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This paper extends Alan John Simmons’s conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons’s main criticism.

Do territorial rights include the right to exclude? This claim is often assumed to be true in territorial rights theory. And if this claim is justified, a state may have a prima facie right to unilaterally exclude aliens from state territory. But is this claim justifiable? I examine the version of territorial rights that has the most compelling story to support the right to exclude: territorial rights as a kind of property right, where 'territory' refers to the public and common spaces included in the domain of state jurisdiction. I analyse the work of A. J. Simmons, who develops the political theory of John Locke into one of the most well-articulated and defended theories of territorial rights as a kind of property right. My main argument is that Simmons' justification for rights of exclusion, which are derived from individual rights of self-government, does not apply to many kinds of public spaces. An upshot of this analysis is that most Lockean-based theories of territorial rights will have a hard time justifying the right to exclude as a prima facie right held by states against aliens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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On what basis, and to what extent, are refugees obligated to obey the laws of their host countries? Consideration of the specific case of asylum-seekers generates, I think, two competing intuitions: (1) the refugee has a prima facie obligation to obey the laws of her host country and (2) none of the popularly canvassed substrates of political obligation—consent, tacit consent, fairness, or social role—is at all apt to explain the presence of this obligation. I contend that the unfashionable gratitude account of political obligation does the best job of accounting for the intuitions. As has been noticed by other commentators, obligations of gratitude are difficult to specify and subject to numerous cancelling conditions. I analyze these conditions in detail and conclude that if one accepts that gratitude is the basis of the political obligation of the refugee, then one must face up to just how frangible the obligation is. In particular, the obligation is conditional on the fair and generous treatment of refugees that is consistent with their dignity as human beings.

In his paper "Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap" (published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy), Jiafeng Zhu argues that the principle of fair play cannot require submission to the rules of a cooperative scheme, and that when such submission is required, the requirement is grounded in consent. I propose a better argument for the claim that fair play requires submission to the rules than the one Zhu considers. I also argue that Zhu's attribution of consent to people commonly thought to be bound to follow the rules by a duty of fair play is implausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen's liberty to reciprocate fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Klosko's account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some political philosophers have judged that it is absurd to think that there can be unintentional consent. In this paper, I present an example of unintentional consent, which I refer to as the adapted boardroom example. I consider reasons for denying that this is an example of unintentional consent but find that these reasons are unconvincing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On what basis, and to what extent, are refugees obligated to obey the laws of their host countries? Consideration of the specific case of asylum-seekers generates, I think, two competing intuitions: (1) the refugee has a prima facie obligation to obey the laws of her host country and (2) none of the popularly canvassed substrates of political obligation-consent, tacit consent, fairness, or social role-is at all apt to explain the presence of this obligation. I contend that the unfashionable gratitude account of political obligation does the best job of accounting for the intuitions. As has been noticed by other commentators, obligations of gratitude are difficult to specify and subject to numerous cancelling conditions. I analyze these conditions in detail and conclude that if one accepts that gratitude is the basis of the political obligation of the refugee, then one must face up to just how frangible the obligation is. In particular, the obligation is conditional on the fair and generous treatment of refugees that is consistent with their dignity as human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article, Arthur Applbaum contributes a new view-legitimacy as a moral power-to the debate over the concept of political legitimacy. Applbaum rejects competing views of legitimacy, in particular legitimacy as a claim-right to have the law obeyed, for mistakenly invoking substantive moral argument in the conceptual analysis, and concludes that "at the core of the concept-what legitimacy is" is only a Hohfeldian moral power. In this article, I contend that: (1) Applbaum's view of legitimacy, when fully unfolded, refers to more than a mere moral power and should therefore be rejected even by his own standards; (2) Applbaum's rejection of competing views of legitimacy ultimately relies on a claim that he does not successfully defend, namely, the claim that moral duties are of absolute rather than prima facie force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have considered the Huxley-Simmons manoeuvre. On the assumption that the quick release is an elastic process and on the basis of the isometric tension and of the stiffness of the muscle fibre we calculated that the spontaneous release of the fibre requires ∼43 μs, which is much faster than the observed release, ∼180 μs. We concluded that the observed quick release is a guided process. After proper selection of the mass and of the stiffness of the system we mimicked the early recovery and noticed that most of the energy required to accomplish the early recovery is supplied by the kinetic energy accumulated during the course of the quick release. We computed that the frequency of the working strokes in the half sarcomere was between 4×106 and 40×106 s-1. This is not to say that the ATPase rate constants are accumulative but only that the overall frequency of the working strokes in the half saromere is many orders of magnitude faster than the average ATPase rate constant. With this frequency no part of the Huxley-Simmons manoeuvre, quick release included, escapes the control of the working stroke. This means also that there is no reason to take the early recovery as an indication of the length of the working stroke. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present our experience with fat injections in the treatment of two cases of facial lipodistrophies. The surgical technique as well as the followup of the two clinical cases are presented in order to evaluate the long post-operative results. Among the different techniques used by us for correcting the soft tissues of the facial contour, this has been by far the simpliest and easiest. We need longer followups and more clinical cases in order to point out some definite conclusions, however. Nevertheless, it is our impression in this preliminary report that this technique could have a place in the treatment of problems related to the soft tissues of the facial contour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]