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Psychotherapy is broadly concerned with secrets. Often our clients bring us things which they have never told anyone, subjects they have felt unable to broach. What happens in the relationship when a secret is uncovered? In this article, I discuss how one's secrets finally being uncovered can invoke shame. However, the shame of being seen in a new way can also create an opening that allows for a deeper intersubjective experience to unfold. Using Sartre's concept of the gaze of the other alongside Merleau‐Ponty's ideas of dehiscence, visibility/invisibility and intertwining, I explore the meaning of secrecy, guilt and shame for both therapist and client within the therapeutic relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Speaking to a small audience in Brussels in 1947, Francis Ponge described his poetic practice as "writing in the desert." This paper examines Ponge's notion of "writing in the desert" as it pertains to his 1942 collection Le Parti pris des choses, focusing on the ecological critique embedded within a seemingly dry discussion of things, particularly his discussion of the pebble. In turning to the mundane and the quotidian, more specifically by writing about humble objects such as the pebble, Ponge challenges us to not only reconsider our relationship to the natural world, but to recognize the linguistic dimension which undergirds our conception of any such relationship. This analysis examines the challenge presented by Ponge's pebble in relation to a more famous literary pebble, that of Antoine Roquentin in Jean-Paul Sartre's novel La Nausée. While the pebble in Sartre provokes a metaphysical disturbance, this paper argues that the pebble in Ponge presents an urgent ecological critique, a critique concerned with poetic expression as such. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human flourishing is often defined in terms of a collection of positive human factors. However, many people around the world are living in conditions that block human flourishing and find themselves powerless tochange those circumstances. I argue that it is more useful to examine instead the idea of living well. Drawing upon Yu Hua's novel To Live and Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist thought, I sketch an account of how we can live well, even in adversity. This notion emphasizes authentic living, being fully present in the moment, and being open, compassionate, and optimistic to anything life may have in store for us. This notion of living well is then applied to the matter of learning in the classroom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A theoretical model for managers responding to a morally challenging situation is developed in the article. This model explores and examines how managers deal with paradoxes created by ethical dilemmas. To explain their strategy, the authors’ model combines a moral philosophy approach – existentialism ‒ with paradox theories. Starting with an emblematic situation such as a dilemma, the lens of Smith and Tushman’s Paradoxical Cognition is used to develop the theoretical construct. Then, with the help of Sartre’s ethics of freedom, two stages that managers pass through to find a solution are explained. Drawing on those theories, a model of ethical cognition to solve the paradoxical tension issues from ethical dilemmas is submitted. A reflexive process that includes awareness, freedom, and personal projects is combined and described. Every stage with examples of issues from the previous research of human resource managers is illustrated. This model allows people to escape those paradoxical tensions and suggests how a person articulates and creates ethical principles to handle a paradoxical conflict. Based on the in-depth interviews reanalyzed, concrete illustrations about paradoxical cognition are shown. These semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted to determine how French-Canadian HR managers make ethical decisions (respondents: 37 HR managers working in Montreal and its suburbs (Quebec, Canada); period: 2013‒2017; number of questions: 16, divided into 4 sections; discourse analysis of data: using AtlasTi software). In doing so, the gap between theory and empirical with Sartre’s concepts such as Awareness, Freedom, and Project is overcome. This conceptual model can be used in the individual to solve of a moral dilemma and can be most valuable for manager when they are facing some moral paradoxical situations.

The relevance of the proposed research is determined by the reviving the interest of modern literary studies of the figure of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, determining the place of his creativity in the context of European modernism, the ambiguity of assessments of this phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian fine literature. The article examines Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s novels in the discourse of French Existentialism. Attention is focused on outlining the similarities and differences between J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus and V. Vynnychenko’s worldviews and aesthetic views. The origins of the existentialist method in the work of the Ukrainian émigré writer and its inclusion in the discourse of French atheistic of Existentialism are also analysed, and some conclusions of the “Mougins” cycle of Vynnychenko’s works are investigated using summarized prospects for its study in a broad and its European context is also outlined. The authors examine the forms and methods of aesthetic refraction of the basic concepts of existentialism (absurdity, rebellion, freedom, choice, and relationships at the level “I – the Other”). The purpose of the work and the tasks involve analyzing the philosophical and artistic texts of Vynychenko in the discourse of French existentialism, as well as revealing the main philosophical ideas and functions of the novels of the Ukrainian writer, consistent with the creative guidelines of J.-P. Sartre and A. Camus. The set of goals determines the need for the use of hermeneutic (analysis of artistic texts), historical-literary, comparative-typological (posing and solving a number of literary problems in the context of equal national literature, and biographical (using diary entries) research methods. The problem is determining the place of ideology in the context of French existentialism and the “Mougins’” cycle of Vynnychenko’s works, was raised in literary studies as early as the 70s of the last century, in particular by diaspora researchers S. Naumovych and L. Zaleska-Onyshkevych, who tried to show the priority of Vynnychenko’s writing compared to Sartre and Camus. The problem of existentialism as a philosophical direction was considered in the late 1940s among the members of the Artistic Ukrainian Movement, attempting to formulate the concept of “Ukrainian existentialism”. The Ukrainian researcher Ya. Kotets includes diaspora representatives 70 years later in the article “The Formula of Ukrainian Existentialism” (2021). There are several Ukrainian and Soviet writers who produce some existential ideas and elements of existential interpretation of human life, but they should not be called conscious writers-existentialists. Among modern Ukrainian works need to name “Existentialist philosophy. Traditions and perspectives” by S. Raida (2009), as well as the comparative study “Ukrainian version of artistic existentialism: B.I. Antonych, V. Svidzinsky, T. Osmachka in the European context” (2020) by H. Tokman, where is introduced the concept of “artistic existentialism”. The critical optics of the research make it possible to combine the historical and philosophical specificity of the interwar twenty years and the post-war period, on which are built the works of Vynnychenko, Sartre and Camus. It is an attempt to show the originality of the philosophical and aesthetic views of the emigrant Vynnychenko in the paradigm of French existentialism, to demonstrate the similarity of the Ukrainian type of philosophizing (from Skovoroda, Franko, Lesya Ukrainka to Vynnychenko), to analyze his characteristic orientation towards a person who faces the eternal problems of life, death, and evil. Such non-scientific philosophizing gave birth to special genre forms: essay, aphorism, portrait, dialogue, drama, and novel, which can be found in V.Vynnychenko’s literary work. Vynnychenko belongs to those thinkers who went beyond the boundaries of traditional philosophy in order to comprehend the broader meaning of the entire spiritual culture, developing the ideas of A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, A. Bergson, the theosophical theory of R. Steiner, in their writings. Vynnychenko set himself the goal of revealing prospects for further development to man, to give meaning to its existence, to point it to certain positive values, that is, to overcome the extremes of German and French existentialism and develop a positive philosophical platform.

