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This paper considers a secure and practical CRT-based RSA signature implementation against both side channel attacks (including power analysis attack, timing attack, and most specially the recent MRED attack) as well as the various CRT-based fault attacks. Moreover, the proposed countermeasure can resist C safe-error attack which can be mounted in many existing good countermeasures. To resist side-channel attack, a special design of random message blinding is employed. On the other hand, a countermeasure based on the idea of fault diffusion is developed to protect the implementation against the powerful CRT-based fault attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ARIA is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher having 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key lengths. The cipher is a substitution-permutation encryption network (SPN) that uses an involutional binary matrix. This paper shows that a careless implementation of ARIA on smartcards is vulnerable to a differential power analysis attack. This attack is realistic because we can measure power consumption signals at two kinds of S-boxes and two types of substitution layers. By analyzing the power traces, we can find all round keys and also extract a master key from only two round keys using circular rotation, XOR, and involutional operations for two types of layers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Korea standard block cipher, SEED, is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher with a more complex F function than DES. This paper shows that SEED is vulnerable to two types of side channel attacks, a fault analysis attack and a power analysis attack. The first one is a fault insertion analysis which induces permanent faults on the whole left register of 15-round. This attack allows one to obtain the secret key by using only two faulty cipher texts for encryption and decryption processing respectively. The second attack is a more realistic differential power analysis. This attack requires about 1000 power traces to find the full secret key. The above two attacks use a reverse property of the F function to obtain secret key, where the reverse property is derived from the our research. Keywords: Side channel attack, Fault insertion analysis, Differential power analysis, block cipher, SEED. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]