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This overview of ethical thought has a merely introductory character. It does not enter into discussions of philosophical views. Axiology or Theory of Value is the discipline addressing values in general; it comprises the study of what makes things desirable. Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics constitute the current main divisions in the field of ethical studies. In the history of Western Philosophy there are three main Normative Ethics theories: Virtue Ethics, Consequentialist Ethics, and Deontological Ethics. Rationality is traditionally equated with experimental or mathematical scientificity, and Epistemology is currently often defined as the study of knowledge as justified true belief. Ethical or Moral Epistemology is concerned with moral beliefs. Reason being theoretical and practical, unique and multiple, valid belief is a broader epistemological category and seemingly more accurate than true belief, as it encompasses all kinds of beliefs and agreed reasons for justifying them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chapter 5 of the book "Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense" is presented. It explores metaphilosophical perspectives on pragmatist metaethics. It examines whether the pragmatist conception of philosophy in moral realism and the status of ethics can be associated to the idea of applied philosophy and philosophical theory. It discusses the traditional idea of applied philosophy as applied science and cites the philosophers' view of applied philosophy as being basically scientific in nature.

The article focuses on traditional and scientific ethics. It mentions that scientific ethics is an application of the axiological framework to the human person and scientific moral disciplines such as economics, sociology, and aesthetics. It notes that meta-disciplines are more exact and more comprehensive than traditional disciplines, and differ in their scientific character.

Chapter Five, Part 7 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of overridden duty in moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the moral considerations for the reality of overridden duty and the appropriateness of the guilt-feelings and sentiments with respect to moral dilemmas and conflicts.

Chapter Five, Part 6 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of moral dilemmas and moral luck on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the connection between phenomenological theory of moral dilemmas and the notion of moral luck and its relation to the concept of evil deeds called dirty hands.

Chapter Five, Part 5 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of moral dilemmas with respect to the moral costs and internal justification for regret. It highlights the concept of internal justification for regret in moral dilemmas resulting from the conflict between obligations and duties, and the appropriateness of moral considerations on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Five, Part 3 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of moral dilemmas with respect to guilt feelings and evil actions termed as dirty hands. It highlights the conflicting obligations essential to the reality of moral dilemmas and the considerations for the validity of feelings of guilt and remorse on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Five, Part 2 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of moral dilemmas with respect to the overridden of duties. It highlights the nature of the reality of the overridden duty, the considerations for this reality, and the logical structure characteristic of moral conflict on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Five, Part 4 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of moral dilemmas with respect to the external justification for guilt-feelings. It highlights the three types of external justification for guilt-feelings in moral dilemma including moral character, utilitarian considerations, and personal identity on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Five, Part 1 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the arguments on the validity and reality of moral dilemmas with respect to the defeasibility of duties. It highlights the conditions for the defeasibility of moral duties and the characteristics of the kind of defeat in situations related to moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Four, Part 3 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the skeptical considerations in moral dilemmas on the basis of the right-answer thesis (RAT) and the conflicts between incommensurable considerations on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the skepticism about the existence of a right answer to moral dilemmas or hard cases based on the general skepticism with respect to moral and legal propositions without truth-value.

Chapter Four, Part 5 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the distinction between prima facie obligations and actual moral obligations which are essential to the notion of moral dilemmas and the conflicts between moral considerations. It highlights the moral objections to the existence of a right answer to moral dilemmas with respect to the distinction between the two obligations on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Three, Part 4 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the idea of moral theory and the plurality of values with respect to moral dilemmas and the conflict between incommensurable considerations on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the concepts of personal autonomy as highly valuable, moral pluralism as a condition for autonomy, and the natural objection to theories denying such plurality.

Chapter Three, Part 3 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the comparability of incommensurable values based on the difference between the incommensurable lengths and incommensurable scientific theories with respect to moral dilemmas. It highlights the conflict between incommensurable considerations and its relation to moral values and moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Three, Part 2 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the mathematical and theoretical meaning of incommensurability of moral values and moral dilemmas and the conflicts between incommensurable considerations. It highlights the difference between the mathematical meaning and the ethical theories of incommensurability with respect to moral values and moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Two, Part 4 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the ethical theory and the principles of moral dilemmas involving moral judgments, meta-normative choices, and meta-prescriptive impositions. It highlights the logical possibility and existence of moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level based on the conditions for the validity of moral norms.

Chapter Two, Part 3 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the principle called ought-implies-can (OIC) in the context of the possibility of moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the connection between the OIC principle and moral dilemmas and the argument concerning the conflicting status of a duty and an obligation with respect to the validity of an unfulfilled expectation.

Chapter Two of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the logical possibility of moral dilemmas and the logical inconsistency of moral situations in which an agent is faced with the conflict between obligations and duties. It highlights the paradoxical conditions for the existence of moral dilemmas and the issues of consistency of a systematic ethical judgment in the meta-ethical level.

Chapter One, Part 5 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the types of moral dilemmas in the meta-ethical level in which the options involve doing something bad or wrong and the options that does not involve evil actions. It highlights the relationship between the types of dilemmas in the context of imperfect duties and the types of moral conflicts involved in dilemmas including normative, cognitive, and conative conflicts.