In this paper, I elucidate how lived space is transformed in social anxiety disorder. The cognitive–behavioral framework that dominates the field conceptualizes the disorder as an intrapsychic dysfunction and sidelines concrete experience. The omnipresent sense of threat as it expresses itself "out there" in the patient's experiential world thus remains unexplored. Looking to first-person descriptions of social anxiety, I argue that the felt presence of the Other constantly threatens the patient's sense of autonomy and ownership of the places they inhabit. They experience others violating the boundaries of their intimate spaces and banishing them from public spaces. These experiences point to an altered mode of inhabiting space I term intersubjective overdetermination. The patient is condemned to live in the space of the Other. I compare this conceptualization to the commonplace cognitive–behavioral account. I end by discussing the treatment implications of this account of socially anxious lived space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore sex and fear in the therapy room through a Sartrean lens. It aims to engage with his ideas on love, desire and sexuality as a response to Heidegger's ontology, and to ask whether we can find a link between fear and our relationship to freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article engages with the readings of Flaubert's two versions of L'Éducation sentimentale (1845 and 1869) given respectively by Jean-Paul Sartre and Pierre Bourdieu in L'Idiot de la famille and Les Règles de l'art. In the first instance, Sartre's reading of the first L'Éducation sentimentale will be considered, in which Sartre argues that Flaubert rationalises and incorporates his 1844 illness into his protagonist Jules' moment of artistic revelation. The article will then examine Bourdieu's response to Sartre in Les Règles de l'art wherein he rejects the existential psychoanalysis of Sartre's biography by highlighting the need for an understanding of the author in his socio-literary context which he sees as objectified in the structure of the 1869 version of the novel. Ultimately, this article will seek to evaluate the distinct readings given of the two versions of Flaubert's novel by highlighting them as the clearest elucidations of Sartre and Bourdieu's differing approaches to Flaubert's authorship and the contexts in which his novels were produced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En 2002, el filósofo Eduard Punset entrevistó a David Cronenberg en el programa de televisión Redes. En dicha entrevista, el cineasta canadiense afirmó haber sido influenciado por una amalgama de escritores y pensadores, entre los cuales se encuentran Jean-Paul Sartre y H.P. Lovecraft. En este artículo analizamos las interferencias intertextuales así como las diferencias y similitudes entre la obra sartriana y los principios del horror cósmico lovecraftiano en el cine de Cronenberg. Del mismo modo, se trazan los preceptos ideológicos sobre los que esta intertextualidad ha podido influir en el body horror, el subgénero de horror del que el propio Cronenberg reniega, aunque sea considerado el pionero y principal exponente.

