the ensuing cataclysmic changes in eastern Europe released the centrifugal pressures which had previously been contained. By the beginning of the 1990s there was rising tension between the republics of Serbia and Croatia, the two dominant segments of the old state. Yet it was Slovenia which took the lead in the race for independence, by holding a plebiscite in December 1990, which produced an overwhelming majority in favour of severing links with the Yugoslav Federation. Despite attempts by all parties to renegotiate the constitution of Yugoslavia along looser confederal lines, the political, economic and ethnic fissures between the various republics deepened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nations and peoples of the United Nations are fortunate in a way that those of the League of Nations were not. We have been given a second chance to create the world of our Charter that they were denied. With the cold war ended we have drawn back from the brink of a confrontation that threatened the world, and, too often, paralysed our organisation. What are the chances that international society will be able to respond positively to the second chance identified by the United Nations Secretary-General? The scale of UN activity since the end of the Cold War might be offered as evidence that we are entering an era when international obligations will at last rank alongside the defence of national interests, even if they will not necessarily take precedence over them. Of the twenty-nine ‘peacekeeping’ operations established by the UN since 1945, sixteen have been created since 1987. At the same time, few of these operations have been unqualified successes, and the demands placed on the UN system can equally be interpreted as evidence of spreading chaos and widespread threats to stability and international order in the wake of the collapse of familiar Cold War structures. Moreover, the potential demand for UN intervention around the world is clearly greater than the Organisation's ability to respond, given the resources currently available to it, or which seem likely to be made available in the foreseeable future. Indeed, by the end of 1993 there were clear signs that the governments of the major powers were more interested in limiting than extending their international commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations operation in Cambodia during 1992–3 was, at the time, the most ambitious and expensive undertaking in the peacekeeping experience of the Organisation. At a cost of around US $1.7 billion, 22,000 military and civilian personnel were deployed to implement the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict which had been concluded at an international conference in Paris on 23 October 1991. That settlement made provision for a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) charged with holding the ring politically so that elections under its aegis could determine the future governance of a country long afflicted by violent upheaval and human suffering. UNTAC was provided with exceptional resources but its mandate was restricted to peacekeeping. Peace enforcement, which had been demonstrated early in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm, was not any part of UNTAC's remit which was confined, in essence, to a quasiadministrative role. The critical problem confronted by UNTAC virtually from the outset of its deployment was how to discharge responsibility for filling a political vacuum in the face of obstructive violence by contending Cambodian parties. The notorious Khmer Rouge refused totally to cooperate in implementing the Paris Agreement which it had signed, while the incumbent administration in Phnom Penh also used violence to force the outcome of the elections in which it would participate. In the event, UNTAC assumed a calculated risk in embarking on elections, which were conducted without serious disruption. No single party secured an overall majority, which paved the way for a coalition government which excluded the Khmer Rouge. They had repudiated the electoral process but failed to disrupt it with an effective military challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]