Chapter One, Part 2 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the nature and structure of moral dilemmas and the possibility of a dilemma in the meta-ethical contexts. It highlights the conditions for the existence of a dilemma, the necessity of an evil act based on the idea of a choice between evil actions and options, and the concept and irresolvability of dilemmas.

Chapter One, Part 1 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the definitions of moral dilemma and moral conflict and their classifications and related issues on the meta-ethical level. It focuses on the conflicts between options and actions, the concept of moral dilemma in the philosophical context, and the discussions on the distinction between conflicts and dilemmas.

The article presents a summary of the arguments on moral dilemmas in the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman. It discusses the nature of moral dilemmas, the structure of the situations, and the conflicts between options in moral conflicts. It also highlights the connection between the doctrines related to moral dilemmas including the reality of dilemmas, the incommensurability of moral values, and the moral objections to ethical theories.

Chapter Four, Part 4 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the moral objections to the right-answer thesis (RAT) in moral dilemmas and the conflicts between moral considerations on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the conditions for the existence of a right answer to moral dilemmas and moral restrictions and the possibility of self-creation, moral pluralism, and moral reasoning.

Chapter Four, Part 1 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the phenomenological considerations involved in moral dilemmas on the basis of the right-answer thesis (RAT) and the conflicts between incommensurable considerations on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the conditions for the existence of a right answer to the dilemma which are supported by various considerations including moral advice, doubts, and mistakes.

Chapter Four, Part 2 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the theoretical considerations in moral dilemmas on the basis of the right-answer thesis (RAT) and the conflicts between incommensurable considerations on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the argument for RAT called the argument from the truth value of propositions (ATV) with respect to hard moral dilemma and its dispositive concept in the existence of a right answer to the dilemma.

Chapter Two, Part 1 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the principles of moral dilemmas and the definition of permissibility in a dilemma on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the necessary conditions for the fulfillment of an obligation without implications and the permissibility of moral dilemmas with contradicting moral experiences.

Chapter One, Part 3 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the nature of the uncertainty in moral dilemmas and the uncertain possibility of evil actions and related issues in the meta-ethical contexts. It highlights the discussions on moral uncertainty, the idea of a choice between actions and options, and agent preference between good and evil.

The article discusses the arguments from meta-awareness. It states that there is only the awareness of the empirical self if the awareness of timelessness is an event in time. It says that the expression on awareness of awareness is shown as a totally senseless expression by the arguments from meta-awareness. It adds that memory is a type of meta-experience but it is an event within time.

The article discusses the philosophy of metaphysics and metaethics. It states that Aristotle used nature to explain logic while Galileo used logic in explaining nature. It says that Galileo has written the true metaphysics in the logical sense which was explained to the physics of Aristotle. It says that the philosophical ethics have been used relevantly to understand moral reality.

Chapter Four of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the right-answer thesis (RAT) based on the considerations involved in the ought-implies-can principle and ethical theories with respect to moral dilemmas. It highlights the theoretical considerations in moral dilemmas and the associated conflicts between these considerations on the meta-ethical level.

Chapter Three, Part 1 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the idea of incommensurability of moral values and moral dilemmas and the conflicts between incommensurable considerations in moral dilemmas. It highlights the notion of incommensurability with respect to moral values and moral dilemmas and their different characteristics in the philosophical and meta-ethical contexts.

Chapter Two, Part 5 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the neutrality of deontic logic in moral dilemmas and its role in expressing the basic structure of moral discourse without commitment to any substantive ethical theories or views. It highlights the possibility of moral dilemmas based on the considerations expressing substantive moral attitudes at the deontic logic and meta-ethical levels.

Chapter Two, Part 2 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the logical possibility of moral dilemmas and the principle of agglomeration in a standard deontic logic and natural conception in the meta-ethical contexts. It highlights the qualification of the conditions for the possibility of moral dilemmas and the conflicting natural objections between ought-statements and other expressions associated with the phenomenon of moral dilemmas.

Chapter One, Part 7 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the nature of moral dilemmas in the meta-ethical level in situations where the options are incommensurable and the agent is ought to do two incompatible actions or forced to do evil. It highlights the necessary conditions for the existence of moral dilemmas and their dramatic and tragic nature in various situations.

Chapter One, Part 4 of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the conditions for the existence of tragedy in moral dilemmas and the effects of tragic situations which involve misery, pain, or suffering on an individual who made the tragic choice. It highlights the structure of moral dilemmas in the context of meta-ethical tragedy and the reactions generated by moral tragedy including denial, self-deception, and moral sensitivity and improvement.

Chapter Three of the book "Moral Dilemmas," by Daniel Statman, is presented. It explores the Right Answer Thesis (RAT) of which moral dilemmas have one right answer and are resolvable and the conflicts between incommensurable considerations in moral dilemmas on the meta-ethical level. It highlights the argument against the RAI from the notion of incommensurability and its meaning with respect to moral values and moral dilemmas.