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present study aims to find out the existential elements in the Selected Characters of The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales by Chaucer. Further, the study analyzes the existential themes of freedom, choices, and bad faith as presented by the existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. The Selected characters are Friar, The Summoner, The Wife of Bath, and The Knight. Chaucer's The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales though written in the fourteenth century, has universal appeal. The themes, dilemmas, and conflicts presented through the fourteenth-century characters are for all ages. These characters have traces of being existential characters. Existentialism as a theory or philosophy emphasizes the importance of freedom and choices made by man. Chaucer's character which comprises of different classes, professions, and gender assert their sense of freedom in many ways and hence falls either into the category of being-in-itself or being-for-itself. Existentialism is used as a methodological framework for the textual analysis of the Prologue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article investigates the nature of Sartre's bad faith by analyzing the concept's modal dimensions. It focuses, in particular, on the discussion of how frequent bad faith is in our everyday lives. On one side of the debate is the reading that bad faith is temporary, avoidable, and contingent. Sartre's wellknown examples of the woman and the waiter in the chapter "Bad Faith" in Being and Nothingness support this reading of bad faith as a state that we come in and out of, as something we can refrain from doing or succumb to and fall into. Bad faith is in this way interpreted to be a normative, ethical concept. However, on the other side of the contingency debate is the reading that bad faith is a constant in our lives. I borrow an argument from Schopenhauer to investigate how having bad faith about the ultimate goals of life presents us with the most prevalent variation of bad faith. This article offers a topography of this debate, thereby underscoring one of the main topics about the modality of bad faith, which has not yet been fully articulated in the literature on Sartre, but which is vital to understanding the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este ensaio aborda os artigos anônimos publicados por Sartre em Les Lettres Françaises, jornal clandestino editado pelo Comitê Nacional dos Escritores na França ocupada. Depois de reconstruir a circunstância histórica dessa intervenção, investiga seus fundamentos conceituais e suas matrizes literárias. No centro está uma leitura de “A Literatura, essa Liberdade!”, onde a afirmação do sentido político do ato de escrever vem circunscrita pela experiência da resistência ao nazifascismo. O percurso conduz a um balanço dos primeiros combates do engajamento.

After tracing the way in which Honneth interprets Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity and seeing how it is essentially based on the consideration of Being and Nothingness, this article aims to discuss some of the theses of the Sartrian paradigm of recognition that emerge in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, in particular those relating to the “groupe en fusion”, that elude the Honnethian interpretation. It can be concluded that Sartre’s last philosophical work is decisive in the effort to conceptualise recognition, because it offers a more articulate and complex understanding of the social world.

O corpo, na filosofia sartriana, é elemento central de explicação sobre a natureza da intencionalidade, isto é, a natureza sobre como a consciência apreende a realidade. Sua fenomenologia corpórea visa refutar os seguidores da tradição cartesiana da mente. Paralelamente, na filosofia contemporânea da mente e da cognição, adeptos da tradição enativista buscam elucidar a centralidade do corpo na constituição da cognição. Da mesma forma, seus oponentes são os adeptos do cognitivismo representacionista, que enxergam o locus da cognição no cérebro como um dispositivo de processamento informacional de conteúdos simbólicos (representacionais). Nesse artigo, pretendemos desenvolver uma relação de proximidade entre a concepção de intencionalidade sartriana e aquela defendida pelo enativismo sensório-motor. Ambas defendem a centralidade do corpo nos processos ditos “cognitivos” ou “mentais”; ambas defendem uma espécie de externismo do conteúdo mental; e ambas criticam o paradigma internista e representacionista focado em processos internos, ou apenas localizada no cérebro. Tais semelhanças nos permite traçar uma relação de continuidade entre a fenomenologia sartriana e as tradições corporificada da mente.

Este artículo rescata la original teoría de la violencia que Jean-Paul Sartre elabora a finales de los años cuarenta y deja plasmada en Cahiers pour une morale (1983). Los Cahiers son una obra póstuma e inconclusa en la cual el filósofo esbozó la ética prometida en las últimas páginas de El ser y la nada. En esta moral inacabada, la violencia es descripta fenomenológicamente como una empresa humana, libremente escogida en una situación existencial, que posee las siguientes características esenciales: la actitud intransigente, la función destructiva, la disociación de fines y medios, la ruptura de los lazos de solidaridad, la creencia mágica, la autojustificación, la exigencia y la desvalorización de la libertad ajena. El objetivo principal de este artículo es reconstruir esta teoría de modo tal que sea posible juzgar su valor en la actualidad ante el problema filosófico de definir qué es la violencia.

