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So when does an idea's time come? The answer lies in the match between idea and moment. An idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it. In 1989–90, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe fell. In a few countries, social movements had challenged and eroded communism; in other places, the regimes seemed to collapse of their own weight. In either case, however, the notion of becoming a normal European state was an idea whose time had come. Almost all the new governments that emerged looked to distance themselves from many communist-era practices and institutions. Elites and citizens generally thought of these changes as part of a “return to Europe.” Even those who argued that one could not “return” to a place (Europe) that one had never left still acknowledged the need for radical changes. Within a few years, elites and citizens also came to a broad consensus that their states should aspire to join the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and many subsequent institutional changes were pursued with these goals in mind. This book analyzes Central and Eastern European (CEE) states' efforts to return to Europe by trying to become members of the EU and NATO. Unlike available accounts of the “dual enlargement,” it pays particular attention to the proclivity of CEE elites to emulate existing institutions from Western Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “return to Europe” was to mean, in domestic terms, the establishment of “normal,” understood as West European-style institutions: a pluralist liberal-democratic political system and a market economy which could offer both consumer affluence and a developed welfare state. To focus on emulation, we must first clear up some misconceptions about CEE institutional change. Some see emulation as a straightforward tool for well-informed elites to quickly set up the right institutions following prevailing “best practices” (Memmelaar 1990). Others characterize it as the mindless and unreflective mimicry of those new elites who lack their own institution-building capacities (Krygier 2002). Still others emphasize precisely the robust institutional visions of the CEE opposition leaders who emerged from the communist era and deny that these elites had any use for emulation at all (Greskovits 1998). Misconceptions about timing also vary. For some observers, emulation was used only in a brief flurry after 1989, while others take roughly the opposite approach and suggest it was not used until NATO or EU conditionality forced the CEE states to adopt their practices. These are misconceptions not because they are simply wrong — for all are partially true — but because they cannot capture the range of things going on under the deceptively simple cover of “emulation.” This chapter focuses on two areas in which the EU had little leverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]