Annie Ernaux's desire to create literature that is in some way 'political' has constantly been reaffirmed throughout her career as a writer. Drawing primarily on her reflexive writings and statements in interviews, this article constitutes an essay on the 'theoretical positioning' of the author's meta-poetic discourses that deal with this question of the political in order to assess which theorizations of 'engagement' they underpin, or from which they draw, and to identify any possible ambivalences or aporias. Like academic critics, Ernaux has, herself, emphasized the influence on her work of her readings in sociology, and particularly of Bourdieu. This contribution aims to show what Ernaux's conception of literary 'engagement' may also owe to Sartre's theorizations, to which Ernaux does not lay claim, but from which she nonetheless seems to borrow some conceptions and ways of operating. The analysis proposed here thus questions some of the foundations and blind spots of Ernaux's approach to the political. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perception is the way we interact with the external world. It is our ability to receive sensory information from the environment, such as seeing, hearing, touching, and smelling. Through perception, we experience the world and its objects as they are in their materiality. Imagination, on the other hand, is the ability to create mental representations and go beyond direct sensory information, allowing us to conceive what is not present, recreate the past, or even anticipate the future. Based on the Sartrean interpretation that there is a dynamic tension between perception and imagination, our goal is to problematize the rigid distinction between these two concepts, recognizing that this dynamic plays a central role in our existential experience, and that the relationship between these two elements is not dichotomous but a constant interaction that enriches our understanding of the world and our own existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes the movement of transcendence in Sartre and examines it in relation to another understanding of transcendence in relation to God circulating in Paris in Sartre's formative years: that of Karl Jaspers. Through exploring the transmission and reception of Jaspers' thought in French philosophy, different understandings can be advanced as to why he engages with the figure of God as that which we transcend towards, however impossibly, and why he counts Jaspers as a Catholic existentialist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this work, it is proposed to highlight the significance of religious experience in Jean-Paul Sartre, who is notably recognized as the proponent of atheistic existentialism. The objective is to examine how religion and theological themes emerge in his thought through a critical reading of his works, with particular attention to "Bariona, ou le fils du tonnerre." Specifically, the reading of "Bariona" offers the opportunity to rethink Sartre's atheism and his philosophy of existence, following the fundamental stages of his philosophical thought. Although Sartre is known for his rejection of traditional religion, this play presents a complex and nuanced view of the religious theme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of the proposed research is determined by the reviving the interest of modern literary studies of the figure of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, determining the place of his creativity in the context of European modernism, the ambiguity of assessments of this phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian fine literature. The article examines Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s novels in the discourse of French Existentialism. Attention is focused on outlining the similarities and differences between J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus and V. Vynnychenko’s worldviews and aesthetic views. The origins of the existentialist method in the work of the Ukrainian émigré writer and its inclusion in the discourse of French atheistic of Existentialism are also analysed, and some conclusions of the “Mougins” cycle of Vynnychenko’s works are investigated using summarized prospects for its study in a broad and its European context is also outlined. The authors examine the forms and methods of aesthetic refraction of the basic concepts of existentialism (absurdity, rebellion, freedom, choice, and relationships at the level “I – the Other”). The purpose of the work and the tasks involve analyzing the philosophical and artistic texts of Vynychenko in the discourse of French existentialism, as well as revealing the main philosophical ideas and functions of the novels of the Ukrainian writer, consistent with the creative guidelines of J.-P. Sartre and A. Camus. The set of goals determines the need for the use of hermeneutic (analysis of artistic texts), historical-literary, comparative-typological (posing and solving a number of literary problems in the context of equal national literature, and biographical (using diary entries) research methods. The problem is determining the place of ideology in the context of French existentialism and the “Mougins’” cycle of Vynnychenko’s works, was raised in literary studies as early as the 70s of the last century, in particular by diaspora researchers S. Naumovych and L. Zaleska-Onyshkevych, who tried to show the priority of Vynnychenko’s writing compared to Sartre and Camus. The problem of existentialism as a philosophical direction was considered in the late 1940s among the members of the Artistic Ukrainian Movement, attempting to formulate the concept of “Ukrainian existentialism”. The Ukrainian researcher Ya. Kotets includes diaspora representatives 70 years later in the article “The Formula of Ukrainian Existentialism” (2021). There are several Ukrainian and Soviet writers who produce some existential ideas and elements of existential interpretation of human life, but they should not be called conscious writers-existentialists. Among modern Ukrainian works need to name “Existentialist philosophy. Traditions and perspectives” by S. Raida (2009), as well as the comparative study “Ukrainian version of artistic existentialism: B.I. Antonych, V. Svidzinsky, T. Osmachka in the European context” (2020) by H. Tokman, where is introduced the concept of “artistic existentialism”. The critical optics of the research make it possible to combine the historical and philosophical specificity of the interwar twenty years and the post-war period, on which are built the works of Vynnychenko, Sartre and Camus. It is an attempt to show the originality of the philosophical and aesthetic views of the emigrant Vynnychenko in the paradigm of French existentialism, to demonstrate the similarity of the Ukrainian type of philosophizing (from Skovoroda, Franko, Lesya Ukrainka to Vynnychenko), to analyze his characteristic orientation towards a person who faces the eternal problems of life, death, and evil. Such non-scientific philosophizing gave birth to special genre forms: essay, aphorism, portrait, dialogue, drama, and novel, which can be found in V.Vynnychenko’s literary work. Vynnychenko belongs to those thinkers who went beyond the boundaries of traditional philosophy in order to comprehend the broader meaning of the entire spiritual culture, developing the ideas of A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, A. Bergson, the theosophical theory of R. Steiner, in their writings. Vynnychenko set himself the goal of revealing prospects for further development to man, to give meaning to its existence, to point it to certain positive values, that is, to overcome the extremes of German and French existentialism and develop a positive philosophical platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aurora: Papeles del Seminario María Zambrano is the property of Seminario Maria Zambrano and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The name of Raymond Aron is often strangely missing from the canon of the twentieth-century's great philosophers. He is sometimes thought of as a "Cold War intellectual," but not as a philosopher of the first rank. This would be a mistake. Aron helped to articulate a distinctively French style of liberal political theory. Unlike Anglophone liberalism that has been a doctrine of rights, Aron's exemplified a certain ideal of human character—rational, skeptical, open-minded—that defines liberalism at its best. His heroes were Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Weber. Aron articulated these views when liberalism was under attack from the combination of Marxism and Existentialism that dominated the post-World War II period in France. His example will be useful today when liberalism is once more under attack from both the extreme Right and the extreme Left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to seek refuge of faith in the era of religious secularization? Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Abraham’s son-killing sacrifice offers us a way out of thought. This story intrigues us in how individuals can reach incommensurable sacred beliefs beyond the level of public ethics and rituals. This way of believing fits with Freud’s conception of unconsciousness, that salvation as a miracle of spiritual healing of life must go beyond group conventions and culture to the individual unconsciousness in lasting private struggle. Moreover, this salvation manifests the existence of the unconscious dynamic of the Way of Life and the spirit of the universe, which will surely dissolve the worldly Other and be present in the absence of consciousness, reason, libido, signifier. At the same time, we will refute the three misunderstandings in turn from the opposition between the unique and the universal, self-sacrifice and scapegoat-sacrifice, silence and speech through dissecting Sartre, Derrida, and Žižek’s biased reading of the story: faith is neither subordinate to universal legislation acting by free choice, nor does it point to ethical relativism guided by individual preference or to political terror movements obeying the Other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Age is said to be defined by the notion of existential threat. The ability to destroy human societies in their entirety with a single class of weaponry raises profound questions about human existence. It even gives us a new form of species extinction – 'thermonuclear omnicide'. Unsurprisingly, existentialism was a philosophy that found its feet in the shadow of the bomb. This article explores the possibilities and limits of an existentialist approach to nuclear dangers. It contrasts the views of two figures central to early existentialism: Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron. Sartre responded to the existential threat of nuclear war with moral outrage about the 'unreality' of the Cold War politics driving the arms race and an existentialist call to reject militaristic social norms. Aron, a key figure in early IR realism, famously rejected existentialism and turned instead to outlining norms for an international society that might better restrain nuclear-armed decision-makers. Bringing Sartre's and Aron's post-Second World War discussions into the new century, this article argues that the ongoing, and even growing, threats posed by nuclear weapons highlight the limits of Sartre's approach as a guide to authentic existence in modern life. Instead, it supports Aron's more conservative approach but also draws on Existentialism to extend it, strengthening the nuclear taboo for the sake of human survival as a persistent but urgent political project. At a moment in IR when scholars and other analysts are once again critiquing the fragile norms of global order and speculating about the dawn of a 'Third Nuclear Age', theoretical reflection on the politics of existential threats and the hard choices they entail remain indispensable aspects of IR's theoretical toolkit. While Sartre and other existentialists argued convincingly that existence precedes essence, Aron reminds us that survival remains a precondition for both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation for Sartre's account of the unity of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego. I will argue that it is only once The Transcendence of the Ego is read alongside other texts written around the same time, such as The Imaginary, that we can understand how Sartre believes it is possible for consciousness to be unified without an I. I begin by setting out the Kantian context that Sartre develops for his views, before looking at Sartre's arguments themselves. I then turn to some of the difficulties other readers have encountered with making sense of the arguments of the Transcendence of the Ego. I argue that it is only in relation to Sartre's account of what he calls the illusion of immanence in The Imaginary, that we can make sense of Sartre's account of consciousness, before reconstructing what I take to be Sartre's position drawing on Sartre's references to Bergson and Spinoza. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O presente artigo apresenta-se como um guia de leitura do capítulo "A Temporalidade", de O ser e o nada, de Jean-Paul Sartre. Para levar a cabo a tarefa, porém, ele articula dois momentos complementares. O primeiro momento funciona como construção de um ângulo de ataque e de um modo de aproximação do texto sartriano em questão. Nele são dadas as condições preliminares de leitura e os elementos de legibilidade do problema, tornando possível que o leitor se instale, por assim dizer, no contexto propriamente sartriano da questão, oferecendo, assim, as condições para sua leitura, o que também passa pela maneira pela qual se desenvolve o tema, nas investigações prévias. A nosso juízo, são esses elementos que, ao dar eficiência analítica para a leitura do problema e para esclarecimento do tema, tornam o texto legível, prova que se faz no segundo momento do artigo.

أكد "سارتر" في كتابه " الوجودية نزعة إنسانية" على أن المبدأ الرئيس للفكر الوجودي هو "الوجود يسبق الماهية"، قاصداً أن الإنسان ليست له "ماهية" سابقة محددة سلفاً، إنما هناك أفراد يأتون إلى العالم، وهم يشكلون ماهيتهم بأنفسهم من خلال أفعالهم واختياراتهم، ولكن هذا المبدأ لم يكن ينطبق على أصحاب البشرة السوداء، فكان لون بشرتهم يحدد ماهيتهم، و ساهم التراث الإنساني سواء الديني والفلسفي والاجتماعي والأدبي في رسم تلك الماهية المسبقة، وظهر الاقتران بين اللون الأسود والكثير من الصفات السلبية كالشر والعبودية، والانحراف الجنسي، والهمجية، مما نتج عنه حالة من الازدراء والدونية لأصحاب البشرة السوداء، وكرد فعل لهذه الحالة ظهر مصطلح "الوجودية السوداءBlack Existentialism "، كصورة جديدة للفكر الوجودي تتناول الأسئلة الفلسفية الخاصة بالوجود الإنساني ومشكلاته كالاغتراب والقلق والحرية والمعاناة والمسؤولية والتحرر في ضوء التجربة المعاشة للسود وسط المجتمع الأبيض. ومن خلال هذا البحث سنحاول التعرف على سمات هذا الاتجاه كما ظهر عند الفيلسوف الفرنسي صاحب البشرة السوداء "فرانز فانون"(1925-1961). In his book, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” Sartre emphasizes that the main principle of existential thought is “Existence Precedes Essence,” meaning that man does not have a predetermined prior “essence.” Rather, there are individuals who come into the world, and they form their essence themselves through their actions and choices. However, this principle dose not apply to people with black skin, as the color of their skin determines their essence. The human heritage in all its forms contributed to drawing that prior essence and many negative characteristics for black people such as evil, slavery, sexual deviance, and barbarism. As a response to this situation, the term “Black Existentialism” appeared, as a new form to existential thought that addressed philosophical questions related to human existence and its problems such as alienation, anxiety, freedom, suffering, responsibility. This is in the light of the experience of the black among white society. In this paper, we will try to identify the characteristics of this trend as it appeared among the black-skinned French philosopher Frantz Fanon (1925-1961).

In this article, I examine Peter Morgan's TV series The Crown (2016–present) through the lens of Sartrean and Beauvoirian existentialism. I argue that the character of Queen Elizabeth II holds a special place in the royal family, as the monarch who demonstrates the compatibility of duty and tradition with existential freedom and authenticity. I also demonstrate the series’ commitment to breaking the illusion of inhumanity that the royal family tries to maintain, by showing that the royals are not out-of-reach ideals, but humans who struggle to transcend their exceptionally binding facticity. As portrayed in The Crown, Queen Elizabeth's lucidity on her situation leads to honest introspection, which dispels any attempt at self-deception, and therefore prevents her from slipping into bad faith.

O presente trabalho procura analisar os conceitos de “liberdade” e “consciência”, tal como aparecem definidos na obra de Jean-Paul Sartre, O Ser e o Nada, com o objetivo de destacar as linhas fundamentais do existencialismo sartriano. Analisa-se a articulação de diversos conceitos entre si, e seu encadeamento no sistema de pensamento sartriano, mostrando-se qual é a relação entre liberdade e consciência que dá coerência a todo o sistema. A liberdade não é uma propriedade do homem, é o ser mesmo do homem, engajado em uma situação. Para a consciência, também para a liberdade: esta é , não uma coisa, mas um ato, o modo mesmo da ação humana no mundo, do desvelamento, da significação, da humanização do mundo.

Dans cet article, nous montrerons comment la philosophie de Sartre propose une déconstruction du lien causal entre l’agent et ses actions dites méchantes selon une démonstration qui s’articule en trois temps. D’abord, nous interrogerons la liberté humaine pour comprendre comment elle peut exister pour faire le Mal. Ensuite, à partir du cas concret de Jean Genet, nous comprendrons le rôle des autres dans l’existence du méchant. Enfin, nous dégagerons des perspectives morales et politiques pour soutenir que la libération des méchants constitue une morale révolutionnaire.

Introduction: The fear of scrutiny central in social anxiety disorder (SAD) points to a problem of the interpersonally perceivable body. Whereas the predominant cognitive-behavioral (CBT) account of the disorder understands this as a problem of excessive self-focused attention, the phenomenological literature reveals it as a sign of a fundamental transformation of body experience. The lived body absent from experience becomes the object body at the forefront of it. The present paper contributes to this literature by refining and grounding these notions in first-person descriptions of concrete experiences of social anxiety. Method: Repeated interviews were conducted with eight informants struggling with social anxiety and collected personal diaries. The interviews were informed by phenomenological concepts and a specific line of inquiry on body experiences. The analysis tested iteratively a set of phenomenologically grounded hypotheses of altered body experience against the first-person descriptions. Results: A concept of bodily instrumentalization is developed which accounts for the tendency of self-directed attention and behavior central to the disorder. That is, the socially anxious patient experiences their body as entrapped by the Other and thus unable to act freely among them. This felt bodily self-enslavement for the Other shows itself in efforts to conceal the body from the others and to puppeteer it for them. Discussion: The notion of bodily enslavement captures a central aspect of the suffering experienced by patients with SAD that exceeds the capability of the CBT language. Additionally, the social nature of the bodily instrumentalization that is constitutive of this suffering means that psychotherapy should not treat SAD as a cognitive disorder, but rather as an interpersonal disorder. Specifically, psychotherapy should offer patients shared interpersonal experiences in which they forget their bodily presence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a brief review of different definitions and types of loneliness I offer an analysis of the concept of existential loneliness and its philosophical background. In contrast to the interpersonal aspects of other types of loneliness, existential loneliness has been characterized as an intrapersonal default state of incommunicability or profound aloneness, part of or based on a fundamental ontological or transcendental structure in human existence. There are both conceptual and practical issues with the notion of existential loneliness, with implications for psychotherapy. I offer a critical approach, and argue that there is no good philosophical basis for this conception of existential loneliness, and that although loneliness can be existential in some respect, it typically manifests itself in interpersonal contexts, and should not be considered a fundamental ontological structure of human existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss how existentialism was criticized, disseminated, and gradually autochthonized in the main philosophical journals of Socialist Romania. We show that the early critique of existentialism was both a statement against contemporary bourgeois philosophy in general and a condemnation of the local philosophical production of the interwar period. In the 1950s, this kind of critique was attuned to the growing fame of several Romanian authors who had emigrated to the West (e.g., Emil Cioran, Mircea Eliade) and targeted both past and contemporary irrationalism. Following a period of critique of existentialism without existentialists (i.e., without reference to individual authors), the 1960s discussions of existentialism were mainly driven by interest in a small number of existentialist authors. In particular, the evolution of Jean-Paul Sartre's work and politics was analyzed as it straddled existentialism and Marxism. The 1970s saw the integration of selected existentialist concepts and themes, in an attempt to offer a Marxist alternative to existentialism in the form of philosophical anthropology. This led to a period of engagement with existentialists without existentialism across an increasing number of separate disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. In the 1980s, following the failure of Marxist philosophical anthropology and at the height of national communism, existentialism could also be autochthonized through the recovery of selected philosophers from the interwar period whose work had been previously criticized as irrationalist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the historical background and transnational context of the dialogue between East-European communist philosophy and Western existentialism. It does so by first outlining the exchanges between Lukács, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty between the late 1940s and the early 1960s. Subsequently three major forums of East–West philosophical dialogue are surveyed, that took place during the 1960s: the 'Morals and Society' colloquium, organized by Instituto Gramsci in Rome in May 1964; the Korčula summer school, organized by the Praxis group between 1964 and 1975; and the International Congress for Philosophy organized in Vienna in September 1968. This series of events and the dialogue and confrontations that they engendered prove that, contrary to the exclusively negative reception of existentialism in the socialist camp in the 1950s, but also contrary to the distorted representation, which can be found in dissidents' recollections and which became dominant after the fall of communism, which excluded any possibility of dialogue between the two sides during socialism, such a dialogue has taken place, and led to mutual appropriations on both sides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the relevance and the conceptual role, within Sartre's Being and Nothingness , of a fleeting impression of shame that reverts the threat of solipsism looming over any project of transcendental philosophy. In reading Sartre's masterpiece, I underscore two methodological points that tend to be bypassed in standard interpretations and lengthy discussions of the book. On the one hand, I safeguard the strictly descriptive core of Sartre's presentation of the impression of shame and what it reveals about the formal structures of the (pre-reflective) cogito , as Sartre understands it. On the other hand, my analysis explores the different phases of the (conceptual) narrative of the For-Itself, which Sartre inherits from the Idealist tradition in modern philosophy and applies to the concreteness of a phenomenological description of the main stages of one's experience of the outside world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out to reinterpret Sartre’s famous analysis of the look in Being and Nothingness from the cultural-anthropological perspective developed in the posthumous Notebooks for an Ethics. In the latter, he comments on some passages by Michel Leiris on the cult of the zar, a North-African belief and practice involving spirit possession. The article also seeks to show the influence of cul‑ tural-anthropological thought on Sartre, asking about what new light these rather unexpected analyses may shed on his thinking about the relationship to the Other. I start with the doctrine of the look as we know it from Being and Nothingness. Then I examine how, in Sartre’s Notebooks, his account takes some new directions. The link with possession, already present—though underdeveloped—in Being and Nothingness, becomes clear. I briefly introduce Michel Leiris in order to interpret Sartre’s comments on the zar cult as described by Leiris. This opens up a new per‑ spective on religion and the social. Finally, I offer some concluding considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The NICE guidelines (2017) for the psychological treatment of anorexia nervosa in young people recommend family-based therapy, cognitive behaviour therapy or psychodynamic therapy focused on the eating disorder, of all which externalisation is an integral technique. In contrast to this, we are challenging the premise of this method by using Sartre's phenomenological ontology that does not presuppose the separation of the person from the illness, which is the basic premise of the externalisation. We present the key-concepts of Sartre as described in 'Being and Nothingness'. We describe the ontological categories of the in itself and for itself, and their development into human reality in the form of facticity and transcendence. In addition, we explore the concept of the look, the psychic body and the notion of objectification through three clinical cases. We conclude by reflecting on the value of Sartre's existential ontology to the promotion of the importance of collaboration in co-constructing treatment with patients and their families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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La idea del cogito prerreflexivo se constituye en una de las ideas más importantes de la fenomenología ontológica sartreana. Por esta razón, el objetivo de este artículo es llevar a cabo una especie de estudio genético de la concepción de dicha idea a partir de la lectura que Sartre realiza de las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempo de Husserl, ya que, de dicha lectura, y esta es la tesis central de nuestro trabajo, Sartre llegará a proponer, frente a la concepción moderna de un cogito egológico y reflexivo, un nuevo cogito caracterizado, primordialmente, por ser no-egológico y consciente de sí mismo, pero no reflexivamente.

Freud occupe une place centrale dans l’œuvre de Sartre, non seulement parce que les textes sartriens sont parsemés de références à Freud depuis 1936 jusqu’aux textes les plus tardifs, mais en plus parce que Sartre théorisa et mis en pratique une psychanalyse existentielle. Toutefois, plus qu’un débat sur l’inconscient, la lecture sartrienne de Freud pose le problème de l’origine de la conscience. Là où Freud fait de la vie psychique l’accumulation de traces d’un passé qui ne passe pas et qui pèse constamment sur le présent, Sartre la pense au contraire comme une archive, c’est-à-dire, comme des traces qui ne prennent sens qu’à partir d’une intentionnalité future. Ainsi, la différence entre la psychanalyse freudienne et la psychanalyse existentielle repose pour l’essentiel sur l’opposition entre un surgissement pulsionnel de la conscience et un surgissement ontologique de celle-ci, ce qui impose deux ichnologies divergentes.

En una carta del 12 de septiembre de 1939, Sartre declara a Beauvoir: “Mi querido Castor... jamás sentí tan intensamente que usted es yo mismo… aquí hay más que amor”. ¿A qué se refería Sartre con eso de "más que amor"? Este artículo es un intento de responder a este interrogante por medio de la reconstrucción de las distintas formas del amor según el pensamiento de la pareja existencialista. Este objetivo se alcanza por medio del análisis de la crítica al amor romántico inauténtico en El ser y la nada y El segundo sexo, seguido por el examen del amor auténtico en Cahiers pour une morale.

Este artículo parte de una revisión de los conceptos de nada y libertad en Heidegger, para compararlos posteriormente con sus versiones sartreanas en El ser y la Nada. Haciendo esto, se defenderá que las discrepancias entre ambos autores se deben a que Sartre, al menos en su obra seminal, no se percata del giro lingüístico dado por Heidegger. Finalmente, se señala un problema central de la concepción sartreana de la libertad que se evidencia en su concepto de mala fe, y se sugiere cómo una consideración de las consecuencias del giro lingüístico puede ayudar a remediar dicho problema.

Esse artigo pretende explorar os temas do estatuto e da função do intelectual em dois autores significativos para a questão a partir do século XX: Julien Benda e Jean-Paul Sartre. Trata-se de revisitar as noções de autonomia e engajamento, fundamentais para uma compreensão comparativa entre os dois autores. O texto procura caracterizar de forma ampla o tipo de intelectual defendido por Benda no mesmo passo em que procura evidenciar a gênese e as condições de aparecimento do intelectual para Sartre. O Caso Dreyfus, momento histórico de surgimento do intelectual como o conhecemos, é revisitado a fim de estabelecermos um referencial concreto para as posições dos autores em discussão. A partir dos elementos levantados, procura-se argumentar no sentido das divergências entre Benda e Sartre sobre a natureza e o papel do intelectual, mas também propõe-se evidenciar o solo comum em que os dois autores parecem trafegar. O texto, ainda, aponta questões para se pensar o intelectual a partir das novas condições políticas e sociais na contemporaneidade.

Com este artigo queremos mostrar como a Literatura pode contribuir com a formação e consequente atuação do psicólogo clínico para que ele possa aprender a ver e ganhar paciência na lida com a experiência humana. E assim, pela descrição das experiências próprias aos contos e romances, esse profissional possa enriquecer o seu repertório de possibilidades no acompanhar das experiências singulares. Para tanto, o caminho que seguimos, na construção deste texto, consistiu em destacar, no conto O Muro de Sartre, suas considerações sobre a morte anunciada. Por um caminho fenomenológico-hermenêutico pudemos realizar um estudo reflexivo sobre o conto e a clínica psicológica. Assim, primeiramente, suspendemos fenomenologicamente os posicionamentos atuais sobre a morte, como algo que diz respeito ao impessoal e que pode ser adiado. Pra que assim possamos deixar aparecer outros modos singulares de lida com a finitude anunciada ao acompanhar as experiências singulares frente à própria morte de cada uma das personagens do conto. Em uma postura hermenêutica, mostramos o modo como cada um é afetado pela morte e é atravessado pela luta do homem moderno contra a finitude da existência, não se tratando, portanto, de uma experiência que nasce em uma subjetividade encapsulada. Por fim, com este estudo, tentamos trazer contribuições da prosa sartriana à formação e, consequente, atuação na clínica psicológica. Sartre ensina e exercita o clínico no exercício do ver, pacientemente, diferentes modos de apropriação do anúncio da finitude, experimentados singularmente pelo jovem Juan, pelo racionalista Tom, o médico Belga, e pelo revolucionário Pablo.

Se analizan los alcances de la noción de libertad desarrollada por Sartre en El ser y la nada. Se propone mostrar que la libertad sartreana no es absoluta, sino que tiene límites para su ejercicio. Con este fin nos preguntaremos, ¿cuál es el fin último de la libertad?, en otras palabras, ¿para qué la acción? Se examinará el problema en dos niveles: los proyectos y acciones concretas del para-sí y el proyecto fundamental de ser en-sí-para-sí. Se incorporan también breves referencias a la literatura sartreana, La náusea, y a ensayos de Simone de Beauvoir (1944) y Albert Camus (1942) del mismo período.

This article compares and contrasts Sartre's discussion of the look with Schutz's theory of intersubjectivity and applies their ideas to race relations. While both focus mostly on face-to-face interpersonal encounters, for Sartre these encounters are fraught with conflict, each partner endeavoring to make the other an object while regaining one's own subjectivity and thus one's ability to pursue one's own goals. Sartre's theory reveals what interracial relationships have been, especially since colonization: how the look objectifies the racial other and turns that person's "for-itself" into "for-others." Schutz, on the other hand, sees interpersonal encounters in ideal terms as harmonious and cooperative, implying shared culture. That assumption presents problems for cross-cultural and cross-racial relationships. Schutz, however, shows how mere simultaneity can include seeing the other as Thou, which would imply respect for a stranger. While Sartre and Schutz both deal with intersubjectivity, they see it differently. Sartre shows no outlet from conflict, whereas Schutz provides seeds for relationships that could be harmonious even without shared culture if the partners in interactions approach each other as Thou, respecting and appreciating their differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]